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BHontborn:s FETTER LANE, EF. 

Mripsia: F. A. ΠΗΓΉ KR IEA, 
β Boch: (6: 8 BET SN ASS StS, 
Bombay anh Caleta: MACMILLAN ANTI Cr, Jit. 

[til Migdds reserved} 




R. D. HICKS, M.A. 








Page 15, critical notes, line 2, a/fer ieliqui codd. add Bek. Trend. 



48, Critical notes, line 4, for appendicem vcad Fiagmenta t., Il. 1—3, p. 164 Z7277a. 

86, critical notes, line 12, after Bek. Trend. Torst. add Rodier. 

56, critical notes, line 13, afte Simpl. Soph. || add ζώντων Ῥ |. 

a7, translation, line 7, for body 7vad rest. 

64, critical notes, line 9, for append. για Fraymenta 01, 1. 61, p. 166 fufra. 

It4, critical notes, line 6, for rére...31. γίνεται read τότε... 31. καὶ ὁ, 

116, critical notes, last line, fur 162 read 160. 

145, Critical notes, line 12, for Hayduck read ITetnze. 

150, critical notes, line 7, for 540 read τ40. 

150, critical notes, line 13, after ap. crit. ad loc.) add” Bek. Trend. 

182, critical notes, last line, affer Bek. Trend. add Biehl. 

20... end of note on 403 b ὃ, edd A similar confusion of of Adyoe with of Adyorres 
τοὺς λόγους may he noticed yo7 b 13—17. 

ast, end of first note on 406 b 13, aad The meaning of ἔκστασις ἐκ τῆς οὐσίᾳ», 
so far as ἀλλοίωσις 1» concerned, is given less bluntly and paradoxically 
414 ULE SQ, 426 ἃ 4 5q-, Where ἡ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ κινητικοῦ ἐνέργεια is 
said to reside not ἐν τῷ ποιητικῷ, but ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι, 

251, line 2 of note on Ὁ 17. for Koch vvad Kock, 

386, end of note on 417 b 5, aad Ch 45ὺῸ 1 & Ὁ, 4300 14 ὁ τῷ πάντα yerdorda. 
The limitation, temporal or modal, which [ find in θεωροῦν, is often 
expressed by a dependent clause when the transition from ἔξες τὸ ἐνέργεια ts 
described, as here, in precise terms, e.g. ὅταν. φρονμῇ 41 tk, ἦταν νυῇ 
430 b 16, ὅταν θεωρῇ 432 ἃ 8, b ay, and generally ὅταν Cvepya gig Ὁ ay: 
cf. τὸ ἤδη ἐνεργοῦν 417 ἃ 12, ὁ ἤδη θεωρῶν 417 ἃ 25. 

377, line tt of note on yig b 24, for XI read No. XXX. (Vol. XEtL). 

385, line 4 of first note on σα 21, add Ch tap. τοῦ Ὁ 25 δὲ... 

goo, enc of first note on 4220 22 add’ Another Miltonie ceho contes from // 
Lenserosa (3-—~ 16 “ Whose saintly visage is too bright | To hit the sense 
of human sight, | And therefore to our weaker view | Overlaid with black.” 

449, end of note on 427 ἃ 4 add Perhaps a 3 ἔστε bi... ἡ ἀδιαίρετον shold rather 
be paraphrased thus: ‘There is, then, ἃ sense in which the percipient of 
two distinct objects is divisible; there is another sense in which it perceives 
them as being itself indivisible”? If so, with ἢ ἀδιαίρετον we should supply 
τὸ αἰσθανόμενον or τὸ αἰσθητικόν, and not τὸ διαιρετόν, as is dane on pe 11g. 

524, end of note on 430 1» 26, add’ In an instructive aete Torstrik (pp. τοῦ τα 19k) 
calls attention to the distinction between ὥσπερ and οἷον. The latter, he 
says, is used in citing examples or in passing from the genus ta its sub- 
ordinate species ; the former extends a predicate from one subject to another 
in sentences like the following: “The Greeks are sharp-wilted, as also 
(ὥσπερ καὶ) some of the barbarians.” Lf this be su, @omep fs quite in place 
in comparing the meaning of two terms. The termi φάσις denotes something 
predicated of something, as dues the term κατάφασις. But the writer passes 
from the term φάσις to the thing dented by the term when be adds in the 
next words that this predication is always true or false. 

§32, line 15, after better instance is zzsert ὁ δὲ νοῦς., οὐσία τις οὖσα sok b τῷ sq. CE. 


HE first English edition of this treatise appeared in 1882 
under the title of “Aristotle’s Psychology in Greek and 
English, with Introduction and Notes by Edwin Wallace.” It 
has been for some time out of print and, if Mr Wallace had 
survived to see his work through a second edition, he would 
probably have made considerable alterations, owing to the re- 
searches of the last quarter of a century. Of these I resolved 
to make full use, when, with their accustomed liberality, the 
Syndics of the Cambridge University Press accepted my offer 
to prepare an independent edition. Among the fresh materials 
which have accumulated, two are of special importance: I mean, 
the critical edition of De Anzma by the late Wilhelm Biehl and 
the series of Aristotelian commentaries re-edited under the 
auspices of the Berlin Academy. As regards the text, I have 
seldom had reason to deviate from Biehl’s conclusions, but in my 
critical notes, which are based on his judicious selection, I have 
gone further than he did in referring to, or occasionally citing 
from, authorities. The interval of time has enabled me to cite 
with greater uniformity than Biehl could do from the Berlin 
editions of the Greek commentators. I have followed the example 
of Wallace in printing an English version opposite the Greek text. 
A century ago, perhaps, the Latin of Argyropylus with the 
necessary alterations would have served the same purpose by 
indicating the construction of the sentences and the minimum 
of supplement needed to make sense and grammar of Aristotle’s 
shorthand style. But fashions have changed. The terse sim- 
plicity, not to say baldness, of literal Latin is now discarded for 
that rendering into a modern vernacular which, whatever its 
advantages, is always in danger of becoming, and too often is, 
a mere medley of specious paraphrase and allusive subterfuge. In 
compiling my notes I have drawn freely upon all my predecessors, 
not only on the Greeks themselves, who even in their decline were 
excellent paraphrasts, but also on modern editors and translators, 
from Pacius and Trendelenburg onward; while through Zabarella 
I have made some slight acquaintance with the views of the Latin 


schoolmen. Among modern critics few have the great gifts of 
Torstrik, who by his insight, candour and logic contributed beyond 
all others to improve Bekxker’s text of the treatise. Of this 
distinction nothing can rob him: haeret capiti cum multa laude 
corona. In matters of punctuation and orthography I have taken 
my own line, but, lest 1 should be accused of inconsistency, I must 
add that when citing from other editions J have been scrupulous 
in preserving their peculiarities. Thus, while for my own part 
I admit indifferently αἰεὶ and ἀεί, γίγνεσθαι and γίνεσθαι, when 
I cite the Metaphysics from Christ, [I follow him in always 
preferring αἰεὶ and ryiryveoGaz, to the exclusion of det and γίνεσθαι. 
Again, though I regard ζῷον and μέμεικται as alone correct, in 
citing from other editions where ζῶον and μέμικται are printed! 
I have been careful not to alter the spelling. In references to the 
Metaphysics, Ethics and Politics Ὁ have been content to give 
Bekker’s page, column and line without the addition of book 
and chapter, thus avoiding the confusion which arises from the 
double numbering of certain books and chapters. I have tried 
as far as possible to give in the notes the reasons for my 
conclusions, so that where I have erred it will be more easy for 
my critics to refute me. My own claims to originality are modest 
enough. In fact, in a subject like this, absolute novelty of view is 
almost unattainable, perhaps undesirable. 

I am indebted to Professor Henry Jackson, to whom the work 
is dedicated, for permission to publish sundry proposals, chiefly 
textual, taken from his public lectures delivered in the year 1903. 
Mr Τὸ, M. Cornford kindly placed at my disposal for this edition 
various notes on the third Book, which, after I had made use of 
them, were communicated to the Cambridge Philological Society. 
My book has profited by the vigilance and insight of several 
friends, to whom I desire to make fitting acknowledement. In 
particular, Miss Margaret Alford, Lecturer of Bedford College, 
revised for me the first draft of the notes and added to them much 
of value. Nor must I pass over the good offices of Dr T. L. ILeath, 
who assisted in correcting the proof-shects, or those of the Rev. 
J. M. Schulhof, who aided me five years ago at the commencement 
of my task. Lastly, I must express very great obligations to the 
staff of the University Press, including their accomplished readers, 
for their able and zealous co-operation. 

R. D. EL. 

CAMBRIDGE, Vovember, 1907. 


List OF AUTHORITIES CITED. . . . . . ΧΊ----ΧΥ 
.» II.: Text . . . . . . ixxtti—Ixxxili 
NOTES. . . . . . . . . Ιχχχῖν 
NoTES . . . . . . . . . . 173—588 
INDEX OF GREEK WORDS . . . . . . 599—626 



Aristotelis De Anima, ed. Trendelenburg (Ienae, 1833); ed. Belger-Tren- 
delenburg (Derolini, 1877). 

Aristotelis De Anima, ed. Torstrik (Berolini, 1862). 

Aristotle’s Psychology, ed. E. Wallace (Cambridge, 1882). 

Aristotelis De Anima, ed. Guil. Biehl (Lipsiae, 1884); nova impressio (Lipsiae, 

Aristotelis De Anima liber B secundum recensionem Vaticanam, ed. H. Rabe 
(Gratulationsschrift der Bonner philol. Gesellsch. an Usener, Berolini, 

Aristote, Traité de Ame, ed. G. Rodier (Paris, 1900). 

Translations of De Anima (other than those of Argyropylus, Barco, Wallace, 
Hammond and Rodier): 

Ides Aristoteles Schrift iiber die Seele, H. Bender (Stuttgart, 1872). 
Des Aristoteles Schrift tiber die Seele, E. Rolfes (Bonn, 1901). 

For ancient conimentaries on De Anima see Philoponus, Simplicius, Sophonias, 


Editions of Aristotle before Bekker: 
Aldina (Vencetiis, 1495—1498) [collated by Trendelenburg]- 
Basileensis (Basileae, 15313; 1530; 1550). 
Sylburgiana (Francofurti, 15793; 1584; 1587). 

Aristoteles graece ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri edidit Academia regia 
Beorussica (Berolini, 1831—1870): 
Vols. I, ΠῚ, Graece ex rec. 1. Bekkeri. 1831. 
Vol. III. Latine interpretibus variis. 1831 [De Anima I[oanne Argyropylo 
Byzantio interprete, pp. 209—226]. 
Vol. IV. Scholia, coll. C. A. Brandis. 1836. 
Vol. ΚΝ. Fragmenta. Scholiorum supplementum. Index Aristotelicus. 1870. 
Aristotelis opera omnia. Graece et latine ediderunt Bussemaler, Dubner, 
Heitz (Paristis, 1848—1874). 

Editions of separate treatises of Aristotle: 
Organon, ed. Th. Waitz! (Lipsiae, 1844—1846). 
Physica, rec. Car. Prantl? (Lipsiae, 1879). 
De Caclo, De Generatione et Corruptione}, rec. Car. Prantl (Lipsiae, 1881). 
Meteoroloyica, rec. J. L. Ideler (Lipsiae, 1834—1836). 
Parva Naturalia, recogn. Guil. Biehl! (Lipsiae, 1898). 
De Sensu and De Memoria, ed. G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge, 1906). 
ἱστορίαι περὶ ζώων, Thierkunde, von H. Aubert and Fr. Wimmer (Leipzig, 

1 My citations are usually made from this edition. 


Editions of separate treatises of Aristotle (comdzzved) : 
De Partibus Animalium, ex recogn. B. Langkavel! (Lipsiae, 1868). 
(De Coloribus.) Ueber die Farben, von Carl Prantl (Munchen, 1849). 
Metaphysica, recogn. H. Bonitz (Bonnae, 1848—1849). 
Metaphysica, rec. W. Christ! (Lipsiae, 1886); nova impressio (Lipsiae, 1895). 
Ethica Nicomachea, rec. I. Bywater! (Oxonii, 1890). 
The Ethics, by Sir A. Grant (3rd edition, London, 1874). 
The Politics, by W. L. Newman! (Oxford, 1887—1902). 
Ars Rhetorica cum adnotat. L. Spengel (Lipsiac, 1867). 
Rhetoric with E. M. Cope’s Commentary, ed. J. E. Sandys (Cambridge, 
Ars Rhetorica, ed. A. Roemer? (Lipsiae, 1885). 
De Arte Poetica, rec. J. Vahlen! (3rd edition, Lipsiae, 1885). 
Fragmenta collegit V. Rose (Lipsiac, 1886). 

Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca edita consilio et auctoritate Academiac 
litterarum regiae Borussicae (Berolini, 1882—1907). 

Aetius, Placita: in Diels, Doxographici Graeci. 

Alexander Aphrodisiensis, De Anima cum Mantissa, ed. I. Bruns! (Berolini, 

—— Quaestiones. De Fato. De Mixtione, ed. I. Bruns?! (Berolini, 1892). 

—— In Aristotelis Metaphysica, ed. M. Hayduck! (Berolini, 18yr). 

In Aristotelis De Sensu, ed. Thurot (Paris, 1875); ed. Wendland! 

(Berolini, 1901). 

Anonymi Londinensis ex Aristotelis Iatricis Menoniis et allis medicis eclogae, 
ed. H. Diels (Berolini, 1893). 

Argyropylus: see Berlin eclition of Aristotle, Vol. 111. 

Aristoxenus, Die harmonischen Fraymente, von P. Marquard (Berlin, p88): see 
also Musici Scriptores. 

Apelt, O., Beitriige zur Gesch. der griechischen Philosophie (Leipzig, τδο τ). 

Bacchius: in Musici Scriptores, ed. Jan. 

Bacumker, Clem., Des Aristoteles Lehre von den dussern und innern Sinnes- 
vermodyen (Leipzip, 1877). 

——- in Philologische Rundschau 1882, Sp. 1356. 1360. 

Das Problem der Materie (Miinster, 18yo). 

Barco, G., Esposizione critica della psicologia greca.  Definizione delP anima 
(Torino-Roma, 1879). 

—— Del? anima vegetativa e sensitiva (Torino, 1881). 

Bast, F. J.. Commentatio Palacographica: appended, pp. 703. 861, to Greporti 
Corinthii ct aliorum grammaticorum libri de dialectis linguae gracecae, ed. 
G. H. Schaefer (Lipsiae, 1811). 

Beare, J. 1., De Anima LL. 8. 3, 419 b 22——25; De Sensu vit: in Hermathena 
No. XXX., Vol. XIII. (1905), pp. 73--76- 

—— Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alemacon to Aristotle 
(Oxford, 1906). 

Belger, Chr., De Anima A. 1. 4o2 b 16: in Hermes X1r (1878), pp. 302, 303. 

Bergk, Th., Zu Aristoteles’ De Anima 1. 4: in Hermes xvi. (1883), p. 518. 

Bernays, .. Die Dialoge des Aristoteles (Berlin, 1863). 

Bichl, W., Ueber den Begriff νοῦς bei Aristoteles (Linz, 1864). 

Bonitz, H., Aristotelische Studien 1.—v. (Wien, 1862— 1867). 

1 My citations are usually made from this edition. 


Bonitz, H., Ueber den Gebrauch von re γάρ bei Aristoteles: in Zeitschrift fiir 
die osterreichischen Gymnasien ΧΙ. (1867), pp. 74—76. 
—— Zur Erklarung einiger Stellen aus Aristot. Schrift uber die Seele: in 
Hermes VII. (1873), pp. 416—436. 
Brandis, C. A., Handbuch der Geschichte der griechisch-romischen Philosophie 
(Berlin, 1835—1866). 
Brentano, Fr., Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom 
vous ποιητικός (Mainz, 1867). 
Bullinger, A., Aristoteles’ Nus-Lehre (De Anima 111. cc. 4—8 incl.) (Dillingen, 
Burnet, J., Early Greek Philosophy (London and Edinburgh, 1892). 
Busse, Ad., De Anima 434a 12—15, in Hermes XXIII. (1888), pp. 469 sq. 
in Berliner philologische Wochenschrift x11. (1892), Sp. 549—552. 
——  Neuplatonische Lebensbeschreibung des Anstoteles: in Hermes XXVIII. 
(1893), pp. 252—276. 
Bywater, I., Aristotelia: in Journal of Philology xiv. (1885), pp. 40—52; XVII. 
(1888), pp. 53—74. 
Chaignet, A. E., Essai sur la psychologie d’Aristote (Paris, 1883). 
Chandler, H. W., Miscellaneous emendations and suggestions (London, 1866). 
Christ, W., Studia in Aristotelis libros metaphysicos collata (Berolini, 1853). 
Cornford, F. M., Plato and Orpheus: in Classical Review XVII. pp. 433—445. 
—— in Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society LXXV. (1906), p. 13. 
Dembowski, J., Quaestiones aristotelicae duae (Regimonti Pr. 1881). 
in Wochenschrift fur classische Philologie Iv. (1887), Sp. 430—433. 
Diels, H., Doxographi Graeci (Berolini, 1379). 
Studia Empedoclea: in Hermes XV. (1880), pp. 161-—179. 
—— Ueber die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles: in Sitzungsberichte der 
Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften 1883, pp. 477—494. 
Leukippos und Diogenes von Apollonia in Rheinisches Museum XLII. 
(1887), pp. 1-- 14. 
—— Parmenides (Berlin, 1897). 
Poectarum Philosophorum fragmenta (Berolini, 1901). 
——— Herakleitos von Ephesos (Berlin, 1901). 
Die Fraymente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin, 1903). 
Dittenberger, W., Exegetische und kritische Bemerkungen zu einigen Stellen 
des Aristoteles (Metaphysik und de Anima). (Rudolstadt, 1869.) 
in Géttingische gelehrte Anzeigen 1863, pp. 1601—-1616. 
Dyroff, Αἰ, Demokritstudien (Leipzig, 1899). 
Essen, E., Der Keller zu Skepsis. Versuch tuber das Schicksal der aristotelischen 
Schriften. Gymn.-Progr. (Stargard, 1866). 
-——— Ejin Beitrag zur Lésung der aristotelischen Frage (Berlin, 1884). 
Das erste Buch der aristotelischen Schrift itber die Seele ins Deutsche 
iibertragen etc. (Iena, 1892). 
—— Das zweite Buch in kritischer Uebersetzung (Iena, 1894). 
—— Das dritte Buch (Iena, 1896). 
Empedoclis Ayrigentini carminum reliquiae, ed. 5. Karsten (Amstelodami, 1838). 
Eucken, R. De Aristotelis dicendi ratione (Gottingae, 1866). 
Ueber den Sprachgebrauch des Aristoteles (Berlin, 1868). 
———- _Methode der aristotelischen Forschung (Berlin, 1872). 
Euclidis, De Musica: in Musici Scriptores. 
Fragmenta Comicorum Graecorum, coll. Meineke (Berolini, 1839—1841); Comi- 
corum Atticorum Fragmenta, ed. Th. Kock (Lipsiae, 1880-—1888). 


Fragmenta philosophorum Graecorum, ed. Mullach (Parisiis, 1860—1867, 1881). 

Frazer, J. G., The Golden Bough (London and New York, 1890). 

Freudenthal, J.. Ueber den Begriff des Wortes φαντασία bei Aristoteles 
(GG6ttingen, 1863). 

—— Zur Kritik und Exegese von Aristoteles: in Rheinisches Museum, 1869, 
pp. 81—93, 392—419. 

Gomperz, Th., Griechische Denker (Leipzig, 1896), Vol. 1, English translation 
by Laurie Magnus (London, Igor). 

Granger, F., De Anima (On the Active and Passive Reason): tn Classical 
Review VI., pp. 298—301: also in Mind 1893, pp. 307—318. 

Grote, G., Aristotle (London, 1872); 2nd edition (London, 1880). 

Waecker, F., in Zeitschrift fiir das Gymnasialwesen, 1864, pp. 198—215. 

Hammond, W. A., Aristotle’s Psychology, translation of De Anima and Parva 
Naturalia (London and New York, 1902). 

Hart, G., Zur Seelen- und Erkenntnisslehre des Demokrit (Leipzig, 1886). 

Hayduck, M., Observationes criticae in aliquot locos Aristotelis, Progr. 
(Greifswald, 1873). 

Heiberg, J. L., Mathematisches zu Aristoteles: in Abhandlungen zur Geschichte 
der mathematischen Wissenschaften, 1904, Heft 4, pp. 8 sqy. 

Heitz, E., Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles (Leipzig, 1865). 

Heracliti Ephesii reliquiae, rec. I. Bywater (Oxonii, 1877). 

Hertling, G. von, De Aristotclis notione Unius commentatio (Berolini, 1864), 

Materie und Form und die Definition der Secle bei Aristoteles (Bonn, 


Hesychii Alexandri T.exicon, rec. M. Schmidt (Jenac, 1858 ~-1868). 

Innes, H. M°L., On the Universal and Particular in -\ristotle’s Theory of 

Knowledge (Cambridge, 1886). 

in Classical Review XVI, pp. 461—463. 

Jackson, FI., Texts to illustrate a Course of Elementary Lectures on the History 
of Greck Philosophy from Thales to Aristotle (London, τοι), 

Joachim, ἘΠ. 1Π., Aristotle’s Theory of Chemical Combination: in Journal of 
Philology XXIX., pp. 72——-86. 

Johnson, W. A. E., Der Sensualismus des Demokritos (Plauen, 1868). 

Kampe, Ir. F., Die Erkenntnisstheorie des Aristoteles (Leipzig, 1870). 

Karsten: see Empedocles. 

Keil, Bruno, Analectorum Isocrateorum specimen (CGiyphiswaldiac, 188.4). 

Kern, Ὁ. De Orphei Epimenidis Pherecydis theogontis quaestiones criticae 
(Berolini, 1888). 

Krische, A. B., Forschungen auf dem Csebiete der alten Philosophie (Géttingen, 

Lasswitz, K., Geschichte der Atomistik vom Mittelalter bis Newton (Hamburg, 

Lobeck, C. A., Aglaophamus (Reyimontiit Prussorum, 1829). 

Phrynichi Eclogae nominum et verborum atticorum (Lipsiae, 1820), 

Madvig, J. N., Acdversaria critica ad scriptores graecos (Hauniae, 1871). 

Maier, Η., Die Syllovistik des Aristotelis (Tubingen, 1896--1goo). 

Marchl, P., Des Arist. Lehre von der Tierseele 1... 11, 1% (Metten, 1897-—180y). 

Martin, A., in Revue critique, 1902, pp. 425— 428. 

Michaelis, K. G., Zu Aristoteles De Anima 11. 3 (Neu-Strelitz, 1882). 

Musicae antiquae auctores septem graece et latine restituit Marcus Meibomius 

(Amstelodami, 1652). 

ed. C. Jan (Lipsiae, 1895). 


Natorp, P., Ueber Demokrits γνησίη γνώμη: in Archiv fiir Geschichte der 
Philosophie I., pp. 348—356. 

—— Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnissproblems im Alterthum 
(Berlin, 1884). 

Neuhaeuser, J., Aristoteles’ Lehre von dem sinnlichen Erkenntnissvermégen 
und seinen Organen (Leipzig, 1878). 

Noetel, R, in Zeitschrift fiir das Gymnasialwesen, 1864, pp. 131—144. 

Ogle, W., Aristotle on the Parts of Animals, translated with introduction and 

notes etc. (London, 1882). 

Aristotle on Youth and Age etc., translated etc. (London, 1897). 

Pacius, Julius, Aristotelis De Anima, Graece et Latine cum commentario 
(Francofurti, 1596; Hanoviae, 1611; Francofurti, 1621). 

Pansch, Car., Zu Aristoteles de anima: in Philologus xxX1. (1864), pp. 543—545.- 

Philippson, L., Ὕλη ἀνθρωπίνη (Berolini, 1831). 

Philoponi, Joannis, In Aristotelis De Anima libros Commentaria, ed. Hayduck! 
(Berolini, 1897). 

Poppelreuter, Hans, Zur Psychologie des Aristoteles, Theophrast, Strato 
(Leipzig, 1892). 

Praechter, K., in Berliner philologische Wochenschrift, 1902, Sp. 193—2o01. 

Prisciani Lydi quae extant (Metaphrasis in Theophrastum, pp. I—37), ed. 
Bywater (Berolini, 1886). 

Riddell, Digest of Idioms, appended to his edition of Plato’s Apology (Oxford, 

Ritter, B., Die Grundprincipien der aristotelischen Seelenlehre (Jena, 1380). 

Rodier, G., Note sur un passage du De Anima d’Aristote, III. 2, 426b 3: in 
Revue des ¢tudes anciennes, 1901, pp. 313—3T5. 

Roeper, G., Zu De Anima 11. 5, U1 3, 1. 6: in Philologus vil. (1852), pp. 238, 
324, 768. 

Rohde, E., Psyche (3rd edition, Tiibingen und Leipzig, 1903). 

Sander, Julius, Alkmaeon von Kroton (Wittenberg, 1893). 

Schaefer, G., Die Philosophie des Heraklit von Ephesus und die moderne 
Heraklitforschung (Leipzig, 1902). 

Schell, J. Ἐξ, Mie Einheit des Seelenlebens aus den Principien der Aristo- 
telischen Philosophie entwickelt (Freiburg im Br., 1873). 

Schieboldt, F. ©., De imaginatione disquisitio ex Aristotelis libris repetita 
(Lipsiae, 1882). “ae 

Schlottmann, K., Das Vergiangliche and Unvergéngliche in der menschlichen 
Seele nach Aristoteles, Univ. Progr. (Halle, 1873). 

Schneider, G., Ueber einige Stellen aus Aristoteles de anima III. 3: in 
Rheinisches Museum XxXI. (1866), pp. 444—454. 

——— Ueber einige Stellen aus Aristoteles de anima ΤΠ. 3: in Rheinisches 
Museum XXII. (1867), p. 145- 

—— Zu Aristotelis de anima (111. 3, 428 Ὁ 25): in Zeitschrift fiir das Gymnasial- 
wesen XXI. (1867), pp. 631—634. 

Shorey, P., in American Journal of Philology, Xx11. (1901), pp. 149 —164. 

Siebeck, H., Geschichte der Psychologie (Gotha, 1880—1884). 

Zu Aristoteles in Philologus XL. (1881), pp. 347356. 

Simplicii in libros Aristotelis De Anima Commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck! 
(Berolini, 1882). 

Sophoniae in libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis, ed. M. Hayduck 
(Berolini, 1883). 

1 My citations are usually made from this edition. 


Stapfer, A. A., Studia in Aristotelis de anima libros collata (Landishutae, 1888). 
Kritische Studien zu Aristoteles’ Schrift von der Seele (Landshut, 1890). 
Steinhart, Car., Symbolae criticae, Progr. (Schulpforte, 1843). 

Stewart, J. A., Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, 1892). 

Susemihl, Franz, in Jahresbericht iiber die Fortschritte der classischen Alter- 
thumswissenschaft (Bursian), Vols. IX., pp. 347-352; XVII., 261 sqc. ; 
XXX., 35-48; XXXIV. 25—35; XLIL, 26, 238-240; LXVIL, 103-111: 
LXXV., 95-100; LXXIX., 99 Sqq., 279; LXXXVIII, I2—I5. 

—— in Philologische Wochenschrift, 1882, Sp. 1283 sq.; 1884, Sp. 784; 1893, 

Sp. 1317—1320; 1895, Sp. 1031. 

in Jenaer Litteraturzeitung IV. (1877), Sp. 707 sy. 
—— in Philologischer Anzeiger, 1873, pp. 683, 690. 
— in Wochenschrift fur classische Philologie, 1884, Sp. 1410. 

in Philologus XLVI. (1888), p. 86. 
Appendix to Aristotelis quae feruntur Oeconomica, ed. Susemihl (Lipsiac, 
Tannery, P., Pour Phistoire de la science helléne (Paris, 1887). 
Teichmiller, G., Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe (Berlin, 1874). 
Themistii Paraphrases Aristotelis librorum quae supersunt, ed. IL. Spengel 
(De Anima in Vol. IL, pp. I—231). 
—— In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis, ec. R. Heimze! (Berohm, 
Theophrasti Eresii opera quae supersunt omnia, ex recogn. F. Wimmer 
(Lipsiae, 1854--- 1862). 
—— Fragmentum De Sensibus, ed. H. Diels! in Doxographi Graect, pp. 4y9— 
See also Priscianus Lydus. 
Thompson, W. H., On the genuineness of the Sophist of Plato ete.: in Journal 
of Philology vill. (1879), pp. 290—322. 
Torstrik, Ad., Die Authentica der Berliner Ausgabe des Aristoteles: in Philo- 
logus XII. (1857), pp. 494—530; XIII. (1858), pp. 204 sq. 
—— in Rheinisches Museum XXI. (1866), p. 640. 
—— Der Anfang. der Physik des Aristoteles: in Neue Jahrbiicher fiir ’hiloleie 
XCV. (17G/), pp. 236-—244. 
“Zu Aristoteles’ Psychologie (Γ 4, 429b 10; T 3, 42848; I 4, 429 a 29-- 
b 5): in Neue Jahrbucher ftir Philologie XCv. (1867), pp. 245 sy. 
in Literarisches Centralblatt (1877), Sp. 1462 sq. 
Trendelenburg, Fr. Ad., Geschichte der Kategorienlehre (Berlin, 1846). 
Historische Beitrage zur Philosophie 11. (Berlin, 1855); 11. (Berlin, 
Elementa logices Aristoteleae, ed. 8 (Berolini, 1878). 
Vahlen, J., Beitrage zu Aristoteles Poetik (Wien) 1., 1865; 11, 18663 tL, 1V., 
-~—— Aristotelische Aufsatze 1. (Wien, 1872). 
—— Grammatisch-kritische Miscellen zu Aristoteles: in Zeitschrift fiir die 
ésterreichischen Gymnasien XVIII. (1867), pp. 721—725. 
Grammatisch kritische Miscellen zu Aristoteles, in Zeitschrift fiir die 
ésterreichischen Gymnasien XIx. (1868), pp. 11-21, 253—256. 
Wilson, J. Cook, Conjectural emendations in the text of Aristotle and 
Theophrastus, in Journal of Philology x1. (1882), pp. 119— 124. 

1 My citations are usually made from this edition. 


Wilson, J. Cook, Interpretation of certain passages of the De Anima in the 
editions of Trendelenburg and Torstrik, in Transactions of the Oxford 

Philological Society, 1882/3, pp. 5—13. 

in Philologische Rundschau (1882), Sp. 1473—1481. 

Wyse, W., The Speeches of Isaeus (Cambridge, 1904). 

Xenocrates, Darstellung der Lehre und Sammlung der Fragmente von R. 
Heinze (Leipzig, 1892). 

Zabarella, J.. Commentaria in tres Aristotelis hbros de anima (Venetiis, 1605). 

Zabarellae opera integra ed. I. L. Havenreuter (Francofurti, 1623, 1624). 

Zeller, E, Die Philosophie der Griechen, Band I., δίῃ edition (Leipzig, 1892); 
Il., 4th edition (1889); 11. 2 Abth. (111), 3rd edition (1879); 111. 1 Abth. (IVv.), 
3rd edition (1880); 111. 2 Abth. (v), 3rd edition (1881). 

—— English Translation of 3rd edition of 11. 2 by Costelloe and Muirhead 
under the title “ Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics” (London, New York, 
and Bombay, 1897). 

——— in Archiv der Geschichte der Philosophie IIL, 303, 311 sq.3 VI., 406 sqq.; 
VIIL, 134 5646. ; IX., 536 sqq. 

Ziaja, J., Aristoteles De Sensu cc. 1, 2,3 bis 439 b 18 tibersetzt und mit Anmerk- 
ungen versehen, Progr. (Breslau, 1887), 

—— Die aristotelische Lehre vom Gedichtniss und von der Association der 
Vorstellungen (Leobschuitz, 1879). 


external soul, on which the life of the individual depends, plays the 
same part as in the folk-lore of savages to-day*. The opening lines 
of the ad draw a sharp distinction between the heroes themsclves, 
left a prey for dogs and vultures, and their souls, sent down to 
Hades or the invisible world. The ghost of Patroclus, which 
appears to Achilles ina dream, is an emaciated, enfeebled shadow, 
deprived of all its strength by severance from the body, which was 
the real man. In the underworld these pale, ineffectual ghosts are 
much alike in general condition. Apart from a few notorious 
offenders punished for their misdeeds, they pursue the shadows of 
their former avocations. Whether in Greek language and thought 
two separate conceptions are blended, whether the sum of the 
intellectual and moral qualities was associated at one time with 
the blood and at another with the breath, whether the breath of life 
superseded an older smoke-soul, the exhalation arising from spilt 
blood, and whether these two conceptions were connected with the 
practices of inhumation and cremation respectively, are matters of 
speculation on which it is hardly possible to arrive at a definite 
conclusion® When we pass from Homer to later poets we find the 
same primitive beliefs variously modified. In Hesiod the heroes 
go no longer to the underworld, but to the Isles of the Blest, and 
ancestral spirits have developed into “daemons” exerting a benefi- 
cent influence on their descendants’. From the dirges of Pindar 
we have two important fragments‘. One is a glowing picture of 
the lot of the happy dead. In the other we are told that, “ while 
the body of every man followeth after mighty death, there still 
liveth a likeness of his prime which alone is of divine origin, which 
slumbereth so long as the limbs are busy, but full oft in dreams 
showeth to sleepers the issue that draweth near of pleasant things 
and cruel.” 

In the Orphic and Pythagorean brotherhoods the primitive 
Orphic beliefs were moulded into a thoroughgoing doctrine 
doctrine. of transmigration. Three main conceptions underlie 
Orphic asceticism. First, there is the opposition between body and 
soul. The soul is better than the body and is buried in the body 
for its sins, the body is its temporary prison. Next comes the 
necessity for a purification of the soul. All evil is followed by 

1 Frazer, éoc, cit., vol. 11., 6. iv. 

2 Etymologically θυμὸς is connected with Jumus: cf. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, 1. 
PP- 249 Sq. ᾿ 

3 Hesiod, Works and Days, τῶι sqq. 

* Fragg. 95, 96. | 


retribution. Through abstinence and penance alone may the soul 
hope to regain its former blissful state. Thirdly, there is the long 
series of incarnations in which, according to their deeds during a 
former existence, souls take a higher or a lower place in human or 
animal bodies or even in plants’. Though these ideas occupy so 
small a place in literature, they are clearly very old, for the extant 
burlesque of Xenophanes? attests the acceptance of metempsychosis 
by Pythagoras, and all probability points to his having derived 
it from the still older Orphic sect. At Athens the Eleusinian 
mysteries, at which some such ideas were symbolically inculcated, 
were under the patronage of the state; but nevertheless the belief 
in an after life in the underworld, as set forth by Homer, for the 
most part maintained its hold upon the ordinary educated citizen. 
Little is to be learned from the Ionian thinkers, whom 
Tonian Aristotle calls physicists or physiologists’, In the 
physicists. dawn of enquiries which, strictly speaking, were 
rather scientific than philosophical, men sought to explain to 
themselves of what things were constituted and how they had come 
into their present condition. Their problem, we should now say, 
was the constitution of matter and, if occasionally, when they found 
the primary element in air or fire or some other body, they also 
declared that this was the cause of vital functions, it was merely a 
corollary to their general doctrine and of no special importance. 
The subjects on which we find hints are the substance of the soul, 
the distinction between its various powers, and the nature of 
knowledge. So far as the substance of the individual soul was 
identical with, or a product of, the universal element, they all 
agreed in regarding it as not immaterial, but of an extremely 
refined and mobile materiality. The soul was credited with the 
power to know and perceive, as well as the power to move the body. 
Heraclitus, who had grasped the flux of matter in 
constant circulation, held it to be governed by an 
universal law. Knowledge to him consists in apprehending this law. 
In comparison with such knowledge he deprecated the evidence of 
sense: eyes and ears are better than the other senses, but are 
bad witnesses, if the soul does not understand. Meanwhile in 
the West other schools of philosophy had arisen, the Eleatic and 


1 Cf. Rohde, Prycke, 11. pp. 103 8qq- 

2 Frag. 7 D. | 

$ ‘The philosophical speculations 6n the soul from Thales to Democritus and Anaxagoras 
mre reviewed by Rohde, 11. pp. 137-198. Cf. also Beare, Greek Theories of Hlementary 
Lagrttion. : : 
οὐ κα, b 


Pythagorean. Xenophanes distinguished between truth and opinion. 
Parmenides derived the intelligence of man from the 
composition and elementary mixture of his bodily 
parts, heat and cold being the elements of things’. The pre- 
ponderant element characterises the thought of the individual man. 
But the chief legacy of Parmenides to his successors was his 
doctrine of the one immutable Being, which alone satisfies the 
requirements of an object of knowledge. The element of the 
Ionians did not satisfy these conditions, being endowed with the 
power to pass from one condition to another, whether intermittently 
or perpetually. Nothing, according to Parmenides, is ever generated 
or destroyed, however varied its manifestations and the changes it 
presents to the senses. On the foundation thus laid by Parmenides 
Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Leucippus constructed their systems, 
resolving apparent generation and destruction into combination 
and separation of primary elements or principles, themselves 
indestructible. They differed, Aristotle remarks, as to the number 
and nature of these indestructible elements, Empedocles made a 
mistake in accepting a crude popular analysis into air, earth, fire and 
water, elements which do not so much as correspond to a rough divi- 
sion of matter into the solid, liquid and gaseous states. Anaxagoras, 
with his homoeomeries, was in our view still wider of the mark. 
Leucippus and Democritus at last found in the atoms a working 
hypothesis of the constitution of matter, which has lasted down to 
the present day. It is these three physical systems which most 
profoundly influenced Aristotle. He unfortunately accepted the first 
with modifications and opposed the last, by the merits of which he 
was nevertheless profoundly impressed. Each of these three systems 
took up the problem of the soul. But in the meantime medical 
enquiries had been actively prosecuted, and it is to a Pythago- 
rean, Alcmaeon of Croton, that we owe the earliest 
advances towards the physiology of the senses. Fle 
was the first to recognise the brain as the central organ of 
intellectual activity. He dissected animals and by this means 
discovered the chief nerves of sense, which, like Aristotle, he called 
“conduits” or “ channels,” and he traced them to their termination in 
the brain. Deafness and blindness he held to be caused when bya 
concussion the brain was shifted out of its normal position and the 
channels of hearing and seeing respectively were thus blocked. He 
submitted the several senses to a searching examination, starting 

1 Frag. 16 D. 
* De Anima 404. Ὁ 30 sqq. 




with the anatomical construction of the sense-organ. The air in 
the ear he regarded as a sounding-board, and he attributed to the 
moisture, softness, flexibility and warmth of the tongue its capacity 
to reduce solid bodies to fluid as a necessary preliminary to tasting. 
He noticed the phenomenon which we call seeing sparks when the 
eye has received a heavy blow, and this suggested a crude theory 
of vision, postulating fire in the eye, a mistake repeated by Em- 
pedocles and by Plato. But it is with the glittering or transparent 
element of water in the eye that it sees, and it sees better according 
to the purity of the element. Vision is effected by the image of the 
thing seen and by the rays which issue from the eye within and 
pass outwards through the water. He derived memory from sense- 
perception and opinion from memory; from memory and opinion 
combined he derived reason, which distinguishes men from the 
lower animals?. What scanty information we have about him 
comes chiefly from Theophrastus’, but it would be a great mistake 
to acquiesce in Aristotle’s neglect of him. He is only once 
mentioned in De Anza, as having held that soul is immortal, on 
the singular ground that by its incessant motion it resembles the 
heavenly bodies, which he also held to be immortal. 

In Empedocles we are dealing not with a sober physical 
enquirer, but with a religious enthusiast and poet-philosopher. He 
accepted the transmigration of souls in a slightly 
altered form; he introduced wicked as well as good 
“ daemons,” condemned for their sins to wander for 10,000 years and 
to become souls of plants, beasts and men. In the course of their 
purification they become prophets, poets, physicians, princes, and 
again return to the gods*. Sensation in general he explained by 
the action of like upon like. Particles emanate from external 
bodies and enter our bodies by channels or pores. They cannot 
enter unless there is a certain proportion® between the emanation 
and the size and shape of the channel which is to receive it. Thus 
a sense-organ is a particular part of the body which, possessing 
channels of a certain size and shape, is adapted to receive 
emanations of a certain kind, of flavour, odour or sound. But his 
theory of vision was more complicated. Not only are there 


1 Plato, Phaedo 96 B, where, however, the name of Alemaeon is not mentioned. 

t De Sensibus, 88 25, 26 (Doxogr. Gr. 306, 25 sqq.): cf. Philippson ὕλη ἀνθρωπίνη, 
pp. 20 sq. and Julius Sander, A/Awiaeon von Kroton. 

5 405 ἃ 29 566. 4 Cf. Plato, Phaedr. 248 Ὁ), E. 

δ συμμετρία, De Gen. εἰ Corr. 1. 8, 324 Ὁ 25 sqq-3 cf. Theophr. De Semsibus § 7. 
Perhaps Empedocles was seeking to express the same fact as was Aristotle when he 
afterwards applied the word μεσύτης to sense. 



emanations from visible objects, but there are also emanations from 
the eye. To this he was led by the analogy of the dark lantern, of 
which the camera obscura furnishes a modern illustration. The 
transparent plates of horn or linen in the lantern, made to protect 
the flame from the wind which might otherwise extinguish it, 
correspond to the thin coats or films in the eye covering the pupil, 
whose contents are partly of a fiery, partly of a watery, nature. 
From the pupil fiery and watery emanations leap forth through 
funnel-shaped channels to meet the fiery and watery emanations 
coming, the one from light, the other from dark, objects outside. 
The principle of “like by like” accounts for the mutual attraction 
of similar materials and their meeting, and, when the two sets of 
emanations meet, vision takes place. The preponderance of water 
or fire in the eye accounts for the fact that some animals see better 
in the dark, others in the daylight’. Thus, then, we perceive like 
by like, the four elements of all things, air, carth, fire and water, 
outside, because air, earth, fire and water are present in our bodies? 
Blood is the most perfect mixture of these four clements and to 
this blood where it is purest, viz. about the heart, he attributecl 
thought. As we see earth by earth which is in us, water by water, 
so we think by means of blood, the bodily tissue in which all four 
elements are most perfectly blended. Tempedocles, then, con- 
sistently confined his attention to the bodily process. The mental 
or psychical state is either ignored in his explanation or reduced to 
its physical conditions. Yet on the problem of knowledge, aware 
of the imperfection of the senses, he counsels us to withdraw our 
trust from them and prefer the guidance of reason. 

Anaxagoras distinguished sensation from intelligence and, 
whereas most of the Pre-Socratics agreed that we 
perceive things by having within us something like 
them, he held that we perceive in virtue of the presence within us 
of something opposite to the thing perceived®, Knowledge is not 
to be gained from the senses, because their powers cannot dis- 
criminate minute changes; while the reactionary physics which he 
propounded involved the presence in every sensible object of 
infinitesimal particles perceptible only in the aggregate and, 
blended with these, alien particles altogether imperceptible, because 
infinitesimal. Over against this infinity of homocomeries he set 


1 Aristotle, De Gen. ef Corr. 1. 8, 324 25 syq-y De Sense a, 437} 23--4588 By 
Theophrastus, De Sensibus, §3 7-~24. 

2 De A. 204} t1—15, 409 Ὁ 23 sep. 417 ἃ 21 βῆ, 

3 405 b 14-21, Theophrastus, De Senstbus, 3 1, 2, 29-—37. 


the other constituent of the universe, which alone is pure and 
unmixed and has nothing in common with anything else. This is 
Nous?. The part it played was to communicate the first impulse 
to that rotatory motion which ultimately evolved from the chaos in 
which all things were mixed the present order and regularity of 
the universe. Nous is in all living beings, great and small, in 
varying degrees. It governs and orders and knows. We fortu- 
nately possess the account which Anaxagoras himself gave of Nous, 
and upon the evidence the reader must decide for himself what was 
its nature’. Plato and Aristotle construed it as immaterial reason 
and censured the philosopher for not making more thoroughgoing 
use of its mighty agency. Returning now to sense, the contrast 
necessary to perception Anaxagoras found most clearly in touch, 
for our perception of temperature depends upon contrast. We 
know the taste of sweet and bitter only by contrast. Seeing, 
again, takes place by the reflection of an image in the pupil, but in 
a part of it which is of a different colour from the object seen. 
Eyes that see in the daytime are, generally speaking, dark, while 
animals with gleaming eyes see better by night. 

In the Atomists the tendencies of earlier Greek thinkers reach 
Leucippus mature development. The problem hitherto had been 
Democritus. to determine what matter is, and Leucippus pro- 
pounded a working hypothesis which has ever since been sufficient 
for the purposes of science. Though this theory is derived from 
sense, it departs very widely from the evidence of the senses. 
Knowledge, said Democritus, is of two kinds, genuine knowledge 
that there are atoms and void and nothing else, and knowledge 
which is dark or obscure, by which he meant the information given 
by the senses*. The existence of void apparently contradicts obser- 
vation, experiment fails even now to obtain an absolute void. The 
properties of body are all given by sense. The Atomists accepted 
the evidence of sense for resistance, extension and weight (perhaps 
Democritus was unaware of this last quality), but rejected it for 
colours, sounds, odours and flavours. Out of impenetrable atoms 
of different shapes and sizes the whole universe is built up, and the 
different qualities in things are due either to difference of shape or 
size, or to different arrangements, of the atoms composing them‘. 
The soul is no exception. It is a complex of atoms within the 

1 4oga 25 Sqq., 4o4b 1-—6, 4050 13---21,) 405 Ὁ 19---2 .., 429 a 18—20, b 23 56. 
2 Frag. 12 D, quoted entire on p. 229 tafra. 

* Krag. 11 D apud Sext. Emp. ἄν. Mathematicos, Vil. 138 sq. 

4 De A. 4044 1-4, De Gen. et Corr. 1. 4, 315 Ὁ 6 sqq.- 


body. Soul-atoms are spherical in shape, extremely minute and 
mobile. They resemble the atoms of fire. In thus postulating a 
body within the body to account for vital and intellectual functions, 
Democritus reverts more consistently and systematically than any 
previous philosopher to the standpoint of the savage who, when he 
sees an animal move, is unable to explain the fact except by 
supposing that there is a little animal inside to move him. But 
there is this difference, that the little animal is imagined to be alive, 
the soul-atoms of Democritus are mere matter”, Thus to push the 
implicit assumptions of their predecessors to their logical con- 
sequences and make the half-conscieus hylozoism of the early 
Ionians blossom forth in materialism is the great merit of 
Leucippus and Democritus. Al]! processes of sensation, then, are 
instances of the contact® between bodies. They are caused by 
“idols” or films which are constantly streaming off from = the 
surface of bodies, of inconceivable thinness, yet preserving the 
relative shape of the parts. So far this agrees with Pmpedocles : 
but the latter made his emanations enter the body through chan- 
nels, while the Atomists conceived them as entering by the void 
between the atoms. The same explanation would apply ta thought, 
which is excited when the material image of an object enters the 
equally material mind. All the senses are thus but modifications 
of touch. This was made out satisfactorily for taste, and 
Democritus attempted to determine the shapes of the atoms which 
produce the different varieties of taste*+ Things made of atoms 
angular, winding, small and thin, have an acid taste, those whose 
atoms are spherical and not too small taste sweet, and κὰν θὰ. {{|5 
four simple colours, white, black, red and green, are accounted for 
by the shape and disposition of atoms, but a similar analysis was 
not attempted for the objects of sound and smell. 

In marked contrast with the attempts which the Atomists and 
Diogenca of EVEN Empedocles made to bring physics and physio- 
Apollonia. logy into shape is the retrograde system of Diogenes 
of Apollonia, whose fantastic absurdities have been immortalised! 
for us by Aristophanes. He was not satisfied with the resolution 
by Anaxagoras, himself a reactionary in physics, of bodies into 
infinitesimal particles possessing definite qualities, though he was 

1 403 Ὁ 31—404.0 16, 405.8 5-—13. 

2 Ch. De 4. 406 b 15—22, 409 Ὁ 7—15. 

® De Sensu 4, 442.8 29 sqq- For what follows see Theophrastux, e Senséfus, @ 4 
—83, who treats of Democritus very fully. 

4 Theophrastus, De Sensibus, ὃ 64 9qq- 


more attracted by the supposition of unmixed Nous, which is the 
seat of intelligence. But he supplemented this theory by reverting 
to the position of the IJonians, one of whom, Anaximenes, had 
chosen air for his primary element. Diogenes endowed air with 
sentience and intelligence. “All creatures,’ he says, “live and 
see and hear by the same thing” (viz. air), “and from the same 
thing all derive their intelligence as well?” He thus made the 
air in us play an important part in the processes of perception 
and thought. From Alcmaeon he must have borrowed the idea 
that the brain is the central organ; the air in the sense-organs, 
the eye, the ear, the nostrils, transmitted the impression to the 
air in or near the brain. The common view that seeing takes 
place by the reflection of an image in the pupil he supplemented 
by postulating that this image must be blended with the internal 
air; otherwise, though the image is formed, there is no seeing. 
He pointed to the fact that, when the optic nerve is inflamed, 
blindness ensues because, as he thought, the admixture with the 
internal air is prevented. His account of hearing may be cited 
for the likeness it bears to that given in De Anza. “The animals 
which hear most acutely have slender veins, the orifice of the ear 
(like that of the nose) being in them short, slender and straight, 
and the external ear erect and large. For movement of the air in 
the ears sets in motion the internal air” [in or near the brain]. 
“ Whereas, if the orifice be too wide, the movement of the air in 
the ears causes a ringing in them, and what is heard is indistinct 
noise, because the air upon which the audible sound impinges is 
not at rest?” 

In the fifth century the evolution of successive systems came 
to a halt. The progress of enquiry had been marked by the 
foundation of new sciences like geometry and astronomy, both in 
a flourishing condition, and new arts, like rhetoric and dialectic. 
The bustle and unrest of the times was attended by a growing 
mistrust, not only of the old traditional religious and moral beliefs, 
but of the bewildering intellectual movement which in so short a 
space of time had put forward so many brilliant and contradictory 
speculations. The professional educators, whom we know as the 
Sophists, turned as a rule to practical interests and made human- 

ism, literary criticism, erudition their main themes. 

Protagoras. Protagoras, the greatest of them, adopted a sceptical 

1 See Simplicius, ὧς Physica, p. 151, 24—153, 24, Theophrastus, De Sensibus, 

88. 39-—48. 
* Theophr. De Sensibus, § 41: cf De A. 4208 3 8qQ4- 


attitude and maintained that man was the measure of all things, 
which, as interpreted by Plato, means that, as things appear to me, 
so they are to me, or the denial of objective truth. There were 
many sceptical currents in the sea of speculation on which Greece 
had embarked. The followers of Heraclitus pushed the doctrine of 
flux to an extreme. Things never are, but are always becomuny, 
they have no fixed attributes. When we say that a thing is, we 
must in the same breath pronounce that it is not. There are 
always two of these fluxes, one the movement or chanye producing 
sensations, flux outside, the other the movement which receives 
the sensations, the flux of our senses. The result of the contact 
between them is that, for example, wood becomes white wood and 
the eye becomes a seeing eye. When the flux of Socrates well 
comes in contact with wine, the wine will be sweet, but, if he ts 
ill, it will be sour. Both these statements will be true: tn facet, 
all statements are true. What wine is depends entirely on the 
man perceiving it. There is no criterion of truth in external 
things, they change so rapidly. On the other hand, Gorgias of 
Leontini in his essay on Nature or the Non-existent hardly 
caricatured the position of the younger Eleatics when he put 
forward the thesis that, if anything existed, tt could not be known, 
and, if anything did exist and was known, it could not be cam- 
municated. Such views as these or that of Futhydenius that 
falsehood is impossible are by no means universal amon the 
Sophists, many of whom had no psychological or epistemological 
theories at all; and, where their views were sceptical, it was the 
scepticism not of one school, but of many. Aristotle justifies the 
revolt of the Sophists against philosophy, he hokis that mast of 
the leading Pre-Socratic systems tend implicitly or explicitly te 
the doctrine of Protagoras. Protagoras first called attention te 
the importance of the knowing mind in every act of knowledee. 
In the view of a plain man like Socrates all the systems ware 
discredited and the question, what is knowledge, was for the time 
more urgent than the ambitious problems proposed by those 
who had sought to know the nature of the universe. Psycholovy 
can glean nothing from the ethical discussions of the historical 
Socrates. When he declared that virtue is knowledge, he was 
confessedly using the latter term as one which neither he nor his 
interlocutors could adequately define. 

Plato in his writings is always talking about the soul, but not 
all that he says is intended to be taken seriously. 

Plato. . 
We must allow for the mythical element, and in 


particular for his imaginative sympathy with the whole mass of 
floating legend, myth and dogma, of a partly religious, partly 
ethical character, which, as was stated above, found a wide but 
not universal acceptance at an early time in the Orphic and 
Pythagorean associations and brotherhoods'. The Platonic myths 
afford ample evidence that Plato was perfectly familiar with all 
the leading features of this strange creed. The divine origin of 
the soul, its fall from bliss and from the society of the gods, its 
long pilgrimage of penance through hundreds of generations, its 
task of purification from earthly pollution, its reincarnations in 
successive bodies, its upward or downward progress, and the law 
of retribution for all offences, these and kindred subjects the fancy 
of Plato has embellished with all the beauty and sublimity which 
the art of a lost poet could bestow upon prose. Such themes stir 
his imagination. His approval of ethical fiction is attested by his 
own words, but it would be the height of imprudence to infer that 
any part of his philosophy is bound up with his gorgeous poetical 
imagery. Plato never set about writing a treatise De “σιώπα. We 
find anticipations of a science, but not the science itself. In each 
dialogue he has a particular end in view. He proposes to examine 
the doctrine of Protagoras or, it may be, the import of predication. 
Incidentally in the course of a long controversy we come across 
models of psychological analysis which for subtlety and insight 
have never been equalled. Such an analysis was something ab- 
solutely new. The psychical or mental states on which Plato 
fixed his attention had hitherto, when they were not ignored 
altogether, been confounded with their bodily concomitants: a 
mistake not unnatural, so long as both sensation and thought 
were regarded as changes in the body. In the TV eactetus® we 
find the following argument. We do not perceive by but through 
the senses. What we perceive through one sense we cannot 
perccive through another. Consequently, if we know something 
about both a sound and a colour, it cannot be known through 
sense. Now we clo know many such things; that they are, that 
they are different from one another, that both are two things and 
that cach is one. How do we know such facts? The soul appre- 
hends them through itself without any sense-organs. Being and 
Not-Being, likeness and unlikeness, number, identity and diversity 
are not apprehended through sense, but through the soul alone. 
The soul apprehends the noble and the base, the good and the 

} See Cornford, “ Plato and Orpheus” in Class. Hee. XVUL. pp. 433-—-445> 


bad, not through the senses, but by calculating in herself the past 
or present in relation to the future. All men and animals from 
the moment of birth have by nature sensations which pass through 
the body and reach the soul, but to compare these sensations in 
relation to Being and expediency comes with difficulty and τὸ- 
quires a long time, much trouble and education. I[t is impossible 
to attain truth and know it without attaining Being ; knowledve 
does not consist in affections of sense because we cannot by them 
attain Being. It is by reasoning about sensations that this is 
alone possible. 

In the Phaedo the Platonic Socrates undertakes to prove that 
learning is reminiscence, which indeed is implied by the fact that, 
if questions are properly put, the right answers are elicited, showing 
that the knowledge sought, the knowledge, ee. of geometry, existed 
previously in the mind of the respondent, This proof is as follows. 
The picture of a lyre reminds us of the person who used the lyre, 
a picture of Simmias may remind us of Kebes or of Simtuias 
himself, so that the reminiscence may be brought about cither in- 
directly or directly. If it is effected directly and the abject seen 
is similar to the object it recalls, we cannot fail to see how far 
the remembrance is exact. Jfor instance, we affirm that there is 
an idea of equality which is called to our minds by our perception 
of sensibles which are equal. That this idea is something distinct 
from the equal sensibles is clear; for the sensibles may appear 
equal to one observer, unequal to another; but about the idea of 
equality no difference of opinion is possible. Now we are to 
observe that all sensible equals appear to us as falling short of 
the standard of absolute equality, which plainly shows that our 
knowledge of absolute equality is prior to our perception of the 
sensibles. And whereas (1) this sense of deficiency in the sensibles 
has been present so long as we have had any perceptions of them, 
(2) our perceptions of them date from the moment of our birth, 
it inevitably follows that our knowledge of the idea must have 
been acquired before our birth. Now this of course applies te all 
ideas as well as to that of equality. Since, then, we have obtained 
this knowledge, two alternatives are open: either we are born in 
full possession of it and retain it through life, or we lose it at 
birth and gradually regain it. The first must be dismissed on 
this ground: if a man knows a thing, he can give an account of 
it, but we see that men cannot give an account of the ideas: it 

+ 728—76bD. In the summary of the argument I have mainly followed that given by 
Mr Archer-Hind, p. 77. 


follows then that the second alternative is true; we lose this know- 
ledge and all learning is but the recovery of it. And since our 
souls certainly did not acquire it during their human life, they must 
have gained it before our birth and at birth lost it. Many more 
passages might be cited to prove that Plato kept the mental 
process distinct from the bodily process and that it is the former 
which he sought to explain. 

Though the various mental operations are often discussed and 
Classification distinguished, yet we find no exhaustive classification 
of mental in any dialogue. The reason is obvious. The varia- 
operations. . . . 

tion is due to the fact that each attempt at partial 
classification is made, as above stated, for a special purpose, to 
prove a particular conclusion in a particular dialogue. Thus in the 
Republec' the tripartite division into reason, passion and appetite 
is brought in to show the relation of justice to the other virtues, 
and this, again, whether subordinate to, or coordinate with, the 
analogy between the individual and the state, is a means to the 
determination of a perfect political constitution, which is said in 
the 7zmmaeus* to have been the chief subject of the dialogue. Nor 
does this tripartite division itself tally either with that into know- 
ledge, opinion (or sense-presentation) and ignorance’, or again, 
with the fourfold division into thinking, understanding, belief and 
conjecture (an expansion probably of the distinction between know- 
ledge and opinion), which we find in other parts of the Repzb/zc'. 
In the Sophist® discursive thought is a dialogue of the soul with 
herself, opinion is the silent assertion of the soul in which this 
results, imagining is a combination of opinion and sensation. In 
the Philebus* Plato goes more into detail and distinguishes sen- 
sation, memory, imagination and recollection. When the affections 
of the body do not reach the soul, the state of the soul is said 
to be insensibility or unconsciousness. When the affections of 
the body are communicated through the body to the soul, there 
is sensation. The retention of such a sensation is memory, its 
non-rctention, the fading of memory, is forgetfulness. The recovery 
of lost memories by the soul without the aid of the body is 
recollection. Later in the dialogue’ the relation of memory to 
imagination is illustrated: the former is a scribe or recorder, what 
it records being propositions, opinions; the latter is a painter, 

1 434 C445 K 

217 B,C. 3477 A SY. 4 511 D, Ἐ, 533%, 5344. 
S 26,Nsqq. Ch Theactelus, 189%, Pile. 38 Ὁ. 

© 33 σσσδασ, 7 38 E—4o Β. 


whose glowing pictures excite hope. In this dialogue also there 
is a practical end, all these distinctions being subservient te 
the classification of pleasures as true or false. Similarly in a 
memorable passage of the Theaetefus* the introduction of two 
illustrations, one from a waxen block and the other from a doveecot 
or aviary, is incidental to a refutation of the thesis that knowledge 
is true opinion. But the similes in themselves are contributions 
to psychology of permanent value. That of the waxen block 
presents in its sum and substance the entire theory of sensation 
conceived as an impression from without, like the print of a seal 
upon wax, and the theory of memory as the retention of such 
impressions, the different degrees of retentiveness in individuals 
being ascribed to the size of the block, the quality of the wax 
and the number of impressions crowded together in small compass*. 
The other, that of the aviary, conveys in a striking manner the 
relation between memory and reminiscence, the latter being the 
deliberate recovery of lost impressions ; at the same time it shows 
the relation between the mere possession of knowledae and tts 
actual application or exercise. 

The most comprehensive view of Plato’s psychology is te be 
found in the 7rwaers. He starts with reason or with 
the operations of intellect. The soul thinks. This 

process is first described as it goes on in the soul of the universe 
or universal soul and, because it is an activity, is compauredl with 
circular motion. The revolution of two circles, that of the Same 
and that of the Other, gives judgments of identity and difference, 
the two most important relations, and without such judginents 
there can be no knowledge. But this ceaseless activity of thought 
from time to time suffers disturbance, and the interference results 
in sensation. In the allegory the creation of particular souls follows 
upon the creation of universal soul, and it is to these particular 
souls, each united to a body, that the following description applies. 
When the revolutions of the immortal soul had thus been confined 
in a body, a body, as Plato says, “in-flowing and out-flowineg 
continually,” these revolutions, “being confined in a great river, 


Ὁ 19re sqq-, 107 ὦ sqq. 

* The comparison of a present sensation with a previous impression implies sone 
representative faculty; in this passaye we hear of ἔννοια and δόξα, but not of φαντασία, 
Plato often uses ἔννοια for free constructive imagination. It is carious to find that, for 
the sake of an Homeric allusion and perhaps under the influence of a false etymology, 
Plato substitutes ἐνσημαινόμενα els τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ (104. (7) for εἷς τὸν σὴς ψυχῆς 

κηρόν. But it would be a mistake to infer that he here favours the heart rather than the 
brain as the organ of senses communis. 


neither controlled it nor were controlled, but bore and were borne 
violently to and fro. For great as was the tide sweeping over 
them and flowing off which brought them sustenance, a yet greater 
tumult was caused by the effects of the bodies that struck against 
them; as when the body of any one came in contact with some 
alien fire that met it from without, or with solid earth, or with 
liquid glidings of water, or if he were caught in a tempest of winds 
borne on the air.” The body of the animal, be it remembered, is 
composed of the same four elements, air, earth, fire, water, with 
which the animal comes in contact in alicn bodies, whether in the 
process of nutrition or in that of sensation. “And so the motions 
from all these elements rushing through the body penetrated to 
the soul. This is in fact the reason why these have all alike been 
called and still are called sensations’. Then too did they produce 
the most wide and vehement agitation for the time being, joining 
with the perpetually streaming current in stirring and violently 
shaking the revolutions of the soul, so that they altogether hindered 
the circle of the Same by flowing contrary to it, and they stopped 
it from governing and from going; while the circle of the Other 
they displaced....So that the circles can barely hold to one an- 
other, and though they are in motion, it is motion without law, 
sometimes reversed, now slanting, and now inverted....And when 
from external objects there meets them anything that belongs to 
the class of the Same or to that of the Other, then they declare 
its relative sameness or difference quite contrariwise to the truth, 
and show themsclves false and irrational; and no circuit is governor 
or leader in them at that time. And whenever sensations from 
without rushing up and falling upon them drag along with them 
the whole vessel of the soul, then the circuits seem to govern 
though they really are governed. On account then of all these 
experiences the soul is at first bereft of reason, now as in the 
beginning, when she is confined in a mortal body*®.” The soul, 
according to this account, is in ceaseless activity, and such normal 
activity, or thought, is from time to time disturbed by sensation, 
which has a tendency to pervert right thinking into falsehood 
and error. We might compare the definition from the Phzledus 
above summarised’, in which it is said that when the bodily 
affections pass through both body and soul and give rise there 
to a sort of shock or tremor not only peculiar to each, but shared 

1 Plato connects αἴσθησις with dlocev. 
2 Tin. 43 A sqy-, Archer-Eind’s translation, 3 33D. 


by both in common, the movement which body and soul thus 
share may properly be called sensation. 

Plato started with intellect and thought. Rightly understood, 
Sense and he does not oppose body to soul, but rather sense to 
reason. reason, as one faculty of soul to another. But what 
are the limits of sense and reason? To which should be referred 
the knowledge of relations of cause and effect, of good and evil? 
Sense, we are told in the Republic’, is sufficient where a thing does 
not tend to pass into or be confused with its opposite; where the 
data tend to become confused, sense is insufficient ancl we must 
appeal to intellect. What sense perceives confusedly thought 
thinks distinctly and in isolation. Sense at the best can only 
give opinion, but reason and true opinion are distinct “because 
they are different in origin and unltke in nature. The one is 
engendered in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the 
one is ever accompanied by right understanding, the other ts 
without understanding; the one ts not to be moved by persuasion, 
the other yields to persuasion; true opinion we must admit fs 
shared by all men, but reason by the gods alone and a very sinall 
portion of mankind.” Sense and thought are concerned with 
different objects, the particular and the universal. The defects 
of sense are not in the subject, but in the object, because the 
particulars of sense are in flux and have no fixed being. Prota- 
goras held that sensible things have their so-called qualittes only 
by acting or being acted upon and, as activity and passivity are 
always relative, no quality belongs to anything fer se We cannot 
say that they are per se anything in particular, or even that they 
are at all. They only become: things are always becoming, not 
being. When an object comes in contact with our scnse-organ 
and interaction takes place, a sensation arises in the organ and 
simultaneously the object becomes possessed of a certain cpuality. 
But the sensation in the organ and the quality in the object are 
results which are produced only by the contact and last only as 
long as it lasts. In this doctrine of Heraclitus and Protagoras 
Plato acquiesced, so far as it relates to sense and sensibles. The 
testimony of Aristotle on this point is explicit* and the dialogucs 
confirm it. But, instead of concluding with Protagoras that all 
presentations are relatively true and that there is no such thing 
as objective truth, he drew a different inference, viz. that, if there 

1 523 4 sqq. 
7 Tim. 51 8, Archer-Hind’s translation. 
* Metaph. 987 a 32 sqq., 1078 b 12—17. 


is such a thing as knowledge, which he firmly believed, its object 
must be an intelligible object and an universal. 

The process of sensation in the separate bodily organs is 
Physiology of thus described in the Tewzaews. “When that which 
the senses. is naturally mobile is impressed by ever such a slight 
affection, it spreads abroad the motion, the particles one upon 
another producing the same effect, until, coming to that which 
is conscious, it announces the property of the agent: but a sub- 
stance that is immobile is too stable to spread the motion round 
about, and thus merely receives the affection, but does not stir 
any neighbouring part; so that, as the particles do not pass on 
one to another the original impulse which affected them, they 
keep it untransmitted to the entire creature and thus leave the 
recipient of the affection without sensation. This takes place with 
our bones and hair and all the parts we have which are formed 
mostly of earth: while the former conditions apply in the highest 
degree to sight and hearing, because they contain the greatest 
proportion of fire and air!.” For the process of vision Plato 
adopts with modifications the theory of Empedocles, for the 
process of hearing that of the Pythagoreans. As to smell, he 
holds that odours cannot be classified according to kinds. For 
no element in its normal state can be perceived by smell, because 
the vessels of the nostrils are too narrow to admit water or earth 
and too wide to be excited by air or fire. They can thus only 
perceive an element in process of dissolution, when it is being 
liquefied or decomposed or dissolved or evaporated. The object 
of smell, then, is either vapour, which is water changing to air, 
or mist, which is air changing to water. The only classification 
we can make is that scents which disturb the substance of the 
nostrils are unpleasant, while those which restore the natural 
state are pleasant. In his account of tasting Plato makes the 
sensation depend upon the contraction or dilatation of the pores 
of the tongue by substances that are dissolved in the mouth, the 
peculiar effect of the principal flavours being briefly indicated. 
He made the flesh the organ of touch and, considering the various 
tactile sensations as relative to the tangibles, proceeds to explain 
what constitutes bodies hot and cold, hard and soft, heavy and 


1 Cf. De A. 4254 3-—-7, 4358. 11--- 3. 
2 Hor the various senses see Zim. 45 Β 544.) 61 Ο 564.» 65 CSqq., 66 Ὁ 544.» 67 A—68 Ὁ. 
See also Theophr. De Sensibus, 88 61, 83-91. 


I have dwelt at what some may think inordinate length upon 
Plato, because in psychology, as elsewhere, making allowance for 
the fundamental difference between the two philosophers, we find 
nothing in Aristotle but the development in a systeinatic form of 
the Platonic heritage. It was the disciple’s task to maintam on 
independent grounds the essentials of the master’s doctrine on the 
subject of the soul, and to do this in face of the widely conflicting 
views and the general uncertainty which, as the foregoing sketch 
sufficiently shows, were prevalent at the time. With the conscicus 
or half-conscious materialism of his predecessors sAristotle has no 
more sympathy than Plato and, as compared with this point of 
agreement, the differences between them count for little, however 
much Aristotle may exaggerate them. In the criticism which he 
passes upon the 7zzaeus! he affects to take the narrative literally. 
The point at issue is whether the activity which both Plato and 
Aristotle ascribe to the thinking soul can justly and reasonably be 
called a movement. The doctrine of the two philosophers is on all 
important points the same: they agree that there is an tinimortal 
soul and a mortal soul, that the immortal clement thinks always 
and that thinking must belong to its essence. What Plato calls 
“movement” is familiar enough in Aristotle as “energy "oor 
“activity’” If Plato would only say “energy,” there werd 
seemingly be no room for objection. But in the tenth book of 
the Laws, the work of his old age, when he may have been perc. 
sumed to have had some acquaintance with the views of his disciple, 
Plato obdurately refused to say “energy,” and by his clussitication 
of the ten species of motion assimilated physical movement and 
change to the only activity which in his view had reality, the 
“movement” of thought’, defining the soul as that which is able to 
move itself. And after his death Nenocrates persisted tn attribut- 
ing “movement” to the number which is the soul At this point 
a brief summary of the first part of Aristotle's treatise may be 
Aristotle's the best means of indicating the way in which the 
treatise. writer approaches his subject and the conclusians 
at which he arrives. 

At the outset, he says, we wish to ascertain the nature or 
substance, and the accidents, of the soul, which is a principle of 

1 De A. 406 b 26 sqq. 

* “ Breaking Plato’s metaphor on the wheel,” to cite a happy phrise, Aristotle elipes 
back occasionally into the use of the melaphurical term himself, avin Wefaph. ropa to. 
Compare my sole on 433 Ὁ 17. 

3. 893 B~-895 A, 8085 Ἐ 566. 


animal life. A few preliminary enquiries are suggested. Is soul 
“something”? Substance? Or quality? Or to which category 
does it belong? Is it potentially existent or is it an actuality? Is 
it divisible or without parts? This suggests the further question, 
Is it homogeneous in all species of animals? If not, are the 
differences between souls generic or specific differences? If it is 
without parts, it must be variable, there will be many sorts of soul. 
If it is homogeneous, the homogeneous soul must be made up of 
different parts. Ought we, then, to start with the whole soul or 
with the parts, ought we to study the parts first or their functions, 
and, if the functions, why not first the objects? As an apology 
for not deciding, it may be remarked that, while in order to 
know the properties of a thing, we ought to know its essence, yet 
knowledge of properties contributes to knowledge of essence: in 
fact, the one is involved in the other. 

The attributes of the soul cannot properly be separated from 
those of the body. ‘The one that seems most separable is thinking : 
but, if this is akin to imagining or if it involves an image, neither is 
thinking separable. If any attribute is peculiar to the soul itself, 
then soul may be independent of body; if not, soul cannot be 
so independent. The attributes of soul are notions or forms in 
matter and, as such, fall within the province of the physicist or 
natural philosopher, while the dialectician studies and defines their 
form apart from their matter. Here is the point of difference 
between the objects of physics and of mathematics: the attributes of 
soul as such, e.g. fear and anger, are inseparable from the physical 
matter of the animals to which they belong; the mathematical 
objects, eg. line and surface, though really inseparable, are 
separable in thought from the concrete things to which they 

From this discussion of method we pass to consider the 
opinions of our predecessors. The characteristics of animate being 
are motion and sensation. Hence some have regarded the soul as 
par excellence the cause of motion, Democritus, who thought it fire, 
and Anaxagoras, being typical instances. All assumed that if a 
thing causes motion, it is itself moved. Others, again, start with 
the assumption that like is known by like and infer that the soul is 
composed of all the elements, whether they are one or many: 
Empedocles that it is composed of earth, air, fire and water; Plato 
of number. All definitions may be reduced to three: that it causes 
motion, is perceptive, is incorporeal, The last characteristic leads 
those to choose the finest matter, who acknowledge none but 

Fi. ἔ 


corporeal elements. Subsequently it is objected that if the soul is 
a fine matter, as the soul is in all the sensitive body, we have two 
bodies in one. 

The application of the idea of motion to the soul leads, it 
is argued, to absurdities. There are four kinds of motion, loco- 
motion, qualitative change, decay, growth, and our enquiry 15 
whether the soul is moved in and through itself, and not as sailors 
inaship. All kinds of motion are in space; therefore, if the soul is 
moved, the soul must be in space. As it moves the body, it would 
naturally move like the body; and in that case it would go up and 
down in, and in and out of, the body. In general, we contend, 
the soul does not move the body, as Democritus supposed, by 
physical agency, but by means of purpose of some sort, that ts, 
thought. The most thorough application of motion to explain 
soul, and in particular the soul which thinks, was made by Plato 
in the 7vmaeus, and this is criticised at some length. Like other 
theories, it neglects the rclation between soul and body in virtue of 
which the soul acts, the body is acted upon, the soul moves anel 
the body is moved. 

Another definition of the soul makes it a harmony or blendingr 
of opposites. This notion may be applicable to health or any 
bodily excellence, but will not apply to the seul. Harmony will 
not cause motion. Harmony means cither (1) a close fit or adjust- 
ment of bodies, or (2) the proportion in which clements are mixed. 
It is needless to show that the first meaning Is Inapplicable, there 
are so many fittings of the limbs. As to (2),in flush and bleed 
the elements are mixed in different proportions; which mixture is 
the soul? Returning to motion, we conclude that the only metion 
of which soul admits is motion per aceidens, due to motion af the 
body, as whiteness is moved when a white body is moved. ἃ 
stronger argument than any our predecessors have adduced is 
derived from the attributes of the soul, such as pain and pleasure, 
fear, anger, and other emotions, sensation and thought, all of which 
are commonly believed to be movements. In them, however, the 
soul is not moved: it is merely the cause of movement in the heart 
or some other bodily part. It would be better to ascribe these 
attributes to the man and say that he perceives or thinks or feels 
pleasure and pain with his soul, This leads to an interesting 

; digression on intellect, followed by a refutation of Nenocrates, who 
*,defined the soul as a self-moving number. Hlow can the attributes 
which are known to belong to soul possibly be deduced from such 
a definition? It will not afford even the slightest bint of them. 


The same argument had previously been used against the definition 
of soul as a harmony. 

Two characteristics of soul, (1) that it moves itself, (2) that it is 
composed of very fine matter, have now been dismissed. Against 
the third, that it is composed of the elements and that like knows 
like, it may be urged that then the soul ought to have in it 
all compounds, all categories. Moreover, a unifying principle 
would be needed. The soul is not to be held divisible into parts 
independent of each other, for in that case what keeps its parts 
together? That must be the real soul. Again, as the whole soul 
keeps the whole body together, each part of the soul should keep a 
part of the body together: but we can assign no such function 
to intellect. 

Book II. begins by defining the soul. We premise that of 
entities to which categories are applied substance is one, where by 
substance we mean either (1) matter, which is not yet anything in 
particular, or (2) form, which makes it something in particular, or 
(3) the union of matter and form in the particular thing. Under 
substance in the last sense is included a natural body partaking of 
life. What we mean by life is the power of the body to nourish 
itself and to grow and decay of itself. Body is clearly matter here, 
therefore soul is form. And, if for matter and form we substitute 
potentiality and actuality and distinguish the first stage of actuality, 
corresponding to knowledge, from the second, corresponding to the 
exercise of knowledge, the soul will be the first actuality of a 
natural body furnished with organs, or of a body that has in itself 
the principle of movement and rest. Thus soul is the quiddity or 
formal essence, to which we have analogies in the cutting power of 
the axe and the visual power of the eye, both actualities in the first 
degree, as contrasted with actual cutting and actual seeing, which 
are actualities in the second degree. 

The definition thus found is the most comprehensive possible, 
applying to life in all its various forms, (1) intellect, (2) sense, 
(3) locomotion, (4) motion of nutrition, growth and decay. Plants 
exhibit life in its last form only. Animals, in addition to this, 
have sensation. Of the different senses touch is indispensable. 
Experiment shows that most of these vital functions are really 
inseparable from one another, though at the same time separable in 
thought. Whether this holds of intellect also it is not so easy to 

1 Aristotle's own view is that the sense-organs are composed of the elements, in 
touch all are blended. But sense is not this corporeal organ itself, lut rather the 
character or power which resides in the organ. 



decide. If to these vital functions be added appetence, which 
clearly is present where sensation is, a certain gradation can be 
recognised. They may be arranged in an ascending series. The 
lower can exist without the higher, but the higher in mortal 
creatures always involve the lower. And there is a similar 
gradation in the senses. It scems, then, that there is one definition 
of soul exactly as there is one definition of rectilinear figure. Alike 
in figures and in the various types of soul, the earlier members of 
the series exist implicitly and potentially in the later; the triangle 
is implicit in the quadrilateral and the nutritive faculty” in the 
sensitive. The definition does not dispense us from investivating 
in detail what is the soul in the plant, in the brute, and in man. 
Having reached this point, we naturally expect that each of the 
four main vital functions, nutrition, sensation, intelleet, locomotion, 
will be investigated in detail; and this in fact is what the writer 
proceeds to do. Nutrition, growth and decay and reproduction, 
are dealt with briefly in Book IL, G 43 sense-pereeption at very 
great length, Book IL, c. 5—Book ML, ο΄. 2; and imagination, which 
is intimately connected with sense, in Book IIL, ὦ 35 Upon 
imagination follows intellect, Book IIL, cc. 4-—8; and, lastly, the 
principle of propressive motion in animals, which ts identified with 
appetence, occupies us in Book IIL, ce, g—it. The treatise ends 
with an attempt, from the standpoint of teleology, to answer the 
question why the various forms of life occur in this ascendinuy, scale, 
Aristotle himself was not consciously constructing a new 
science. Tis discussion of the soul was forced upon 
him when, traversing the wide domain he had set 
apart for his science of nature or physics, he passed from inorganic 
to the borders of organic life. The method of science laid down 
in the Ovgazoz, and hitherto pursued, is a method partly inductive, 
partly deductive, aiming to establish rational theories on empirical 
data and often falling short of its aim, because either the data were 
at fault or the theories inappropriate, or because there were defects 
in both. Natural science has to do with nature and with natural 
bodies, which by common consent are pre-eminently substances, 
sensible substances, Nature is itself a cause of things, the power 
in the things themselves which makes them what they are Hts 
characteristic is that, like human intelligence, it devises means to 
ends. In this respect natural bodies or natural substances may 
be compared with the products of art and skill, but in the former 


1 sighs 16 sq. 


case the cause is, and in the latter case is not, in the product itself. 
We wish to know what are (1) the concrete natural substances, 
(2) their properties, (3) their physical changes, (4) the causes of 
these changes. If we could answer these questions, we should 
know the ends of nature in making concrete substances, the 
means used to realise these ends, the form and matter of which the 
substances consist. In logic we proceed from one determination to 
another. Psychology is concerned with mental acts or operations. 
In some of these operations we are conscious of a process; for 
example, in operations of reason we know how we reason, by what 
steps we advance. To search for a method is to aim at determin- 
ing the order and arrangement in which these processes follow one 
another in any science. In geometry certain principles are assumed 
and necessary conclusions are deduced from them. Induction 
generalises from known particulars in order to obtain principles. 
Both induction and deduction may be combined in a more com- 
prehensive method which, after establishing general principles, 
deduces derivative laws and verifies the particular conclusions 
which follow from them. But it may be impossible to apply this 
complete method directly in its simplicity. The effects, which are 
conclusions, may be known, while the causes are to seek. If so, it 
is necessary to infer backwards and discover the causes from the 
effects. The early progress of mathematics and astronomy, with 
their applications to optics and harmonics, led to the belief, which 
Plato endorses, that deduction is the method of scientific research. 
Aristotle agreed for pure mathematics, while in applied mathe- 
matics he regarded induction from the materials collected as, 
strictly speaking, lying outside of the science and subsidiary. But 
in the natural sciences, where we rise from effects to causes, a 
thorough description of facts is a necessary preliminary to the 
discovery of the ultimate principles, and the inverse method must 
be applied. The method of astronomy, we are told, was to collect 
the facts, the phenomena, and from them to deduce astronomical 
laws. The whole method is summed up with convenient brevity 
thus: “In every department of nature we must first ascertain the 
facts and then after that state the causes.” The task to which the 
History of Animats is devoted is thus described: “First let us 
ascertain the existing varieties of animals and the properties of 
each, and after that we must try to discover their causes. This is 


the natural method which puts the collection of material first’. 

1 nal. Prior. 1. 30, 460 1958qq., De Part. 44.1.1) 6400 14, Hast. Am 1.7, 493 4 
δ, 966. 


Characteristic of Aristotle’s mind is the notion that some things 
can be got at both deductively and inductively: it is the con- 
silience of fact and theory. The soul being a part of nature, 
psychology must needs be a branch of general physics, as all 
preceding thinkers, including Plato, agreed. The presuppositions 
of Aristotle’s metaphysics refer life to a cause. Vital phenomena, 
wherever found, are sufficiently alike in their manifestations to 
justify the assumption of one such cause. The treatise, then, is a 
preamble to all parts of the system dealing with plants, or animals, 
or with yet higher beings, if endowed with life. As one of the 
series of biological works, it stands in the closest connexion with 
the tracts known as the Parva Naturalia, with the morphological 
treatise De Partibus Animalinm, and with that upon embryolary, 
De Generatione Animalium, The part which the enquirer professes 
to take calls for very careful demarcation. It is impossible tea say 
what contributions, if any, Aristotle himself made in the field of 
psychology: the presumption is that they were but small The 
evidence of his dependence upon Plato for all that relates to 
psychical phenomena is so overwhelming”, so constant. Possibly 
the repeated illustrations from zoophytes or stationary animals and 
from worms, which give signs of life after they have been severed 
into parts®, are original; but in the main hus facts are precisely the 
facts of his predecessors, the scantiest stock now at the disposal af 
any ignorant layman, Speculation had outrun observation. Nor 
is there any complaint of the scantiness of the data. Ne. Such 
as they are, they have already called forth tee numereus and tad 
divergent explanations. The writer’s modest aim is by preliminary 
discussion to settle a few, just a few, fundamental questions as te 
the nature and attributes of the one principle of Hfe and mind. 
Aristotle’s enquiry is founded on his metaphysies. Et is the 
Body and business of natural science to discover form and 
soul. matter in natural substances. Every animal, every 
plant is a natural substance, compounded of body, which is 
matter, and soul, which is form, and the science of nature has 
therefore to investigate both body and soul. Yet here a provises 
is needed. Natural science does not necessarily treat of the whole 
: The ae SS De part. An. ᾿ r, Ggta 17 BC 3 cf Plata, θύρα, 170 (μι. 
, east; but Aristotle's real merit comes ont θη» 
spiionsly in the tracts Je Some and Qe Memoria. 
"6.8: 410 Ὁ 19, 432} 20, 4rrb 10 sqqey 413 16 sqq. Aristotle may alse be credits 
with the simple experiment of placing a sensible object upon the sense-organ itvelf as userdt 

to show the necessity of a meclium, grgar2, 420 b rg Β΄. 423 b 17 Sip, and the appeal 
to experiment, as e.g. 421 Ὁ rg. 


soul. Wherever soul as form is in matter, wherever it employs 
a bodily organ, we are still in the domain of natural science; but 
anything included under soul which is independent of the body 
and which cannot be thus defined must be reserved for meta- 
physics’. The meaning which Aristotle attached to independence 
or separate existence must be grasped, if we would understand what 
he conceived by a substance or thing. Primarily this separate 
existence is the attribute of concrete particulars presented to 
sense in the external world. They are bodies locally, numerically 
and by magnitude separate. From them the conception is trans- 
ferred to whatever the mind thinks as distinct, and even for 
immaterial notions Aristotle has no other formula. They, too, 
like concrete bodies, are described as being in time, in space and 
in conception separate or distinct? In reducing soul to the logical 
essence or form of body Aristotle, according to his own presup- 
positions, so far from favouring materialism, secures once and for 
all the soul’s absolute immateriality. The living body has in- 
dependent existence, has its own form and its own matter. Even 
a dead body or an inanimate thing is something existing inde- 
pendently, to which we can apply the pronoun “this*.” But the 
soul does not exist in the same way. Nor, again, is it a thing 
capable of being added to or subtracted from another thing, the 
body, any more than form in general is a thing which can in 
mechanical fashion be united to and separated from its appropriate 
matter’. If a brazen sphere be melted down, the brass remains. 
It is still “this” something, “this” mass of metal; but we cannot 
then say of its spherical shape that it is “this” anything or that 
it any longer exists. The lifeless body is like the eye which 
cannot see or the axe which is spoilt for use.’ We may apply to 
them the same names as before; but, as the nature is no longer 
the same, the application is irrelevant, misleading, equivocal. But, 
though the lifeless body is still a concrete particular and a sub- 
stance, the soul apart from its relation to the body is no such 
thing at all. Now the soul as form stands to the body as matter 
of the concrete individual precisely as the spherical shape to the 
brass, as vision to the eye, as cutting power to the axe. In every 
case the form is a quality predicable of the matter. But the 

1 De Dart, Amt 1. το 6412 14-—b το, 

2 Meaph. 1016) 1--.3. 

5. Biological writers now avoid the ambiguity attaching to the use of the term “body” 
in two distinct senses by means of the term ‘‘organism.” 

4 Cf. Metuph. 1045 Ὁ 12 8qq- 
® 412b τὸ 866. 


body is not predicable of the soul, we cannot explain the soul 
in terms of body or make it a material thing, however fine the 
materials. On the contrary, we must explain body in terms of 
soul. It is form which determines and we only know a thing as 
determined. Primary matter, the absolutely indeterminate, is in 
itself unknowable’. Therefore, if we would know the living bady, 
we must study its activitics and operations and all the attributes 
which it acquires in virtue of soul. Soul and body, then, are nat 
two distinct things, they are one thing presenting two <listinct 
aspects. The soul is not body, but belongs to body ?: it is not 
itself a concrete particular, although its presence in the beady 
makes a concrete particular; it resides in a body and, what is 
more, in a body of a particular kind, furnished with the means 
whereby the functions of the soul can be exercised. The relation 
of matter to form in the particular thing is one instance of a 
relation of higher generality, that between potence and act be- 
tween the power to become and the realisation of that power in 
actuality. Before it is,a thing may be or may not be, and when 
it is, if it has the power to act, it may act or it may not act. 
Now body stands to soul, and matter to form in general, as the 
potential to the actual which has reached the first stage: ane 
already is. In other words, the soul is the power which the living 
body possesses and the lifeless body lacks. This is first actual- 
isation or first entelechy. Again, the actual possession of facultics 
unused still stands to the exercise of these faculties in the relation 
of potence to act. Life itself, the use of actual power, is the 
seconcl stage, energy. The actual use must be preceded by actual 
power. Soul is actual power to live, but is not life. Τὰ Plate 
body is opposed to soul. The body could be trained te obey the 
soul by gymnastic and music. In Aristotle the body is the natural 
instrument of the soul, and so the body into which a particular 
soul enters must be adapted to its use. This fact renders the 
Pythagorean idea of transmigration absurd‘ Soul is Ukewise 
both the final and efficient cause of the body* It is the final 
cause, because the soul is merely means to vital power and life; 
it is the efficient cause not only in the obvious case of progressive 
motion, but also in all the various changes which the body under- 

goes in the exercise of vital functions, including nutrition, growth, 

1 Metaph. 1036 ἃ 2—9. 4 gtah δ aay, 414.ἃ ty μὰ 
5 4t2ag sqq., a 22 sqq., b 27 qq, 
4 407) 20—~26, 5 grab Bane. 


Such, in brief, is the description of soul considered in and by 
Classification itself, including the various separate powers, which 
of vital are assumed to account for the varieties of vital and 
powers. . . . 

psychical operations. The great problem is how this 
multiplicity of acts or operations should be classified. Plato in 
some dialogues divides soul into parts, an immortal part, reason, 
and two mortal parts, passion and appetite. His pupil is more 
cautious. He does not go beyond the supposition of certain 
powers or faculties. In one sense, he says, this division into 
powers is illusory, for the powers of soul are really infinite in 
numbert But he contends that his own groups are convenient 
groups. Faculties, like every other basis of classification, are 
only means to an end. Plato, he thinks, should have added the 
nutritive and sensitive faculties. Desire, again, runs through all 
operations: there is the rational wish, the angry impulse and the 
instinctive appetite. Here at least it is clear that the different 
powers are but different capacities of the single soul. Yet his 
ignorance of the bodily conditions of thought and his consequent 
assumption of a separable and immortal part of soul leave Aris- 
totle much in the same position as Plato. In order to get a clear 
view, special stress must be laid upon the statement that the 
powers of soul are arranged in an ascending scale% In mortal 
creatures, at all events, the higher faculty always presupposes the 
lower, without which it cannot exist*, The lowest power, that of 
nutrition and propagation, is common to animals with plants; in 
plants it exists alone. Animals have sensitivity in addition: of 
the senses they must possess at least touch. So far we are on 
safe ground. From this point we may simplify in one of two 
ways. In the third Book the two faculties, sense and intellect, 
tend more and more to be conjoined as the judging faculty, while 
appetency, which in its lowest form is implied by sense‘, is made 
the principle on which progressive motion depends® These con- 
siclerations lead to the following scheme : 

t. Nutritive 2. Discriminative 3. Motive 
[ Γ ἰ ᾿ 
Sense Intellect Appetence Faculty of 

On the other hand, intellect is said to be the highest of all our 
powers, and the lower forms of appetency, as well as the power 

1 4324 22 sqq., 433 Ὁ 1---- 2 arab 28—q4isa τ. 
δ 4rsa II. 4 414 1 sqq. 8 4324 21 560: 


of progressive motion, are associated with sense, while an inter- 
mediate place must be found for the imaginative faculty. These 
considerations suggest the following table of faculties: 

1. Nutritive; 2. Sensitive, which is also appetitive ; (this is in 
most animals joined with) 3. Locomotive; 4. Imaginative; 5. In- 

In the ascending series of vital functions we start with the 
The soul of lowest, which constitute the sole life of plants and 
the plant. are an indispensable element in the life of animals. 
Their isolation from all others in the vegetable kingdom facilitates 
their study. We accordingly assume! a power of self-nourishment, 
the nutritive faculty. But we must be careful to remember that 
this faculty has also to account for growth, decay and reproduc- 
tion; by which last it partakes, so far as it can, of immortality, 
the species of plants, as well as of animals, being imperishable, 
though the individual members of the species perish. If we are 
to define things by their end, the primary soul, the soul of the 
plant, is that which is capable of reproducing the species. But 
if the individual plant or animal is to be capable of this, it must 
be kept alive. Hence in a certain sense the subsidiary functions 
of nourishment and growth are even more important than the 
end to which they are means. Tfood or nutriment is the cor 
relative object of the nutritive faculty, and we must determine how. 
things are nourished. It was a common opinion that contrarics 
are nourishecl by contraries. This is generally, but not always, 
true of the clements or simple bodies. Fire, Aristotle points ont, 
is nourished by water, but not water by fire. Others said like was 
nourished by like These two views can be reconciled. Undi- 
gested food is unlike, but food, when digested, has been assimilated 
to that which it nourishes, and then like is nourished by lke. 
Nutrition, then, is motion or change, and it is casy to discever the 
movent, the instrument and the moved. Soul is the nourisher, 
food the instrument of nutrition, body the nourished. Vital heat, 
as well as food, is employed by the soul in the process, and we 
have an analogy in the steersman, who employs his hand to move 
the rudder with which he steers the ship. 

Little suspecting what advances botanical science was to make, 
Aristotle denied that plants have sensitivity. He admits that they 
are affected by heat and cold, but only, he argues, as inanimate 
things are affected; that is, they are simply heated and covledd. 

11, c.g Cf also grit bb rg-——30, 4138 15 βῆ.» 4240 32 Mdey $326 17 MIT, 4358 
27-30, 4354 28 50. 


They cannot receive the form of objects without the matter, and 
this because they have no organ in which the elements are so 
blended as to give the means of discriminating, say, cold and 
heat. When a plant touches an object, there is merely physical 
contact. Thus the excessive preponderance, as Aristotle supposed, 
of “earth” in the structure of plants precludes sensation, because 
it precludes the proper blending of the elements, which would be 
necessary to make organs of sense. The insensibility of certain 
tissues of the body, eg. bones, sinews, hair, he explained in a 
similar way as due to the presence in them of too much earth: 
and in this erroneous view he followed Plato. 

The characteristic of animals when contrasted with plants is 
Sense- that they not only live, but have the power to per- 
perception. ceive, which the Greeks regarded as essentially a 
cognitive power. They thought that we cannot perceive by sense 
without perceiving something, and interpreted this something 
objectively, as something which exists. The distinction so im- 
portant for modern psychology between sensation and perception 
had not yet received much attention. For Aristotle, as for his 
predecessors, the main question is, in what does this operation of 
perceiving consist and how does it take place? We must describe 
the various kinds of perception and determine how perceiving is 
related to thinking, since both are cognitive. One distinctive 
mark is that by sense we perceive individuals. But we have 
much knowledge of individuals which the five senses cannot give. 
Does, then, all this knowledge come from sense, or must it be 
referred in part to intellect, or must we invent new faculties or 
powers to account for it? Suffice it to say that, whenever per- 
ception takes place, an universal is perceived, but not directly and 
per se, only per accidens*, Directly sense perceives only “this,” 
just as directly sense perceives it here and now. The operation 
of perceiving something existent is made by Aristotle to depend 
on his own physical theories of motion, of efficient cause and of 
essential form. One specics of motion he defines as the production 
of an effect in matter by an efficient cause, as, e.g., the production 
of an impression upon wax by a seal or of an image in a mirror 
by a candle. Motions may be classified according to the categories 
as qualitative, quantitative or spatial, and the species of motion to 
which sense-perception is referred is the first species or qualitative 
change, the alteration or transformation which a thing undergoes 

> 417 19 564. 
2 Anal. Lost ts 3t, 87 Ὁ 28 sqq., 11. 19, 1000 173 Metaph. 10874 19 syq- 


when it loses certain qualities and acquires new ones, remaining 
itself numerically the same. The form or essence without the 
matter is transmitted by the efficient cause or agent to the patient 
upon whom it acts, as when fire transmits heat to fuel. The form 
or essence is one in all the things thus affected. The one universal 
heat is the same wherever actually found, in fuel ignited, in water 
heated or in molten iron. Applying this physical theory, we 
should define the particular motion or qualitative change which 
we call perceiving by sense as the production of an effect in a 
particular part of the body, which we call a sense-organ, by a 
particular external thing, which we call the sensible object. But 
this is inadequate. Plants receive heat and cold and the air 
receives odour, but they do not perceive’. It is not enough, then, 
to say that perceiving is undergoing some affection or being acted 
upon. Besides, what is affected? Not the single organ, but the 
percipient as a whole; and we have scen that the animal is a 
particular case of composite substance, the body being matter, 
the sentient soul form. Now it is with the soul that we perceive, 
as it is with the soul that we live and think® Let us, then, amend 
the definition. Perception is an alteration in the soul. It consists 
in the production by an external object of an effect in the sensitive 
faculty. This effect is the reception of the form, without the 
matter, of the external thing perceived’. 

Thus Aristotle is able to decide between the conflicting views 
of his predecessors, according to some of whom like acts upon like, 
while Heraclitus and Anaxagoras insisted that for any change to 
be perceived object and percipient must be unlike. As we saw 
about nutrition, both are right and both are wrong. The /er- 
cipiendune is unlike, the perceptum is like, that which perceives its, 
for, when the process of percciving takes place, both the external 
thing which causes it and the percipient affected by that cause 
have in the very act one common form which, like every universal, 
is the same wherever it is found. That which sees is in the act 
of vision in a way coloured’, for it receives the same one form of 
colour which existed and exists in the coloured object perceived. 
But we may go a step further. Where one thing acts upon an- 
other, both the action and its effect reside in the patient, in that 
which is acted upon. Previous to their interaction, if they are 
physical bodies, the one is merely a potential agent, the other is 

1 4242 32—b 18. 
3 4148 12 5q., 408 b 13—r18. * 4248 17 ΒαΩ, 
4 416 b 35, 417 ἃ 18—20, 4184 3—6, 5 425 b 22. 


merely a potential patient, whatever else they may be actually. 
Applying this to perception, the external thing is always per- 
ceptible, a percipiendum, a potential percepfum, the sense-faculty 
is always potentially percipient: but in the process of perceiving 
the potential in both cases has been transformed into an actual. 
The eye, eg., becomes a seeing eye, the whiteness whiteness per- 
ceived, and these two actualities reside in that which ts passively 
affected,in the sense. In other words, the actuality of the sensible 
object is one and the same with (not merely similar to) the actuality 
of the perceiving subject!, sense and sensible having in the act 
of perception one and the same essence, since the whiteness seen 
in the object is transferred to the visual faculty and, being an 
universal, a form, is one and the samme, wherever it resides. Is 
this, we ask, a doctrine of relativity? Most certainly not. The 
followers of Protagoras are supposed to argue that, if the sensible 
quality is alone real, nothing would exist at all unless there were 
living beings to perceive, for without them there would be no 
perception. 1 grant, Aristotle replies, that in the absence of living 
beings there would be no act of perception, no affection of the 
percipient. But for all that, it would be impossible to get rid of 
things, which are potential causes of perception even when they 
are never perceived. Jor perception does not perceive itself, there 
is something beyond the perception; and this must be logically 
prior to the perception, since whatever causes motion or change 
must be prior to that which it moves or changes: and this is not the 
less true because sensible object and percipient are relative to cach 
other’. In other words, the object perceived actually exists with 
its own form, its own qualities, even when it is out of all relation 
to a percipient. And similarly we may conccive a percipient out 
of all relation to an object, none such being actually present. It 
is then what it always was, a power of perceiving, a faculty of 
sense, mere sensitivity. 

These considerations apply most emphatically and most natur- 
ally to sense regarded as a whole, a single power which resides in 
the body of the animal, likewise regarded as a whole. But this 
power of perceiving is localised and pluralised. Wherever a part 
of the body subserves a particular end or function, it becomes 
an organ or instrument, and the general power of perception, as 
specialised in the five senses, employs its separate sense-organs, 

1 425 Ὁ 26 sqq.- 
2 Melaph. τοιοῦ 30—-1orr ἃ 2. 


the eye, the ear, the nostril and the organs of taste and touch. 
For the detailed account of the modes in which they are employed, 
the medium which they necessarily imply and their special objects 
or provinces, the reader must be referred to Book 11. ce. 7—11}. 
Here there is space only for a few general remarks. First, the 
parallelism between sense as a whole and the single special sense, 
e.g. sight or touch, must never be overlooked. “As the sensation 
of a part of the body is to that part, so is sensation as a whole 
to the whole sentient body as such.” ‘Thus the sense of vision 
presides over its own special province of colour, bounded by the 
opposites, white, black, and embracing every intermediate shade®. 
The sense of touching has its special province, or rather provinces, 
especially temperature and resistance, bounded the former by the 
extremes of hot and cold, the latter of hard and soft, and inclucling 
all varieties of temperature and resistance intermediate between 
the extremes in each province. Vision resides in the eye, touch 
in the internal organ of touch (probably the heart) or in the 
intra-organic medium, the flesh, according as we adopt the more 
scientific or the popular standpoint. To perceive is to undergo 
a qualitative change. In order, then, to become assimilated to 
the object, the organ must be capable of undergoing such change 
in the direction of either extreme or of any of the intermecliate 
grades between these extremes. If it could not respond to the 
stimulus, as modern psychologists would say, at any point in the 
scale of colour, of temperature or of resistance, the failure on the 
part of the organ would be attended by mal-perception or non- 
perception on the part of the faculty. This is brought home to 
us whenever we try to employ our senses upon objects either 
altogether out of their range or such that the perception is at- 

1 As might be expected, the contributions to the physiology of the senses, and 
especially vision, are worthless. ‘See Beare, Greek Zheortes, Introduction; alsa 
pp. 9—11- The mathematical researches of the Pythagoreans finally developod a more 
correct doctrine of sound and its propagation, to which the spurious treatine Jv 
Audibilibus, probably by Heraclides, bears testimony, See Jan, Musii Serintores, 
pp. s0—57, who also traces (pp, 130 sqq.) to Archytas some of the theories found in 
Plato’s Zimaeus. For the helplessness of the Greeks in empirical science cf. Zeller, 
Aristotle, 1. p. 443, Eng. Tr. From our superior knowledge we can afford to smile 
at the naive simplicity, the sheer audacity, which professes to explain growth, while 
knowing nothing of cells, discusses sensation and movement without understanding the 
nature and functions of the nervous system, and treats fire as an element in blissful 
ignorance of the chemical changes which go on during combustion. If Aristotle had been 
in possession of a microscope, it is probable that he would have made no better use of 
it than did Huxley’s unsophisticated correspondent (see Life of Mluxley, vol. τὰ, 
pp. 365 8qq-)- 

4 4xab 23——25. ® 426 Ὁ 8 sqq,, 422 Ὁ 1 sqq. 


tended by pernicious effects, when we try to see in the dark or 
to look at the noonday sun or to plunge the hand in boiling water 
or to touch the air’. Now what is it which justifies our expectation 
that in normal cases a sensible object, when present, will be per- 
ceived? What are the physical or physiological grounds on which, 
with the science of his day, Aristotle based this belief? He ac- 
cepted from Empedocles the false physics which resolved all 
bodies into four elements, air, earth, fire, water, with four primary 
qualities, hot, cold, wet, dry. These elements are found in their 
compounds in the outside world. They are also found all four 
mixed (we might say, chemically combined) in the tissues or 
homeveneous parts of animal bodies, of which, again, the hetero- 
geneous parts or organs of animal bodies are composed. Hence 
there is a new application of the old maxim that like is known 
by like. The characteristic of cach object perceived depends not 
so much upon the materials which enter into its composition as 
upon the combining ratio of those materials, which constitutes its 
form. When Empedocles resolved bone into definite proportions 
of his four clements, he was not far from realising that this com- 
bining ratio is the form which makes bone what it 153, So, too, 
with the sense-organ. It also has its combining ratio which con- 
stitutes its form, and this form, again, is the faculty residing in 
the organ. Hence sense as a whole, and each special sense, Is a 
form, because it is the determining: proportion or combining ratio 
of the tissues composing the organ". In perceiving, form receives 
and apprehends form. In order that it may perceive all the quali- 
ties which came within its range, the sense must be neutral or 
indifferent to all, must be a mean between the opposite extremes 
which it can perceive and be actually neither of them“ In the 
organ of sense the constituent elements are blended in a certain 
way, «og. the finger has a certain temperature. But, as by the 
definition perceiving is qualitative change, this temperature must 
be capable of variation in the direction of either extreme or of 
any grade intermediate to the extreines, and the constituent 
elements of the organ of sense must be blended in such a way 
as to allow of this. This possibility of variation serves to explain 
the discriminating power which attaches both to sense as a whole 
and to the single special senses. Whatever is intermediate be- 

1 424 tr κήηή. 

t goa t3 sq, s10a 56..; Melaph. οὐ 0 15 aq]. 
3 τοὶ τ4--τῷὸ, 46 Ὁ 3, 4340 2 BY. 

4 423 b 30-4242 τὸ, 4168 27-- 7. 


tween two extremes is differently related to the one and to the 
other. In Aristotelian language, any point in the middle of a line 
is the beginning of the line in relation to one extremity, the end 
of the line in relation to the other. The single sense sight dis- 
criminates two shades of colour. It is in a certain relation to the 
first when it perceives the first, it is in a different relation to the 
second when it perceives the second. The discrimination measures 
the difference between these two relations. 

The parallel between sense as a whole and the separate special 
senses extends to the objects directly perceived. The objects which 
the special senses directly perceive are known by two marks: they 
cannot be perceived by another special sense and the appropriate 
special sense cannot be mistaken about them’. The objects not 
exclusively bclonging to this or that special sense, but perceived by 
two or more special senses, are referred to sense as a whole, often 
called sensus communis. Such percepts are shape and magnitude, 
unity and number, motion, rest and time. They include what 
Democritus considered and Locke called the primary qualities of 
body. About this common function of sense as a whole there has 
been much needless mystification. The sentient soul is one, and 
all the more important and more intellectual of its functions belong 
to it in virtue of this unity. As one, it perceives the common 
sensibles ; as one, it pronounces judgments of identity and differ- 
ence between sensibles; as a single faculty attendant upon each 
and every special sense, it is self-conscious% That to sense as a 
whole, the so-called sexsus communis, should be assigned functions 
which in degree, if not in kind*, exceed those of the separate special 
senses, need not surprise us. τ in sense we have a whole which 
is something more than the sum of its different parts. Analysis 
into its elements does not completely explain it, nor will the simple 
addition of these elements reproduce what was subjected to 
analysis. The operation of this single faculty is temporarily 
arrested in slecp, permanently in death. Lastly, to this faculty 
belong imagination, dreams and memory, which we are now to 

1 4188 7 5464., 4158. 14 8qq-, 428 b 18 sq. 

2 4254 27, 426 Ὁ 20 sqq.3 De Somno 2, 455 ἃ 12 Sqq. 

5. Some of these functions appear to be delegated by sensus communis to the special 
senses, if we interpret strictly the statements that each special sense discriminates the 
objects within its own province (426 b ro), and that it is by sight that we perceive that we 
see (4250 12 sqq.). Probably, however, both statements require careful qualification, 
which the latter receives from De Somso ἃ, 4558 12 sq. Cf. Beare, Greek Theories, 
PP- 233, 72. 2, 277. 


Sensation is defined as the production of an effect in the sense- 
Images and organ, a part of the body, by an external object. It 
Sleep. is, then, a movement or impression affecting the body 
and, so far as we are conscious of it, the sensitive soul as well. Now 
this movement does not always vanish with the disappearance of 
the object which caused it. Instances may be given of its 
persistence, as our inability at first to see in a darkened room if we 
have just left the sunlight ; or what is known as the after-image 
{more correctly, the after-percept) when, if we close our eyes after 
looking at the sun, we see a succession of images of it in different 
colours’. It is by facts like these that Aristotle explains 
imagination. He defines it as a motion generated by actual per- 
ception, a motion distinct from, yet similar to, the motion which 
constituted the original sensation’, or, as Hobbes translates, “ All 
fancies are motions within us, reliques of those made in the sense.” 
In order to learn how wide is the range of the imaginative faculty 
we must turn to the tracts on Sleep and Memory. Sense itself is 
often mistaken in regard to the common sensibles and the things 
to which sensible qualities belong, for example, as to what the 
coloured or sonorous body is and where it is+: and these errors 
of sense are shared in and increased by imagination, especially 
when the sensible object is perceived from a distance. Illusion in 
gencral is due to the clifference between imagination and judgment 
and between the standards they employ® It may sometimes be 
corrected by one sense coming to the aid of another, as when the 
object perceived as double by crossed fingers is seen to be single‘. 
The illusion that objects seem to move past us, when we in fact are 
travelling past them, implies that a movement is set up in the eye 
of the same kind as would occur if we were stationary and the 
objects themselves were in motion, In fact, the bodily movement 
induces a picture of the very object which might have been its 
cause. It is to the imaginative faculty that dreams must be 
ascribed’. Sleep is the arrest of the sensitive faculty as a whole 
or seusus coummnunis, by which when awake we are conscious that 
we are awake and have sensations’, Plants, having no sensation, 

1 Cf. go8b 18, 4151} 24 sy, 4208. 43 De Ζιφ τ, 2, 4508 24—28, 

% De ον. ἃ, 489 5-20. 

* 428 Ὁ ro—429 a 5. 

4 4180 18 56., 428b 20 sqq- 

δ De Lnsont. ὦ, 460b 16 sqq., 1, 458) 9 sqq. 

6 16. ἃ, 4690 b 20—-27. 

7 De Insomn. i, 4808 L422. 
8 De Somuo 1, 444 25-27, 4, 455 12-—b 2. 


do not sleep. In order that sense, which is charged with motive 
as well as perceptive functions, may recover from fatigue, sleep 15 
necessary’, and it is brought about ultimately by the process of 
nutrition?, An evaporation from the food in the stomach rises to 
the head‘, is there cooled and descends, causing a feeling of 
drowsiness. The surface of the body is cooled and what heat there 
is in the system collects about the heart® It is clear that dreaminy 
is not a function proper to sense as a whole nor to any special 
sense, much less to understanding or opinion® Yet the tmages 
seen in dreams have sensible qualities. It only remains to refer 
dreaming to the same faculty as illusions in our waking hours. 
The residual movements in the organs are no doubt present in the 
daytime, but at night, when the action of the spectal senses ts 
suspended’ and the environment is peaccful, the imagination ts 
most active’, Then ev Aypothesi these persistent effects reach and 
stimulate the central organ of sense. We are most Hable to 
illusions when labouring uncer emotion or morbid states", as, fear 
example, when a patient in sickness mistakes figures on the wall 
for real animals” and even makes bodily movements to escape from 
them. In sleep, again, the judging faculty is weak", owing to the 
increasing pressure of blood around the heart There are, of 
course, cases in which creams are the result of seimi-conmsecious 
sensations, half-heard sounds or half-seen lights", which would have 
escaped attention in our waking hours: and reflections and ideses 
are often added to them, But in itself dreaminc is simply the 
result of the movement of our sensations curing the portod of sleeps 
as such*#, Dreams are movements which give rise to images within 
our serise-organs", 

The most important of all our images are those of memory. Tf 
Memory- imagining is consciously referred to an carlier per- 
image. ception of which the image is a copy, then we call it 
memory”, For memory there are two conditions, the affection mew 

1 De Sono i, 454) t7——485 ἃ 3. Ὁ 6. 2, 488 λ΄ 28. 
3 20. ἃ, 4560 32 sqq. 4 ibe 3, 56 1 «ἢ τη,» 
4b. ἃ, 457 33 BYq.3 Me Jresomin. 3, 461% 3 sqe). 

6 De Lusomn. t, 488 Ὁ 9--- 480 α 9. 7 th. 3, αὔτ 4. 

5 26. 3, 461.4 14--} 30. ® ih, a, αὔο Ὁ ἃ νη. 
W 7, 2, 460 bie 566. It sd, 4, Gt by Rom, 
2 ἐξ, 3, 462 τὰ 840... 26 sq. fh, 3, 4620 Sy mY 
Wid. 1, 458 15 βή.. 3, 4620 5---ἴ. 1S Jb. 3, 402 A τὸ 54}. 

1b γῇ. 3, 462 0 8 sqqy. 

17 Oe Mem. τ, 4490 24 Sq 450} δ᾽ πάλι a 2, 15 Φανγάσματοι, as εἰκόνων οὐ 
φάντασμα, ἕξις, where ἕξις, which is usually understood to mean * retention,” may 
mean ‘ reference.” 


present, and the perception of time’; in other words, not only 
images, but images regarded as decayed copies of earlier im- 
pressions, and this involves the perception of time. By memory 
we see distance, not indeed in space, but in time? As memory is 
not confined to man, but extends to some of the lower animals, 
these latter must be credited with the imaginative faculty and the 
perception of time®. Here are very promising beginnings of a 
comparative psychology, which Aristotle, though he desiderated it 
in his predecessors, did very little himself to supply. His denial of 
understanding to brutes was a prejudice which a little research 
would have been able to surmount. As a matter of fact, he not 
only holds absolutely that, though the lower animals remember, 
they have no reasoning power, but, further, that, if memory were a 
function of pure intelligence alone, even man himself could not 
remember, since intellectual acts cannot be remembered fer se‘. 
What, then, can be remembered? The instrument of memory is 
the image. Hence whatever can be presented as an image can be 
directly remembered, all that cannot be presented as an image can 
only be remembered indirectly by means of the images with which 
it is associated. But how can we know the past which is not 
present, if our only instrument is a present affection, the image 
which survives after the original impression is gone®? Let us 
revert to the formation of images. The fact that a present move- 
ment of sensation sets up a subsidiary movement of imagination 
may be expressed in a clifferent way, if we employ the metaphor of 
an finpression, by which perception has been so often illustrated". 
The act of perceiving, as it were, stamps a particular impression 
upon the sense-organ, as a seal ring stamps an impression upon 
wax. This impression, which remains, is a potential image so long 
as it is latent, an actual image when we become conscious that it is 
still present. Is it, then, this image, the reproduced impression, and 
not that of which it is an image, which we remember? If so, it 
may be urged, remembrance is not of the past at all. δὲ that rate 
we might just as well suppose that in actual sensation also we sce 
and hear what is not present to sense ; an objection which cuts at 
the very root of cvery representative theory of perception. The 
objection is met by pointing out that in a certain way it is true that 
actual perception has for its object what is not present’. Wesee a 

1 fe Mom. τέ, 449) 18—29, 450 b Li—-20, 2, 4512 20-31. 

4 #6. 2, 4520 7 sqq. 3 2b, 1, 4508 15---22. 
* 1. τὸ 4802 τὸ τοῖα. 6 ib. I, 4508 25 Sq., 450 b £1 sqq. 
ὅδ δια 48O 30 SIG. 7 76. χ, 450 b 20 5646. 



likeness of an absent person: the picture is present, the original 15 
not. The picture, though numerically one and the same, may be 
regarded in two ways, either as a simple picture or, in relation to 
the original, as a likeness. Apply this to the memory-image. . [t, 
too, may be regarded in itself simply as an image before the mind, 
or in relation to something else of which it is a representation. If 
viewed in the latter aspect, it is a memorial or reminder of an 
earlier perception which it recalls. It is distinguished from other 
images by its reference to time past and by the fact that it is, what 
many images are not, a copy or representation. Memory may 
accordingly be defined not simply as a retention, but rather as a 
reference, of a mental presentation as a likeness to the original of 
which itis a likeness. All representations are likewise presentations. 
Images are before us in memory, in present sensation and in 
expectation, whether hope, fear, or desire, but we refer these 
images to the past, the present, and the future respectively) In all 
three cases something is presented, and the only way of cistingsuish- 
ing them is the accompanying perception of time, one of the 
common sensibles. Confusion of memory with imagination is one 
case of hallucination: thus Antipheron of Oreus was a type of 
mental derangement when he mistook what he only fancied 
for a past experience*, So far, then, like imagining in veneral, 
memory is a function of sexsus comununis, and hence it is to the 
central organ of sense that we must refer this movement or 
impression or image, or whatever else we call the corporeal change 
in question. 

The distinction between memory and reminiscence or recollec- 
tion is never very clearly stated by Aristotle, but, if we attend te 
what he says about acquiring knowledge and reacquiting it, he. 
about learning for the first time and learning over ayain what we 
have forgotten (neither of which, of course, is to be identitied! with 
memory or recollection), it seems that the case may be put as 
follows®, When we retain what we learn, whether by sense or 
thought, we are said to remember. Recollection iimplies the 
recovery of what has temporarily been obscured without poaing 
through the process of re-learning, and this whether the recovery 
is due to voluntary effort or is involuntary. We can remember 
without recollecting, if the image has never been lost, but is latent 
or potentially existent in us. When we recollect by voluntary 
effort we are conscious that it is lost and seek to recover it. Llere 

1 De Mem. 1, 440 Ὁ 25-——28. 2b. 1, 451 ἃ ἢ Heep. 
5. 2b. 2, 4518. λο---ῷ ro. 


I cite at length the account given by Wallace, p. xcv: “ Recollec- 
tion may take place either intentionally or unintentionally : we 
may, that is to say, recall some event of past experience either 
accidentally as it were or by the help of a distinct effort to call it 
back to mind; but in either case it is regulated by certain laws 
which it is one of the great psychological merits of Aristotle to 
have tabulated for us. The laws which thus express the mode 
in which the mind attempts to recall its past impressions are what 
have commonly been designated since Aristotle’s day, the Laws of 
the Association of Ideas. But to Aristotle, it must be added, the 
laws in question have little or none of the significance which they 
have acquired in the hands of modern inquirers. To him they are 
simply a statement of the manner in which we seek to regain some 
fragments of knowledge which have for the moment got outside 
our consciousness. Recollection in short being the recalling of our 
past impressions, it follows that the success of our efforts to recall 
them will depend to no inconsiderable extent on the degree to 
which we can recall the order in which other impressions stood to 
that of which we are in search. But our impressions follow one 
another in memory in an order similar to that in which the actual 
sensations succeeded one another. Recollection thus involves 
a study of the laws of sequence in the order of our ideas: and 
Aristotle analyses the method of recalling past impressions in the 
following manner. ‘When engaged in recollection we seek to 
excite some of our previous movements, until we come to that 
which the movement or impression of which we are in search was 
wont to follow. And hence we seek to reach this preceding 
impression by starting in our thought from an object present to us 
or something else whether it be similar, contrary or contiguous to 
that of which we are in search; recollection taking place in this 
manner because the movements are in one case identical, in another 
case cuincident and in the last case partly overlap’ Similarity, 
contrariety and contiguity are thus to Aristotle the three principles 
by which for purposes of recollection our ideas and impressions 
have to be guided. Our sensuous movements and impressions really 
follow one another in an order corresponding to that of external 
nature. Thus, the more order and arrangement there is in the 
elements of our experience—the better connected our ideas are— 
the more easily will they be remembered. And again the greater 
number of times we have established a connection between our 

1 De Mem. 2, 451 b 16-—22. 2 ah. 2, 452 a I—3.- 


ideas, the greater will be the ease with which we can recall them. 
Habit in short becomes a second nature: and the constant con- 
junction of two phenomena in outer experience will lead to their 
being so completely connected in the mind that the one will never 


show itself without the other’. 

I have reserved to the last the highest employment of mental 
images in the service of the intellect. It 15 impossible to think 
without such an image before the mind* When we are contem- 
plating the object of thought, we must have an image before us. 
The past experience which we remember includes not only 
perceptions, but thoughts, and the reference of the image to 
sensus communis compels Aristotle to declare that nothing but 
what is sensible is remembered directly, fer se, ancl that the whole 
of our thoughts, notions and conceptions are remembered indirectly, 
per acctdens. Our thinking is conditioned by continuity, Le. oxten- 
sion, and by time. Just as in proving a geometrical proposition we 
are aware that the size of the figure does not affect the proof, but 
we nevertheless draw the figure of a determinate size, so in 
thinking, even though the object is not quantitative, we think of it 
as a quantum, and, if it is quantitative but indefinite, we neverthe- 
less think of it as of a definite size*, What affections of sense are 
to the sensitive faculty, such images are to the thinking soul, The 
total loss of a sense cuts off the man from all the knowledge 
available through that sense’, Without the sensations in question 
he will not have the corresponding images, and without them he 
cannot have the thoughts ancl conceptions. Intellect itself dos 
not think external things without the aid Of sense-perception® 
‘Further, the use of images in thinking implies their usc in that 
process of deliberation in which the mind balances the present 
against the future, and after due calculation decides upon a course 
of action’. When reason is obscured by passion, images of sense 
themselves directly move to action, and such images control the 
movements of the lower animals generally*. 

Intellect forms the subject of Book HL, cc. 4-8. But the 
detailed treatment there by no means exhausts what 
is said about it in the treatise. It will be convenient 
to collect here the more important of the scattered remarks 


1 De Ment. 2, 4528. 27-—30. 

2 De A. 4314 16 8q., 4328 8—13; De Aven. t, 449) 81. 

3 De Mem. 1, 450 α I—14. 4 431 a 14sq. 5 4320 7 ay. 
6 De Seusu 6, 445 Ὁ 16 3q. 7 430b 2 sqq-, 4348 5 sq 
δ 4298 4.Sqq-, 43329 Sqq., Ὁ 28—go, 415 ἃ 11. 


previously made on thinking, on intellect, or even on the soul, 
where the context suggests that Aristotle, like Plato, is using soul 
for that which thinks. 

If to think is a species of imagining or not independent of 
imagining, even thinking could not exist apart from body. 
Anaxagoras made soul the moving cause when he said that 
intelligence set the universe in motion. But, whereas Democritus 
absolutely identified mind with soul and did not use the term mind 
to denote a faculty conversant with truth, Anaxagoras was less 
consistent. He often made mind the cause of goodness and order; 
elsewhere he identified it with soul, as when he attributed it to all 
animals, great and small, high and low. And yet, Aristotle adds, 
mind in the sense of intelligence is not so widely distributed as 
soul or vital principle. Anaxagoras took mind as his first principle 
and said it alone of all existing things is simple, unmixed, pure. 
He attributed to one and the same principle that it knows and 
that it causes motion. Mind, according to him, is impassive and 
has nothing in common with anything else?. 

The criticism? of the Ziizaeus suggests that in Aristotle’s 
opinion the mind in the universe is not a magnitude; it is one and 
continuous in the same sense as the process of thinking, which 
consists of a series of thoughts; the unity of these thoughts is a 
unity of succession, the unity of number, not that of a magnitude. 
Hence, mind not being continuous like a magnitude, there are two 
alternatives: either it has no parts, or it has parts and is con- 
tinuous, but not like a magnitude. A magnitude is incapable of 
thinking ; if mind can apprehend with any one of its parts, it need 
not revolve nor have magnitude; it has to think two kinds of 
objects, the one kind divisible, the other indivisible. Thinking, as 
we know it, has limits which determine it, viz. the end in view or 
the new truths that the thinker discovers. Both thinking and 
inference bear far more analogy to rest or pause than to motion. 
In thinking the thinker ought to realise happiness. Thinking is 
the essence of the mind. Many held that entanglement in the 
body was a hindrance to thought ; a satisfactory theory ought to 
explain why the thinking soul is enclosed in the body and ‘under 
what conditions of the body. 

In criticising the doctrine of harmony, he asks, what part of the 
bodily compound combining with the rest, can we assume to be 
intellect?? In another connexion Aristotle says that intellect 

1 403 a 8—10, 4044 25—b 6, 405. a 13—19, Ὁ 19—21. 
+ 407a %2—b 26. 3 408 a 12. 


would seem to be a self-existing substance which comes into play in 
us and is in itself imperishable, in spite of senile decay. Thought 
and its exercise are enfeebled when something internal is destroyed, 
but the intellect in itself is impassive. Memory, love and hate are 
not affections of the intellect, which is something more divine and 
is impassive’. In criticising Empedocles, Aristotle remarks that it 
is impossible for soul, and still more impossible for intellect, to have 
anything superior to it and overruling it, to it belongs a natural 
priority and authority*. It is difficult to conjecture what part of 
the body intellect holds together or how it can hold together any 
part’. After soul has been defined, we are told that there is as yet 
no evidence to show whether intellect is, like some of the other 
faculties of soul, really inseparable and only logically separable, 
from the rest, It would seem to be a distinct species of soul and 
capable of separation, as the immortal from the perishable’. 
Sensation is of particulars, knowledge of universals, which are in a 
manner in the soul itself. Hence it is in our power to think 
whenever we please®, To think is not the same thing as to have 
sensation, though they were identified by the ancients, who believed 
both to be corporeal changes". Nor is thinking the same as 
imagination or as belicf? Imagination leads to action in the lower 
animals because they have no intellect, and sometimes ἴῃ man 
when intellect is obscured by passion, discase or sleep* 

What conclusions can be drawn from these scattered remarks ? 
Apparently in one passage we have a choice of alternatives τ cither 
intellect is without parts (and therefore by the presuppositions of 
the Aristotelian system must be immaterial and an energy), or it is 
something continuous, which is, however, continuous only like a 
number or series, by sequence, and not by coherence, ke a 
magnitude A bodily organ, which has parts, would alone secure 
the continuity of coherence; and for such an organ there is, or so 
Aristotle believed, no evidence. With this agrees the tentative 
assumption that intellect is something impassive, independent and 
imperishable, since its decay in the individual is an accident and 
not its real essence. 

The account of intellect in Book IIL, cc. 4—8, is condensed and 
imperfect and falls far short of the clearness which marks the 
exposition of sense-perception. Intellect is especially concerned 
with quiddities and universals. It employs no bodily organ, for of 

+ 408 b 18—a9. 4 gtob 1a—15. Yo grab rk. 

7 413 Db 24-27. 5 417 b 22 sqq, 9 437 a τῷ Μ}. 
7 7 ( 4 
427 14. 560. 4298 4-~8, 


the functions of the nervous system Aristotle and his contem- 
poraries had no idea. It contains a divine element, which is 
independent of the body and immortal. This summary tells us 
hardly any more than we have collected from the casual or 
polemical remarks in the previous part of the treatise. But 
Aristotle might fairly claim to have set before us his view both of 
(1) the difference between intellect and sense, and (2) the way in 
which thinking comes about: and this is all he promised at the 

(1) There is an analogy between sense and intellect, there is 
also a difference. Both furnish knowledge, both pass judgments, 
both are intermittent, sometimes in act, sometimes not. When in 
activity both have an object, the transition from the dormant 
power to its actual exercise does not depend upon sense alone or 
upon thought alone, and, when the activity is over, the alteration 
thus undergone leaves intellect absolutely, and sense to a great 
degree, unaffected. Sensitivity in the abstract is a form which 
knows or apprehends sensible forms. Similarly intellect is a form 
which knows or apprehends intelligible forms*. Moreover, in both 
sensation and intellection alike at the moment of apprehension, 
there is identity between the form which apprehends and the form 
which is apprehended. Again, sense-perception is always true of 
its own appropriate object, and similarly thinking is always true in 
respect of quiddities®. On the other hand, the external object which 
stimulates the sense-faculty to activity is an individual, a particular, 
and it is external to the percipient; whereas the universals, the forms 
which we think, are present in the understanding, at any rate, of the 
mature man. Sensation cannot dispense with a bodily organ, a part 
of the body appropriated to its special functions. For intellect no 
such organ can be discovered. Yet, when a sense-organ is wanting, 
the action of intellect is impeded, for all knowledge through that 
sense is cut off Moreover, excess in the sensible fatigues or 
destroys the organ of sense, but the activity of thinking cannot 
be thus impaired. Again, intellect is the higher faculty of the two 
and implies the lower ; the lower does not imply the higher. For 
actual thinking the indispensable condition is the presence of a 
mental image, for, as we saw above, we think of nothing apart 
from continuity. Even when the object conceived is not itself 
a quantum, we nevertheless think of it as such. And we never 
think of objects without thinking them in time® 

1 429 a 12 Sq. 2 431 Ὁ 20—432 4 3. 3 430 b 29—31, 433 4 26. 
* 4324 7 sq. 5 De Mem. τ, 450a 7—9. 


(2) The process of thinking an object is explained in much the 
same way as the process of perceiving an object by sense. In spite 
of the differences stated above, both, as acts of apprehending, are 
assimilated to the process of reciprocal action between physical 
bodies. Apprehension is reception of form. If the mind knows 
objects by receiving them, since nothing receives what it already 
has, it must be assumed to be at first without them; and further, so 
long as it remains capable of thinking, the same condition must be 
fulfilled for every fresh act. Hence intellect must be itmpassive, 
suffering in no way by the change from power to act and, since it 
thinks all things or, in other words, is capable of receiving all forms, 
it must in itself be devoid of any form, though at the same time it 
“provides room for forms.” It may be called, then, a mere 
aptitude or capacity to think. Until it actually thinks them, it is 
none of its objects, but becomes cach object in turn when it thinks 
that object. In physical action there is a transference of essence 
or form: in combustion the form of heat is transferred from tire 
actually alight to combustible fuel. When a white object Is 
perceived, the form of whiteness is transferred from the object te 
the eye and, as there is but one such form, is the same in the 
percipient sense as in the external object. Amd so when we think 
a stone, a horse, a triangle, the form or essence in our mind, the 
object of thought, is identically one with the form or essence outside 
in verum natura. As a contribution to the theory of knowleduc, 
this explanation is adequate. External things affect our sense, 
By sense we apprehend hot and cold and whatever other sensible 
qualitics are accidents of flesh’. We think cach sensible quality, 
gcneralising and abstracting the universals, of which sense by itself 
informs us only fer weeidens, The substance in which the attributes 
inhere, which is said to be indirectly perceived by sense, is directly 
judged and known by thought. 

50° far intellect has been treated as one. It is possible τὸ apply 
to this unity the analysis which resolves particular things. When 
nature gencrates or art produces a concrete particular. three 
conditions are fulfilled. There is the efficient agent transmitting 
form, there is the passive recipient upon which form is impressed, 
and there is, lastly, the result of the process, the new particular inte 
which matter impressed by form has been made. To manufacture 
a brazen sphere, we need the craftsman with the design in his 
mind and brass to receive that design, The form of a sphere is 

429 b rg—r16. 


impressed upon the brass and a new particular is made, precisely 
as the form of humanity is transmitted from father to son'. Our 
knowledge and actual thinking answer to the manufactured 
product, they are generated in the receptive intellect by something 
which must be assumed in intellect itself to correspond to the 
efficient cause. That which on one view is the reception of essence, 
is on another the spontaneous transition from potence toact. This 
is true of sense. Sense becomes like its object, in quality identical 
therewith. But it is just as true to say that sense has risen from 
the lower stage of potence to the higher stage of act and realised 
itself in full activity. So, again, thinking is reception of the form 
or essence, but it is just as true to say that intellect has risen from 
the lower stage of potence to the higher stage of act and realised 
itself in full activity. Perception, it is true, cannot be explained 
without assuming interference from without. The occasion which 
supplies the stimulus to the transition must be something given. 
With thought it is different. The occasion, the stimulus, are not 
external, but internal. I may say, if I like, that my potential or 
passive intellect has been acted upon and educed into actuality : 
but what brought this about? A mental agent, the active intellect, 
has called forth this activity and produced the thought. In my 
individual experience the power to think precedes actual thinking, 
but the transition cannot be explained except by assuming the 
prior existence of the efficient cause which brought it about. This 
point once reached and the unity of intellect being resolved into 
agent and patient, it follows that the agent which we postulate 
must have the same attributes as the patient, of which we have 
experience. It must be separable, impassive and unmixed, because 
its essence is activity, as the essence of the other factor is poten- 
tiality. Could it be actually separated and exist independently, it 
would be eternal. But this eternity is not communicated to the 
other factor of intellect, or to the intellect as a whole. Is such a 
hypothesis necessary? Can the potential intellect be affected by 
external things? So far as these things have matter in them, they 
are objects of thought only potentially. The intelligible forms are 
implicit in the sensible forms, and intellect er hypothest has no 
special bodily organ. But so far as knowable things are pure 
forms, no such expedient is required. The question, then, why an 
active’ intellect is introduced, may be thus answered. It is in 
order to provide a cause of that transition from potence to act 

which takes place whenever we actually think. 
1 Metaph. 1032 a 12—1033 Ὁ 26, 


The difficulty in understanding what Aristotle did or did not 
Diverse inter. intend by this analysis of the intellect, or rather this 
pretations. distinction of the intellect which makes from the 
intellect which becomes, is notorious. The scanty comments of 
Theophrastus! develop various lines of acute criticism, which in my 
judgment are not incompatible with an acceptance of the doctrine. 
So much is clear, that Theophrastus considered intellect in both tts 
forms, as making and becoming, to be our human intellect, which ts 
connatural and in us from birth to death, though its origin is 
elsewhere. In face of the difficulties which he is at pains to 
develop he seems content to regard the passive intellect dependent 
upon the body and the human intellect which results from the 
union of the passive with the active as in a sense distinct, yet as in 
another sense one nature, in so far as the two are related to one 
another as matter and form are in the unitary thing. That the 
active intellect exists ger se in man independent of the passive ts 
nowhere stated or implied either by Aristotle or Theophrastus. 
From a casual criticism by Themistius® it appears that certain of 
his predecessors had identified the active intellect with the 
premisses from which all our knowledge is derived and with the 
knowledge itself which we gradually acquire. Alexander of 
Aphrodisias*, who cndeavoured to preserve faithfully the teaching 
of Aristotle and to present it as consistent, distinguished a material 
intellect ancl an intellect ει A@drin, which the former becomes by 
actual thinking and reception of the intelligible form. The material 
intellect is the mere aptitude for thinking: this is a power or 
faculty of the individual human seul, the form of the body. Lastly, 
there ts the active intellect which is not a faculty or part of the 
human soul, though it is in it from birth to death whenever we 
actually think : not only when we think it or any of the immaterial 
forms with which it is identical, but also when we think forms in 
matter, for it is only through the agency of the active intellect that 
actual thinking is possible. Being wholly immaterial, enerpy 
devoid of all matter and potentiality, it always is, even when it is 
not thought by men; it is an eternal, imperishable, self-existent 
substance. There can be but one such substance: it must conse- 
quently be identified with the deity, the first cause of motion in the 
universe, whose nature and essence is activity, the energy of 

1 See Appendix, p. 580 sqq. 
7 y02, 32 sqq. 11., 189, 17 syq- Sp. This view follows from an extremely one-aided 
Interpretation of the statement that νοῦς is τὰ νοητά. 

8 De An, 80, t6-—g2, 11, Mantissa 106, 19-113, 24. 


thinking. In individual men it supervenes as something coming 
in from outside. It finds in the capacity of thinking which does 
belong to the human soul an instrument ready for its use, upon 
which it can work and produce actual thinking. As to the reason 
why men think not always, Alexander has no better explanation to 
offer than a suggestion of his teacher’, that the craftsman is still a 
craftsman even when he has laid aside his tools. The eclectic 
Themistius? refused to identify the active intellect with the deity 
outside man. He appeals to two expressions of the master 
(1) “that these differences must be present in the soul,” (2) “this 
alone is immortal and eternal,’ which he thinks Alexander’s 
interpretation forces out of their natural meaning. As to (1) 
Alexander has his own explanation to offer, according to which the 
active intellect, and therefore the deity, is in our mind whenever we 
think: but there is some force in the contention that Aristotle 
would never have described the deity as “alone” immortal and 
eternal. However, the point in which Themistius agrees with 
Alexander is more important than the points in which they differ. 
He fully admits that the active intellect is one and the same in all 
men, it is distributed among different individuals as light is divided 
into single rays. Of the other commentators, the Neo-Platonist 
Simplicius* distorts Aristotle’s account in order, as far as possible, 
to adapt it to his own philosophical presuppositions. According to 
him, the rational human soul is one immortal substance, It has 
three states: in the first it remains in itself; this is the active 
intellect. In the second it enters the body; it then knows nothing, 
but is the pure potentiality of thought. Intellect of the first stage 
acts upon intellect of the second stage, and the result is the third 
stage, when intellect is iz Aadztu and acquires knowledge. The 
passive intellect is mortal, because it ceases to be passive and is 
absorbed in the higher or active intellect. It is not worth while to 
pursue the course of speculation further among Arabian philoso- 
phers and the schoolmen, in both of whom the theological bias is 
unmistakeable. Avicenna‘ was an original thinker who exerted a 

1 fJantissa 110, 4 ἤκουσα δὲ περὶ νοῦ τοῦ θύραθεν παρὰ ᾿ἈΑριστοτέλους, ἃ διεσωσάμην 
κτὸ. If this is not a pleasant fiction, which would be more incongruous in Alexander 
than the one joke in Thucydides (ὁ λέων γέλασε), we must acquiesce in Zeller’s con- 
jecture ᾿Αριστοκλέους, Phil, der Gr. 1v.3, p. 785. 

2 98, 12—109, 3 H, 181, 3-200, 25 Sp. 

3 217, 23 SQq-, 243, [0—245, 2, 246, 10-—-248, 17. 

* I have not studied the mediaeval philosophers at first hand. Fox my acquaintance 
with them I am indebted mainly to Zabarella, Brentano, Psychologie des Aristoteles, 

pp- 8 sqq., who gives copious extracts, Ueberweg, Geschichie der Philosophie, Siebeck, 
Geschichte der Psychologie. 


great influence on his successors; but neither his distinction of 
universals, ate res, in vebus, post ves, nor his doctrine that these 
universals are at once substantial forms in things outside us and 
intelligible forms to the mind which thinks them by abstraction 
has any direct Aristotelian authority, and when he makes both 
forms alike emanate from the active intellect and ultimately from 
God, this doctrine becomes nearly akin to that of the Neo-Platonists. 
Averrocs and Aquinas, though both professing to interpret Aristotle, 
modify his doctrines to suit their own preconceptions. «s\ccordingr 
to the former, neither passive intellect nor active intellect is part of 
the human soul as defined in the definition. In scholastic language 
each is forma assistens, superveniens and not ferma dans esse 
homintz. Fach is immortal and each is one and the same in all 
men. According to Aquinas, active intellect as well as passive 
intellect is a faculty of the rational human soul, which was created 
by the will of God and is yet immortal, having the power as form 
to provide a vehicle for itself after it is separated from its present 
body. Regarded as interpretations of z\ristotle’s doctrine, these 
two conflicting views, which clivided the allegiance of the later 
schoolmen, cannot both be right, but may both be wrong. Aristotle 
himself was free from the preconceptions of his two commentators : 
he was not a Moslem mystic nor a Christian theologian. 

These successive attempts to fill in the meagre outline 
presented by the text of De “πέρα proceed mn two directians. 
Either they make the two intellects two faculties of the human 
soul, or they seek to identify one, if net both, of them, with an 
intelligence outside man. Alexander, Averroes, and in modern 
times, Ravaisson and Renan, have gone to the greatest lengths in 
the latter direction. ut, if the act of thinking is independent of, 
or alien to, man’s nature, how can the aptitude for thinking be any 
longer a part of it? Averroes no doubt is consistent: he declares 
the passive intellect also to be an immaterial substance ancl ne part 
of the soul which is the form of the human body. But, in order to 
maintain this, he is obliged to do violence to the lanyuave of the 
treatise. In particular, his wzrtus cogtfativa, with which, according 
to him, the definition of soul endows man, has to be divorced from 
intellect proper and reduced nearly to the level of sensus connaunis 
or imagination, Jéven then he is unable to explain why, after the 
definition of soul has been obtained, it should have been left an 
open question whether intellect properly so called is or is not a 
part of the soult, or why it should be designated as a “ part” when 

1413 13-26, 41K a τὰ sp 


at last it comes up for special treatment?, But in fact all views in 
which human intellect or a part of it is identified with the activity 
of divine intellect are met by the same insoluble difficulty: what is 
to be made of the intellect which becomes all things? Modern 
enquirers are hopelessly divided as to what the passive intellect is. 
Trendelenburg answers “all the lower faculties in contradistinction 
to the active intellect?,” Zeller “the sum of those faculties of 
representation which go beyond imagination and sensible percep- 
tion and yet fall short of that higher Thought, which has found 
peace in perfect unity with its object®,” Ravaisson “the universal 
potentiality in the world of ideas‘,” Brentano ‘“ imagination’,” 
Hertling “the cognitive faculty of the sensitive part*,”’ and 
Hammond, if I understand him rightly, “the life of sensation as a 
potentially rational mass,” “the sum of the deliverances of sense- 
perception and their re-wrought form in memory and phantasy, 
regarded as potentiality”.” The last two would seem almost to 
identify its functions with those of sewsus communis as a judging 
faculty. Now these various answers do not accord with the 
description in De Azzma of the process and act of thinking, 
whether as apprehension of the intelligible object or as the 
judgment which makes two concepts one; they do not fit either 
the conception of intellect zz haditu, the process by which 
knowledge is acquired, or the sharp distinction drawn between 
a thought and a mental image. Thinking is not the same as 
receiving or retaining or remembering or judging the percepts of 
sense, which are all individual and lack the universality required. 
Abstraction alone renders thought possible, and abstraction cannot 
be restricted to the active intellect. Again, all the operations of 
thought imply a single judging power. This position, which 
Aristotle has maintained for sense, he would certainly maintain as 
strongly for thought. When he controverts the Protagorean maxim 
and points out that it must lead to universal relativity, he contends 
that there is such a thing as absolute existence, a something 
determinate in itself apart from all relations, for presentation of an 
object implies a subject to whom the object is presented®. The 

1 4294 Io, 

3 >. 308: ‘*Omnes illas, quae praecedunt, facultates,in unum quasi nodum collectas, 
quatenus ad res cogitandas postulantur, νοῦν παθητικὸν dictas esse iudicamus.”’ 

* Aristotle, 11. Ὁ. 102 Eng. Tr. 

4 Essai sur la Métaplysique α Aristote, 1., pp. 586 sqq.: cf. 11., pp. 17, 19. 

5 Psychologie, p. 208 sq. 

8 Materie τε. Form, Ὁ. 174. 

7 pp. lxxxiii sq. 8 Metaph. 1011 a 17-—20. 


object of thought, then, implies a thinking subject. If these 
modern interpreters were right in equating the intellect which 
becomes with one or other of the lower faculties or with the sum of 
them, then the functions of these faculties would be identical with 
the function of thought, so far as the intellect becomes all things. 
But the lower faculties, sense and imagination, never succeed in 
obtaining an object which is a true universal. 

If, however, we vindicate the right to think for the intellect 
which becomes all objects and is said to be ἐκ Aabitu when it 
acquires knowledge, it would seem that this can only be done at 
the expense of the intellect which makes all objects. The functions 
of the latter are then reduced within the narrowest compass, 
According to some, it does not really think at all, it does little more 
than “illuminate” the mental image, thus facilitating the abstrac- 
tion of the universal form. But Aristotle speaks of its perpetual 
activity, he says there is no intermission in its thought Yet it is 
not unreasonable to suppose that determinations so unlike is 
“pure potentiality” and “incessant activity” refer to the same 
thing under two different aspects. IJach describes it abstractly, 
and, to know the whole, the two determinations must be combined, 
If there is within us a thought which is continuous ancl always in 
activity, at any rate expericnce does not tell us πὸ" it can only be 
a conclusion of reason. ILow, then, did Aristotle reconcile this con- 
clusion with the facts? Apparently he mace this thinkiny latent. 
The intellect always thinks, but we do not remember. This, then, 
is what the attribute “ potential” means as applied to the intellect4; 
and this agrees with the conception of the powers or faculties of 
the soul in general, which are permanent possessions, all dormant 
and unconscious, until roused to activity in conscigusness. Tere 
we may recall a previous use of the antithesis between potential 
and actual in Aristotle’s account of jinagination. “Phe images or 
survivals of sensation are not always present to consciousness, yet 
Aristotle treats them as still in existence; they continue, he says, 
in the organs of sense, they are potential images while they are 
dormant, actual iinages when they are revived and reappcur, as we 
should say, in consciousness’ It may be worth while to hazard the 
conjecture that the intellect which docs not consciously think is 

1 So, at least, I understand 430 a 22. 

2 Cf. Anal. Post. 11. τὸν οὐ Ὁ 25 wé ἕξεις. ἐνοῦσαι λελήθασιν. 

4 Aristotle conceives νοητὰ to be directly presented, much as meuderm paycheh opiate 
conceive perceptual objects to be directly presented and ty form a perceptual continuum. 

Cl. Meflaph. 1087 ἃ 1o-—25. 
+ Cf. 4256 24 8q., De Insomn. ἃ, 460) 2 Βα.7) ἃ, 461 b T1107. See alse p. liii. 


similarly described as potential intellect, and yet all the time its 
thoughts are there, though its incessant activity is subconscious. 
It will be seen that, though I do not entirely agree with Wallace, I 
nevertheless recognise a certain element of truth in his solution of 
the difficulty. He thus conceives the relation of the two intellects : 
“the creative reason is the faculty which constantly interprets and 
as it were keeps up an intelligible world for experience to operate 
upon, while the receptive reason is the intellect applyine itself in 
all the various processes which fill our minds with the materials of 
knowledge.” And again: “the two it must be remembered are not 
‘two reasons’: they are merely different modes of viewing the 
work of reason®.” 

In the account of sense and thought, with which we have been 
Desire and hitherto mainly occupied, the cognitive element is very 
Volition. prominent. It is natural to infer that our philosopher 
regards man chiefly on the intellectual side, as a spectator of the 
universe, a being who contemplates. And this impression would 
seem to be confirmed when we learn from the E¢h#ics wherein 
man’s chief good consists. But no Greek could overlook the other 
side of human nature. The conclusions of the #¢fhkics must be 
taken in conjunction with the wider gencralisations of the Polzzzcs; 
and, if the self or ego is identical with intellect, intellect is practical 
as well as theoretic. The true is in the same class with the good; 
good, real or apparent, is the goal of all striving and effort. With 
his teleological bias, Aristotle would have endorsed the words of a 
modern psychologist*: “ Looking broadly at the progress of life, as 
it ascends through the animal kingdom and onwards through the 
history of man, it secms safe to say that knowledge is always a 
means to ends, is never an end by itself—till at length it becomes 
interesting and satisfying in itself. Psychologically, then, the sole 
function of perception and intellection is to guide action and 

{ p. xeviil. 

2 p.cxv. Wallace was not alone in holding that Aristotle never intended to afhrm 
two distinct intellects, but only to distinguish two phases or aspects of the one intellect. 
A similar view is maintained on very different grounds by Bullinger, Wzs-ZLekhre, pp. 3489q., 
and by Mr F. Granger, Class. Kev. V1. pp. 298—301, who states it as follows: ‘‘the reason 
is passive and affected by corporeal conditions, so far as it uses the φαντάσματα, grasping 
the εἴδη from among them. It is purely active only when it concerns itself with 
vonrd, among which itself is included.” Cf. Brandis, Gesch. der Antw. τ. Ὁ. 518, 
Handbuch, ul. Ὁ, 1178. Kampe and Grote came to the conclusion that intellect, though 
separable from the human body, is not separable from body in general. They affirm that 
it has for its necessary substratum the ether, the most divine of the elements: Kampe, 
Lrkenntiisstheorte, pp. 12—49, Grote, Aristotle, U. p. 220 sqq. See, however, Zeller, 

Aristotle, 11. Ὁ. 95, π. 2, Eng. Tr. 
® Professor James Ward, Znc. Brit., Article on Psychology, p. 56. 

H. é 


subserve volition—more generally, to promote self-conservation and 
betterment.” In De οἱ ριΐμα, a professedly biological treatise, with 
the soul in all living things for its subject, this part of the enquiry 
is not pushed far’. The main outlines are given, but we must look 
elsewhere, and particularly to the £7¢/zcs, for further details. The 
problem is presented in a very simple fashion. In the animal 
world motion, in the sense of locomotion, is an all-pervading fact, 
and but slight observation suffices to show that this motion ts not 
random or irregular, but is directed to an end. To what power or 
faculty, then, is it to be ascribed? The nutritive faculty, Aristotle 
thinks, sufficiently accounts for movements of growth and decay, 
whether in animals or plants, but not for the progressive move- 
ments of animals, movements prompted by want and directed ta 
an end. If the nutritive faculty were sufficient to produce such 
movements, Aristotle adds with unconscious irony, plants would 
move spontaneously and would have organs adapted for the 
purpose. Nor can these movements be explained as due to the 
sensitive faculty, since there are whole genera of perfectly-developed 
animals of a low type which do not move from place to place. 
But if locomotion were implied in sensation, they, too, would have 
organs adapted for locomotion. Is intellect, then, the cause of 
which we are in search, as Plato thought? No. Intellect is etther 
theoretical or practical. The former fssues no command as to 
what we should avoid or pursue and, although the latter does issue 
such commands, they are not necessarily obeyed. The analogy of 
the arts, too, shows that, in order to produce action, something 
else is required beyond the mere knowledge of what is to be 
pursued or avoided. Shall we say, then, that there are two motives 
to action, (1) desire and (2) the intellect which calculates means to 
ends, the place of which latter in animals devoid of reason is taken 
by imagination? If so, how are the two connected? Desire ts 
always of an end, and this end is the starting point for the calcula- 
tions of the practical intellect. Intellect and desire, then, are 
connected by the ultimate unmoved movent, the end of action. 
It is this which stirs desire, while intellect, assuming that the end 
can be realised, calculates the steps towards its attainment. Thus 
the physician whose aim is to cure an apue assumes this to be 
done, just as if he were trying to solve a geometrical problem, ancl 
then reasons backwards from the patient's recovery to the normal 
temperature which this implies, from the normal temperature to 
the production of heat or cold, and from that to some remedy at 
1 See Book 111, ce. Q—-11. 


his command; and thereupon, having reached the end of his 
calculations, he proceeds to act. Hence the statement that there 
are two motives to action calls for qualification. Had there been 
two, they would have had some common character, but as a 
matter of fact intellect is never a motive apart from desire. On 
the other hand, desire does sometimes move to action in spite of 
reason. Desire is thus found in all forms of mental life. In reason 
it is rational wish, but there are also irrational desires, anger and 
appetite, or mere desire of pleasure. In fact, an appetitive faculty 
must be assumed in which Plato’s anger and appetite are both 
included, and Aristotle says quite fairly that the soul may be 
divided into many faculties, any two of which are more distinct 
than these two of Plato. Wherever in the animal world there is 
sense-perception, there is also the feeling of pleasure and pain. The 
pleasurable prompts desire, the painful aversion, and the survival of 
sense-impressions, which is imagination in its lowest form, can 
prompt to desire no less than the present object in the moment of 
perception. For the intellect images take the place of present 
sensation. A conflict of desires may arise, for though reason will 
judge correctly, anger or appetite may be blinded. They may take 
apparent good for real good, or they may interpret good as the 
pleasure of the moment. Every desire, whether rational or 
irrational, implies a corresponding image of the object desired. 
Hence a distinction between images, according as they proceed 
wholly from sense (and this class of images alone belongs to 
irrational animals) or proceed from reason, calculation; in fact, 
deliberation. This latter class of images is peculiar to man. Yet 
even in man in the abnormal state of incontinence the irrational 
desire gets the better of reason and controls action. In order to ex- 
press the antecedents of action, whether of the normal or abnormal 
kind, Aristotle resorted to the analogy of the syllogism. From a 
universal major premiss and a particular minor a conclusion is 
inferred. For example, all men should take exercise, Callias is a 
man, exgo Callias should take exercise. His taking exercise is 
regarded as an inference from the premisses. It resembles the 
conclusion of a syllogism just in so far as a particular case is 
brought under a general rule. But this way of looking at the 
matter by no means ensures rational action or justifies the assump- 
tion that the intellect always calculates correctly, for incontinence 
has a syllogism of its own. For example, all sweet things are to be 
tasted, this thing before me is sweet: then, if you have the power 
and are not hindered, you cannot but at once put the conclusion 
€ 2 


(this is to be tasted) into practice. In this way the triumph of the 
irrational impulse and the sacrifice of the permanent good to the 
pleasure of the moment may equally be considered to bring a 
particular case under a general rule. In other words, although 
reason has a natural right and ought to prevail, experience shows 
that it is not always effective, even in beings endowed with reason, 
who look before and after, When tmpulsive action has) been 
distinguished from deliberative and we are dealing with the latter 
only, since purpose is desire following upon deliberation, if the 
purpose is to be all it should be, both the calculation or reasoning 
must be truce and the desire right, and the very same things must 
be assented to by the reason and pursued by the desire’. 

In the foregoing sketch I have been content to let -\rtstotle 
speak for himself, piecing together various utterances and putting 
the best construction [ could on what is obscure and eniematical in 
them, but refraining as a rule from criticism. Obviously he studied 
psychology as a philosopher and was chiefly interested in it as it 
bore upon philosophical problems. Ife exalted the cocnitive 
element, while his treatment of the emotions and the will fs 
wholly inadequate, even if the έτος and the Afetorre be called 
in to redress the balance. It is now contended that the sefence οὗ 
psychology, which has made vast strides since these humble be- 
ginnings, must be based exclusively upon individual expertenee 
and be made independent of physiology. Whatever can be set 
down to the credit of Aristotle as a psychologist rests upon the 
Opposite assumptions. He approached his subject from the 
psychophysical standpoint, as it is called; he had his own repre- 
sentative theory of perception, his own account of the vradual 
ascent from sense, through memory, to science and reason Ee 
could not escape the errors and confusion incident to such assumip- 
tions, if after all they are not ultimately valid. Thus we are 
brought face to face with grave metaphysical problems. But this 
is not the place to examine Aristotle's system as a whole. and 
without such an examination it is impossible to do justice cither 
to his theory of knowledge or to the treatise on the seul, 

1 hth. Nie. w39 0 2a~-26, 


The text of De Anima rests mainly on the authority of a single 
good manuscript, cod. Parisiensis 1853, better known by the symbol 
E, given it by Bekker. Trendelenburg’, p. xvi, describes it thus; 
saeculi decimi, membranaceus, eleganter et perspicue scriptus, 
vocibus non seiunctis sed inter se ligatis. Torstrik adds, p. viii: 
In co igitur codice qui sunt de Anima libri duabus manibus scripti 
sunt, antiquissimis, elegantissimis, simillimis, sed duabus. Book L, 
Book Π1|. and the fragments of a recension or paraphrase of Book 11., 
different from the vulgate (see pp. 164 sqq. zz/ra), are in the same 
hand as the /’4ysics, which cod. E also contains, and have 38 lines 
to the page. Book II. in a complete form and’in practically the 
same recension as all other manuscripts present is the work of 
another hand and has 48 lines to the page. Cod. E has been 
scrutinised by Bekker, Trendelenburg, Bussemaker, Pansch, Tors- 
trik, Bichl, Stapfer and Rodier. For further information respecting 
its peculiaritics I refer my readers to Trend.! pp. viii, xxiii—xliii, 
Trend. pp. vi, xiv—xviii, Torstrik pp. ii, vili—xv, Stapfer, Stadza zzz 
Aristotelis de anima libros collata, especially pp. 4—13. In Book 
ΣΤ. cod. EF is mutilated, one leaf, which should have come between 
fol. 200 and fol. 201, is missing: it doubtless contained upon its 
76 lines the text from 430a 24 μνημονεύομεν to 431 b 16 ἐκεῖνα, 
or 84 of Bekker’s lines. Further, the last leaf is also wanting, 
which should have contained from 434a 31, the -θὲν of μηθέν, to 
the end, 435 b 25, or about 86 of Bekker’s lines. The loss of these 
two leaves is serious, but is in some measure compensated by the 
fact that for the whole of Book III. we have cod. L, Vaticanus 253, 
presenting a text which agrees more closely with that of cod. E 
than with that of the other extant manuscripts. Cod. L, which 
contains only the third book of De Anima, is described by Trend.?, 
p. ix, as follows: codex chartaceus, foliis quaternis minoribus, satis 
recens, cuius librarius interdum scripturae compendia male in- 
tellexit. Hauthalius codicem bombycinum perspicue et diligenter 


scriptum saeculi XIV esse litteris nobis significavit. A lectionum 
praestantia (saepius enim cum vetustissimo codice (I) consentit) 
antiquior quam recentior esse videatur. 

Besides codd. E and 1. Bekker collated six other codices of later 
date, which he indicated by the symbols STUVWi. To these 
in what follows I shall give the name of the S-X group. The six 
have, so far as know, never been scrutinised or collated by anyone 
since Bekker. Torstrik consulted the manuscript materials (pre- 
served in the Royal Library of Berlin), which Bekker collected 
for his edition, and was thus enabled from Bekker's own evidence 
to correct a few errors in Bekker’s report of the readings of cod. 5, 
as of cod. E (Torstrik, p. vii sq.: ef. PAidolagus XU. 3, pp. 494— 
530, XIIL 1, pp. 204——206). The conclusion which Stapfer! reached 
after carcful study was that without a fresh collation of these 
six inferior codices the question of their mutual relationship and 
pedigree could not be definitely settled, but that the result of such 
a fresh collation would not be worth the trouble expended upon 
it (Kvitésche Studicn su dristoteles Schrift vou der Seele, pp. 33 84.) 
What is certain is that, while codd. HI. go back te one common 
archetype, those belonging to the S-X group go back to another 
and a different common archetype, This result is established as 

(A) Cod. FE has two lacunae, each, 1 conjecture, a line of its 
archetype, which the other six codices supply. These lacunae 
are 405b 25 sq. ἄλλο, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμοίως ἕν τὶ τούτων and 
425 Ὁ 30 6. τότε κυἡ Kar’ ἐνέργειαν ἀκοὴ ἅμα γίνεται καὶ ὁ. Further, 
cod. E in 44 several places omits a single particle, an article, 
adjective, noun or verb, or even two (and once three) words, which 
are supplied by the group S-X. On the other hand, there are 22 
cases where cod. Τὸ has a slightly fuller text than the S-X group, 
the latter having omitted most frequently a particle, sometimes 
ἃ noun or verb, and twice a couple of words (ὁμοίως δὲ 426 ἃ 31, 
ὁ νοῦς 420 Ὁ 13). 

(Β) When we come to classify the readings in which ec. αὶ 
differs? from the S-X group, we sometimes find (1) a different word 
or (2) a different inflexion of the same word. The following are 
instances. In all cases the reading put first is the reading of 
cod. E, that put second is the reading of the S-X group, while 

1 Tn all that follows upon the relationship of the manuscripts to each other Tam 

largely indebted to Stapfer's two pamphlets. 
# I mean the first hand of cod. E. See below as to the corrections. 


the words within brackets denote variants in some of the six 
manuscripts of the S-X group. 

(1) 4028 26 μόνον : μᾶλλον, 4038 19 σημεῖον : μηνύει, 403 Ὁ 12 
ὅσα : ὁπόσα, 406 ἃ 10 δισσῶς : διχῶς, 407a 19 ἤ : καί, 409b 9 μιυ- 
Kpas ᾿σμικράς, 409b 11 ταύτας : αὐτάς, 410a 7 ἐνεῖναι: εἶναι, ἀτο ἃ 25 
τεῖ τί, ΔΙῸ 18 πάσης : ἁπάσης, 411. ἃ 30 αὔξη : αὔξησις, 426b 2 
λιπαρά: πικρά, 427 Ὁ 11 ταὐτό: τὸ αὐτό, 4284 14 ἐνεργῶς : ἐναργῶς, 
428 b 3 ποδιος: ποδιαῖος, 428 Ὁ 15 αὐτῆς :αὐτη, 428 Ὁ 16 κατὰ ταύ- 
τὴν KAT αὐτήν, 4290a9 διότε: διὰ τί, 429 4 14 ὅτε: τι", 432 bg αὔξην Ἐ, 
(Trend.), αὔξειν Βὶ (Bek.) : αὔξησιν, 432 Ὁ 27 ἐκείνων : κινῶν, 4334 18 
ὀρεκτόν : ὀρεκτικόν, 4348. 3 λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν ἔχονσα : λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ 
ἐνοῦσα, 4348 14 ἐνῇ : γένηται. 

(2) 4020 4 μόνον : μόνης, 402 Ὁ 6 ἑκάστην : ἕκαστον (ἕτερον), 
402} ὃ κατηγορεΐται" : κατηγοροῖτο, 403 29 ὁρίσαιντο : ὁρίσαιτο, 
405a ὃ ἀποφαινόμενος : ἀπτοφηνάμενος, 406a 18 ὑπάρχει : ὑπάρξει, 
406 Ὁ 23 ταῦτα ταὐτά : τοῦτ᾽ αὐτό (ποτε), 407 ἃ II μορίῳ : τῶν 
μορίων, 407 ἃ 26 ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπόδειξις : αἱ δ᾽ ἀποδείξεις, 408 Ὁ 34 ἴδια: 
ἐδίᾳ, 409b 7 τοῖς σώμασι : τῷ σώματι, 410b 6 γνωρίζει : γνωριεῖ, 
411 12 ἡ ψυχή: τὴν ψυχήν, 424 Ὁ 27 ἐκλυπεῖν : ἐκλείπειν, 425b 1 
yorny ὅτι: ὅτι χολή, 426 Ὁ 4 ἄγεται: ἄγηται, 428 Ὁ τό ὑπάρχει: ὑπάρ- 
yew, 428 Ὁ 20 διαψεύσασθαι : διωψεύδεσθαι, 428 Ὁ 30 ἔχοι : ἔχει, 
4308 2 γιγνομένη : γεγνομένης, 420 Ὁ 23 ἀπαθής : ἀπαθές, 4308 II 
ἐκεῖνο : ἐκεῖνα, 431 Ὁ 25 δυνάμεις : τὰ δυνάμει, 4328 7 αἰσθανόμενον : 
αἰσθανόμενος, 432 a 12 sq. φάντασμα : φαντάσματα, 4328 27 ταύτας: 
ταῦτα, 16. φανεῖται : φαίνεται (φαίνονται), 432 1 τό: τῷ. 

(3) Where the words are the same in cod. E as in the other 
six codices, the order is sometimes different. The following are 
instances: 4048 5 τῆς ὅλης φύσεως στοιχεῖα λέγει : στουχεῖα λέγει 
τῆς ὅλης φύσεως, 4044 28 ψυχὴν ταὐτόν : ταὐτὸν (τὴν) ψυχήν, 
406 b 32 κύκλους δύο: δύο κύκλους, 407 Ὁ 2 ἂν κινοῖτο : κινοῖτο ἄν, 
4τι Ὁ 21 μὴ καὶ : καὶ μή, 4288 7 ὑπάρχοντος τούτων : τούτων ὑὕπάρ- 
χοντος, 4298 25 τίς γὰρ ἄν : γὰρ ἄν τις, ἐδ. ἢ ψυχρὸς ἢ θερμός : 
θερμὸς ἢ ψυχρός, 430a 18 ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμυγής : ἀμυγὴς καὶ ἀπαθής, 
4308 τῷ δ᾽ αὐτό : αὐτὸ δ᾽, 431 Ὁ 21 ἐστι. πάντα γὰρ ἤ : ἔστι πάντα. 
ἢ γάρ, 432 Ὁ 30 διώκειν ἡ φεύγειν : φεύγειν ἢ διώκειν, 433 8 Ο ταῦτα 
δύο: δύο ταῦτα, 4338. 27 κινεῖ μέν : μὲν κινεῖ, 433 Ὁ 18 κίνησις ὄρεξις : 
ὄρεξις κίνησις. 

1 Stapfer’s statement (A7vit. Siud., p, 21) “Ero STUVWX ὅτι" will mislead no 
one. By a similar inadvertence he has (p. 23) interchanged the authorities for 403 a 29 
ὁρίσαιντο and ὁρίσαιτο. 

2 See Stapfer, Stwd., p. 5. 


From the instances given under (A) we may at once conclude 
that neither any single manuscript of the group S-X nor their 
common archetype was copied from cod. EF, but we cannot directly 
infer that cod. E was not copied from the archetype of group 
S-X, for the omissions in cod. E, even the larger ones, are acci- 
dental. But the passages adduced under (B) sufficiently prove that 
cod. E is independent of the archetype of the group S-X. Chance 
might account for two or three or even a dozen variations, but 
not for 50. There can be no connexion between cod, EH and the 
archetype of the group S-X. 

But had the six manuscripts of the group S-X a common 
archetype? Yes: not because of the common omissions, which 
are few and insignificant, but because of such variants as the 
following: 403a 19 σημεῖον : μηνύει, the transposition of 4oga 5 
already noticed, 425 1 χολὴν ὅτι : ὅτε χολή, 426b 2 λιπαρὰ: 
πικρά, 4344 3 λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν ἔχουσα : λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐνοῦσα. 
Taken singly, the manuscripts of the group S-X are full of 
mistakes. There are inany cases where they diverge frem cach 
other in all manner of ways; but, as soon as we get a reaclings 
or arrangement of the words which presents a noteworthy differ- 
ence from that of cod. If, they all agree. In fact, it has been 
proposed to use a fresh symbol for the agreement of the proup 
S-X, as opposed to cod. FE. 

But can we say how the manuscripts of the group S-X are 
related to each other? For example, in 403b 2 UX have εἶδος, 
ST VW ὁ δὲ or ὅδε. Possibly the genuine tradition of the arche- 
type may have come down to us in the numerical minority of the 
representatives of the group. It may be that four of the six 
represent one lost codex of equal value with the remaining twe. 
Let us consider, besides 403 Ὁ 2 just mentioned, where UX have 
εἶδος, ST V, like E, ὁ δὲ and ΚΝ ὅδε, 402a τὸ ἀπόδειξίς τίς, where 
τίς is omitted, not only by TU W Χ, but also by E; 403 b 26 δυοῖν 
TU, δυεῖν Εἰ, δνσὶ SVWX; 40o4gb 31 ἀσωμάτους XK, ἀσωμάτοις 
ESTUVW; 4054 If λεπτομέρειαν corr. E and T, μικρομέρειαν pr. 
EUVWX, pixporerrropépecav S; 408 Ὁ ὃ τὸ V, τῷ reliqui codd.; 
410a 6 γένοντο TVW, ἀγένοντο ES UX; 410b 30 δὲ TWX anel 
corr. E, δὴ reliqui codd.; 425a2 τοῦ δι’ TW, τοῖν L,om ES UV Κα; 
426 a 1 εἴπειεν T W, εἴποιεν EH L, εἴπτου y, φήσειεν SUV X; g29b 13 
ἔχοντυ TW X,om. EL SUV; 429b 20 ἄλλο ἘΝ X, ἄλλῳ reliqui 
codd.; 431 Ὁ 27 τὸ TW, room. ELSUVX; 432a5 ἐν TWX, ἐν 
om.E LS UV; 433b τό sq. τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν TW X, room. EL SUV. 


Cod. T and cod. W almost universally go together in the third 

Another circumstance confirms the conclusion that the six 
manuscripts of the group S-X are derived from a common arche- 
type. After cod. E had been copied, it was subjected to much 
revision and many corrections were entered, either between the 
lines or in the margin. A great number of these, which on palaco- 
graphical grounds are attributed to a second hand, agree in the 
main with the readings of the S-X group. Hence it may be 
inferred that the reviser, whether the original scribe or someone 
clsc!, collated cod. E with a manuscript which, whether it was 
or was not the archetype of the group S-X, agreed generally with 
the clistinctive readings of that group. In other words, corr. E 
agrees in the main with the manuscripts of the group S-X where 
they differ from the first hand? of E. Let us assume, then, that 
the text of Books I. and 111, has come down by two independent 
traclitions. The variations in Book 11. are of minor importance, 
whether because, as Torstrik supposed, cod. E in the second Book 
follows a different authority from that which it follows in the other 
two Books, or because the two traditions never diverged to the 
same extent in this Book as in the others. It cannot be claimed 
that cither is infallible. To begin with (A) omissions and insertions: 
if we examine the several instances in detail, the presumption is 
that the omissions are due to carelessness. The good manuscript 
E has this peculiarity in common with the late manuscript P? of 
the Politics, that it is apt to omit small words. It would be 
absurd to prefer a text which omitted 403a 6 δέ, 4038 18 γάρ, 
407b 9 γε (cf. 407 b 32, 409 a 30), 408b 15 οὔσης, 408 Ὁ 19 οὖσα, 

1 In Books 1. and wu. Stapfer distinguishes three hands E, ἘΞ, E*, admitting that ἘΞ 
is hardly to be distinguished from E and that Ἐδ is the same hand in which Book 11. is 
copied: ‘Kae igitur [correctiones] plurimae inveniuntur in primo et tertio libro, aliquot in 
secundo. Alterius vero manus scriptura proxime accedit ad prioris manus similitudinem. 
Etenim ab utrius calamo manaverit scriptura, solum cognosci potest cum ex aliarum 
quarundam litterarum forma, tum ex diphthongo “ει facillime concluditur..,Accedit, ut 
secunda manus aliquoties litteras radendo, prior nonnisi expungendo deleat. Tertiae vero 
manus litterarum ductus idem stint ac librarii secundi libri” (Stapfer, Szvaia, p. 4). 

2 See Stapler, ἄγη Stud. p. 34: * Derselbe [der Archetypus von ST ὃν W ΧῚ gilt 
allgemein fiir verloren. Auch ich war dieser Ansicht, bis eingehendere Studien tiber 
die Korrekturen in E mich belehrien, dass die von zweiter Hand nach keiner anderen 

Vorlage gemacht sein kinnen als nach diesem Archetypus. Die Griinde hieftr sind teils 

palivgraphischer, teils kritischer Natur.” 
3 Since ΕἾ is of the tenth century, P4 of the fifteenth, it is quite possible that the 

archetype from which Demetrius Chalcondylas derived his copy may have deserved the 
censure which Newman passes upon it, vol. 11, Ὁ. lvii, 111. p. vil sq., Class. Kev. VII. 

Ῥ- 305- 


429b 21 dpa, 430a 4 ἡ before θεωρητική (cf. 431b 29, 432a 15, 
bis, Ὁ 28, 433b 4), 431 Ὁ 24 εἷς, 432b 13 Ti, 433b 31 «at: and 
these omissions are doubtless duc to the same haste or care- 
lessness which has mangled the text by curtailment in 400 ἃ 10, 
428 Ὁ 7, 428 Ὁ 3 sq., 432 a 2, as well as by the longer lacunae already 
enumerated. Only three times does it appear that cod. FE is un- 
doubtedly right in its omissions; 426b 1, 429b 8, 433b 3. For 
my part, though I have not had the courage of my opinion, 1 
think that in 428b 2 φαίνεται δέ ye καὶ ψευδῆ is an improvement?: 
while, if we compare 433a 9 with 433a 17, two passages which 
ought to be similarly worded, the balance of probability surely 
inclines to the supposition that in both the scribe of FE. or of its 
archetype is at his old trick of omitting a small word, even though 
in the former passage all our other sources join in the error, On 
the other hand, cod. IX seems redundant in 407b 24, 411 b 4. 24), 
425b 3, 429b 11, 13 (zs), 16: and that this, too, is due to care- 
lessness is very evident in the dittography of ἁ δεὸ καὶ 425 b 3 and 
the impossible article in 429b 16. (133) aN comparison, again, 
of the variations which depend either upon a different word (ea. 
403 ἃ 19 σημεῖον : μηνύει) or a different inflexion of the same word 
shows that, although I. is undoubtedly the best manuscript, it has no 
decisive superiority over the common archetype of the τὸν proup. 
The text printed in this edition, which differs very little from Torstrik 
and still less from Biehl, agrees in this respect 23 times with cod. Ie 
against the S-X group and 29 times with the latter against cod. Fe, 
On the other hand, out of 15 instances where the same words are 
differently arranged in cod. KE and in the S-X group, I follow my 
predecessors in preferring the order of cod. EF 12 times and the 
order of the S-X group only 3 times, viz. 411 b 21, 4334 9, 
433b 18: though, as will be seen from my note on the last 
passage, I incline to think that there also the order given by 
cod. E may have been that of the original text. Bich] himself, 
who of all editors adhered most closely to cod. E, sometimes 
departed from it, and I have gone still further in this directicn, 
as in 4028 12, 4028 19, 403b 17, 4078 26, 27, 408 a 21, 415 ἃ £7, 
418 Ὁ 22, 4208 4, 427 ἃ 14, 428b 4, 431 b 25, 26, 431 b27. On 
the other hand, I return to the reading of cod. E in 4o4b τος 
4138 298q., 4268 27, 433 Ὁ 17. 

Two other manuscripts have been collated since Bekker com- 
pleted his labours. The one is Parisiensis 2034, collated by 

* To the lemma of Philoponus sos, 15 I attach little value for reasons given below. 


Trendelenburg and called by him P. Belger, however, preferred 
to denote it by y and has been followed by subsequent editors. 
It offers many peculiarities, which may sometimes be due to 
conjectural emendation or to the arbitrary selection of a scribe 
who was acquainted with the variations in older manuscripts. 
The other is Vaticanus 1339, from which Rabe published a 
collation of the second Book in 1891. Its symbol is P. 
Besides certain essays by Alexander of Aphrodisias! and his own 
treatise De Azuma, in which he follows the lines of Aristotle’s, we 
have two paraphrases, one by Themistius and one by Sophonias. 
These are not, however, entirely paraphrase: a large proportion of 
commentary is interspersed. We have also two commentaries, 
one by Simplicius, the other ostensibly by Philoponus. Hayduck, 
who has re-edited Philoponus, inclines to think (p. v) that the 
commentary on Book III. is not by the same author as that upon 
Books I. and I1., and attributes it conjecturally to Stephanus, the 
author of the extant commentary on Περὶ ἑρμηνείας. Four of 
these writers go back centuries beyond our oldest manuscript. 
Alexander lived at the end of the second century A.D., Themistius 
belongs to the latter half of the fourth, while Simplicius and Phi- 
loponus were contemporaries in the reign of Justinian in the sixth 
century. Of Sophonias Fabricius’ says: “Quis ille Sophonias 
fuerit et quando vixerit, non liquet.” But an extant manuscript 
of his paraphrase is of the thirteenth or fourteenth century. The 
writings of Alexander, including his lost commentary on De Anima, 
were used by all his successors, and Simplicius and Philoponus 
betray an acquaintance with Themistius’. So far, then, the sug- 
gestion of a continuous tradition among the commentators of 
Aristotle may be readily admitted. But with Alexander our 
stream of tradition stops: a gap of five centuries separates him 
from Aristotle and Theophrastus. It is a perfectly gratuitous 
assumption that these later commentators represent the unbroken 
tradition of the Peripatetic School‘, especially as Alexander is the 

1 viz. those collected in pp. ro1—r150 of the AZazrissa (formerly known as the second 
book of his De Anima), also’ Amoplat καὶ λύσεις I. 2, 8, 11a, τα’ 17, 26, 11. 2, 8, 9, 10, 24, 
25, 26, 27, 111. 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, llept κράσεως καὶ αὐξήσεως, pp. 213 sqq., ed. Bruns. 

2 As cited by Trend.%, Ὁ. xi. 

8 Simpl. 151, 14, Philop. 408, 25; 409, 33 410, I. 353; 418, 25; 450, 9. 19; 508,203 
514, 29. Cf. also Priscianus Lydus, Proven. Solutionun, 42, 18. 

4 Rodier, vol. 1. p. ii: ““En Hsant ces commentaires, on s’apergoit bientét que ceux 
qui les ont dcrits possédaient, pour l’exégése d’Aristote, des traditions qui remontaient 
jusqu’a ses disciples immédiats,”’ 


only one of them who can be reckoned as a genuine Peripatetic. 
For the interpretation and criticism of Aristotle in the earlicst 
days of the school our only authority is Priscianus Lydus, a con- 
temporary of Simplicius and Philoponus, who wrote Jletaphrasis 
iz Theophrastum. A portion of this is preserved and was edited 
by Bywater for the Supplementuim cl ristotelscum. 

What aid, then, do these testimonia furnish to the text? From 
the nature of the case they must be subsidiary to ancient manu- 
scripts. A paraphrast may indeed be content to repeat his author 
without change, as Themistius frequently does. But his main 
object is to render the meaning clear, and the freedom with which, 
in the pursuance of this object, he varies either the actual words 
or the arrangement of the words and sentences of his author must, 
even under the most favourable circumstances, render him a very 
unsafe guide to the reconstruction of the text. If anyone thinks 
this a harsh judgment, let him consider what sort of an idea we 
should have of the text of this treatise, supypesing the manuscripts 
and commentaries had been lost and only Themistius and Sopho- 
nias preserved. The problem of determining what text or texts 
the paraphrast had before him is analogous to the problem) of 
determining the reading of. the manuscript or manuscripts used by 
William of Moerbeke when he made his Latin translation. We 
never can be sure that the paraphrast or translator confined him- 
self to a single manuscript. In the particular case of Sophonias, 
however, the difficulty of this problem is greatly diminished. The 
attention bestowed upon him by Trendelenbury, Torstrik, }layduek 
and Stapfer! has established this result, that his paraphrase agrees 
more nearly with cod. IX than with any other of our manuscripts. 
The case of Themistius, Simplicius and Philopouus is different. 
A. study of the critical notes in this edition will show that their 
evidence, such as it is, favours sometimes cod. EK and at other 
times the readings of the S-X group. Sometimes, as may be seen 
from my notes on 4208 4, the words of Themistius suggest one 
reading, but can be shown to be in all probability an intentional 
variation upon the other. The evidence to be obtained from the 
commentaries of Simplicius and Philoponus must in cach case 
be weighed independently of the prefixed lemma. I heartily 
endorse the judgment of Torstrik, p. vi: Philoponi ct Simplicii 
ῥητά nullius sunt momenti. He adds: pertinent enim ad deterioris 

1 Studia, py. th—~23. 


familiae codices: licebatque eos negligere uno excepto loco Sed 
quum in Philoponi commentario passim natarent quaedam ῥητά 
antiquiora et librariorum errore cum ipsa interpretatione com- 
mixta, haec exscripsi...duabus de causis: primum quod habent 
quaedam bona: deinde ne nocerent: possunt enim facile pro iis 
haberi quae ipse Philoponus apud Aristotelem legerit. It is by 
no means certain that the lemma comes from the commentator 
at all: at most, he was probably content for brevity to indicate 
the first words and the last, with ἕως τοῦ interposed, or the first 
words followed by καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς, a practice which may still occasion- 
ally be detected in Simplicius, eg. zz Phys. 50, 5; 113, 20; 
114. 233 440, 18; 935, 21; 1220, 27; De Antma 71, τι sq.; 76, 13; 
93,15; 99, 5; 163, 27: 192, 22; cf. Philop. 431, 30. Subsequent 
copyists would expand the lemma! and piously supply the missing 
words from the best text of Aristotle available, without paying 
much regard to the incications of the commentary appended. 
This may be illustratecl by a comparison of the Aldine editions 
of Simplicius and Philoponus with those recently edited by 
Hayduck. Trincavellus took his lemma with almost unfailing 
regularity from the Aldine edition of Aristotle. This fact is many 
times admitted by HTaycduck in the course of his critical apparatus. 
See, 6g., 315, 8; 374, 14; 388, 11; 394, 335 423, 25; 425,1; 441, 12; 
451,29; 461,13 467,25; 473, 30; 483,17; 492, 22; 498, 12; 505, 15; 
513, 21; 530, 28; 533, 14; 553,175 562, 5; 569,25; 606, 3. But 
the same thing is true of scores of passages where Hayduck has 
not pointed out the dependence of Trincavellus upon the Aldine, 
eg., Philop. 179, 27 καὶ om.; 181, 10 δέ; 189, 8 παραλογώτερον ; 
189, 28 ὠπολαβεῖν; 76. wepl insert.; 192, 14 τῇ οτὰ.; 210, 26 ὕλη; 
236, 14 καὶ ὥσπερ; 236, ι5 οὕτω Kal; 237,27 καὶ πότερον μόρια; 
260, 4 δὲ τὸ; 200, 26 τὰ μέν; 263, 25 λόγον; 267, 18 τῶν ἐν τοῖς 
ξῶσεν ὄμγων; 273, 34 ἔστι δέ; 274, 25 ἡ ψυχή; 283, 21 ἔτι τροφή 
πάσχει TL; 284, 30 ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὐδέ; 320, 2 ὅτε Om.; 345, 31 δὲ καί; 
423, 26 ἔκδηλον; 477, 3 54. μέν, ὅταν ἄγηται, εἰλικρινῆ καὶ ἀμευγῆ 
ὄντα ὥγεται εἷς; 524, τῷ αὐτοῦ; 585, 17 post κινοῦν add. πρώτως. 
In all these cases the reading indicated must have come from the 
Aldine edition. It is not known from any manuscript of De 
Antma. Besides these differences, wherever the Aldine edition 
presents a peculiar order of words, this order is adopted by Trin- 
cavellus for the lemma of Philoponus. Asulanus made a similar 
use of the Aldine Aristotle for his edition of Simplicius, as may 

1 Trincavellus certainly did this. See Hayduck’s critical notes on Philop. 211, 9; 288, 
223 204, 103 461, 1, 


be seen from such instances as Simpl. 11, 1; 16, 31; 23, 1; 72, 17; 
82,13; 271, 11. It is reasonable to infer that the same thing had 
been done before. For, even when the interference of the Aldine 
Aristotle is excluded, as it is in Hayduck’s edition, lemma and in- 
terpretation are not always completely in accord. See for example 
Philop. 247, 13; 303, 31; 461, 1, where Hayduck has adapted the 
lemma to suit the interpretation (as he has also done e.g. 475, 28; 
534,173 574,23); 553,17. Compare also 45, 16 σώματος with 46, 5 
τοῦ σώματος; 186, 22 with 186, 24; 241, 16 with 241, 21 and 261, 15; 
315, 7 with 315, 10; 348, 9 with 348, 10; 377, 32 with 378, τ; 
425, 1 with 425, 22; 493,15 with 493,17; 560, 23 with 560, 26. 
The same tendency is seen in Themistius, and the last editor, 
Heinze, may be within his rights in altering the words or the 
order of the words in the paraphrase, in spite of his manuscripts, 
to ensure consistency with the context as a whole. Two notable 
instances are Them. 116, 18, where Heinze has substituted τῶλλα 
for ταῦτα, and Them. 58, 9 sq., where the alteration affects the 
order of the words, The commentators, then, as distinct from 
their copyists, are only to be held responsible for those variants 
which they cither distinctly attest by διττὴ ἡ γραφὴ and the like 
or cite verdatine in the course of their interpretations. Even then 
caution is needed, since Philoponus is not alone in using φησὶν 
for a paraphrase and alteration of the Aristotclian text, much as 
Froude may be said to have violated the sanctity of inverted! 
commas when he printed between them his own abstracts of the 
documents he cited. AI] beyond this is matter of inference, often 
no doubt correct, but seldom sufficiently strong to stifle a feeling 
of uneasiness and uncertainty. For the rest, the readings of 
Simplicius and Philoponus, and indeed of Alexander and Plutarch 
in the few cases where we have information about them, do net 
seem uniformly to favour either cod. FE oor the S-N group. A 
few instances of bad readings are appended. In 431 a 24 Simpli- 
cius read ὁμογενῆ: if he had consulted Philuponus §61, 6 sq. he 
might have found the right reading, μὴ ὁμογενῆ. In giGh 27 
Alexander and Simplicius read κω οῦν μόνον with the S-X group, 
while cod. KH hag the support of Themistius and Sephonias, Vhile- 
ponus knew both readings (288, 10 5.) Where the manuscripts 
leave us in the lurch, it is seldom that a commentator helps us out, 
as Simplicius undoubtedly does in 403 b 12 by reading 7, not 7, and 
in 431a23 by reading ὄν, not ὅν, It is very sivnificant that in 
both these cases the change required is a change of breathing, 
which would not be indicated in an uncial manuscript or older 


kind of papyrus. The reader of an ancient book understood as 
no modern can the meaning of the line νοῦς op7 καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, 
τἄλλα κωφὰ Kai τυφλά!. On the other hand compare 431 a II, 
where Simplicius prefers 7 to the 7 which is presented (rightly, 
as I think) by Philoponus. Again, the right sense could some- 
times be got out of a bad reading. Thus in 431 b17 Simplicius 
read with most of the S-X group ὅλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέρ- 
γείαν τὰ πράγματα νοῶν, but he escaped the absurdity which results 
from such a reading by suggesting that τὰ πράγματα should be 
transposed to precede ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν (Simpl. 279, 7-9). In short, 
the text which the commentators had before them was substantially 
the same as that of our manuscripts. They all found in it μαρτυρεῖ 
TO νῦν λεχθὲν 410a 29, τῶν αἰτίων 430b 25, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγένητον 
434Ὁ 4sq. Where we are perplexed, so as a rule were they, and 
we look to them in vain to solve the riddle of such passages 
as 403 Ὁ 2,407 ἃ II, 407b 285sq., 408 a 255q., 411 b 25, 4128 17, 
425 b 1, 2, 4268 27, 427 ἃ 10, 13, 14, 428 Ὁ 198q., 428 Ὁ 30—429 a 2, 
430 Ὁ 148qq., 26sqq., 433 Ὁ 17, 18, 434a I2—15. 

1 Epicharmus apud Plut., De Sollertia animalium, g6t A. 



E, codex Parisiensis 1853. 

L, 5 Vaticanus 253. 

P, 4,  Vaticanus 1339, ex ed. H. Rabe. 

S, Laurentianus δι. 

T, 5  Vaticanus 256. 

U, ,  Vaticanus 260. 

V, »  Vaticanus 266. 

W, , Vaticanus 1026, 

xX, 5, «&mbrosianus H 50. 

y,; 5,  Paristensis 2034. 

m, ,,  Parisiensis 192t. 

Ald., eclitio Aldina. 

Basil, 4, Basileensis tertia. 

Sylb., ,,. Sylburgiana. 

Bek, 4, Bekkeri Academica. 

Trend, 5 ‘Trendelenburp'ii, 

Torst., » Torstriki. 

Bus. 4 Bussemakeri (Didotiana) 

Bhi, 5 Biehl. 

Κι, »  Rodiert. 

Bon., Bontts. 

Alex., Alexander Aphrodisiensis. 

Them., Themistius. 

Simpl., Simplicius. 

Philop., Philoponus. 

Soph., Sophonias. 

Prisc. Lyd., Prisetanus Lydus. 

vet. trans., vetusta translatio latina ex editione Juntina, Venet. 1530, et 
Thomae Aquinatis op. tom. XX., ed. Parmae 1866. 

BJ., Jahresbericht iib. die Fortschr. ete. herausy. v. C. Bursian ete, 




Τῶν καλῶν καὶ τιμίων τὴν εἴδησιν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, μᾶλ- 
λον δ᾽ ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἢ Kat ἀκρίβειαν ἢ τῷ βελτιόνων τε 
=> a ‘ Ἢ ΝΗ 
καὶ θαυμασιωτέρων εἶναι, δι’ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα τὴν περὶ τῆς ψυ- 
Ἂ ς , > / * 3 , θ 4 ὃ ἴω δὲ '᾿ 
χῆς ἱστορίαν εὐλόγως ἂν ἐν πρώτοις τιθείημεν. OOKEL OE καὶ 
πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἅπασαν ἣ γνῶσις αὐτῆς μεγάλα συμβάλ- 
λεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν- ἔστι yap οἷον ἀρχὴ 
~ , 2 σὰ \ A ‘ - ΄ » 
τῶν ζῴων. ἐπιζητοῦμεν δὲ θεωρῆσαι καὶ γνώναι τήν τε φύ- 
3. AN ‘ ‘ 3 f oA ΜΨ ξ ‘ ? , 
σιν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, εἶθ᾽ ὅσα συμβέβηκε περὶ αὐτήν᾽ 
ὧν τὰ μὲν ἴδια πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ δι 
ἐκείνην καὶ τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπάρχειν. πάντῃ δὲ πάντως ἐστὶ τῶν 
χαλεπωτάτων λαβεῖν τινὰ πίστιν περὶ αὐτῆς. καὶ yap ὄν- 
TOS κοινοῦ τοῦ ζητήματος καὶ πολλοῖς ἑτέροις, λέγω δὲ τοῦ περὶ 
τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι, τάχ᾽ dv τῳ δόξειε μία τις εἶναι 
Ed Ν / 4 Tt a o~ ᾿ > 
μέθοδος κατὰ πάντων περὶ ὧν βουλόμεθα γνῶναι τὴν ov- 
ν᾽ Vd Ν “ ‘ ‘ ἰδί > >) ἐ 
σίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἰδίων ἀπόδειξις, 
4 lA ¥ N la ¢ ᾿ δ ,»Ὰ» f 
ὥστε ζητητέον ἂν ein τὴν μέθοδον ταύτην. εἶ δὲ μή ἐστι μία 
τις καὶ κοινὴ μέθοδος περὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ἔτι χαλεπώτερον 
γίνεται τὸ πραγματευθῆναι: δεήσει γὰρ λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκα- 
ὁ ς f ‘ ἈΝ Ἀ εχ ‘4 > + ¢ , 
στον τίς ὁ τρόπος. ἐὰν δὲ φανερὸν ἢ, πότερον ἀπόδειξίς τίς 
ἐστιν ἢ διαίρεσις Kai τις ἄλλη μέθοδος, ἔτι πολλὰς 

Codices EST ΟΝ ΚΥ Χγ: libro secundo P, libro tertio L. 

I. μᾶλλον...3. εἶναι Alexander Philopono teste spuria notabat i 2. recom. Καὶ Torst., lege: 
runt Philop, Soph. || 3. ταῦτα om, If Torst., leg. Philop. Soph. et, ut videtur, Them. 1, 18 3 
περὶ οἵα. STUWX Bek. Trend., add. Soph. Torst. {τῆς om. Vy Soph. ἢ g. καινὰ pro 
δι’ ἐκείνην y, τὰ δὲ κοινὰ καὶ rots ζώοις δι' ἐκείνην U, receptum textum tuenturs Ther. 
Soph. || ro. δὲ καὶ πάντως ST UV Wy, πάντῃ δὲ πάντως etiam Philop. | ra. καὶ om 
EX Bek. Trend. Biehl Rodier || 13. τὸ] τοῦ SVWKX Philop. Bek. Trencl., τὰ TU 
15. ἀπόδειξιν SUWX Bek., ἡ ἀπόδειξις T, ἀπόδειξιν etiam Soph. ἢ 17. καὶ κοινή ris 
ὌΝ ΧΥ || τὸ] τοῦ STUWX || 19. post τρόπος virgulam Bek. | ὅταν SU W, af V, 


DE ANIMA. Βοοκ I. 

Cognition is in our eyes a thing of beauty and worth, and this 1 
is true of one cognition more than another, either because it is 
exact or because it relates to more important and remarkable 
objects. On both these grounds we may with good reason claim 
a high place for the enquiry concerning the soul. It would seem, 
too, that an acquaintance with the subject contributes greatly to 
the whole domain of truth and, more particularly, to the study of 
nature, the soul being virtually the principle of all animal life. 

Our aim is to discover and ascertain the nature and 

The sub- : 

ject of essence of soul and, in the next place, all the accidents 
“we belonging to it; of which some are thought to be 
attributes peculiar to the soul itself, while others, it is held, belong 
to the animal also, but owe their existence to the soul. But every- 2 
where and in every way it is extremely difficult to arrive at any 
trustworthy conclusion on the subject. It is the same here as in 
many other enquiries. What we have to investigate is the essential 
nature of things and the What. It might therefore be thought 
that there is a single procedure applicable to all the objects 
whose essential nature we wish to discover, as demonstration is 
applicable to the properties which go along with them: in that case 
we should have to enquire what this procedure is. If, however, 
there is no single procedure common to all sciences for defining 
the What, our task becomes still more difficult, as it will then be 
necessary to settle in each particular case the method to be 
pursued. Further, even if it be evident that it consists in demon- 
stration of some sort or division or some other procedure, there 
ἐὰν etiam Simpl. p. 10, 4 || τις post ἀπόδειξις om. pr. ET U WX, etiam Philop. Biehl (in 

alt. ed.) || 20. post μέθοδος punctum Bek. || ἔτε δὲ πολλὰς TU V W Bek., δὲ om. etiam 


“~ ¥ 
ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ πλάνας, ἐκ τίνων det ζητεῖν: ἄλλαι yap 
Ἂν 3 ,ὔ / 3 a \ 3 , 
ἄλλων ἀρχαί, καθάπερ ἀριθμών καὶ ἐπιπέδων. 

3 πρῶτον δ᾽ ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον διελεῖν ἐν τίνι τῶν γενῶν καὶ τί 
> 7 ‘ / , Ν > 4 A Ν a Ν +) , 
ἐστι, λέγω δὲ πότερον τόδε TL καὶ οὐσία ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ Kat τις 
ἄλλη τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν κατηγοριῶν, ἔτι δὲ πότερον τῶν ἐν 25 

΄ μ ‘A on > ᾽ , , ‘ ¥ 
δυνάμει ὄντων ἢ μᾶλλον ἐντελέχειά Tiss διαφέρει yap ov τι 

4 σμικρόν. σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ εἶ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερής, καὶ πότερον 402 Ὁ 
ε δὴ ha Ν mal “An 3 δὲ ‘ εξ ὃ / f 
ὁμοειδὴς amaca ψυχὴ ἢ οὐ" εἰ OE μὴ ὁμοειδὴς, πότερον 
μά Ζ x ΄ ΜᾺ Ν Ν ¢ 4 ‘ 
εἴδει διαφέρουσιν ἢ γένει. νῦν μὲν yap οἱ λέγοντες καὶ ζη- 
τοῦντες περὶ ψυχῆς περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μόνης ἐοίκασιν ἐπι- 

ra 3 ? > Ὁ \ ᾽ ? e € / 
ς σκοπεῖν. εὐλαβητέον δ᾽ ὅπως μὴ λανθάνῃ πότερον εἷς ὃ λό- 5 
7A 3 ᾽ὔ ? ¢ A > « , Ψ - 
γος αὐτῆς ἐστί, καθάπερ ζῴου, ἢ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην ἕτερος, οἷον 
¥ / 3 ’ ΤᾺ δ ‘ Ὰ Ν ‘ ¥ > 
ἵππου, κυνός, ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ, τὸ δὲ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου ἤτοι od- 
, 3 aA Ὁ ε ΄ δὲ Ἄ ¥ Ν ¥ 
θέν ἐστιν ἢ ὕστερον: ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν εἴ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο KaTN- 

6 yopotro: ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ μὴ πολλαὶ ψυχαὶ ἀλλὰ μόρια, πότερον δεῖ 
ζητεῖν πρότερον τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν ἢ τὰ μόρια. χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ 10 
τούτων διορίσαι ποῖα πέφυκεν ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, καὶ πότερον 
τὰ μόρια χρὴ ζητεῖν πρότερον ἢ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, οἷον τὸ 
νοεῖν ἢ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικόν: ὁμοίως 

‘ ‘ > NS “ ¥ > ‘ ‘ ¥ ΄ a ‘ad 

7 δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ τὰ ἔργα πρότερον, πάλιν ay 
τις ἀπορήσειεν εἶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα πρότερα τούτων ζητητέον, οἷον 

8 τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ νοῦ. ἔοικε δ᾽ 
οὐ μόνον τὸ τί ἐστι γνῶναι χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ θεωρῆσαι 

~~ Ψ Pa’ 

τὰς αἰτίας τῶν συμβεβηκότων ταῖς οὐσίαις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς 

/ f ‘ > fs ‘ / κι , Ν ν 3 7 

μαθήμασι τί τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ καμπύλον ἢ τί γραμμὴ Kal ἐπί. 

πεδον πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν πόσαις ὀρθαῖς αἱ τοῦ τριγώνου γωνίαι 20 
ἴσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ συμβεβηκότα συμβάλλεται μέ- 
ya μέρος πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ τί ἐστιν: ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἔχω- 



46. μᾶλλον] μόνον Ἐὶ (Trend), μᾶλλον tuentur Them. Philop. Simpl. Soph. ἢ z+ om 
SVWkXy, legit Soph. {402 b, 2. dporoedds utrobique TUVWX, ὀμυειδὴς tucntur 
Them. Philop. Simpl. || 4. μόνον y Torst., μόνης corr. ἘΣ et reliqui, etiam Them. Philop. 36, 
γ Soph. || 6. ἑκάστην pr. If Torst., etiam Soph., ἕτερον V y, ἕκαστον reliqui ante Torstrikium 
omnes, etiam, ut videtur, Simpl. 13, 4 et Philop. in prooemio ad lib, 11. 205, 20 || 7. δὲ] 
γὰρ V, Alex, da. καὶ Ato. (ed. Bruns) p, 21, 15. 22, 2. 24, 4, etiam Soph. || &. κατηγορῆται 
Εἰ, sed ἡ in rasura (Trend.), κατηγορεῖται Torst., κατηγοροῖτο reliqui, etiam Simpl. Alex. 
23, τὸ || 11. τοῦτο V {|ἀλλήλων ἕτερα X || 12, δεῖ U WX |] rs. πρότερον TUVWX 
Philop. Soph. Bek. Trend. || 16. vof IOV X, in textum recepit Biehl (cf. gaya, 17), 
γοητοῦ ἢ, νοητικοῦ reliqui et scripti et impressi, eliam Philop., pro αἰσθητικοῦ οἱ νοητικοῦ 
legi vult αἰσθάνεσθαι et νοεῖν Belger, Llermes, 1878, p. 302, at αὐσθητικοῦ etiam Philop. ἢ 
19. kalrizvdn. SU Wy, καὶ τί κι TX |] aa. εἰδῆσαι STU W Xy, εἰδήσειν V. 

CH. I 402 a 2I—402 Ὁ 22 5 

is still room for much perplexity and error, when we ask from 
what premisses our enquiry should start, for there are different 
premisses for different sciences; for the science of numbers, for 
example, and plane geometry. 

The first thing necessary is no doubt to determine under which 3 
The of the summa genera soul comes and what it is ; I mean, 
problems. whether it is a particular thing, ie. substance, or is 
quality or is quantity, or falls under any other of the categories 
already determined. We must further ask whether it is amongst 
things potentially existent or is rather a sort of actuality, the 
distinction being all-important. Again, we must consider whether 4 
it is divisible or indivisible; whether, again, all and every soul is 
homogencous or not; and, if not, whether the difference between 
the various souls is a difference of species or a difference of genus: 
for at present cliscussions and investigations about soul would 
appear to be restricted to the human soul. We must take care not 5 
to overlook the question whether there is a single definition of soul 
τα there answering to a single definition of animal; or whether 
asingle there is a different definition for each separate soul, as for 

horse and dog, man and god: animal, as the universal, 
being reyardecd either as non-existent or, if existent, as logically 
posterior. This is a question which might equally be raised in 
regard to any other common predicate. Further, on the assump- 6 
tion that there are not several souls, but merely several different 
Questions = Parts in the same soul, it is a question whether we should 
of pro- begin by investigating soul as a whole or its several 
cedure. «oy Ὁ , . . 

parts. And here again it is difficult to determine which 
of these parts are really distinct from one another and whether the 
several parts, or their functions, should be investigated first. Thus, 
eg. should the process of thinking come first or the mind that 
thinks, the process of sensation or the sensitive faculty? And so 
everywhere else. But, if the functions should come first, again 7 
will arise the question whether we should first investigate the 
correlative objects. Shall we take, eg., the sensible object before 
the faculty of sense and the intelligible object before the intellect ? 

It would seem that not only is the knowledge of a thing’s 8 
A teat of essential nature useful for discovering the causes of its 
a good ς attributes, as, ¢.g., in mathematics the knowledge of what 

‘ is meant by the terms straight or curved, line or surface, 
aids us in discovering to how many right angles the angles of a 
triangle are equal: but also, conversely, a knowledge of the 
attributes is a considerable aid to the knowledge of what a thing is. 


μεν ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκό- 
A on f 
των, ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, τότε καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας 
Ν, 3 Ν, 
ἕξομέν τι λέγειν κάλλιστα: πάσης γὰρ ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ τὸ 25 
a ῪᾺ [4 ‘ 
τί ἐστιν, ὦστε καθ᾽ ὅσους τῶν ὁρισμῶν μὴ συμβαίνει τὰ συμ- 
βεβηκότα γνωρίζειν, ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ εἰκάσαι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐ- 4038 
a a a Ψ 
μαρές, δῆλον ὅτι διαλεκτικῶς εἴρηνται καὶ κενῶς ἅπαντες. 
3 / > »¥ Ν Ν , aa οὐ / / 3 / 
9 ἀπορίαν δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, πότερόν ἐστι Tav- 
ΝᾺ oe ων »¥ 
Ta κοινὰ Kal τοῦ ἔχοντος ἢ ἐστί τι Kal τῆς ψυχῆς ὕδιον αὖ- 
~ ans 1. ἴω \ 4 ω > c # / , 
τῆς: τοῦτο yap λαβεῖν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, ov ῥᾷάδιον δέ. φαίνε- 5 
Tat δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων οὐθὲν ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν οὐδὲ 
™ Ὄ 3 , ™~ > ~ wd > / 
ποιεῖν, οἷον ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι. 
; > ὃ» ¥ N ΝᾺ 3 > 2 Ν N “~ ? 
μάλιστα δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἴδιον τὸ νοεῖν- εἶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία 
Ὁ . » , 3 3 ? > ἃ OS “a > Κ᾿ 
τις H μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ évdéyour ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἄνευ 
το σώματος εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστί τι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ 
, » 3 7 5. ἃ > N ? > ‘ 
παθημάτων ἴδιον, ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ ἂν αὐτὴν χωρίζεσθαι: εἰ δὲ μη- 
» a ΡᾺ 
θέν ἐστιν ἴδιον αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη χωριστή, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ τῷ 
A Ὁ ~ 
εὐθεῖ, ἢ εὐθύ, πολλὰ συμβαίνει, οἷον ἅπτεσθαι τῆς χαλ.- 
κῆς σφαίρας κατὰ στιγμήν, οὐ μέντοι γ᾽ ἅψεται οὕτω χωρι- 
σθὲν τὸ εὐθύ: ἀχώριστον γάρ, εἴπερ ἀεὶ μετὰ σώματός TE 15 
νός ἐστιν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι με- 
Ν 4 / ? f ἂν / ἂν 
τὰ σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι 
Ἃ “ 
χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν: ἅμα yap τούτοις πά- 
σχει τι τὸ σῶμα. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ ποτὲ μὲν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐν- 
ca 4 
ἀργῶν παθημάτων συμβαινόντων μηδὲν παροξύνεσθαι ἢ φο- 20 
βεῖσθαι, ἐνίοτε δ᾽ ὑπὸ μικρῶν καὶ ἀμαυρῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν 
ὀργᾷ τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥσπερ ὅταν ὀργίζηται. ἔτι 
Ν “ a 
δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον φανερόν" μηθενὸς yap φοβεροῦ συμβαΐνον- 
τος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται τοῖς τοῦ φοβουμένου. εἰ δ᾽ οὕτως 
¥ Sar Ψ ‘ ‘6 λό ¥ λ , 3° τ cy 
ἔχει, ONAOV OTL TA TAO) λόγοι EVVAOL εἰσιν. WOTE OL OPOL 35 



25. τί λέγειν TU V, re insert. Ey Simpl. Soph. || drs κάλλιστα TV X y, τι κάλλιον ὟΝ, 
κάλλιστα etiam Simpl, Philop. || yap tuentur praeter onines codd. Philop. Alex. apud Philep. 
Simpl. || 403 a, 6. δὲ om. E || τῶν μὲν EX y Philop. Soph. Torst., μὲν om. reliqui ante 
Torst. omnes || dvev τοῦ σώμ. E Philop. Soph. Torst., τοῦ om. reliqui ante Torst. omnes ἢ 
8. ἰδίω SWXy, Simpl. Philop. Trend. ed. pr., cov etiam E, sed ον in ras., ὦ superser. 
(Bhl.), ἔδιον etiam Them. Soph. || 9. ἄνευ rod σώμ. Wy et, ut videtur, Philop. 46, 5, χοῦ 
om. etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. || 13. ἢ εὐθεῖ W et Ey, 9 εὐθύ Ἰὼ (Stapf) Il 14. οὕτω 
solus E et Bonitz (Hermes VIL, 417), reliqui ante Biehlium omnes τούτου, etiam Philop, 
Simpl. et, ut videtur, Soph. 7, 28 |] 18. καὶ τὸ μισεῖν SW X | γὰρ et χορ. 710m. Ἐς, leg. 
Soph. || dua...19. σῶμα unc. inel. Torst., tuentur haec verba praeter codd, Simpl. Philop., 

CH. I 402 Ὁ 23—403 a 25 7 

For when we are able to give an account of all, or at any rate 
most, of the attributes as they are presented to us, then we shall 
be in a position to define most exactly the essential nature of the 
thing. In fact, the starting point of every demonstration is a 
definition of what something is. Hence the definitions which lead 
to no information about attributes and do not facilitate even con- 
jecture respecting them have clearly been framed for dialectic and 
are void of content, one and all. 

A further difficulty arises as to whether all attributes of theg 
Soul and soul are also shared by that which contains the soul or 
body. whether any of them are peculiar to the soul itself: a 
question which it is indispensable, and yet by no means easy, to 
decide. It would appear that in most cases soul neither acts nor is 
acted upon apart from the body: as, e.g., in anger, confidence, desire 
and sensation in general. Thought, if anything, would seem to be 
peculiar to the soul. Yet, if thought is a sort of imagination, or 
not independent of imagination, it will follow that even thought 
cannot be independent of the body. If, then, there be any of the ro 
functions or affections of the soul peculiar to it, it will be possible 
for the soul to be separated from the body: if, on the other hand, 
there is nothing of the sort peculiar to it, the soul will not be 
capable of separate existence. As with the straight line, so with 
it. The line, gud straight, has many properties; for instance, it 
touches the brazen sphere at a point; but it by no means follows 
that it will so touch it if separated. In fact it is inseparable, since 
it is always conjoined with body of some sort. So, too, the 
attributes of the soul appear to be all conjoined with body: such 
attributes, viz., as anger, mildness, fear, pity, courage; also joy, 
love and hate; all of which are attended by some particular 
affection of the body. This indeed is shown by the fact that some- 
times violent and palpable incentives occur without producing in 
us exasperation or fear, while at other times we are moved by 
slight and scarcely perceptible causes, when the blood is up and 
the bodily condition that of anger. Still more is this evident from 
the fact that sometimes even without the occurrence of anything 
terrible men exhibit all the symptoms of terror. If this be so, 
the attributes are evidently forms or notions realised in matter. 

e.g. 50, 22, Soph. || 19. σημεῖον E Torst., μηνύει reliqui ante Torst. omnes, etiam Them. 
Soph. || μὲν ὑπὸ ἰσχ. TU V WX Soph. || 21. δ᾽ δὲ καὶ UV Wy, om. καὶ etiam Them, 
Soph. || é4x ST V WX Soph., ὅταν etiam Simpl. || 23. μᾶλλον τοῦτο ST VW X y, τούτου 
μᾶλλον coni. Torst., τούτῳ coni. Christ || 25. ὅτι καὶ τὰ U Vy || ἐν ὕλη ET, ἔνυλοε etiam 
Them. Philop. Soph. 



ΜᾺ @ \ 3 , ? , ral δὶ ra A 
τοιοῦτοι οἷον τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κίνησίς τις τοῦ TOLOVOL σώματος ἢ 
, «ἡ ὃ , eon ἡὃ 9 7 \ ὃ \ A +5 
μέρους ἢ δυνάμεως ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἕνεκα τοῦδε. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα NOH 

A , κε on , 
φυσικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ ψυχῆς, ἢ πάσης ἢ τῆς τοιαύτης. 
διαφερόντως δ᾽ ἂν ὁρίσαιντο φυσικός τε καὶ διαλεκτικὸς 
ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον ὀργὴ τί ἐστίν" ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυ- 

σὰ ΜᾺ Φ 
πήσεως ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, ὃ δὲ ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος 

ἢ θερμοῦ. τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν ὕλην ἀποδίδωσιν, ὃ δὲ τὸ 403Ὁ 

5 a 
εἶδος καὶ τὸν λόγον. ὁ μὲν yap λόγος εἶδος τοῦ πράγματος, 
> + > 4 Ν > ¢ > » y > “ 
ἀνάγκη δ᾽ εἶναι τοῦτον ἐν ὕλῃ τοιᾳδί, εἰ ἔσται: ὥσπερ οἰκίας 
a Ν ~ 
ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, ὅτι σκέπασμα κωλυτικὸν φθορᾶς ὑπ᾽ 


ἀνέμων καὶ ὄμβρων καὶ καυμάτων, ὁ δὲ φήσει λίθους καὶ ς 

πλίνθους καὶ ξύλα, ἕτερος δ᾽ ἐν τούτοις τὸ εἶδος ἕνεκα των- 
, , > ς \ , , ε ν,νΝ Ψ \ 4 
δί. τίς οὖν ὁ φυσικὸς τούτων; πότερον ὁ περὶ THY ὕλην, τὸν δὲ 
λόγον ἀγνοῶν, ἢ ὃ περὶ τὸν λόγον μόνον; ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ἐξ 
3 κ᾿ 3 ’ Ν \ ’ ¢ “ x > ¥ ξ ‘ 
ἀμφοῖν. ἐκείνων δὲ δὴ τίς ἑκάτερος; ἢ οὐκ ἔστι τις ὁ περὶ 
τὰ πάθη τῆς ὕλης τὰ μὴ χωριστὰ μηδ᾽ ἢ χωριστά, ἀλλ᾽ 
ὁ φυσικὸς περὶ ἅπανθ᾽ ὅσα τοῦ τοιουδὲ σώματος καὶ τῆς τοι- 
αὕτης ὕλης ἔργα καὶ πάθη: ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἣ τοιαῦτα, ἀλ- 
λος, καὶ περὶ τινῶν μὲν τεχνίτης, ἐὰν τύχῃ, οἷον τέκτων ἢ 
ἰατρός, τῶν δὲ μὴ χωριστῶν μέν, ἦ δὲ μὴ τοιούτου σώμα- 
- ‘ ? 3» δ ε é i \ 
τος πάθη Kal ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, ὁ μαθηματικός, ἢ δὲ κεχωρι- 
a € a ? ? > 3 id + € + 
σμένα, ὃ πρῶτος φιλόσοφος. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπανιτέον ὅθεν ὁ λόγος. 
S Κ' >» ᾧ ν rd a ἴω > Fd ἴων * 
ἐλέγομεν δ᾽ ὅτι τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς ἀχώριστα τῆς φυσικῆς 
ὕλης τῶν ζῴων, ἦ δὴ τοιαῦθ᾽ ὑπάρχει, θυμὸς καὶ φόβος, 
καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον. 

26. κίνησιν Ἰὼ κίνησις etiam Simpl. Philop. Soph. Cf ad 402 αν 18 || τὰς om. ES Soph, 
rts leg. etiam Simpl. Philop. || 27. ἤδη} δὴ STV Wey, om. X ff 2g. ὁρίσαιτο ᾧ. V, dploaro 
6¢.S5TU WXy Soph. || καὶ ὁ διαλεκτικὸς W y, 60m. etiam Soph. || 31. τοιοῦτο STU V W, 
τοιοῦτον etiam Soph. || verba αἵματος καὶ (vel ἢ) removenda esse censet Steinhart, Syntb. 
Crit. 1843 || 403 b, 1.4] καὶ Ἰὼ Bek. Torst., ἢ etiam Philop. Soph. Trend. || 2. εἶδος rod] 
εἶδος mihi suspectum, ὅδα τοῦ W et, ut videtur, Soph. 8, 35, fortasse recte, ὁ δὲ τοῦ 
EST Vy Simpl. Philop. Plutarchus ap. Simpl. a1, 15. || 3. εἶναι τοιοῦτον V, τοῦτον 
εἶναι W || ἐπὶ οἰκίας Wy || 4. ὅτι) τις S, res ὅτι X, ἂν εἴη TW, ἂν εἴη ὅτι UV { 
5. καυμάτων καὶ ὄμβρων WX, ὄμβρων καὶ πνευμάτων Ἰὼ, textum tuentur etiam Them. 
Philop. Soph. || φησι ΒΨ ΧΥ || καὶ wd.) καὶ om. V {{|6. ἐν om. W it 9. post ἀμφοῖν 
interrogandi signum Bek., correxit Trend. {| 8% om. UV || τὸ. post μὴ χωριστὰ 
virgulam Bek. et Trend., sustulit Torst. {| cx. πάνθ᾽ T, ἅπανθ᾽ etiam E, sed α 
eras. (Stapf) || 709 om. SUW || τοιουδὶ] φνσικοῦ T || 12. ὅσα FE Philop. Torst., το αὶ 
ante Torst. omnes ὁπόσα || ἦν ἘΣ, sed ν expunct. (Stapf), 7 Simpl. Bon. (Metaph. p. 484) 
Torst., omisisse videtur Philop. in interpr. 62, τό, reliqui ante Torst. omnes ὃ || 13. roves 
T, twa UWy, τινῶν etiam Simpl. Philop. Soph. || 1s. 6 om. E, leg. etiam Soph. ἢ 

CH, I 403 a 26—403 Ὁ 19 9 

Hence they must be defined accordingly: anger, for instance, as a 
certain movement in a body of a given kind, or some part or 
faculty of it, produced by such and such a cause and for such and 
such anend. These facts at once bring the investigation of soul, 
Digres- whether in its entirety or in the particular aspect 
sion. described, within the province of the natural philosopher. 
But every such attribute would be differently defined by the 
physicist and the dialectician or philosopher. Anger, for instance, 
would be clefined by the dialectician as desire for retaliation or 
the like, by the physicist as a ferment of the blood or heat 
which is about the heart: the one of them gives the matter, the 
other the form or notion. For the notion is the form of the thing, 
but this notion, if it is to be, must be realised in matter of a 
particular kind; just as in the case of a house. The notion or 
definition of a house would be as follows: a shelter to protect us 
from harm by wind or rain or scorching heat; while another will 
describe it as stones, bricks and timber; and again another as the 
form realised in these materials and subserving given ends. Which 
then of these is the true physicist? Is it he who confines himself 
to the mattcr, while ignoring the form? Or he who treats of the 
form exclusively? 1 answer, it is rather he who in his definition 
takes account of both. What then of each of the othertwo? Or 
shall we rather say that there is no one who deals with proper- 
ties which are not separable nor yet treated as separable, but 
the physicist deals with all the active properties or passive affec- 
tions belonging to body of a given sort and the corresponding 
matter? All attributes not regarded as so belonging he leaves 
to someone else: who in certain cases is an expert, a carpenter, 
for instance, or a physician. The attributes which, though in- 
separable, are not regarded as properties of body of a given sort, but 
are reached by abstraction, fall within the province of the mathe- 
matician: while attributes which are regarded as having separate 
existence fall to the first philosopher or metaphysician. But 
to return to the point of digression. We were saying that the 
Conelu- attributes of the soul are as such,—I mean, as anger and 
sion. fear, inseparable from the physical matter of the animals 
to which they belong, and not, like line and surface, separable in 


17. οὔτε ὡς χωριστὰ ex solo E Biehl Rodier, quasi 19. καὶ οὐχ huic οὔτε respondeat, 
sed aut <odre xwpierd > οὔτα aut οὐδὲ pro οὔτε minus incommodi haberet, χωριστὰ ΤΥ X, 
οὐ χωριστὰ Soph. Torst. Dembowski, Woch. f. class. Phil. 1887, p. 430, reliqui ἀχώριστα, 
etiam Them. Philop. Simpl. {| 18. 7 δὴ] ὅ ve U Simpl., εἴ ye T, ἢ X, 7 δὴ etiam Philop. 
Soph. || τοιαύτη X. 


10 DE ANIMA 1 CH. 2 

3 ~ 4 Ἀ ΨᾺ 3 aA “4 ὃ 
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ἴω 3 
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τὰ μάλιστα δοκοῦνθ᾽ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῃ κατὰ φύσιν. τὸ ἐμψυ- 25 
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γάρ τινες αὐτῶν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα, οἱ 

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ante προελθόντας virgulam ponunt Bek. Trend. || 22. συμπεριλαμβάνειν TWX, διαλαμ- 
Bavew V, συμπαραλαμβώνειν etiam ‘Them. Philop. Soph. || 23. καλῶς om. T, post εἰρημένα 
ponit U {μήτι UV || 24. τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθῆ θῶμεν S || a6. δυεῖν Ἐς, δυσὶ SVWX | μάλιστα 
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μὲν) καὶ Anu. V |] 4040, 1, αὐτήν gnow ΤᾺΝ | a. τὰ σφαιρ...«λέγει et 4. ὧν delenda et 
5. ὁμοίως.. "Λεύκιππος parenth. includenda censet Madlvig, adversaria critica I, p. 471, 

» ele mae Nala TNlale Lh’ σὰ ἔγυνε ιν ὑ δὲ 

CH. 2 403 Ὁ 20—404 a 18 11 

In our enquiry concerning soul it is necessary to state the 2 
problems which must be solved as we proceed, and at the same 

The time to collect the views of our predecessors who had 
current anything to say on the subject, in order that we may 

adopt what is right in their conclusions and guard against 
their mistakes. Our enquiry will begin by presenting what are 2 
commonly held to be in a special degree the natural attributes of 
soul. Now there are two points especially wherein that which is 
animate is held to differ from the inanimate, namely, motion and 
the act of sensation: and these are approximately the two charac- 
teristics of soul handed down to us by our predecessors. There are 
some who maintain that soul is preeminently and primarily the 

Soul cause of movement. But they imagined that that which 
mover ΚΟ is not itself in motion cannot move anything else, and 
movent. thus they regarded the soul as a thing which is in 
motion. Flence Democritus affirms the soul to be a sort of fire or 3 
The | heat. For the “shapes” or atoms are infinite and those 
Stomists- _ which are spherical he declares to be fire and soul: they 

may be compared with the so-called motes in the air, which are 
seen in the sunbeams that enter through our windows. The 
agerregate of such seeds, he tells us, forms the constituent elements 
of the whole of nature (and herein he agrees with Leucippus), 
while those of them which are spherical form the soul, because 
such figures most easily find their way through everything and, 
beings themselves in motion, set other things in motion. The 
atomists assume that it is the soul which imparts motion to 
animals. It is for this reason that they make life depend upon 
respiration. For, when the surrounding air presses upon bodies 
and tends to extrude those atomic shapes which, because they are 
never at rest themselves, impart motion to animals, then they are 
reinforced from outside by the entry of other like atoms in respira- 
tion, which in fact, by helping to check compression and solidification, 
prevent the escape of the atoms already contained in the animals ; 
and life, so they hold, continues so long as there is strength to do 
this. The doctrine of the Pythagoreans seems also to contain the 4 

Certain same thought. Some of them identified soul with the 
τ Ασα, motes in the air, others with that which sets these motes 

der Vorsokratiker, p. 363, 7 |l 4: τὴν μὲν πανσπ. E (Trend.), Them. Torst., μὲν om. reliqui 
ante Torst. omnes, etiam Philop. Soph. || 5. στοιχεῖα λέγει τῆς ὅλης φύσεως excepto E 
omnes codd.-, etiam Them. Soph. Bek. Trend. || 6. σφαιρ. πῦρ καὶ ψυχὴν V || 9. διὸ... 
12. κίνησιν om. V || 10. τὴν εἰσπνοὴν καὶ τὴν ἀναπνοήν S. {| 13. οὐρανόθεν T {| εἴτ᾽ 
εἰσιόντων E, ἐπεισιόντων etiam Them. Soph. et sine dubio Philop. et Simpl. ᾿ 


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Ἁ ἈΝ Ἁ 3 / 3 ‘\ ἘΝῚ ΄ ᾿ Ν Ἂ 
τινὶ περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ λέγει ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν. 
᾿Αναξαγόρας δ᾽ ἧττον διασαφεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν: πολλαχοῦ μὲν 4040 
γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς τὸν νοῦν λέγει, ἑτέρωθι 
δὲ τοῦτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν: ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν 
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δὲ τούτων εἴρηται practerit, de Simpl. 26, 13 sqq. non liquet || ry. virgulam pest 
εἴρηται sustulit Rodier || ὅτε 5, in interpr. εἴρηται δὲ αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, dre Soph. ἢ 
ar. ἑαυτὸ STVWXKX || 24. αὐτῆς E, ὑφ᾽ daurfs ctiam Them. || 26. virgulam post 
εἴρηκεν posuil Diels || 27. ὁ vols SW Χ γ, ὁ om. etiam Them. Soph. || post Agu. colon 
Diels, vulg. punctum || 28. ψυχὴν ταὐτὸν καὶ νοῦν ex solo EF (Trend.) Biehl, reliqui 
ante Bichlium omnes ταὐτὸν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν || 404 Ὁ, τ. πολλαχῇ KE, πολλαχῶς W, 
πολλαχοῦ etiam Them. qui in interpr. 10, 5. sq. πολλαχόθι posuit ἢ a. τὸ om. Vy, legit 
etiam Them. || 3, ταὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν τῇ ψυχῆ V, τὸν νοῦν εἴναι ταὐτὸν τῇ ψυχῇ TW et, 
qui τὸν αὐτὸν, Uy, similia veteres interpretes || 4. vulg. virgulas post fois et μικροῖς 

CH. 2 404 8 19—404b 15 13 

in motion: and as to these motes it has been stated that they are 
seen to be in incessant motion, even though there be a perfect calm. 
The view of others who describe the soul as that which moves itself 
tends in the same direction. For it would seem that all these thinkers 
regard motion as the most distinctive characteristic of the soul. 
Everything else, they think, is moved by the soul, but the soul is 
moved by itself: and this because they never see anything cause 
motion without itself being in motion. Similarly the soul is said to 5 
be the moving principle by Anaxagoras and all others who have held 
Anaxa- that mind sets the universe in motion; but not altogether 
goras. in the same sense as by Democritus. The latter, indeed, 
absolutely identified soul and mind, holding that the presentation 
to the senses is the truth: hence, he observed, Homer had well 
sung of Hector in his swoon that he lay ‘with other thoughts.’ 
Democritus, then, does not use the term mind to denote a faculty 
conversant with truth, but regards mind as identical with soul. 
Anaxagoras,* however, is less exact in his use of the terms. In 
His view ΠΊΘΩν places he speaks of mind as the cause of goodness 
ambigu- and order, but elsewhere he identifies it with the soul: as 
ewe where he attributes it to all animals, both great and 
small, high and low. As a matter of fact, however, mind in the 
sense of intelligence would not seem to be present in all animals 
alike, nor even in all men. 

Those, then, who have directed their attention to the motion of 6 
Soul, a8 the animate being, conceived the soul as that which is 
cognitive, most capable of causing motion: while those who laid 
from the stress on its knowledge and perception of all that exists 
siements- identified the soul with the ultimate principles, whether 
they recognised a plurality of these or only one. Thus Empedocles 
Empedo- Compounded soul out of all the elements, while at the 
cles. same time regarding each one of them as a soul. His 
words arc “With earth we see earth, with water water, with air 
bright air, but ravaging fire by fire, love by love, and strife by 

sustulit Diels || ἀτεμοτέροις ἘΣ (Stapf.) || 5. φαίνεται viv δὲ E (νῦν in rasura, Trend.) || 
6. πᾶσιν om. ST WX || 0. τὸ post καὶ om. STV Wy, leg. etiam Them. Soph. || δὴ U 
Them., om. VW |] 10. ποιοῦντες ταύτας οἱ VW et vet. transl. Biehl Rodier, ποιοῦντες 
αὐτὰς of in lermmate Philop. 72, 31 et in interpr. of μὲν πλείους εἰπόντες ἀρχὰς 73, 13, 
ποιοῦντεΞ τὰς ἀρχὰς οἱ Ὁ, et Philop. v. 1. 72, 31, ποιοῦντες ras ἀρχὰς ταύτας ol SXy et 
iu interpr. Them. Soph., ποιοῦντες, οἱ E Bek. Trend. Torst. ταύτας unc. includere malui, 
delemdum censet etiam Dembowski, p. 431, om. Diels, p. 213, Fr. 10g || ante ταύτας et 
11. ταύτην virgulas posuit Rocdier (| rr. μὲν om. STW || 22. οὕτως Ἐ, (Trend.), οὕτω 
λόγων SU, om. TW, vulgo ante Biehlium οὔτω || 13. δ᾽ insertum E, leg. etiam Them. 
Soph. i 14. δῖον TU VW, etiam Soph. 

14 DE ANIMA I CH. 2 

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χὰ τῶν ὑπειλήφασιν, οὐκ ἀλόγως. ὅθεν ἔδοξέ τισι πῦρ εἶναι" 5 
καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο λεπτομερέστατόν τε καὶ μάλιστα τῶν στοιχείων 
ἀσώματον, ἔτι δὲ κινεῖταί τε καὶ κινεῖ τὰ ἄλλα πρώτως. 
/ ‘ ‘ f ¥ ? / 
12 Δημόκριτος δὲ Kal γλαφυρωτέρως εἴρηκεν ἀποφαινόμενος 
διὰ τί τούτων ἑκάτερον: ψυχὴν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν, 
τοῦτο δ᾽ εἶναι τῶν πρώτων καὶ ἀδιαιρέτων σωμάτων, κινητι- τὸ 
κὸν δὲ διὰ λεπτομέρειαν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα’ τῶν δὲ σχημάτων 

16. καὶ ὁ BH, “et Plato” vet. transl, om. STUV Wy, ὁ om. Bek. Trend. Torst. ἡ 
Ἰλάτων post Τιμαίῳ U Wy, port ψυχὴν 5. 1 |] at. τὰς δ' ἄλλας Them. et tanquam varia 
lectionem Philop. commemorat 79, 15, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα Simpl., τἄλλα δὲ Soph. | 23. dp! ev] 
γίνεται X, om. ἢ T, leg. etiam Them. Soph. || 24. αὐτὰ om. S X, leg. Soph. |! al ante ἀρχαὶ 
exuno Καὶ addunt Bek. et Torst., om. Soph. Trend. || 27. εἴδη δὰ καὶ ἀριθμοὶ coni. Steinhart, 
οὗτοι καὶ coni. Susemihl, Jen. Lit. 2. 1877, Ρ. 708 || 28. virgulam post οὕτως Torst. 
Belger in ed, alt. Trend. Rodier, etiam Soph. 14, 2, ante ofrws reliqui, ctiam Simpl. 
Philop. || 30. διαφέρονται... 405 Ὁ, 29. ψυχήν non satis ad praccedentia quadrare videntur 
Susemihlio, Oecon. p. 84 || 31. τὰς ἀσωμάτους e codd. solus X, τοῖς ἀσωμάτοις Them. 
Philop. Soph. Trend. Torst., ceteri codd. et Bek. τοῖς ἀσωμάτοις |] 405, 2. τοῦ πλήθοιν 
STVX || 4 reom. ST || 7. ὅτι δὲ Ey, sed eras., in ras. καὶ, καὶ etiam VX, fre δὲ καὶ 
STW || re om. STW | 8. ἀποφαινόμενος Torst. ex I, reliqui ante Torst. omnes 
ἀποφηνάμενος, etiam Soph. || 9. ψυχὴ E (Trend.) {| ταὐτὸν ST VX ἢ τὸ. εἶναι ἐκ τῶν 
TUVWX || x1. λοπτομέρειαν T et nunc Ἐν, sed Aerro in ras. (Stapf), “subtilitatem ” 


CH. 2 404 Ὁ 16—405 a IL T5 

gruesome strife.” Inthe same manner Plato in the Tzsmaeus con- 7 
structs the soul out of the elements. Like, he there 
maintains, is known by like, and the things we know are 
composed of the ultimate principles. In like manner it was 
explained in the lectures on philosophy, that the self-animal or 
universe is made up of the idea of One, and of the idea-numbers 
Iwo, or primary length, Three, primary breadth, and Four, primary 
depth, and similarly with all the rest of the ideas. And again this 
has been put in another way as follows: reason is the One, know- 
ledge is the Two, because it proceeds by a single road to one 
conclusion, opinion is the number of a surface, Three, and sensation 
the number of a solid, Four. In fact, according to them the 
numbers, though they are the ideas themselves, or the ultimate 
principles, are nevertheless derived from elements. And things 
are judged, some by reason, others by knowledge, others again 
by opinion and others by sensation: while these idea-numbers 
are forms of things. And since the soul was held to be thus 8 
The self COgnitive as well as capable of causing motion, some 
moving thinkers have combined the two and defined the soul as a 
self-moving number. 

But there are differences of opinion as to the nature and number of 9 
Various the ultimate principles, especially between those thinkers 
theories of who make the principles corporeal and those who make 

elements : 
corre- them incorporeal; and again between both of these and 

theories of others who combine the two and take their principles 
soul. from both. But, further, they differ also as to their ro 
number: some assuming a single principle, some a plurality. And, 
when they come to give an account of the soul, they do so in strict 
accordance with their several views. For they have assumed, not 
unnaturally, that the soul is that primary cause which in its own 
nature is capable of producing motion. And this is why some αὶ 
identified soul with fire, this being the element which is made up of 
the finest particles and is most nearly incorporeal, while further it 
is preeminently an element which both moves and sets other things 
in motion. Democritus has expressed more neatly the reason for 12 
each of these facts. Soul he regards as identical with mind, and 
this he makes to consist of the primary indivisible bodies and 
considers it to be a cause of motion from the fineness of its particles 
and their shape. Now the shape which is most susceptible of 


vet. transl. Torst., cui assentitur etiam Noetel, Zeitschr. ἢ, Gym. 1864, p. 141, μικρο- 
λεπτομέρειαν ὃ, μικρομέρειαν rc. E et reliqui codd. Diels, p. 386, 33, quod rasurae subfuisse 
coni. Stapfer, Studia, p. 13, etiam Philop. Soph., σμικρομέρειαν Them. 

16 DE ANIMA I CH. 2 

ἴω 3 > / 

εὐκινητότατον τὸ σφαιροειδὲς λέγει" τοιοῦτον δ᾽ εἶναι τόν τε 
ΜᾺ \ Ν A > / δ᾽ » Ν Ψ λέ 

13 νοῦν καὶ τὸ πῦρ. ᾿Αναξαγόρας δ᾽ ἔοικε μὲν ἕτερον λέγειν ψυ- 
»" Ἀ / “Ὰ 3 
χήν τε καὶ νοῦν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν καὶ πρότερον, χρῆται ὃ 

3 a] ε ἰὼ ’ Ν 3 4 Ν, oN 6 ᾽ 
ἀμφοῖν ὡς μιᾷ φύσει, πλὴν ἀρχήν γε τὸν νοῦν τίθεται μά- τς 
λιστα πάντων" μόνον γοῦν φησὶν αὐτὸν τῶν ὄντων ἁπλοῦν εἶναι 
‘ > ~ ‘ / 3 (ὃ δ᾽ ¥ “~ > -”™ 
καὶ ἀμιγῆ te καὶ καθαρόν. ἀποδίδωσι ἄμφω τῇ αὐτῇ 
ἀρχῇ. τό τε γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ κινεῖν, λέγων νοῦν κινῆσαι τὸ 
14 πᾶν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς, ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι, κινητικόν 

mn ¥ ¥ 

τι THY ψυχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν, εἴπερ τὸν λίθον ἔφη ψυχὴν ἔχειν, 


¢ x 7 “Ἂ Fd > Ψ , °° é 

15 ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ, Διογένης δ᾽ ὥσπερ καὶ eTEpot τινες 
ἀέρα, τοῦτον οἰηθεὶς πάντων λεπτομερέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἀρχήν" 
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο γινώσκειν τε καὶ κινεῖν τὴν ψυχήν, ἢ μὲν πρῶ- 
τόν ἐστι, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τὰ λοιπά, γινώσκειν, 7 δὲ λεπτότατον, 

Ν > . ς , \ Ν 9 \ >  F 

16 κινητικὸν εἶναι. Kat Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φησι 25 
ψυχήν, εἴπερ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, ἐξ ἧς τἄλλα συνίστησιν" καὶ 
ἀσωματώτατόν τε καὶ ῥέον ἀεί: τὸ δὲ κινούμενον κινουμένῳ 
γινώσκεσθαι. ἐν κινήσει δ᾽ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα κἀκεῖνος ᾧετο καὶ 

17 οὗ πολλοί. παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ ᾿Αλκμαΐων ἔοικεν 
€ a Ν o~ Ν ‘ > Νὰ 2) 2 > 
ὑπολαβεῖν περὶ ψυχῆς: φησὶ yap αὐτὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι 30 
διὰ τὸ ἐοικέναι τοῖς ἀθανάτοις" τοῦτο δ᾽ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ ws 
ἀεὶ κινουμένῃ' κινεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ τὰ θεῖα πάντα συνεχῶς 

18 ἀεί, σελήνην, ἥλιον, τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον, τῶν δὲ 405b 
φορτικωτέρων καὶ ὕδωρ τινὲς ἀπεφήναντο, καθάπερ ἽἽππων' 
πεισθῆναι δ᾽ ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῆς γονῆς, ὅτι πάντων ὑγρά" καὶ 

Ν re ‘ ΐ , ‘ / Ψ φ ‘ 
yap ἐλέγχει τοὺς αἷμα φάσκοντας τὴν ψυχήν, ὅτι ἡ γονὴ 
’ Φ ’ ὃ᾽ Τ Ν ΄ f ¢ > Ἔ 
το οὐχ αἷμα' ταύτην δ᾽ εἶναι τὴν πρώτην ψυχήν. ἕτεροι δ᾽ al- 
™ ‘ Fa) 

pa, καθάπερ Κριτίας, τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ψυχῆς οἰκειότατον 
ξ / a) ἾἍ.ϑβ,,ςε , \ Ἀ Νὰ Ψ 7 
ὑπολαμβάνοντες, τοῦτο δ᾽ ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὴν τοῦ αἵματος φύ- 
σιν. πάντα γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα κριτὴν εἴληφε, πλὴν τῆς γῆς’ 


14. Te orm, X || χρῆσθαι EX, χρῆται etiam Simpl. || 16. ἁπάντων Sy Them. 
Rodier, πάντων reliqui, etiam E (Stapf) Simpl. Philop. || 17. re om SV Wy ἢ 
19. virgulam post Θαλῆς et post ἀπομν. posuit Diels || 20. ὑπολαμβάνειν TUV Wy, 
ἀπολαμβάνειν S, ὑπολαβεῖν etiam Them. || τὴν λίθον X Them. Simpl. Philop., τὸν etiam 
Soph. || 24. λεπτομερέστατον TU VW |] a5. φησι τὴν ψ, UW If 26. καὶ γὰρ de. TU | 
a7. re] δὲ SX Zeller Ph. ἃ, Cir. I” p. 646, adn. 3, δὴ TU Bek. Trend., om. V, re 
etiam Soph. et, ut videtur, Them. 13, 28, Torst. || 31. post ἀθανάτοις virzulam vulg., 
colon posuit Diels || 32. ὅπαντα STUVX || gogb, 4. τοὺς om. UV W, leg. etiam 
Them. Soph. || 2. post Ἵππων vulg. punctum, colon Diels | 3. post ὑγρά punctum Diels ἢ} 
5. τὴν om. ST, πρώτην om. W, πρώτην δὲ ψυχὴν (v.l. τὴν ψυχὴν) λέγει τὴν γονὴν Philop. 

CH. 2 405 a I2—405 Ὁ 8 17 

motion is the spherical ; and of atoms of this shape mind, like fire, 
consists. Anaxagoras, while apparently understanding by mind 
something different from soul, as we remarked above, really treats 
both as a single nature, except that it is preeminently mind which 
he takes as his first principle; he says at any rate that mind 
alone of things that exist is simple, unmixed, pure. But he refers 
both knowledge and motion to the same principle, when he says 
that mind sets the universe in motion. Thales, too, apparently, 
judging from the anecdotes related of him, conceived 
soul as a cause of motion, if it be true that he affirmed 
the loadstone to possess soul, because it attracts iron. Diogenes, 
however, as also some others, identified soul with air. 
Air, they thought, is made up of the finest particles and 
is the first principle: and this explains the fact that the soul knows 
and is a cause of motion, knowing by virtue of being the primary 
element from which all else is derived, and causing motion by the 
extreme fineness of its parts. Heraclitus takes soul for his first 
principle, as he identifies it with the vapour from which 
he derives all other things, and further says that it is the 
least corporeal of things and in ceaseless flux; and that it is by 
something in motion that what is in motion is known ; for he, like 
most philosophers, conceived all that exists to be in motion. 
Alcmaeon, too, seems to have had a similar conception. or soul, 
he maintains, is immortal because it is like the beings 
which are immortal; and it has this attribute in virtue of 
being ever in motion: for he attributes continuous and unending 
motion to everything which is divine, moon, sun, stars and the 
whole heaven. Among cruder thinkers there have been some, like 
Hippon, who have even asserted the soul to be water. The reason 
for this view seems to have been the fact that in all 
animals the seed is moist: in fact, Hippon refutes those 
who make the soul to be blood by pointing out that the seed is not 
blood, and that this seed is the rudimentary soul. Others, again, 
like Critias, maintain the soul to be blood, holding that it is 
sentience which is most distinctive of soul and that this 
is due to the nature of blood. Thus each of the four 
elements except earth has found its supporter. Earth, however, 







89, 3 54., τὴν πρώτην leg. etiam Soph. || 6. τῆς ψυχῆς Uy |] 8, γὰρ] δ᾽ οὖν TV Them., 
οὖν Soph., dpa Susemihl. 





18 DE ANIMA J CHS, 2, 3 

/ > 3 4 > / ‘ ¥ > ON » 3 
ταύτην δ᾽ οὐθεὶς ἀποπέφανται, πχὴν εἰ Tis αὑτὴν εὑρηκεν ἐκ 

mp ral / ra / 
πάντων εἶναι τῶν OTOLYELWY ἢ πάντα. 10 
ε ͵ A - Ν ‘\ Ν ¢ > a / 3 
20 ὁρίζονται δὲ πάντες τὴν ψυχὴν τρισὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν, κινήσει, αἰ- 

᾽ὔ a 3 é - 7° 3 a A ‘\ 3 [4 
σθήσει, τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ: τούτων δ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀνάγεταιπρος τὰς ἀρχάς. 
a“ ~ Ἃ 
διὸ καὶ οἱ τῷ γινώσκειν ὁριζόμενοι αὐτὴν ἢ στοιχεῖον ἢ ἐκ τῶν 
, “~ » [4 5 ’ Ν ξ , 
στοιχείων ποιοῦσι, λέγοντες παραπλησίως ἀλλήλοις, πλὴν ἑνὸς" 
φασὶ γὰρ γινώσκεσθαι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ 
ψυχὴ πάντα γιγνώσκει, συνιστᾶσιν αὐτὴν ἐκ πασῶν τῶν ἀρ- 

Lo | 


ΝᾺ Ζ > 4X ~ g 
2I χῶν. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν μίαν τινὰ λέγουσιν αἰτίαν καὶ στοιχεῖον ἕν, 
‘\ Ν ᾿ a , Ὁ ΜᾺ A >? € δὲ 
καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἕν τιθέασιν, οἷον πῦρ ἢ ἀέρα" οἱ d€ πλείους 
lg ‘ ? \ \ \ \ , a >, 
22 λέγοντες τὰἂς ἀρχὰς καὶ THY ψυχὴν πλείω ποιοῦσιν. Ava- 
ξαγόρας δὲ μόνος ἀπαθῆ φησὶν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν, καὶ κοινὸν 20 
> ‘ 3 Ν a“ ¥ ¥ ran) > «A nN ~ Ἀ 
οὐθὲν οὐθενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχειν. τοιοῦτος δ᾽ ὧν πῶς γνωριεῖ καὶ 
~~ » ΨᾺ 
διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν, οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖνος εἴρηκεν OUT ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων συμ- 
23 φανές ἐστιν. ὅσοι δ᾽ ἐναντιώσεις ποιοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, καὶ 
τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων συνιστᾶσιν: οἱ δὲ θάτερον τῶν 
3 ΄ Ό \ x x ¥ ω ¥ Ν 4 
ἐναντίων, οἷον θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο, Kal τὴν 25 
ψυχὴν ὁμοίως ἕν τι τούτων τιθέασιν" διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν 
> ω ε Ἧ ‘ Ν, Ἀ ‘4 Y ‘ ΜᾺ . 
ἀκολουθοῦσιν" οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν λέγοντες, ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο καὶ 
Ν wn 3 # ¢ Ἀ ἊΝ ‘ ‘ ‘ Ψ ἈΝ Ν ‘ 
τὸ ζῆν ὠνόμασται, οἱ δὲ τὸ ψυχρὸν διὰ τὴν ἀναπνοὴν καὶ τὴν 
κατάψυξιν καλεῖσθαι ψυχήν. τὰ μὲν οὖν παραδεδομένα περὶ 
al > 
ψυχῆς, καὶ dv ἃς αἰτίας λέγουσιν οὕτω, ταῦτ᾽ ἐστίν. 30 
5» ἴω ¥ 
3 Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ πρῶτον μὲν περὶ κινήσεως" Lows yap ov 
~ ~ Ψ 
μόνον ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς τοιαύτην εἶναι οἵαν 
“" a A 
φασὶν οἱ λέγοντες ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ ἢ δυνάμενον 406a 
a ΜᾺ ‘ ~ 
κινεῖν, GAN & τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων TO ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κίνησιν. 
5 »“"᾿ ΡᾺ ‘ a 
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον TO κινοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι, πρό- 
δ Ν Ϊ 
τερον εἴρηται. διχῶς δὲ κινουμένου παντός (ἢ γὰρ καθ᾽ ἕτερον 

9. ἀποφαίνεται STV WX, ἀποπέφανται etiam Them. || 10, ἢ πάντα nunc E sed inter 
ἢ et πάντα ras., cui subfuisse coni. ἃ Rodier, ὅς Stapfer, ἢ 8s πάντα Soph. 15, 7 If re. δὴ 
pro δὲ coni. Hayduck, recepit Rodier, δὴ etiam Them. 14, 4 || rdvres ὡς εἰπεῖν τ. y. 
coni. Christ {τὴν om. ST, τὴν ψυχὴν om. V |] 15. γιγν. καὶ τὸ ὅμ. Ὁ, τὸ ὅμοιον γιγν. 
ST y, καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον γιγν. VW || r@ ὁμ. τὸ bu. X || ἐπειδὴ...τ6. ἀρχῶν post το. ποιοῦσιν 
transponenda censet Steinhart, Symb. Crit. p. 4, cui assentitur Susemihl, Oecon. p. 86. ἢ 
fom, E || 18. πλείω UV W, πλείονα y || 19. ποιοῦσιν] λέγουσιν STU Wy, ποιοῦσιν etiam 
Soph. || 21. γνωρίζει SU, γνωρίζοι y, futurum etiam Philop. || 25. ἄλλο om. X, ado... 
26. τούτων om. Ii, tuentur haec verba Philop. gz, 1 Soph. |f 26. post τιθέασιν vulg. 
punctum, colon posait Diels {| 27. yap ex uno E restituit et post ἀκολουθοῦσιν colon posuit 
Tawet oni aveantitnr etiam Noetel Ὁ, 142. praeterquam quod aut λέγοντας post 28. Ψυχρὺν 

CHS. 2, 3 405 Ὁ 9—406 a 4 I9 

has not been put forward by anyone, except by those who have 
explained the soul to be derived from, or identical with, all the 

Thus practically all define the soul by three characteristics, 20 
motion, perception and incorporeality ; and each of these 
characteristics is referred to the ultimate principles. 
Hence all who define soul by its capacity for knowledge either 
make it an element or derive it from the elements, being on this 
point, with one exception, in general agreement. Like, they tell 
us, is known by like; and therefore, since the soul knows all 
things, they say it consists of all the ultimate principles. Thus 21 
those thinkers who admit only one cause and one element, as fire 
or air, assume the soul also to be one element; while those who 
admit a plurality of principles assume plurality also in the soul. 
Anaxagoras alone says that mind cannot be acted upon and has 22 
nothing in common with any other thing. How, if such be its 
nature, it will know anything and how its knowledge is to be 
explained, he has omitted to state; nor do his utterances afford 
a clue. All those who introduce pairs of opposites among their 23 
principles make the soul also to consist of opposites; while those 
who take one or other of the two opposites, either hot or cold 
or something else of the sort, reduce the soul also to one or other 
of these elements. Hence, too, they etymologise according to their 
theories ; some identify soul with heat, deriving ζῆν from ξεῖν, and 
contend that this identity accounts for the word for life; others 
say that what is cold is called soul from the respiratory process 
and consequent “cooling down,” deriving ψυχή from ψύχειν. Such, 
then, are the views regarding soul which have come down to us 
and the grounds on which they are held. 

We have to consider in the first place the subject of motion. 3 
For, unless I am mistaken, the definition of soul as the 



of the nat self-moving, or as that which is capable of self-motion, 
soul is misrepresents its essential nature: nay, more; it is quite 

impossible for soul to have the attribute of motion at 
all. To begin with, it has been already stated that a thing may 2 
cause motion without necessarily being moved itself. A thing 
is always moved in one of two ways; that is, either indirectly, 

poni, aut verba 29. καλεῖσθαι ψυχήν eici vult, virgulam post Adyorres omissam post θερμὸν 
posuit Rodier || 28. post ψυχρὸν virg. Torst. Biehl Rodier, quod si recte est, illud 27. yap 
delendum est {406 8, 1. εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν U, τὴν om. etiam Philop. || αὑτὸ UW, ἑαντὸ 
etiam Them. Philop. | 

20 DE ANIMA 1 CH. 3 

Φ wn ζω 
ἢ καθ᾽ αὑτό: καθ᾽ ἕτερον δὲ λέγομεν, ὅσα κινεῖται τῷ ἐν 
5. τ δ ξ ΄ a - 
κινουμένῳ εἶναι, οἷον πλωτῆρες" OV YAP ὁμοίως κινουνται τῷ 
πλοίῳ: τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ κινεῖται, ot δὲ τῷ ἐν κινου- 
> ~ om 4 
μένῳ εἶναι. δῆλον δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν μορίων- οἰκεία μὲν yap ἐστι 
, aA ͵ Ψ \ ν᾿ 5 “ > ς “ 
κίνησις ποδῶν βάδισις, αὕτη δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπων: οὐχ ὑπάρ- 
χει δὲ τοῖς πλωτῆρσι τότε) δισσῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ κινεῖ- 
Fon) “~ Ἀν ΜᾺ ~ 3 > e Ἂ 
σθαι, νῦν ἐπισκοποῦμεν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν κι- 
ΜᾺ > o~ 
3 νεῖται Kal μετέχει κινήσεως. τεσσάρων δὲ κινήσεων οὐσῶν, 
“ > ? a 3 , Cat 7 - 
φορᾶς ἀλλοιώσεως φθίσεως αὐξήσεως, ἢ μίαν τούτων κι- 
A> ἃ ΝΥ , rN , > \ ra ‘ ‘ 
vor ἂν ἢ πλείους ἢ πάσας. εἰ δὲ κινεῖται μὴ κατὰ συμ- 
7 ra Ἂ ε ? 7 ἫΝ > δὲ ~ ‘ 
βεβηκός, φύσει ἂν ὑπάρχοι κίνησις αὐτῇ εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ 
a ~ 3 
τόπος: πᾶσαι yap at λεχθεῖσαν κινήσεις ἐν τόπῳ. εἰ ὃ 
ΝᾺ on “~ > 
ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία τῆς ψυχῆς TO κινεῖν ἑαυτήν, ov κατὰ συμβε- 
σι A 9 “A κι 
βηκὸς αὐτῇ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ὑπάρξει, ὥσπερ τῷ λευκῷ ἢ 
“Ἂ ‘ ~ ? ‘ 
τριπήχει" κινεῖται γὰρ Kal ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβὴη- 
a“ ω Ἀ ~ 
κός- @ yap ὑπάρχουσιν, ἐκεῖνο κινεῖται, TO σῶμα. διὸ Kal 
ΨᾺ ~ ων ad 
οὐκ ἔστι τόπος αὐτῶν: τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἔσται, εἴπερ φύσει κι- 
Ἵ 3 ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ φύσει κινεῦτα ἂν Bil - 
4«νήσεως μετέχει. ἔτι ύσει κινεῖται, κἂν βίᾳ Kun 
θείη- κἂν εἰ βίᾳ, καὶ φύσει. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ 
7) 3. ᾿ς ρ Χ 
~ Pa \ ~ 
περὶ ἠρεμίας: εἰς ὃ yap κινεῖται φύσει, καὶ Hpewer ἐν τούτῳ 
rd € 4 Ἅ ‘ Ἄ ὧι ΓᾺ ᾽ Ἂ 3 “ > 7 
φύσει" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰς ὃ κινεῖται Big, καὶ ἠρεμεῖ ἐν τού- 
Bi a) δὲ βί Ὰ » 4 ¥ Ἀ 
τῳ βίᾳ. ποῖαι d€ βίαιοι τῆς ψνχῆς κινήσεις ἔσονται καὶ 
5 ἠρεμίαι, οὐδὲ πλάττειν βουλομένοις ῥάδιον ἀποδοῦναι. ἔτι δ᾽ 
3 μά ad ¥ > μ᾿ , ΜᾺ f 
εἰ μὲν ἄνω κινήσεται, πῦρ ἔσται, εἰ δὲ κάτω, γῆ" τούτων 
γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων al κινήσεις αὗται. ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος Kal 
a ~ ‘ ΄΄α 
6 περὶ τῶν μεταξύ. ἔτι δ᾽ ἐπεὶ φαίνεται κινοῦσα τὸ σῶμα, 
“ ‘ Δ 
ταύτας εὔλογον κινεῖν τὰς κινήσεις as καὶ αὐτὴ κινεῖται. 
> δὲ “Ἂ ν..» f 3 on eX θὲ ῳ τὰ Ν “ 
εἰ O€ τοῦτο, καὶ αντιστρέψασιν εἰπεῖν ἀληθὲς ὁτι ἣν τὸ σώ- 

to. δισσῶς solus Ὁ Philop. Bich] Rodier, reliqui et scripti ct impressi διχῶν, etiam corr. 
το, Ἐ (Rr.) {ἷ δὲ] οὖν U, Them. in interpr., δὴ coni. Susemihl, Jen. Lit. 2877, p. 707, δὲ 
etiam Philop. || 12. καὶ «οὐκ cl>, vel καὶ «οὐκ εἰ καθ᾽ repoy> coni. Susemihl, καὶ 
<gice> Steinhart {| 13. φθίσεως om. pr. EB, ley. etiam Them. Philop., Dittenberyer, 
Gitt. gelehrte Anzeigen 1863 p. 1612, ex verbo φθίσεως in pr. FE omisso suspicatur, primum 
tres tantum motus species hoc loco nominatas esse: cf. Soph. 17, 11 τριῶν δὲ οὐσῶν 
κινήσεων φυσικῶν || 18. ὑπάρξει practer ceteros codd. etiam Ie, sed & in ras. (Stapf), 
leg. et Soph. || r@ τριπήχει TU VW Bek. Trend. Torst., τῷ om. etiam Philop. ror, ὃ 
(acd ror, £1 ve Efayducki adn. crit.) Soph. || 20. virgulam post κινεῖται om. Bek. Trend., 
addidit Torst. || 23. εἰ om. pr. E (Trend. Bus.) || καὶ φύσει] κατὰ φύσιν pr. Ἐῶ, verba κἂν 
el Big, καὶ φύσει Trendelenburgio suspecta videntur, leg. etiam Philop. Simpl. Soph. ἢ 




CH. 3 4ἀοδ8Α 5—406a 32 21 

through something else, or directly, of and through itself. We 
say things are moved through something else when they are in 
something else that is moved: as, for instance, sailors on board 
a ship: for they do not move in the same sense as the ship, for 
the ship moves of itself, they because they are in something else 
which is moved. This is evident if we consider the members of 
the body: for the motion proper to the feet and so to men also 
is walking, but it is not attributable to our sailors in the case 
supposed. There being thus two senses in which the term “to be 
Is the cour moved” is used, we are now enquiring whether it is of 
moved and through itself that the soul is moved and partakes 
me of motion. 

Of motion there are four species, change of place or loco- 3 
motion, change of quality or alteration, diminution and augmenta- 
Species of tion. It is, then, with one or more or all of these 
motion. species that the soul will move. If it is not indirectly 
or per accidens that it moves, motion will be a natural attribute of 
soul; and, if this be so, it will also have position in space, since 
all the aforesaid species of motion are in space. But, if it be the 
essential nature of soul to move itself, motion will not be an 
accidental attribute of soul, as it is of whiteness or the length of 
three cubits; for these are also moved, but per acczdens, viz. by the 
motion of the body to which these attributes belong. This, too, 15 
why these attributes have no place belonging to them; but the soul 
will have a place, if indeed motion is its natural attribute. 

Further, if it moves naturally, then it will also move under 4 
constraint; and, if under constraint, then also naturally. 

The theory . 

involves So likewise with rest. For, as it remains at rest naturally 
5 * - a . "» ΓῚ 

conse- in any state into which it moves naturally, so similarly 


it remains at rest by constraint in any state into which 
it moves by constraint. But what is meant by constrained motions 
or states of rest of the soul it is not easy to explain, even though 
we give free play to fancy. Again, if its motion tends upward, 5 
it will be fire; if downward, earth; these being the motions proper 
to these natural bodies. And the same argument applies to 
directions of motion which are intermediate. 

Again, since it appears that the soul sets the body in motion, 6 
it may reasonably be supposed to impart to it the motions which 
it has itself: and, if so, then conversely it is true to say that the 
motion which the soul has itself is the motion which the body 

28. κινήσεται Ἐς, superscr. On E, (Stapf.). || 30. ἔπειτα δ᾽ εἰ corr. E || 31. εὔλογον ταύτας 
ST VWXy, ταύτας edd. etiam Soph. 

22 DE ANIMA I CH. 3 

ἴω , Ν " rd Ν δὲ ”~ a _ 06b 
μα κινεῖται, ταύτην καὶ αὐτή. TO δὲ σώμα κινεῖται Popa: 4 
ῷ fan] h 
ὥστε Kal ἡ ψυχὴ [μεταβάλλοι ἂν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα] ἢ ὅλη ἢ 
‘\ / / > Ν a> 2 δέ \ 9 6 “ 
κατὰ μόρια μεθισταμένη. εἰ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐνδέχεται, καὶ ἐξελθοῦ- 
ΟῚ - 4 9 , 2. κῃ , > YY > HK Ν " ? 
σαν εἰσιέναι πάλιν ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ dv: τούτῳ δ᾽ ἕποιτ᾽ ἂν τὸ ἀνί. 
\ ἴω nw ’ Ἁ \ Ν \ 
ἡστασθαι τὰ τεθνεῶτα τῶν ζῴων. τὴν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 5 
᾽ my eyo ¢ 9 A 5 7 \ aN , \ A 
κίνησιν κἂν ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου κινοῖτο: ὠσθείη yap av Bia τὸ ζῷον. 
3 ~ \ Ὁ N © 7? ¢ ~ “ 3 ΡᾺ > 7 Aas? e¢ 3 
οὐ δεῖ δὲ ᾧ τὸ Ud ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖσθαι ἐν TH οὐσίᾳ, τοῦθ᾽ ὑπ 
A ~ ἈΝ 9 Ν Ἁ ‘4 4 3 Ἁ 
ἄλλου κινεῖσθαι, πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ 
\ > en 3 \ Ἃ > c +, \ \ > » > δ 
τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ dv αὑτό, τὸ μὲν dv ἄλλο εἶναι, τὸ 
> ¢ “ Ψ Ν Ν Ἁ , , “ἊΟ ε \ ~ 
δ᾽ ἑτέρου ἕνεκεν. τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν μάλιστα φαίη τις ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν το 
9 ~~ “ ¥ “Ὁ 3 Ν ‘ Ν 9 ~ 
8 αἰσθητῶν κινεῖσθαι, εἴπερ κινεῖται. ἀλλὰ μὴν Kal εἰ κινεῖ 
γε αὐτὴ αὑτήν, καὶ αὐτὴ κινοῖτ᾽ av, ὥστ᾽ εἰ πᾶσα κίνησις 
ἴω Ὄ “~ 
ἔκστασίς ἐστι τοῦ κινουμένου ἢ κινεῖται, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξίσταιτ᾽ 
ἂν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἑαντὴν κινεῖ, 

? > ¥ ξ ᾽ a 9 a > ~ ? ε ᾽ ¥ Ν Ἀ 
9 ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς καθ᾽ αὑτήν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ 15 
‘= a) © ca) 
κινεῖν φασὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ σῶμα ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν, ὡς αὐτὴ κινεῖται, 

® / / rd a Ἂ 
οἷον Δημόκριτος, παραπλησίως λέγων Φιλίππῳ τῷ κωμῳ- 
4 ‘\ be) Ἀ ‘a rd “~ 
δοδιδασκάλῳ' φησὶ yap τὸν Δαίδαλον κινουμένην ποιῆσαι 
\ - 3 , 3 a > ¥ - ξ , Ἀ 
τὴν ξυλίνην ᾿Λφροδίτην, ἐγχέαντ᾽ ἄργυρον χυτόν: ὁμοίως δὲ 
καὶ Δημόκριτος λέγει’ κινουμένας γάρ φησι τὰς ἀδιαιρέτους 20 
4 ‘ \ - / a / 
σφαίρας, διὰ τὸ πεφυκέναν μηδέποτε μένειν, συνεφέλκειν 
το καὶ κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα πᾶν. ἡμεῖς δ᾽ ἐρωτήσομεν εἰ καὶ ἠρέ- 
pyow ποιεῖ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα. πῶς δὲ ποιήσει, χαλεπὸν ἢ καὶ 
>a? 3, κ᾿ y ᾽ > ° , n ε ν 
ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν. ὅλως δ᾽ οὐχ οὕτω φαίνεται κινεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ 
4 “ 
τὸ ζῷον, ἀλλὰ διὰ προαιρέσεώς τινος καὶ νοήσεως. 25 
Ν ΝΣ \ 7 Loe τὰ κι Ν \ 
11 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὃ Τίμαιος φυσιολογεῖ THY ψυχὴν 
ΜᾺ ‘\ A ~ an \ “ “ 
κινεῖν TO σῶμα: τῷ yap κινεῖσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ TO σῶμα κινεῖν 
\ ἊΝ a 
διὰ τὸ συμπεπλέχθαι πρὸς αὐτό. συνεστηκυῖαν yap ἐκ τῶν στοι- 
406b, 2, κατὰ τὸ σῶμα omnes codd., etiam Soph. et, ut videtur, Simpl. 37, 3. 4 
et vet. transl., κατὰ τόπον coni. Bon., Hermes VII, p. 424, μεταβάλλοι, σῶμα une. 
Inclusi, cf, Them. τύ, 16 sq.3 sin verba genuina sunt, fort. legendum ψυχή. μεταβάλλοι 
<i> ἂν xrd || 3. ἐνδέχοιτο ST VW, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ ἂν καὶ y Bon, LL, 
ἐνδέχεται etiam Soph. ct vet. transl. || 4. ἐνδέχοιτ' ἄν om. SWXy Bon., leg. etiam 
Soph. et vet. transl. || rovry...5. ξῴων a manu Christiani lectoris inserta esse suypicatur 
Trend., cui adversatur Bon. || 8 μὴ om. KE Simpl., leg. Philop. [{ 0. 8: αὐτὸ dy coni. 
Christ || 12. ye om. ΤΥ ΑΝ Alex. ἀπ. καὶ λύσ. 46, 24 Soph. || davrary STUVWy 
et corr. Ky Soph. || ed] ἐπεὶ Alex. 46, 25 || 13. ἐξισταίη T, ἐξίσταται (omisso av) S WX, 
ἐξίστατο y, ἐξίσταιτο ἂν Alex. 46, 26 || 14. οὐσίας αὐτῆς καθ᾽ αὑτήν, sed ad’ αὐτήν expunct. 

E, αὐτῆς receperunt Biehl Rodier, αὐτῆς hoc loco legisse videntur ‘Them. 18, 11 et 
Soph. 18, 36, omittunt ceteri, etiam Simpl. Philop. | 15. καθ' αὐτήν une. inel. Torst., 

CH. 3 406 b 1—-406 Ὁ 28 23 

has. Now the motion of the body is motion in space: therefore 
the motion of the soul is also motion in space, whether the whole 
soul so move, or only the parts, the whole remaining at rest. But, 
if this is admissible, the soul might also conceivably quit the body 
and re-enter; and this would involve the consequence that dead 
animals may rise again. 

To return now to motion per accidens, soul might certainly 7 
thus be moved by something external as well:—for the animal 
might be thrust by force. But a thing which has self-motion as 
part of its essential nature cannot be moved from without except 
incidentally ; any more than that which is good in itself can be 
means to an end, or that which is good for its own sake can be so 
for the sake of something else. But, supposing the soul to be 
moved at all, one would say that sensible things would be the 
most likely to move it. 

Again, even if soul does move itself, this is equivalent to saying 8 
that it is moved; and, all motion being defined as displacement 
of the thing moved guwzé moved, it will follow that the soul will 
be displaced from its own essential nature, if it be true that its 
self-movement is not an accident, but that motion belongs to the 
essence of soul in and of itself. Some say that the soul in fact 9 
Democri- moves the body, in which it is, in the same way in which 
tus. it moves itself. So, for example, Democritus; and herein 
he resembled Philippus, the comic poet, who tells us that Daedalus 
endowed the wooden Aphrodite with motion, simply by pouring 
in quicksilver: this is very similar to what Democritus says. For 
according to him the spherical atoms, which from their nature can 
never remain still, being moved, tend to draw the whole body 
after them and thus set it in motion. But do these same atoms, 10 
we shall ask in our turn, produce rest, as well as motion? How 
this should be, it is difficult, if not impossible, to say. And, 
Animal speaking generally, it is not in this way that the soul 
motion is would seem to move the animal, but by means of purpose 
purposive. ς 

᾿ οὗ some sort, that is, thought. 

In the same way the Platonic Timaeus explains on physical 11 
The grounds that the soul sets the body in motion, for by its 
‘Timaeus.” own motion it sets the body also in motion, because it 
is closely interwoven with it. For when it had been made out of 
tuetur haec praeter omnes codd. Alex. 47, 1. || 19. δὲ οἵα. Wy || 21. post σφαίρας virg. 
posuit Diels, post μένειν virg. om. Biehl Rodier || 22. καὶ] re καὶ T Vy || ἐρωτήσωμεν 
STUVW | tpentices STU V W, ἠρεμεῖν X, ἠρέμησιν etiam Soph. || 23. ποιεῖ τοῦτ 

atré ST U WX, τοῦτο ποιεῖ ποτε V, ποιεῖ τοῦτο αὐτὸ y et E, sed in rasura, videtur sub- 
fuisse ταῦτα ταὐτὰ (Bek. Trend.), τοῦτο ποιεῖ αὐτό Soph. 18, 31. 

24 DE ANIMA I CH. 3 

Ἁ Ψ 
χείων καὶ μεμερισμένην κατὰ τοὺς ἁρμονικοὺς ἀριθμούς, ὅπως 
»Ἤ Ν Ν Ὁ / 
αἴσθησίν τε σύμφυτον ἁρμονίας ἔχῃ Kal TO πᾶν φέρηται 30 
/ “ Ἁ 3 / 3 / ξ΄ 
συμφώνους φοράς, τὴν εὐθυωρίαν εἰς κύκλον κατέκαμψεν᾽" 
‘ ὃ Ν 3 Mm EN ’ λ δύ ὃ ni / 
καὶ διελὼν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς κύκλους OVO δισσαχῃῇ συνημμένους 
πάλιν τὸν ἕνα διεῖλεν εἰς ἑπτὰ κύκλους, ὡς οὔσας τὰς τοῦ 4078 
12 οὐρανοῦ φορὰς τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐ κα- 
λῶς τὸ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν μέγεθος εἶναι: τὴν γὰρ τοῦ παν- 
Ν “A Ψ 7 >» ΄ ὯΔ 3.» \ ¢ , 
τὸς δῆλον ὅτι τοιαύτην εἶναι βούλεται οἷόν TOT ἐστὶν ὁ Kadov- 
a 3 Ν δὴ ὯΔ > ¢ 3 θ δ᾽ “ἃ e 5» θ 
μενος vous: οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἷόν γ᾽ ἡ αἰσθητική, οὐδ᾽ οἷον ἡ ἐπιθυ- ς 
ia χὰ 
13 μητική" τούτων γὰρ ἡ κίνησις οὐ κυκλοφορία: ὁ δὲ νοῦς εἷς 
καὶ συνεχὴς ὥσπερ καὶ ἢ νόησις: ἡ δὲ νόησις τὰ νοήμα- 
ἴω o~ “~ / > \ 
Ta’ ταῦτα δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἕν, ὡς ὃ ἀριθμός, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς TO 
/ ὃ , © € ων WA ‘ ἐλλ᾽ ¥ ? ‘ nN 
μέγεθος" διόπερ οὐδ᾽ ὁ νοῦς οὕτω συνεχής, GAN ἤτοι ἀμερὴς ἢ 
, ΜᾺ ‘ Ν 
οὐχ as μέγεθός τι συνεχής. πῶς γὰρ δὴ καὶ νοήσει μέγε- 
a! a ~ 5» ‘ 
Jos ὦν; πότερον ὁτῳοῦν μορίῳ τῶν αὑτοῦ; μορίῳ δ᾽ ἤτοι κατὰ 
14 μέγεθος ἢ κατὰ στιγμήν, εἰ δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο μόριον εἰπεῖν. εἰ 
ον ea ¥ a“ 3 
μὲν οὖν κατὰ στιγμήν, αὗται δ᾽ ἄπειροι, δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτε 
4 3 μ᾿ Ἁ a f x > , Pa 
διέξεισιν. εἰ δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος, πολλάκις ἢ ἀπειράκις νοή- 
‘ > + rd δὲ )ν»νσ 5 ὃ / > ὃ᾽ € 
oe. τὸ αὐτό. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἅπαξ ἐνδεχόμενον. εἰ δ᾽ ixa- 15 
% ra € lan ΝᾺ ὔ rd ὃ a Fa “ θ A \ 
νὸν θιγεῖν ὁτῳοῦν τῶν μορίων, τί δεῖ κύκλῳ κινεῖσθαι ἢ καὶ 
ἮΝ ᾿ θ μή . > δ᾽ 3 to ΡᾺ οὶ oN ’ Χ 
ὅλως μέγεθος ἔχειν; εἰ δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον νοῆσαι τῷ ὅλῳ κύκλῳ 
θυγόντα, τίς ἐστιν ἡ τοῖς μορίοις θίξις ; ἔτι δὲ πῶς νοήσει τὸ 
~ γ ~ os Ν 
μεριστὸν ἀμερεῖ ἢ τὸ ἀμερὲς μεριστῷ; ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸν 
νοῦν εἶναι τὸν κύκλον τοῦτον: νοῦ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις νόησις, κύ- 20 
Ἄ a 
15 κλου δὲ περιφορά' εἰ οὖν ἡ νόησις περιφορά, Kal νοῦς ἂν εἴη 



30. re] τς καὶ TU, καὶ om. etiam Them. Philop. {ἁρμονίαν T UW Soph., ἁμμονίας 
etiam Them. Philop. in interpr., v. [ayducki ap. crit. 22, 27 || 32. κύκλοις δύο ex uno 
10 recepit Torst., reliqui ante Torst. omnes δύο κύκλους, Soph. τὸ, 23 ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς κύκλου δύο jj 
407 ἃ, 5. y om. Wy, leg. etiam Simpl. in prooemio acl lib. I, p. 4, ret Soph. ἢ 6. ante 
ὁ δὲ transponendum τῷ. dvayKatoy...22. νόησις censet Susemihl, Oecon. p. #4 i} τούτων, 
κυκλοφορία unc. incl. Essen, p. 18 || 7. καὶ συνεχὴς unc. incl. Kssen || 8. ὁ ἀριθμός pr. EK 
(Trend.) et U Simpl. Philop. (ec. princeps) Torst., reliqui ante Torst. omnes om. arti- 
culum, etiam Philop. (ITayduck cum cocdd.) 10. οὐδὲ νοῦς UW, οὐδὲ delere vult A. 
Martin, Revue Critique, 1902, p. 427 || offrw Biehlio suspectum videtur, delendum censet 
A. Martin, legit etiam Simpl. Soph. 20, 37 || συνεχής unc. incl. Hssen || rr. ὧν; πότερον 
ὁτῳοῦν μορίῳ recepit Biehl ex solo pr. I! (cf Susemihl, Occon. p. 84), ὧν ὁτῳοῦν τῶν μορίων 
(omisso wérepov) rc. If et ceteri cocdkl. (praeterquam quod V ἐν ér. praebet) Philop., 
quam lectionem etiam Bek. recepit, ὧν πότερον καθόλου ἢ ὁτῳοῦν τῶν mop. scripsit Trend., 
sic etiam vet. transl, dv; πότερον καθ᾽ ὅλον θυγὼν ἢ ὁτῳοῦν τῶν pop. posuit Torst., av; 
πότερον Kad’ ὅλον ἢἣ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν τῶν μορίων Simpl. 43, 38, Soph. 2x, 7 (coll. 21, 303 22, 
rt. 23), unde ays πότερον καθ᾽ ὅλον ἢ ὁτῳοῦν τῶν μορίων Rodier || τῶν om. V Soph. ἢ 
ἑαυτοῦ T, αὐτοῦ y Ald. Sylb. Rodier, etiam Philop. Simpl. δορὰ, {{|μορίων δ᾽ omnes 

CH. 3 406 Ὁ 29—407 a 21 25 

the elements and divided in harmonical ratios in order that it 
might have a native perception of proportion and that the universe 
might move in harmonic revolutions, he, the creator, proceeded to 
bend the straight line into a circle; and then to split the one circle 
into two, intersecting at two points; and one of the two circles he 
split into seven, the revolutions of heaven being regarded as the 
motions of the soul. In the first place, it is not right to call 
Criticism the soul a magnitude. For by the soul of the universe 
in detail. -_ Timaeus clearly intends something of the same sort as 
what is known as mind: he can hardly mean that it is like the 
sensitive or appetitive soul, whose movements are not circular. 
But the thinking mind is one and continuous in the same sense 
as the process of thinking. Now thinking consists of thoughts. 
But the unity of these thoughts is a unity of succession, the unity 
of a number, and not the unity of a magnitude. This being so, 
neither is mind continuous in this latter sense, but either it is 
without parts or else it is continuous in a different sense from an 
extended magnitude. For how can it possibly think if it be 
a magnitude? Will it think with some one or other of its parts: 
such parts being taken either in the sense of magnitudes or in the 
sense of points, if a point can be called a part? If it be with 
parts in the sense of points, and there is an. infinity of these, 
clearly mind will never reach the end of them; while, if they be 
taken in the sense of magnitudes, mind will have the same thoughts 
times without end. But experience shows that we can think a 
thought once and no more. Again, if it be enough for the soul 
to apprehend with one or other of its parts, what need is there for 
it to be moving in a circle or to have magnitude at all? But, if 
it is necessary to thought that the mind should bring the whole 
circle into contact, what does the contact of the several parts 
mean? Again, how will it think that which is divisible by means 
of that which is without parts, or that which is without parts 
by means of that which is divisible? It must be mind which 
is meant by the circle in question. For when mind moves it 
thinks; when a circle moves it revolves. If, then, thought 
is a revolution, the circle which has such a revolution must 

libri scripti et impressi, etiam Philop. (sed v. 1. μορίῳ) Soph., μορίῳ δ᾽ e Susemihlti et 
sua coniectura Biehl, etiam Rodier || scripsisse Arist. v. 11. ὦν; πότερον ὁτῳοῦν τῶν 
αὑτοῦ -«- μορίων»; μορίων δ' suspicor || 15. φαίνεται... ἐνδεχόμενον a philosopho Platonico 
interpolatum existimat Christ, non legisse videtur Philop., legunt etiam Them. Simpl. 
Soph. | ef θ᾽ coni, Susemihl || 16. καὶ om. SV W, leg. etiam Them. || 19. ἢ τὸ E (Trend.) 
et y Philop. Soph. vet. transl. Torst., reliqui ante Torst. omnes καὶ τὸ {| dvaykaioy] v. ad 
407 8, 6. 




26 DE ANIMA I CH. 3 

4 / λ Ἂ ¢€ , ‘ / 3. αὶ δὲ ὃ ’ Ld 

ὁ κύκλος, οὗ ἡ τοιαύτη περιφορὰ [νόησις͵. ἀεὶ δὲ δή τι νοή- 

σει" δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ ἀΐδιος ἣ περιφορά: τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρα- 

κτικῶν νοήσεων ἔστι πέρατα (πᾶσαι γὰρ ἑτέρου χάριν), at δὲ 

θεωρητικαὶ τοῖς λόγοις ὁμοίως ὁρίζονται: λόγος δὲ πᾶς ὁρι- 25 
Ν A 3 / e ‘ εν > 4 & Ν 9 3 9» a) Ν 

σμὸς ἢ ἀπόδειξις: αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς, καὶ 

¥ ’ s Ν Ν Ἃ Ν δ 3 δὲ 

ἔχουσι πως τέλος τὸν συλλογισμὸν ἢ τὸ συμπέρασμα: εἰ OE 

μὴ περατοῦνται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀνακάμπτουσί γε πάλιν ἐπ᾽ ἀρχήν, 

λ 4 δ᾽ > ἃ / Ν ἡ ὴθ ΓᾺ € de 
προσλαμβάνουσαι δ᾽ ἀεὶ μέσον καὶ ἄκρον εὐθυποροῦσιν- ἡ δὲ 
περιφορὰ πάλιν ἐπ᾿ ἀρχὴν ἀνακάμπτει. οἱ δ᾽ ὁρισμοὶ πάν- 30 

‘4 » ? £ 3 Ν “ a ὃ a 
16 TES πεπερασμένοι. ἔτι εἰ ἡ αὐτὴ περιφορὰ πολλάκις, δεή- 
4 “ ‘\ 3 / ¥ 8. ςε 4 » 3 δ 
17 σει πολλάκις νοεῖν τὸ αὐτό. ἔτι δ᾽ ἡ νόησις ἔοικεν ἠρεμήσει 
τινὶ καὶ ἐπιστάσει μᾶλλον ἢ κινήσει: τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον 
\ ς / > ἈΝ Ν Qs 7 / Ν Ν ς ΄ 
18 καὶ ὁ συλλογισμός. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ μακάριόν γε τὸ μὴ ῥᾷ- 
ὃ 3 Ν ,, > 2.3 ‘ ε , >” ‘ >? 
tov ἀλλὰ βίαιον. εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις αὐτῆς μὴ οὐσΐα, πα- 407b 
το pa φύσιν ἂν κινοῦτο. ἐπίπονον δὲ καὶ τὸ μεμεῖχθαι τῷ σώ- 
ματι μὴ δυνάμενον ἀπολυθῆναι, καὶ προσέτι φευκτόν, εἴ- 
βέλ ~ n Ν ‘ / ¥) θ A ¥ θέ 
περ βέλτιον τῷ νῷ μὴ μετὰ σώματος εἶναι, καθάπερ εἰωθέ 
20Te λέγεσθαι καὶ πολλοῖς συνδοκεῖ. ἄδηλος δὲ καὶ Tous 
κύ λ / θ Ν > ‘ ξ af ¥ ‘ os Ὰ ε 
κλῳ φέρεσθαι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡ αἰτία" οὔτε γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ 
a / > - ΨᾺ 4 la > Ν ‘ ‘ 
οὐσία αἰτία τοῦ κύκλῳ φέρεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 
Ψ ~ » % ~ ¥ > 3 ς Ἄ ~ 
οὕτω κινεῖται, οὔτε τὸ σῶμα atTiov, ἄλλ᾽ ἡ ψνχὴ μᾶλλον 
21 ἐκείνῳ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ὅτι βέλ λέ . καί ᾿ ἐχρῆ 

. μὴν οὐδ᾽ ὅτι βέλτιον λέγεται" καίτοι γ᾽ ἐχρῆν 
διὰ A x θ Ν , λ on φέ θ ‘\ / aT" 

τοῦτο τὸν θεὸν κύκλῳ ποιεῖν φέρεσθαι THY ψυχήν, ὅτι 

aN > 7 ΝΟΦἶ “ θ ran) rg w~ θ δ᾽ y h ΥᾺλ 
βέλτιον αὐτῇ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τοῦ μένειν, κινεῖσθαι δ᾽ οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως. 
3 Ν ? 5 ‘ € 4 , ¢ » , % 
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη σκέψις ἑτέρων λόγων οἰκειο- 
22 τέρα, ταύτην μὲν ἀφῶμεν τὸ νῦν. ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἄτοπον συμ- 
βαίνει καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν περὶ ψυ- 
χῆς" συνάπτουσι γὰρ καὶ τιθέασιν εἰς σῶμα τὴν ψυχήν, οὐ- 15 
θὲν προσδιορίσαντες διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν καὶ πῶς ἔχοντος τοῦ σώ- 
/ 4 ὰ ΕΖ: ἴω + ὃ ba) Ν ‘ 
paros. καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν τοῦτ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι" διὰ yap τὴν 

"»"Ἡλ Ρῖ 


22. γόησις unc. incl. Torst., sine uncis Biehl Rodier, non legisse videtur Suph. 
23, 17, virgulam ante νόησις posuit Rodier || δή τι νοήσει. Soph, Bek. Trend., δὴ τί 
νοήσει: Simpl. Torst. Biehl Rodier || 23. γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἢ πρακτ. SUWX, ποιητικῶν 
ἢ non legisse videntur Them. Philop. (v. tamen Hayducki app. crit. ad 133, 8) Simpl. {{ 
25. was ἢ Uy || 26, al δ᾽ ἀποδείξεις STUV WX Bek. Trend., al μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξει: y 
et, ut videtur, Soph. 23, 27, Torst., ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπόδειξις Ἐῶ, sed superscr. al et as Ey 
(Stapf.) Biehl Rodier || 27. ἔχουσα FE Bich] Rodier, reliqui et seripti et impressi ἄχουσι | 
29. προσαναλαμβάνουσαι Ἰὼ, sed ava expunct. (Stapf.) Torst., προσκαταλαμβάνουσαι y, 
reliqui προσλαμβάνουσαι, etiam Philop. Soph. |} 30. of θ᾽ dp. coni. Christ || 407 Ὅν 1. μὴ 
οὐσία corrupta putat et coni. ἢ οὐσίᾳ Torst., ἢ οὐσία « καὶ», vel “«-ἕκστασιᾳ de> τῆς οὐσίαν 

CH. 3 407 a 22---407 Ὁ 17 27 

be mind. But then it will go on thinking of something for ever, 
for this is required by the eternity of the revolution. To practical 
thinking there are limits, for it always implies an external end; 
while speculative thinking is determined in the same way as the 
logical explanations which express it. Now every explanation 
consists either in definition or in demonstration. But demonstra- 
tions have a premiss for starting-point and reach a kind of goal 
in the inference or conclusion; while, even if they never reach 
a conclusion, at all events they do not revert to the starting-point, 
but with the aid of a succession of middle terms and extremes 
advance in a straight line. But circular movement returns to the 
point from which it started. Definitions, too, are all determinate. 
Besides, if the same revolution recurs again and again, the mind 16 
will be obliged to think the same thing again and again. Further, 17 
it is a sort of rest or coming to a halt, and not motion, which 
thinking resembles: and we may say the same of the syllogism. 
Nor, again, will that which does not move easily, but under con- 18 
straint, even realise happiness. If the motion of soul be not its 
essence, it will be an unnatural motion. And the entanglement of 19 
the mind in the body without the possibility of release is painful ; 
nay, it is to be avoided, if indeed it is really better for mind to 
‘be independent of body, a view commonly expressed and widely 
accepted. Also it is not clear why the heaven revolves in a circle ; 20 
seeing that circular motion is neither implied by the essence of 
soul (that form of movement being indeed merely accidental to it), 
nor due to the body: on the contrary it is rather the soul which 
causes the motion of the body. Besides, we are not even told that 21 
it is better so: yet surely the reason why God made the soul 
revolve in a circle ought to have been that movement was better 
for it than rest, and this form of movement better than any other. 

But such an enquiry as this belongs more appropriately to 
a different subject: so let us dismiss it for the present. We may, 22 
however, note here another absurdity which is involved in this as 
Relation in most other theories concerning the soul. They attach 
between the soul to, and enclose it in, body, without further de- 
body ins termining why this happens and what is the condition 
moved. of the body. And yet some such explanation would 
seem to be required, as it is owing to their relationship that the 

vel μὴ ἢ οὐσία coni. Susemihl, ac sane quidem Them. 22, 35 non leg. negationem, leg. μὴ 
Philop. Simpl. Soph. et vet. transl. || 2. ἂν κινοῖτο E Simpl., ceteri codd. κινοῖτ’ ἄν || 9. γ᾽ 
om. E (Trend.) et Torst., etiam Soph. 24, 21 || 10. ποιεῖν κύκλω SV Wy Torst., κύκλῳ 
ποιεῖν etiam Soph, || 14. τῶν περὶ, sic omnes codd., etiam E (Trend.) et Them., τοῖς περὶ Soph. 

2ὃ DE ANIMA I CHS. 3, 4 

κοινωνίαν τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ TO δὲ πάσχει καὶ TO μὲν κινεῖται TO 
Ν a) ? > 3 ΔΝ ε / \ ¥ “ ~ 

δὲ κινεῖ, τούτων δ᾽ οὐθὲν ὑπάρχει πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς τυχοῦσιν. 
e \ / 3 ῬᾺ ‘4 “Ns ε / \ \ “~ 

23 οἱ δὲ μόνον ἐπιχειροῦσι λέγειν ποῖόν τι ἡ ψυχή, περὶ δὲ τοῦ 20 

ft ra 5242 .λ » ΄ ν 2 4 
δεξομένου σώματος οὐθὲν ἔτι προσδιορίζουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐνδεχό- 
μενον κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορικοὺς μύθους τὴν τυχοῦσαν ψυχὴν εἰς 
τὸ τυχὸν ἐνδύεσθαι σῶμα" δοκεῖ γὰρ ἕκαστον ἴδιον ἔχειν εἶ- 
δος καὶ μορφήν. παραπλήσιον δὲ λέγουσιν ὥσπερ εἴ τις 

’ Ν ‘ > 3 ‘ 3 δύ ~ \ ‘ \ 
dain τὴν τεκτονικὴν εἰς αὐλοὺς ἐνδύεσθαι" det yap THY μὲν 25 
τέχνην χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀργάνοις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι. 

4 Καὶ ἄλλη δέ τις δόξα παραδέδοται περὶ ψυχῆς, πι- 
θανὴ μὲν πολλοῖς οὐδεμιᾶς ἧττον τῶν λεγομένων, [λόγους δ᾽] 
ὥσπερ εὐθύνας «δὲ; δεδωκυΐα καὶ τοῖς ἐν κοινῷ γινομένοις λό- 
yous. ἁρμονίαν γάρ τινα αὐτὴν λέγουσι: καὶ γὰρ τὴν ap- 30 

μονίαν κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι, καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγ- 
2 κεῖσθαι ἐξ ἐναντίων. καίτοι γε ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία λόγος τίς ἐστι 
a“ ΄ A f Ν \ \ > ? » + 
τῶν μειχθέντων ἢ σύνθεσις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν οὐδέτερον οἷόν τ 
Ὁ 4 ¥ δὲ Ν ~ > ¥ ε , ~ Se 

3 εἶναι τούτων. ETL O€ TO κινειν οὐκ ἔστιν appovias, ψνχῃ O€ 

, 2 a ΨᾺ / > ¢€ > a ς cd \ ~ 
4 πάντες ἀπονέμουσι τοῦτο μάλισθ᾽ ὡς εἰπεῖν. ἁρμόζει δὲ μᾶλ. 4o8a 
λον καθ᾽ ὑγιείας λέγειν ἁρμονίαν, καὶ ὅλως τῶν σωματι- 
a 3 “ bs A “~ 4 3 ¥ > 
κῶν ἀρετῶν, ἢ κατὰ ψυχῆς. φανερώτατον δ᾽ εἴ τις ἀπο- 
, / Ν , ‘ \ ad ΤᾺ “~ e 
διδόναι πειραθείΐη τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ψυχῆς appo- 

/ “ Ν ‘ 3 / ¥ 3 ’ fa ᾿ 
svia Twi χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἐφαρμόζειν. ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ λέγομεν τὴν 5 
ἁρμονίαν εἰς δύο ἀποβλέποντες, κυριώτατα μὲν τῶν μεγε- 
θῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσι κίνησιν καὶ θέσιν τὴν σύνθεσιν αὐτῶν, ἐπει- 
δὰν οὕτω συναρμόζωσιν ὥστε μηδὲν συγγενὲς παραδέχεσθαι, 

a Ἁ 
ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν μεμειγμένων λόγον, οὐδετέρως μὲν οὖν 
¥ @ \ A m “ é ~ ? > Cd 
εὔλογον, ἡ δὲ σύνθεσις τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν λίαν εὐεξέ- τὸ 

18. ποιεῖ τι τὸ ὃ ΤΨ ΝΥ Χὶ {{.|ὲ καὶ] σῶμα καὶ ς solo K seripsit Biehl, celeri seript! et 
impressi om, σῶμα, etiam Simpl. Philop. 139, τ΄ sqq. || δὴ 5X, δή τι TVW et Them, | 
27. de loco 27.,.g08a, 29. cf. Bon., Hermes VII, p. 428 syq. ff 28. πολλοῖς καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς 
TW pr. y Soph. | arrow TV Wy et corr. S Soph. v. 1. (ἦττον e cold. Hayduck, 
25, 5), πιθανὴ μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς ἧσσον Them. |} λόγοις V, λόγον. cont. ‘Tovst., Adyor 8" ὥσπερ 
καὶ coni. Bergk, Lermes XVIII, 518, λόγον δὲ καὶ ὥσπερ Susemihl, λόγους δ᾽ omittendum 
censet Bernays, die Dialoge des Arist. p. 1.5. cul assentiuntur Elaecker (Zeitschr. £ Ciym. 
1864, p. 204) et Bonitz (Ilermes VII, p. 429), unc. inclusi, λόγους leg, Philop. Soph., nen 
legisse videtur Them. || 2g. « δὲ - ¢ Bernaysii coniectura scripsi {| ywoudvors λόγοιφ] sic 
etiam Simpl, Aeqyoudvou λόγοις W Philop. in interpr. 145, 22, λεγομένοις Ὁ | 30. αὐτήν 
τινες V Wy, τίνας etiam Them. et Philop. 141, 31 legisse videntur {! 32. ye om. ὦ Soph. 
Torst. || 408 a, 1, ἀπονέμουσιν ἅπαντες τοῦτο STV Wy, ἅπαντες ἀπ. τ΄ X, πάντες etiam 
Soph. || 3. pavepwrdrav E, φανερώτατον corr. Ἐὰ (Stapf.) |} 5. λέγομεν pr. Ἰὼ (Trend.) 

CHS. 3, 4 407 Ὁ 18—408 a Io 29 

one acts, the other is acted upon, that the one is moved, and 
the other causes it to move; and between two things taken at 
random no such mutual relations exist. The supporters of such 23 
theories merely undertake to explain the nature of the soul. Of 
the body which is to receive it they have nothing more to say: 
just as if it were possible for any soul taken at random, according 
to the Pythagorean stories, to pass into any body. This is absurd, 
for each body appears to have a distinctive form or shape of its 
own. It is just like talking of a transmigration of carpentry 
into flutes: for the craft must employ the right tools and the soul 
the right body. 

There is yet another opinion concerning soul which has come 4 
down to us, commending itself to many minds as readily as any 
that is put forward, although it has been severely criticised even 
The theory in the popular discussions of the present day. The soul 
of har- is asserted to be a kind of harmony, for harmony is 
“mony on this view a blending or combining of opposites, 
and the components of the body are opposites. And yet this 2 
harmony must mean either a certain proportion in the components 
or else the combining of them; and the soul cannot possibly be 
either of these. Furthermore, to cause motion is no attribute of 3 
a harmony: yet this function more than any other is all but 
universally assigned to soul. Again, it is more in harmony with 4 
the facts to apply the term harmony to health or bodily excellence 
generally than to soul, as is very clearly seen when we try to 
assign to a harmony of whatever kind the affections or functions 
of the soul: it is difficult to harmonise them. 

Further, if we use the word harmony with a twofold appli- 5 
cation; first, and in its most natural sense, of those magnitudes 
Two which have motion and position, to denote the combining 
meanings of them into a whole, when they are so closely fitted 
term har- together that they do not admit between them anything 
mony: of the same kind; and then in a secondary sense to denote 
the proportion subsisting between the components of a mixture: in 
neither sense is it reasonable to call soul a harmony. The view which 
regards it as a combining of the parts of the body is singularly 

ST VX et, ut videtur, Soph. 25, 34, Torst. Bon., stud. Arist. IT, III. p. 61, ἔτι δὲ λέγομεν 
Madvig 471, reliqui ante Torst. omnes λέγοιμεν || 8. συνγενέσθαι E, μηδὲν μὴ συγγενὲς 
coni. Steinhart, μηδὲν <pire συγγενὲς μήτε μὴ: συγγενὲς coni. Susemihl, Burs. 
Jahrb. XVII, 261, vulgat. leg. interpretes, etiam Alex. De an. 25, 10 || 9. post λόγον 
punctum Bek., colon Torst., virgulam Trend. 

30 DE ANIMA I CH. 4 

? A € ad “A ran) \ 
ταστος. πολλαί Te yap αἱ συνθέσεις τῶν μερῶν καὶ πολλα- 
χῶς" τίνος οὖν ἢ πῶς ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν νοῦν χρὴ σύνθεσιν εἶναι, 

6 ἢ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἣ ὀρεκτικόν ; ὁμοίως δὲ ἄτοπον καὶ «τὸ» τὸν 
λόγον τῆς μείξεως εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν: οὐ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει 
λόγον ἡ μεῖξις τῶν στοιχείων Kal ἣν σὰρξ καὶ καθ' ἣν ὀστοῦν" 15 
συμβήσεται οὖν πολλάς τε ψυχὰς ἔχειν καὶ κατὰ πᾶν τὸ 
σῶμα, εἴπερ πάντα μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων μεμειγμένων, ὁ δὲ 

“A / a € / Ν é > ? > ¥ 

7 τῆς μείξεως λόγος ἁρμονία Kat ψυχή. ἀπαιτήσειε δ᾽ ἂν τις 

τοῦτό γε καὶ παρ᾽ ᾿Εμπεδοκλέους: ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν λόγῳ 

7 > ΄ > ε 7 > \ ς ᾽7 “Ὁ ἴω 
τινί φησιν εἶναι" πότερον οὖν ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή, ἢ μᾶλ- 20 
λον ἕτερόν τι οὖσα ἐγγίνεται τοῖς μέλεσιν ; ἔτι δὲ πότερον ἡ 
φιλία τῆς τυχούσης αἰτία μείξεως ἢ τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ; καὶ 
αὕτη πότερον ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ἢ παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἕτερόν τι; 

8 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔχει τοιαύτας ἀπορίας. εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἕτερον ἡ 
ψυχὴ τῆς μείξεως, τί δή ποτε ἅμα τῷ σαρκὶ εἶναι ἀναι- 25 

ἴω ~ ta) ΓᾺ »ἢ} 
ρεῖται καὶ τῷ τοῖς ἄλλοις μορίοις τοῦ ζῴου; πρὸς δὲ τούτοις εἴπερ 
μὴ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων ψνχὴν ἔχει, εἰ μή ἐστιν ἡ ψνχὴ ὁ λόγος 
τῆς μεΐξεως, τί ἐστιν ὃ φθείρεται τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπολειπούσης ; 

7 ‘ > ¥zp ἐ 4 5 3 ἐν ‘ Ν 
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐθ᾽ ἁρμονίαν οἷόν τ' εἶναι. τὴν ψνχὴν 

9 οὔτε κύκλῳ περιφέρεσθαι, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. κατὰ 30 

Ν δὲ “ θ θ ζ΄ ¥ ἂν ‘ 
συμβεβηκὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ἔστι καὶ κι- 

ra) ~ μὰ ω 
νεῖν ἑαυτήν, οἷον κινεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, τοῦτο δὲ κινεῖσθαι 
[4 Ἅ ΤᾺ Ν᾿ ¥ ? > é “~ s ΞΖ 
ὑπὸ τῆς ψνχῆς ἄλλως δ᾽ οὐχ οἷόν τε κινεῖσθαι κατὰ τόπον 

τὸ αὐτήν. εὐλογώτερον 8 ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις περὶ αὐτῆς ὡς Ki 
νουμένης, εἷς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας. φαμὲν γὰρ τὴν ψυν- 408b 
χὴν λυπεῖσθαι χαίρειν, θαρρεῖν φοβεῖσθαι, ἔτι δὲ ὀργί. 
, Ἢ > , ‘ A A 4 , 
ζεσθαί τε καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι: ταῦτα δὲ πάν- 
/ — ὃ ~ 54 5» θ , ὰ ΣΝ κι A 
τα κινήσεις εἶναι δοκοῦσιν, ὅθεν οἰηθείη τις ἂν αὐτὴν κινεῖσθαι" 

τὰ τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον. εἶ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα τὸ λυπεῖ- 5 

rr. αἱ om. ἘΝ || μερῶν} πολλῶν nunc Hf, subfuisse videtur μερῶν (Stapf.) i ra. χρὴ 
τὸν νοῦν ST V Wy || 13. καὶ τὸ λόγον VX, quod probat Bon., stud. Arist. I. p. 97, arin. 
1, καὶ τὸ τὸν λόγον Soph., quod in textum receperunt Biehl] Rodier, malunt etiam Torst, 
et Bon., stud. Arist. 11, LIL. p. 61, reliqui καὶ τὸν λόγον || 15. post ὀστοῦν punctum vuly., 
colon posuit Diels |] 18. doracrjoee...28. ἀπολειπούσης in parenth, Torst. |] 19. αὐγῶν ἐν 
λόγῳ Wy Soph. |] a1. μέρεσιν pr. Io W et, ut videtur, y Torst. Biehl Rodlier, μέλεσιν re. 
ESTUV Bek. Trend. Diels, p. 175, μιχθεῖσιν X VPhilop, 150, τα Soph. |} 26. τὸ T et in 
interpr, Philop. Simpl. Chaignet, [essai sur la psych. (Ar. p. 246, adn. 2, Susemihl, om. 
SV W, τῷ in interpr. etiam Them. Soph. 1 27. μὴ prius delendum esse conset Chaignet, 

at Simplicium vulgat. non legisse ex interpr. 56, 18 sqq. parum constal. | 28. ri dora ὃ 
φθείρεται viclentur corrupta Torst., tuentur haee verba praeter omnes codd. Them. Philop. 

CH. 4 408 a 11—408b 5 31 

open to criticism. For there are many combinings of the parts, 
and they combine in many ways. What part, then, is that whose 
combining with the rest we must assume to be the intellect, and 
in what way does it combine? Or again, what of the sensitive 
and appetitive faculties? But it is equally absurd to regard the soul 6 
as the proportion determining the mixture. For the elements are 
not mixed in the same proportion in flesh as in bone. Thus it 
will follow that there are many souls, and that, too, all over the 
body, if we assume that all members consist of the elements 
variously commingled and that the proportion determining the 
mixture is a harmony, that is, soul. This is a question we might 7 
Empe- ask Empedocles; who says that each of the parts is 
docles. determined by a certain proportion. Is the soul, then, 
this proportion, or is it rather developed in the frame as something 
distinct? And, further, is it a mixture at random or a mixture in 
the right proportion which he ascribes to Love: and, if the latter, 
is Love the proportion itself or something other than the proportion 
and distinct from it? Such, then, are the difficulties involved in 
this view. On the other hand, if soul is something distinct from 8 
Dificulties the mixture, how comes it that it is destroyed simul- 
involved taneously with the disappearance of the quiddity of the 
ing the flesh and of the other parts of the animal? And, further, 
theory. . 

assuming that each of the separate parts has not ἃ soul 
of its own, unless the soul be the proportion of their admixture, 
what is it that perishes when the soul quits the body? 

From what has been said it is clear that the soul cannot be 
Conclu- a harmony and cannot revolve in a circle. But inci-g 
sion. dentally it can, as we have seen, move and set itself in 
motion: for instance, the body in which it is may move, and be 
set in motion by the soul: otherwise it cannot possibly move from 
place to place. The question whether the soul is moved would 10 

a more naturally arise in view of such facts as the 
Objection . . - . . 
stated and following. The soul is said to feel pain and joy, con- 
answered. fidence and fear, and again to be angry, to perceive and 
to think; and all these states are held to be movements: which 
might lead one to infer that soul itself is moved. But this is no 11 
necessary inference. For suppose it ever so true that to feel pain 
Soph., egregie totum hunc locum explicavit Bon., Hermes VII, p. 435 || 8] ᾧ coni. Barco, 
assentitur Susemihl, Oecon. p. 84 || ἀπολιπούσης TV Xy Them., ἀπολειπούσης in paraphr. 
Simpl. Philop. 153, 4 Soph. v. 1. (ἀπολιπούσης e codd. Hayduck 26, 37) || 408 Ὁ, 3. τε 
om. V jj 5. de hoc loco εἰ γὰρ...11. τὸ δὴ vide Bon., stud. Arist. IT, III. p. 22 sqq., 

quem in textu restituendo secutus est Biehl, etiam Rodier, nisi quod a verbis Ὁ, 9. τούτων 
δὲ parenth. incipere maluit Rodier. 


KA ca ΝᾺ - > Ν Ν y 
σθαι ἢ χαιρειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι κινήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ ἕκαστον κι- 
A ͵ Ν \ κι , » es A A - Ν 
νεῖσθαι τούτων, τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαί ἐστιν ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ 
ὀργίζεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ τὴν καρδίαν ὡδὶ κινεῖσθαι, τὸ 
δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἴσως ἢ ἕτερόν τι, τούτων δὲ συμ- 
βαίνει τὰ μὲν κατὰ φορὰν τινῶν κινουμένων, τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ 
12 ἀλλοίωσιν (ποῖα δὲ καὶ πῶς, ἕτερός ἐστι λόγος)" τὸ δὴ λέ- 
3 ’ “ ‘\ ῳ ἌἊ » / “ 
yew ὀργίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις λέγοι THY ψυ- 
Ν ε ΄ “ἃ 2 ὃ “Ἂ ἫΝ Ν κέ ᾿ λέ Ν 
χὴν ὑφαίνειν ἢ οἰκοδομεῖν: βέλτιον γὰρ ἴσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν 
ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρω- 
Tov τῇ Wyn τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ws ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῆς κινήσεως οὔσης, 
5 > εν Ν , 5 ΄ e oN δ᾽ > > 2 ? Ὁ ξ Ν 
ἀλλ᾽ ὁτὲ μὲν μέχρι ἐκείνης, ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης, οἷον ἡ μὲν 
» 9 ‘ 4 ε 3 2 4 > 3 3 ’ > N ‘ > 
αἴσθησις ἀπὸ τωνδί, ἡ δ᾽ ἀνάμνησις am ἐκείνης ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν 
13 τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις κινήσεις ἣ μονάς. ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι 
οὐσία τις οὖσα, καὶ οὐ φθείρεσθαι. μάλιστα γὰρ ἐφθείρετ᾽ ἂν 
ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ ἀμαυρώσεως, νῦν δ᾽ ἴσως ὅπερ ἐπὶ 
~ 3 “ / > Ν , ς , ” 
τῶν αἰσθητηρίων συμβαίνει" εἰ γὰρ λάβοι ὁ πρεσβύτης ὄμμα 
a / al Ψ ‘\ € ra Ψ Ἁ “~ > 
τοιονδί, βλέποι ἂν ὥσπερ Kal 6 νέος. ὥστε TO γῆρας οὐ 
‘a \ / θέ LAX. > ®t θά > , 
τῷ τὴν ψνχὴν τι πεπονθέναι, ἃ ἐν @, καθάπερ ἐν μεέ- 
14 θαις καὶ νόσοις. καὶ τὸ νοεῖν δὴ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν μαραίνεται 
λλ Ν ¥ A / > AN δὲ 2 θέ > b) δὲ ὃ 
ἄλλου τινὸς ἔσω φθειρομένον, αὖτὸ δὲ ἄπαθές ἔστιν. τὸ δὲ δια- 
“ θ Ν ~ Ἃ “ > ¥ 3 ? ‘8 > λὰ 
νοεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκείνου πάθη, ἀλλὰ του- 
“~ ῬᾺ ya) ΡᾺ 4 
δὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο, ἡ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει. διὸ καὶ τούτου φθειρο- 
΄ ¥ , ¥ λεῖ > S24 ey > ‘ “ 
μένον οὔτε μνημονεύει οὔτε φιλεῖ" οὐ yap ἐκείνου Hv, ἀλλὰ τοῦ 
“ΔΑ. ἊΝ λ ξ δὲ mo ¥ θ ‘4 é \ 3 θέ bd 
κοινοῦ, ὃ ἀπόλωλεν" 6 δὲ νοῦς tows θειότερόν TL καὶ ἀπαθές ἐστιν, 

Ψ Ν > > Ὄ ied ‘ ‘a ‘ 
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ οἷόν τε κινεῖσθαι THY ψυχήν, φανερὸν: 

ἐκ τούτων’ εἰ δ᾽ ὅλως μὴ κινεῖται, δῆλον ὡς οὐδ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς. 
‘ μ᾽ “ > , 3 , δ μ 5 ‘ εν 

16 πολὺ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀλογώτατον τὸ λέγειν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι 

τὴν ψυχὴν κινοῦνθ᾽' ἑαυτόν: ὑπάρχει γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατα 

7. pro δὲ coni. δὴ, quod probat Essen, et a verbis τὸ δὴ apodosin incipere vult 
Susemihl || 8, τὸ τὴν «. V Bon., reliqui ante Bon. omnes τῷ τὴν x. |] 0. ἢ τοιοῦτον Libri 
scripti et ante Biehlium impressi omnes, etiam Philop., ἢ τῷ τοῦτο coni. Torst., ἢ τὸ τοῦτο 
coni. Bon,, quod recepit Biehl || τούτων... τὰ. λόγος in parenth. Susemihl, Burs. Jahrb, (X, 
351 Roclier || cx. ποῖαι WM, litera ¢ inserta quidem sed aperte a prima manu (Trend.), etiam 
Philop. {| (wote...Aéyes) in parenth. Bon. {τὸ δὴ ST GBon., qui ab his verbis apodosin 
incipit ad 5. οἱ γὰρ, quod tam Philop. diserte fecerat 156, 10 sq., τὸ δὲ reliqui ante Bon. 
omnes, etiam Philop. {| 15. οὔσης om. pr. KE, sed ab antiqua manu insertum (Trend.) | 
16. μέχρις TV WX Philop. {| 18. ὁ 68...29. ἐστεν alieno loco inserta censet B. Ritter, 
Grundprinc. ἃ. Arist. Seelenl. Ὁ. 2y, cui assentitur Susemihl ἢ 1g. οὖσα om, pr. EB, 
56 (1 al antiqua manu insertum (Trend.), leg. etiam Them. Philop. (excepte Philop. 
cod. D) || 20. νυνὶ δ᾽ ὥσπερ STV WX y, ὥσπερ etiam Soph., viv δὲ ὅπερ Them. 20, 26 ἢ 


CH. 4 408 Ὁ 6—408 Ὁ 33 33 

or joy and to think are movements, that to experience each of 
these is to be moved and that the movement is due to the soul: 
suppose that to be angry, for instance, or to be afraid means 
a particular movement of the heart, and that to think means 
a movement of this or of some other part, some of these move- 
ments being movements of locomotion, others of qualitative change 
(of what sort and how produced does not concern us here): yet, 12 
even then, to speak of the soul as feeling anger is as if one should 
say that the soul weaves or builds. Doubtless it would be better 
not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man 
does so with the soul: and this, too, not in the sense that the motion 
occurs in the soul, but in the sense that motion sometimes reaches 
to, sometimes starts from, the soul. Thus, sensation originates in 
particular objects, while recollection, starting from the soul, is 
directed towards the movements or traces of movements in the 
Intellect:  Sense-organs. But intellect would seem to be developed 13 
impassive ἴῃ us as a Self-existing substance and to be imperishable. 
perishable. For, if anything could destroy it, it would be the feeble- 
ness of age. But, as things are, no doubt what occurs is the same 
as in the case of the sense-organs. If an aged man could procure 
an eye of the right sort, he would see just as well as a young 
man. Hence old age must be due to an affection or state not 
of the soul as such, but of that in which the soul resides, just as is 
the case in intoxication and disease. In like manner, then, thought 14 
and the exercise of knowledge are enfeebled through the loss of 
something else within, but are in themselves impassive. But 
reasoning, love and hatred are not attributes of the thinking 
faculty but of its individual possessor, in so far as he possesses 
it. Hence when this possessor perishes, there is neither memory 
nor love: for these never did belong to the thinking faculty, 
but to the composite whole which has perished, while the intellect 
is doubtless a thing more divine and is impassive. 

From the foregoing it is clear that the soul is incapable of 15 
motion; and, if it is not moved at all, clearly it does not move 
Criticism itself. Now of all the views that have been put forward 16 

in detail of . . . . 
the self- by far the most irrational is that which makes the soul 
number. a self-moving number. Its supporters are involved in 

22. E superscr. οἷον νέος post τοιονδί est interpretamentum (Bhl.) || 23. πεπονθέναι τι τὴν 
ψυχήν VWy Philop., τὴν ψυχὴν πεπονθέναι S Them. 29, 29 || 25. ἔσω] ἔξω coni. 
Steinhart, ἐν ᾧ coni. Bon., cf. Susemihl, Burs. Jahr. XVII, 264, adn. 24, ἔσω tuentur 
etiam Simpl. p. 60, 30 Philop. Soph., εἴσω Them. 29, 30 et 30, 14, ἔσω retineri volunt 
etiam Zeller, Gesch. d. Ph. d. Gr. II, 2, p. 370 et Neuhiuser, Arist. Lehre von dem sinnl. 
Erkenntnissvermoégen, p. 12. 

H. 3 

34 DE ANIMA I CH. 4 

ra A \ 3 ~ ~ , » > > ~ 

πρῶτα μὲν Ta ἐκ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι cupBaivovta, ἴδια δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ 
2 > \ > , a Ν Ν on / 

λέγειν αὐτὴν ἀριθμόν. πῶς yap χρὴ νοῆσαι μονάδα κινου- 4098 

ΜᾺ > ~ id oO 

μένην, καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος, Kal πῶς, ἀμερῆ καὶ ἀδιάφορον od- 

3 ᾽ 3 Ἁ \ rd fa A ¥ > 
I7 σὰν ; εὖ γὰρ ἐστι KLYYTLKY) Καὶ ΚυνΉΤΉ: διαφέρειν δεῖ. ἔτι ὃ 

9 ? 4. Ν 3 / Ὰ Α \ 
ἐπεί φασι κινηθεῖσαν γραμμὴν ἐπίπεδον ποιεῖν, στιγμὴν δὲ 
γραμμήν, καὶ αἱ τῶν μονάδων κινήσεις γραμμαὶ ἔσονται" ς 
ἡ γὰρ στιγμὴ μονάς ἐστι θέσιν ἔχουσα' ὃ δ᾽ ἀριθμὸς τῆς 

χ8 ψυχῆς ἤδη πού ἐστι καὶ θέσιν ἔχει. ἔτι δ᾽ ἀριθμοῦ μὲν ἐὰν 

ἀφέλῃ τις ἀριθμὸν ἢ μονάδα, λείπεται ἄλλος ἀριθμός" 
τὰ δὲ φυτὰ καὶ τῶν ζῴων πολλὰ διαιρούμενα ζῇ καὶ δο- 

19 κεῖ τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν τῷ εἴδει. δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν οὐθὲν δια- 10 

rad , rd Ἀν, ? ? ‘ ‘ > a 
φέρειν μονάδας λέγειν ἢ σωμάτια μικρά: Kal yap ἐκ τῶν 
Δημοκρίτου σφαιρίων ἐὰν γένωνται στιγμαΐ, μόνον δὲ μένῃ 

“A \ an) 
TO ποσόν, ἔσται TL ἐν αὐτῷ TO μὲν κινοῦν τὸ δὲ KLVOUpErO?r, 
¥ ΕῚ “ aa) + \ ὃ ‘ ‘ rd Ζ A 
ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ! ov yap διὰ TO μεγέθει διαφέρειν 7 
/ / \ ΄ 3 > & 4 \ 3 
μικρότητι συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, GAN ὅτι ποσόν. διὸ ἀναγ- 15 

" > f Ν os ‘ (ὃ > δ᾽ 4 ζω ΄ \ 

καῖον εἶναί TL TO κινῆσον Tas μονάδας. εἰ 0 ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ TO 
A ξ / \ 9 nn 3 A 2 ? \ n \ \ 
κινοῦν ἡ ψυχή, Kat ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, ὥστε οὐ τὸ κιιοῦν καὶ τὸ 

20 κινούμενον ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ τὸ κινοῦν μόνον. ἐνδέχεται δὲ δὴ 


a / » κυ ~ \ € rd Ν +] “~ 
πῶς μονάδα ταύτην εἶναι; δεῖ γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τινὰ αὐτῇ 
ὃ \ \ \ TAX nw δὲ ὃ ἊὉ" / a al 
ιαφορὰν πρὸς Tas ἄλλας. στιγμῆς δὲ μοναδικῆς τίς ἂν εἴη 20 
διαφορὰ πλὴν θέσις ; εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν ἕτεραι at ἐν τῷ σώματι 
μονάδες καὶ αἱ στιγμαΐ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔσονται αἱ μονάδες" 
7 Ν᾿ ral ἮΝ / ? 4 3 “w 3 ~ 
καθέξει yao χώραν στιγμῆς. καίτοι τί κωλύει ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ 
2 ‘ ? a ‘ 3 a 
εἶναι, εἰ δύο, καὶ ἀπείρους; ὧν yap ὃ τόπος ἀδιαίρετος, 
καὶ αὐτά. εἶ δ᾽ αἱ ἐν τῷ σώματι στιγμαὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς 6 τῆς 25 
ψυχῆς, ἢ εἰ ὁ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι στιγμῶν ἀριθμὸς ἡ 
ψυχή, διὰ τί οὐ πάντα ψυχὴν ἔχουσι τὰ σώματα; στιγμαὶ 

34. ἴδια Ἰὸ (Bus.) Simpl. p. 65, 17 Soph. et, ut videtur, Philop. 165, 31, receperunt Biehl 
Rodier, ἰδίᾳ reliqui οἱ scripti et ante Bichlium impressi omnes, etiam Them., ἴδια defendit 
Vahlen in ed. art. poet. tert. r1g || goga, 3. ef γὰρ] ἢ γὰρ T, ἦ γὰρ X, ἢ μὲν γὰρ Soph. ay, 
at || 10. αὐτὴν om. EE || ἔχειν ψυχὴν STU Vy Them. jl rt. σμικρά ST Them., μικρά etiam 
Soph. || 12. σφαιρῶν TX et re. E, σφαιρίων reliqui codd. et, ut videtur, pr. Ε (Trend.) |] 13. 
αὐτῷ] αὐταῖς Soph. 30, 9 || post κινούμενον virgulam delevit Torst. || 14. συνεχεῖ] μεγέθει 
T Wy Soph. || 15. σμικρότητι plerique codd., etiam Them. Soph., μικρότητι FE (Stapf) 
Bek, Trend. Torst. || 16. κινῆσαν T Wy, κινῆσον etiam Soph. || 17. ὥστε] πρώτως γε coni. 
Essen || τὸ post καὶ ογὰ, SUWXy |f 18. δὲ οἵα. SVWXy, leg. Them. |] 19. πῶς Them. 
Trend. Torst., πὼς (enclit.) et post εἶναι colon Bek. || ταὐτὴν] αὐτὴν TX, etiam Philop, 
168, 16 || 22. καὶ al] καὶ SUVWy,4T et rc. 1, καὶ αἱ pr.  (Trend.), ἔτεραι al ἐν τῷ 
σώματι στιυμαὶ καὶ αἱ μονάδες coni. Christ || 23. κωλύσει VW Them. Trend., κωλύει 

CH. 4 408 Ὁ 34—409 a 27 35 

many impossibilities, not only in those which arise from attributing 
motion to the soul, but also in others of a special character 
due to calling it a number. For how are we to conceive of a unit, 
a thing which is without parts or differences, as in motion? By 
what would it be moved, and in what way? For if it is capable 
of imparting motion as well as of being moved, it must admit 
differences. Further, since they say that a line by its motion gene- 
rates a surface and that a point by its motion generates a line, the 
movements of the units will also be lines, for a point is a unit 
having position. But the number of the soul must, from the 

nature of the case, be somewhere and have position. Again, if 18 

you subtract a number or unit from a number, a different number 
remains: whereas plants and many animals continue to live when 
divided and seem to have specifically the same soul in each seg- 
ment. Besides, it would seem to make no difference whether we 
Say units or tiny particles. For if the little round atoms of 
Democritus be converted into points and only their sum-total be 
retained, in such sum-total there will still be a part which moves 
and a part which is moved, just as there is in that which is 
extended. The truth of this statement does not depend upon the 
size of the atoms, whether great or small, but upon the fact that 
there is a sum-total or quantity of them. Hence there must be 
something to set the units in motion. But if in the animal the 
part which causes motion is the soul, then it is so likewise in 
the number: so that it will not be both that which causes motion 
and that which is moved which is the soul, but that which causes 


motion only. How then can this cause of motion be a unit? 20 

For if it were so there must be some difference between it and 
the other units. But what is there to differentiate points which 
are units, except position? If, then, the units, that is the points, 
in the body are distinct from the units of soul, the units of soul 
will be in the same place as the points, for each unit will occupy 
the space of a point. And yet if two things can be in the same 
place, why not an infinite number? When the place which things 
occupy is indivisible, the things themselves are also indivisible. 

If, on the other hand, the number of the soul consists of the ar 

points in the body, or if the soul is the number of such points, 
why are not all bodies possessed of soul? For in all bodies there 

etiam Simpl. Soph. |] 25. ὁ prius om. X, alterum insert. E, || 26. ὁ τῶν E Them. Philop. 
17x, 12 Simpl. Soph., recepit Biehl, ceteri et scripti et ante Biehlium impressi omnes ὁ ἐκ 
τῶν, etiam. Philop. in lemmate r71, 6, ἐκ insert. Eg. 


36 DE ANIMA I CHS. 4, 5 

ιν a icy ¥ ~ © 
22 γὰρ ἐν ἅπασι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἄπειροι. ἔτι δὲ πῶς οἷόν τε 
n ¥ 
χωρίζεσθαι τὰς στιγμὰς καὶ ἀπολύεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων, εἰ 
io) / 
γε μὴ διαιροῦνται at γραμμαὶ εἰς στιγμάς ; 30 
5 Συμβαίνει δέ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τῇ μὲν ταὐτὸ λέγειν 
a a ~ ~ ? 
τοῖς σῶμά τι λεπτομερὲς αὐτὴν τιθεῖσι, TH δ᾽, ὥσπερ An- 
“ lan) ἴων » 
μόκριτος κινεῖσθαί φησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἴδιον τὸ ἄτοπον. 409b 
εἴπερ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν παντὶ τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ σώματι, 
ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δύο εἶναι σώματα, εἰ σῶμα τι ἡ 
ψυχή: τοῖς δ᾽ ἀριθμὸν λέγουσιν, ἐν τῇ μιᾷ στιγμῇ πολ- 
“~ “ ‘\ ¥ > \ ¢ 
has στιγμάς, ἢ πᾶν σῶμα ψυχὴν ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ διαφέρων s 
τις ἀριθμὸς ἐγγίνεταν καὶ ἄλλος τις τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν ἐν 
τοῖς σώμασι στιγμῶν. συμβαίνει τε κινεῖσθαι τὸ ζῷον ὑπὸ 
τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καθάπερ καὶ Δημόκριτον αὐτὸ ἔφαμεν κινεῖν" 
a N ¢ 4 - ‘ x a ta 
τί γὰρ διαφέρει σφαίρας λέγειν μικρὰς ἢ μονάδας μεγά- 
λας, ἢ ὅλως μονάδας φερομένας; ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ ἀναγ- το 

3 καῖον κινεῖν τὸ ζῷον τῷ κινεῖσθαι ταύτας. τοῖς δὴ συμπλέ- 
ἕασιν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ κίνησιν καὶ ἀριθμὸν ταῦτά τε συμβαΐνει 
καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα: οὐ γὰρ μόνον δρισμὸν ψυχῆς 
ἀδύνατον τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμβεβηκός. δῆλον δ᾽ εἴ 
τις ἐπιχειρήσειεν ἐκ τοῦ λόγον τούτου τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα 15 

σὰ a 3 / e UA ? / ς f 
τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποδιδόναι, οἷον λογισμούς, αἰσθήσεις, ἡδονάς, 
y A Y 
λύπας, ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα' ὥσπερ yap εἴπομεν πρότερον, 
οὐδὲ μαντεύσασθαι ῥᾷδιον ἐξ αὐτῶν. 
“ ‘ / lA 3 a ¢ 4 ‘ 

4 τριῶν δὲ τρόπων παραδεδομένων Kal? ods ὁρίζονται THY ψυ- 
χήν, οἷ μὲν τὸ κινητικώτατον ἀπεφήναντο τῷ κινεῖν ἑαυτό, οἱ δὲ 20 
σῶμα τὸ λεπτομερέστατον ἢ τὸ ἀσωματώτατον τῶν ἄλλων. 

ῬᾺ \ / 9 A ‘ € / ¥ 4 
ταῦτα δὲ τίνας ἀπορίας τε καὶ ὑπεναντιώσεις ἔχει, διεληλύθα- 
f id > 3 , mn a ‘ > o~ 
5 μεν σχεδόν. λείπεται δ᾽ ἐπισκέψασθαι πῶς λέγεται τὸ ἐκ τῶν 

ag. ψυχὰς STU, στιγμὰς Ἰὸ (Bus.) οἱ VWXy Soph. vet. transl. et, ut videtur, 
Philop. 171, 21, Torst. || 30. ye om. Ef || els τὰς or. TW || 31. falso hic incipitur nevum 
caput || δὲ καὶ καθ. Ἰὼ, pro δὲ coni. δὴ Susemihl |] gog b, 1. ἔδιον om. S, τὸ om. X, 
verba ἴδιον τὸ ἄτοπον unc. incl. Torst., legerunt Vhilop. et sine dubio Them. et SimpL., 
tuetur Vahlen in ed. art. poet. tert. r19, non legisse videtur Soph. 31, 6 |] 2. περ om. pr. IE ἢ} 
σώματι om. Wy, leg. Philop. Soph. || 5. pro ἢ cont. Torst. καὶ, ἢ in interpr. Simpl. Philop. 
172, 25 sqq., defendit ἢ Dittenberger, Gétt. gelehrte Anz. 1863, p. 1615 || 7. τοῖς σώμασι 
E Torst., reliqui ante Torst. omnes τῷ σώματι || συμβαίνη E (Bek.), συμβαίνει E (Bus.) |} 
re] δὲ UX, om. S. || ὃ. αὐτὸ ἔφαμεν EX, receperunt Bich] Rodier, ἔφαμεν αὐτὸ reliqui et 
scripti et impressi || 9. μικρὰς E (Bus.) y; reliqui ante Bichlium omnes σμικρὰς |) 11. ταύτας 
-* “ss weliaani wimde tl 18. μαντεύεσθαι S'TUV Wy, 

CHS. 4, 5 409 a 28—409 Ὁ 23 37 

would seem to be points: nay, an infinity of points. And, further, 22 
how can the points be separated and set free from the bodies to 
which they belong; unless, indeed, we are prepared to resolve lines 
into points? 

It comes to this, then, as we have said, first, that this view 5 

The ob- coincides with that which makes of the soul a body 
tecapitz. composed of fine particles; next, that its agreement 

lated. with Democritus as to the manner in which he makes 

the body to be moved by the soul gives it an especial absurdity of 
its own. If the soul resides in the whole sentient body, on the 
assumption that the soul is a sort of body it necessarily follows 
that two bodies occupy the same space. Those who call the soul 
a number have to assume many points in the one point, or else 
that everything corporeal has a soul; unless the number that 
comes to exist in the body is a different number, quite distinct 
from the sum of the points already present in the body. Hence it2 
follows that the animal is moved by the number in the same way 
precisely as we said Democritus moved it. For what difference 
does it make whether we speak of small round atoms or large 
units, or indeed of units in spatial motion at all? Either way it is 
necessary to make the motion of the animal depend on the motion 
of these atoms or units. Such, then, are some of the difficulties 3 
confronting those who join motion and number: and there are 
many others, since it is impossible that the conjunction of motion 
with number should form even an attribute, much less the defi- 
nition, of soul. This will be evident if we try to deduce from this 
definition the affections and functions of the soul; its reasonings, 
perceptions, pleasures, pains, and so forth. For, as we said above, 
from the account given it is difficult even to divine what these 
functions are. 

Three modes of defining the soul have come down to us: 4 
some defined it as that which, in virtue of its self-motion, is most 
capable of causing motion; others as the body which consists of 
the finest particles, or which is more nearly incorporeal than any- 
thing else. And we have pretty fully explained what difficulties 
and inconsistencies these views present. It remains to consider 5 
what is meant by saying that the soul is composed of the 

μαντεύσασθαι etiam Them. Soph. et, ut videtur, Philop. 175, 1 || 20. of μὲν...23. σχεδόν 
in parenth. et post 21, ἄλλων colon pro vulg. punct. posuit Rodier || 20. éavré] ἑαυτήν 
Soph. || 22. re om. V W Philop. 

38 DE ANIMA I CH. 5 

/ 5 Α Ky 9 Ν - 7 3 > 4 , 
στοιχείων αὐτὴν εἶναι. λέγουσι μὲν γάρ, w αἰσθάνηταΐ τε 
τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἕκαστον γνωρίζῃ, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ συμβαΐνειν as 

λλὰ ὶ ἀδύ » λό ἴθενται γὰρ γνωρίζειν τῷ 
πολλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα τῷ λόγῳ. τίθενται γὰρ γνωρ τῴ 
x ‘ Ν , 
ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ THY ψυχὴν τὰ πράγματα 
᾿ 3 ¥ \ / ΜᾺ ‘ N ‘ ῳ 
τιθέντες. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ μόνα ταῦτα, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἕτερα, 
A > ¥ ¥ Ν 3 Ν Ν > ; 3 ® 
6 μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἴσως ἄπειρα τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὰ ἐκ τούτων. ἐξ ὧν 
μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἕκαστον τούτων, ἔστω γινώσκειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ 30 
9 ra 3 Ν Ν ᾽ , ~ RK 2 , 
αἰσθάνεσθαι' ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον τίνι γνωριεῖ ἢ αἰσθήσεται, 
Φ / Ν a Ἅ ‘ ἌΣ A ε ΄ \ Ν 
οἷον τί θεὸς ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἢ σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν ; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 
ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν συνθέτων: οὐ γὰρ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχοντα τὰ 410a 

“~ / a > \ / Ν Ἁ / , 

στοιχεῖα τούτων ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ τινὶ καὶ συνθέσει, καθά. 
N . 3 o“ ‘ Ε a“ 
περ φησὶ καὶ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς τὸ ὀστοῦν' 
ἡ δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος ἐν εὐστέρνοις χοανοισὶν 
τὼ δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μερέων λάχε νήστιδος αἴγλης, 5 
τέσσαρα δ᾽ “HAdaicroo' τὰ δ᾽ ὀστέα λευκὰ γένοντο. 

5 ΝᾺ ΤᾺ ἴω »-Ἁ 
οὐδὲν οὖν ὄφελος ἐνεῖναι τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.» εἰ μὴ καὶ οἱ 
λόγοι ἐνέσονται καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις" γνωριεῖ γὰρ ἕκαστον τὸ 
wd \ > » a) πὰ Ἁ μή 3 , 9 ‘ Ἀ »“" 8 
ὅμοιον, τὸ δ᾽ ὀστοῦν ἢ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐθέν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ταῦτ 
> ?- a) » Φ sO 7 35 Δὰ “ rd / Ν Ἂ 
ἐνέσται. τοῦτο δ᾽ ὅτι ἀδύνατον, οὐθὲν δεῖ λέγειν: τίς γὰρ ἂν το 
3 rd > ¥ 3 “Ἂ »ἜἬ / » Ἂν ¢ ’ 
ἀπορήσειεν εἶ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ ψνχῇ λίθος ἢ ἄνθρωπος; ὁμοίως 
δὲ Ν ‘ 3 ‘\ ‘ Ν Ν > ‘a ‘ 2 N ‘ / 

é καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθόν: τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον 

y καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἔτι δὲ πολλαχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ὄντος 
Ν, ia) \ ba 

(σημαίνει yap τὸ μὲν τόδε TL, TO δὲ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ Kai 

", ἮᾺ ΜᾺ ~ 
τινα ἄλλην τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν κατηγοριῶν) πότερον ἐξ ἅπάν- is 

» ¢ ν ἃ ¥ 2y\> > a ‘ , ᾿ 
των ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ οὖ; ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δοκεῖ κοινὰ πάντων εἶναι 
os “' ω ~ ~ 
στοιχεῖα. ap οὖν ὅσα τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἐκ τούτων μόνον ; πῶς οὖν 
“ μὰ Fa 
γινώσκει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ; ἢ φήσουσιν ἑκάστου γένους 
t ~ ‘ 2 ‘ ἰδί ε Ἔ ᾿ ᾿ f 
εἶναι στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχὰς ἰδίας, ἐξ ὧν τὴν ψυχὴν συνεστά- 

¥y ¥ Ν Ἀ Ν % 9 ’ 3 » at 4 3 

ναι; ἔσται apa ποσὸν Kal ποιὸν καὶ οὐσία. ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον ἐκ 20 

24. ἵν᾽ om. pr. E || αἴσθηται TW et corr. E (Trend.), αἰσθάνηται etiam Them. Soph. ἢ 
31. τίνι...η] οὐ... οὐδ᾽ WX || 41040, 1. ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο excepto Εὖ omnes curd, etiam Soph. 
Trend. || 2. τούτων] τῶν pr. Ὁ (Trend.) || post ἕκαστον virg. om. Diels, p. 208 |] 5. τὰ δύο 
V et rc. E Bek. Trend., ras δύο ἊΝ et Alex. in metaph. p. 135, τό (ed, Hayduck), τὼ δύο, 
quod iam Steinhart coniecerat, scripserunt Torst. Biehl in ed. pr, Rodier Diels, Herm. XV, 
166 sqq., τῶν δύο ST U Xy et pr. E (Bhl.), etiam Them. Philop. Soph., seripsit Biehl in 
ed. alt. || μοιράων UV Wy et το, E Philop., μερέων ut videtur pr. E (Trend.) et Alex. 1. 1 
Them. Soph. |[ 6. Ae” SUX Alex. 1. 1. Them. Soph. Bek. Trend. | dyévovro SU X, 
Alex. Them. Soph. Bek. Trencl., γένοντο nunc E, sed ante Ὑ est una littera erasa {81}1.}} 
7. ἐνεῖναι solus Ἰὼ Torst., ceteri codd. εἶναι, etiam Soph. || rx. ἐστὶν UW, ἔνεστιν 

CH. 5 409 Ὁ 24-—410 a 20 39 

elements. Soul, we are told, is composed of the elements in 
Soul is order that it may perceive and know each several thing. 
not a com- But this theory necessarily involves many impossibilities. 
the ele- For it is assumed that like is known by like; which im- 
ments: plies that soul is identical with the things that it knows. 
These elements, however, are not all that exists: there are a great, 
or perhaps we should say rather, an infinite number of other things 
as well, namely, those which are compounded of the elements. 
Granted, then, that it is possible for the soul to know and to 6 
perceive the constituent elements of all these composite things, 
with what will it know or perceive the compound itself? I mean, 
what God or man is; what flesh or bone is: and so likewise with 
regard to any other composite thing. For it is not elements taken 
anyhow which constitute this or that thing, but only 
Empe- . . . - . 
doclescri/ those which are united in a given proportion or com- 
Heised. bination, as Empedocles says of bone :— 

“Then did the bounteous earth in broad-bosomed crucibles 
win out of eight parts two from the sheen of moisture and four 
from the fire-god; and the bones came into being all white.” 

It is therefore of no use for the elements to be in the soul, 
unless it also contains their proportions and the mode of combining 
them. For each element will know its like, but there will be 
nothing to know bone or man, unless these also are to be present 
in the soul: which, I need hardly say, is impossible. Who would 
ask if stone or man resides in the soul? And similarly with that 
which is good and that which is not good: and so for all the 

Being, again, is a term which has various meanings, signifying 7 
sometimes the particular thing, sometimes quantity or quality or any 
other of the categories which have been already determined. Is the 
soul to be derived from all of these, or not? It cannot be: the 
general opinion is that there are no elements common to all the 
categories. Does the soul, then, consist of those elements alone 
which are the elements of substances? How then does it know 
each of the other categories? Or will they say that each summum 
genus has special elements and principles of its own, and that the 
soul is composed of these? Then soul will be at once quantity, 
quality and substance. But it is impossible from the elements of 

etiam Soph. || ὁμοίως...12. μὴ ἀγαθόν unc. incl. Susemihl || 13. ἐπὶ τῶν TX Simpl. || 
17. τὰ στοιχ. Ey; τὰ om. Them. 33, 30 Soph. || post οὐσιῶν virgulam om. Bek. Trend. || 
μόνων STUVX || 20. ἔσται... οὐσία Torst. suspecta sunt, agnoscunt haec verba et eodem 
. quidem loco Philop. 179, 3 sq- Simpl. Soph., post 21. ποσόν posuit Belger. 

40 DE ANIMA I CH. § 

ἴω “A “~ > A \ ’ “~ Ἁ 
τῶν τοῦ ποσοῦ στοιχείων οὐσίαν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ποσόν, τοῖς δὴ 
ἴω “2452. Φᾧ 
λέγουσιν ἐκ πάντων ταῦτά τε καὶ τοιαῦθ᾽ ἐτερα συμβαΐνει. 
3, ‘ ‘ \ ΄ Ν 3 N 5S \ Ψ € A “ 
8 ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι μὲν ἀπαθὲς εἶναι τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ 
ΜᾺ 4 Ν 
ὁμοίου, αἰσθάνεσθαι δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ γινώσκειν 
τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον: τὸ δ᾽ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τι καὶ κι- 25 
νεῖσθαι τιθέασιν: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν τε καὶ γινώσκειν. 
Ν > 2 , \ ΄ ¥ a , 
9 πολλὰς δ᾽ ἀπορίας καὶ δυσχερείας ἔχοντος τοῦ λέγειν, κα- 
θάπερ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς, ὡς τοῖς σωματικοῖς στοιχείοις ἕκαστα 
A \ aA 
yuepilerar, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον [μαρτυρεῖ τὸ νῦν λεχθέν ]" 
ln) ἌᾺ , ~ Ὄ 
ὅσα γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς τῶν ζῴων σώμασιν ἁπλῶς γῆς, οἷον 30 
> a a ΄ 3 Ἁ > , o~ 4 3 ION ~ 
ὀστᾶ νεῦρα τρίχες, οὐθενὸς αἰσθάνεσθαι δοκεῖ, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ τῶν 4IOb 
ἴα ao“ ~ δ 
10 ὁμοίων: καίτοι προσῆκεν. ἔτι δ᾽ ἑκάστῃ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἄγνοια 
πλείων ἢ σύνεσις ὑπάρξει’ γνώσεται μὲν yap ἕν ἕκαστον, 
Ν ΩΝ ΄ >? 3 
πολλὰ δ᾽ ἀγνοήσει: πάντα yap τἄλλα. συμβαίνει δ᾽ Ἔμ.- 
~ iy ‘ \ on) 
πεδοκλεῖ γε Kal ἀφρονέστατον εἶναι τὸν θεόν: μόνος yap τῶν 5 
Ἀ \ ‘ 
στοιχείων ἕν ov γνωρίζει, τὸ νεῖκος, τὰ δὲ θνητὰ πάντα" ἐκ 
τὰ πάντων γὰρ ἕκαστον. ὅλως τε διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν οὐχ ἅπαντα 
» Ἂν 
ψυχὴν ἔχει τὰ ὄντα, ἐπειδὴ πᾶν ἤτοι στοιχεῖον ἢ ἐκ στουχείου 
Ν Ὁ 
ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων ἢ πάντων ; ἀναγκαῖον γάρ ἐστιν ἕν τι γι- 
τς νώσκειν ἢ τινὰ ἢ πάντα. ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ τί ποτ᾽ τὸ 
ω \ 
ἐστὶ TO ἑνοποιοῦν αὐτά" ὕλῃ yap ἔοικε τά γε στοιχεῖα" KU- 
΄ δ 3 a ‘ / Ψ / > 3 ’ a Ν 
ριώτατον γὰρ ἐκεῖνο τὸ συνέχον ὅ τί ποτ᾽ ἐστίν: τῆς δὲ ψυ- 
> “ ‘ > 
χῆς εἶναί τι κρεῖττον Kal ἄρχον ἀδύνατον- ἀδυνατώτερον ὃ 
» ra) ~ \ ω ἐν 
ἔτι τοῦ νοῦ" εὔλογον yap τοῦτον εἶναι προγενέστατον καὶ κύριον 

‘ 4 \ 4 ad ‘a ἴω ΕΝ ΔΝ 
κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖά φασι πρῶτα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι. ι5 
έ , 4 € ‘ % di ‘ 3 é Ἂν 
1. πάντες δὲ καὶ οἱ διὰ τὸ γνωρίζειν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὰ ὄντα 

‘ " 3 an - ΄ > » Ν ς \ 
τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων λέγοντες αὐτήν, καὶ οἱ TO κι- 

48. δ yap TX Susemihl Vhilop. in interpr. 80, 5, Rodier || re lo Soph., reliqui re, 
etiam Philop. 81,4 {κινεῖν E, ποιεῖν UX i] 26. τε οἵ, Εν re V, leg. re etiam Soph. ἢ 
20. πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον sic omnes codd., ‘et ad simile” vet. transl., pro his τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον 
scripsit Torst. Sophoniam seeutus || post πρὸς virgulam posuit, post ὅμοιον sustulit Reslier | 
λεχθησόμενον T et corr. Uy, Soph. interpretatur τὰ ἐξῆς AexOnodueva, λεχθέν etiam 
Simpl. 7o, 8 Philop. 180, 23, quorum uterque λεχθησόμενον interpretatur, vet. transl, 
verba μαρτυρεῖ τὸ νῦν λεχθέν unc. inclusit Torst., probat Susemihl || 30. ἔνεστιν STU V 
Bek. Trend, ἐστιν etiam Philop. Suph. Torst. || 410 Ὁ, 2. προσῆκεν τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τὰς 
τρίχας γεηρὰ ὄντα τῶν ὁμοίων αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἔτι W, de his nihil veteres interpretes || 3. πλέον 
SUV W Xy Soph., πλείων etiam Them. {{υὑπάρχει WX || ἑκάστη T WX Soph. | 4. πάντα 
γὰρ τῶλλα om. pr. HE, leg. Them. et sine dubio Soph., Dittenberger, Gétt. gel. Anz, 
1863, Ὁ. 1614, ut superflua omitti vult || 6, γνωρίζει solus E Torst., cui assentitur Noetel, 
Zeitschr. f. Gym. 1864, p. 141, reliqui ante Torst. omnes γνωριεῖ, etiam Them. Soph. |f 

CH. 5 4Ioa 21--- ΔΙῸ Ὁ 17 41 

quantity to derive substance or anything but quantity. These, 
then, and others like them are the difficulties which confront those 
who derive soul from all the elements. There is a further incon- 8 
sistency in maintaining that like is unaffected by like and yet at 
the same time that like perceives like and knows like by like. 
But they assume that perceiving is a sort of being acted upon or 
moved. And the same holds of thinking and knowing. 

Of the many problems and difficulties involved in holding with 9 
Empedocles that each thing is known through corporeal elements 
and by reference to its like [what has just been said ts evidence].— 
For, it would seem, whatever within the bodies of animals consists 
entirely of earth, such as bones, sinews, hair, perceives nothing 
at all, and consequently cannot perceive its like; as in consistency 
it should. Moreover, each one of the elemental principles will have ro 
a far larger share of ignorance than of intelligence; there being 
many things of which it will be ignorant and only one which it will 
know: in fact, it will be ignorant of all besides that one. It 
follows, for Empedocles at any rate, that God is quite the most 
unintelligent of beings. There is one of the elements, viz. Strife, 
which he, and he alone, will not know, while mortal things, being 
composed of all the elements, will know them all. And in general, rz 
seeing that everything is either an element or derived from one or 
more or all elements, why should not all things that exist have 
soul? For they must certainly know one thing or some things 
or all. It might further be asked what it is that gives them unity. 12 
For the elements, at all events, correspond to matter. That other 
principle, whatever it be, which holds them together, is supreme. 
Yet it is impossible that anything should be superior to the soul 
and overrule it; and still more impossible that anything should 
overrule intelligence. This, it may reasonably be held, has a 
natural priority and authority. Yet we are told that the elements 
are prior to all other things that exist. 

And it is characteristic, alike of those who derive the soul from 13 
the elements on the ground of perception and knowledge, and of 
those who define it as the thing most capable of causing motion, 

ἐκ πάντων γὰρ ἕκαστον unc. incl. Torst., praeter omnes codd. tuentur haec verba Them. 
Soph. 34, rg, et, ut videtur, Philop. 181, 28sq., defendit Dittenberger, Progr. Rudolstadt 
1869, p-19 || 7. δὲ STU V W, τε etiam Them. et, ut videtur, Soph. 34, 15 || 8. πᾶν om. 
pr. E, leg. Soph., πάντα Them. || #roe στοιχεῖον recepit Torst. ex solo E (Bus.), reliqui 
ante Sorst. omnes ἢ o7., etiam Them. {|| 9. ἢ ἐκ πλ. TVW || & re] ὃν SUX, ἢ ὃν W |i 
rx. γε οἵα. STW Χ || 12. γὰρ] γὰρ E, sed in rasura, Bek. δ᾽ subfuisse coni. (Trend.), 
γὰρ etiam ceteri codd. et Soph., δ᾽ scripsit Torst. || 13. κρεῖσσον E W X. 

43 DE ANIMA I CH. 5 

‘ , a ¥ \ ‘\ 

νητικώτατον, οὗ περὶ πάσης λέγουσι ψυχῆς. οὔτε yap Ta 

é \ > ? , 

αἰσθανόμενα πάντα κινητικά: φαΐνεται yap εἶναί τινα μό- 
a \ an 7 , 

νιμα τῶν ζῴων κατὰ Tomov: καίτοι δοκεῖ ye ταύτην μόνην 


a , an ες \ Ν “ ε ῇ \ . ¢ 
τῶν κινήσεων κινεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ TO ζῷον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι 
τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιοῦσιν" φαίνεται 
‘ , Ν Ἂ 3 ? “~ nO 3 A / 
γὰρ τά τε φυτὰ Cyv ov μετέχοντα φορᾶς ovd αἰσθήσεως, 
‘ a) ? Ν / > ¥ > ’ ‘ -~ 
14 καὶ τῶν ζῴων πολλὰ διάνοιαν οὐκ ἔχειν. εἰ δέ TLS καὶ ταῦτα 
παραχωρήσειε καὶ θείη τὸν νοῦν μέρος τι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὁμοίως 25 
δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, οὐδ᾽ ἂν οὕτω λέγοιεν καθόλου περὶ 
? ων 3 ‘\ Ἁ Ψ > am) “ δ , 
16 πάσης ψυχῆς οὐδὲ περὶ ὅλης οὐδεμιᾶς. τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε 
Ν ξ 3 ῪᾺ 3 ΡᾺ » ἤ, Ν Ἁ 
καὶ ὃ ἐν τοῖς ᾿Ορφικοῖς ἔπεσι καλουμένοις λόγος" φησὶ γὰρ 
τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου εἰσιέναι ἀναπνεόντων, φερομένην ὑπὸ 
“ > fF 3 © / ‘ “Ἂ “ a 4 aQN 
TOV ἀνέμων. οὐχ οἷόν TE δὴ τοῖς φυτοῖς τοῦτο συμβαίνειν οὐδὲ 30 
τῶν ζῴων ἐνίοις, εἴπερ μὴ πάντα ἀναπνέουσιν": τοῦτο δὲ λέ- 4rra 
\ y ε , Ὗ va \ \ > σι 
16 ληθε τοὺς οὕτως ὑπειληφότας. εἴ τε δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν 
στοιχείων ποιεῖν, οὐθὲν δεῖ ἐξ ἁπάντων" ἱκανὸν γὰρ θάτερον 
μέρος τῆς ἐναντιώσεως ἕαντό τε κρίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. 


καὶ γὰρ τῷ εὐθεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ Kal τὸ καμπύλον γινώσκομεν" 

Ν ‘ 3 ~ ¢ ὔ ΄Ν \ , » AP ε a 

κριτὴς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ὁ κανών, τὸ δὲ καμπύλον οὔθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ 

¥ A 3 / ἈΝ > “~ 7 > N ~ ra 

17 οὔτε τοῦ εὐθέος. καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δέ τινες αὐτὴν pepetyOat 

o Ψ 5 ral 5.9 ? 4 a) εν 
φασιν, ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς φήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι. 
18 τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας" διὰ τίνα γὰρ αἰτίαν ἐν μὲν τῷ 
ΕΥ̓ ~ ἮΝ ΤᾺ “~ 

ἀέρι ἢ τῷ πυρὶ οὖσα ἡ ψυχὴ ov ποιεῖ ζῷον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μει- τὸ 

19 κτοῖς, καὶ ταῦτα βελτίων ἐν τούτοις εἶναι δοκοῦσα; ἐπιζητή- 
\ ¥ \ Ἁ ν᾿» > + ξ > ~ 9 fs \ ry 
σειε yap av τις καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν ἡ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ψυχὴ τῆς 
20 ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις βελτίων ἐστὶ καὶ ἀθανατωτέρα. συμβαίνει δ᾽ 
ἀμφοτέρως ἄτοπον καὶ παράλογον: καὶ γὰρ τὸ λέγειν 
~ ‘ on a # 

(gov τὸ πῦρ ἢ τὸν ἀέρα τῶν παραλογωτέρων ἐστί, καὶ τὸ 15 
t8. πάσης ἵν Them. Philop., ἁπάσης ceteri codd. et Soph. {| offre] οὐδὲ coni, Steinhart ἢ 
20. fortasse legendum μόνη annotat Trend., μόνην «« μόνη» coni. Susemihl, Oucan. p. $4, 
probat Rodier Il, p. 154 || 22. τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν unc. incl. Torst., tuentur Them. 
Philop. et Vahlen, Ocester. Gym. Zeitschr. 1868, p. 20 ἢ 23. φορᾶς οὐδ᾽ unc. incl. Torst., 
leg. etiam Philop. Simpl. ct sine dubio Them, || 26. οὕτω] οὗτοι Them. 35, 15 || καθόλου om. 
T UV Torst., tuentur etiam Them. Simpl. et Vahlen 1, 1. p. 21 || 27. οὐδεμιᾶε] οὐδ μιᾶς 
ETUVW Bek. Trend., μιᾶς (omisso οὐδὲ) Torst., οὐδὲ περὶ μιᾶς SX Simpl. (cf Soph. 
35, 12 οὐδὲ περὶ ὅλης οὐδὲ περὶ putas), οὐδεμιᾶς eliam Them. et sine dubio Philop., qui in 
interpr. bis περὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ὅλης, seme] περὶ μιᾶς ὅλης, semel περὶ ὅλης μιᾶς || τοῦτο ae... 
411 ἃ, 2. ὑπειληφότας post 411 ἃ, 7. εὐθέος transponenda coni. Bywater, Journ. of Phil. 

1888, p. 53 Sq., cui assentitur Susemihl || 28%. καλουμένοις ἔπεσι TV Wy Them., καλουμένοις 
om. 8, καλούμενος Soph., λεγομένοις Philop. 186, 24 (sed in lemmate καλουμένοις) || Adyous 

CH. 5 410 Ὁ 18—41I1a 15 43 

that their assertions do not apply to soul in every form. For not 
all sentient beings can cause motion ; some animals are seen to be 
stationary in one place. And yet it is at all events a received view 
that this, namely, change of place, is the one form of motion which 
the soul imparts to the animal. Similarly with those who derive 
intelligence and the faculty of sense from the elements. For plants 
are found to live without any share in locomotion or sensation, and 
many animals to be destitute of thought. If we waive this point 
and assume intellect to be a part of the soul, and the faculty 
of sense likewise, even then their statements would not apply 
generally to all soul, nor to the whole of any one soul. The account 
The Or- given in the so-called Orphic poems is open to the same 
phic cos- strictures. For the soul, it is there asserted, enters from 
mogeny- the universe in the process of respiration, being borne 
upon the winds. Now it is impossible that this should be so with 
plants or even with some animals, seeing that they do not all 
respire: a point which the upholders of this theory have over- 
looked. And if the soul is to be constructed out of the elements, 
there is no need to employ them all, the one of a pair of contraries 
being sufficient to discern both itself and its opposite. For by that 
which is straight we discern both the straight and the crooked, the 
carpenter’s rule being the test of both. On the other hand that 
which is crooked is not a test of itself or of that which is straight. 
There are some, too, who say that soul is interfused through- 
out the universe: which is perhaps why Thales supposed 

Soul not 
ciffuses all things to be full of gods. But this view presents 
the uni- some difficulties. For why should the soul not produce 

verse. . - . 
an animal, when present in air or fire, and yet do so 

when present in the compounds of these elements: and that, too, 
though in the former case it is believed to be purer? One might 
also enquire why the soul present in air is purer and more im- 
mortal than soul in animals. Whichever of the two suppositions 
open to us we adopt is absurd and irrational. To speak of fire 
or air as an animal is very irrational; and on the other hand 

E,, λόγος corr. Ey (Bhi.) || 30. δὲ TW X et corr. E Soph., δὴ reliqui et scripti et impressi 
et E, || grra, 1. δὴ E, δὲ etiam Simpl. et, ut videtur, Them. 35, 20 || 2. εἰ δὲ X Trend., 
εἴπερ SV W, εἴπερ δὲ T et nunc ἘΣ, εἴ re δὲ olim subfuisse nihil nisi coniectura Bekkeri 
(Trend.), εἴγε U Bek. Torst., εἰ καὶ in interpret. Simpl. |] 8. ἴσως om. V Soph., leg. 
Simpl. || 9. τίνα μὲν γὰρ Vy et corr. ἘΣ, om. μὲν Them. || ἐν μὲν} wevom. ST Vy, leg. 
Them. || ro. ἢ ἐν τῷ STU jf 11. βέλτιον E, βελτίων etiam Soph. || ἐπιζητήσειε... 
13. ἀθανατωτέρα in parenth. Torst. Susemihl {| 12. γὰρ] δ᾽ WX Soph. et, ut videtur, 
Philop. 189, 4, yap reliqui, etiam re. E, sed Bek. coni. fuisse γ᾽ (Trend.) || 15. mapa- 
λόγων SU X, παραβολωτέρων Them. 36, 2, Philop. 189, 11 (sed in v. 1. utriusque vulg.) || 
room. TVW. 




44 DE ANIMA I CH. 5 

Ν ? “ “~ 3 , ¥ € a > 5 ἢ 
21 μὴ λέγειν ζῷα ψυχῆς ἐνούσης ἄτοπον. ὑπολαβεῖν δ᾽ ἐοίκασιν 
> , ¢ “A 
εἶναι THY ψυχὴν ἐν τούτοις, OTL TO ὅλον τοῖς μορίοις ὁμοειδές" 
y 3 3» “ 9 ~ 4 ἃ ᾿ i € ΜᾺ A 
ὥστ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς λέγειν καὶ THY ψυχὴν ὁμοειδῆ τοῖς 
“ἽΝ “~ 4 “A 
μορίοις εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ἀπολαμβάνεσθαΐ τι τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐν 
Νὰ , » Ἁ “ / > > ¢ Ν ΔΝ ¢ 
τοῖς ζῴοις ἔμψυχα τὰ ζῷα γίνεται. εἰ δ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἀὴρ διασπώ- 
μενος ὁμοειδής, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἀνομοιομερής, τὸ μέν τι αὐτῆς 
ς / oN Ψ ‘\ 3 3 ε , 3 -~ > >  N 
ὑπάρξει δῆλον ὅτι, τὸ δ᾽ οὐχ ὑπάρξει. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν αὐτὴν 
ἢ ὁμοιομερῆ εἶναι H μὴ ἐνυπάρχειν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν μορίῳ τοῦ παντός. 
> wn Ν 
22 φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὡς οὔτε τὸ γινώσκειν ὑπάρ- 
“a [αἱ ἰοὺ ἴων 
χει TH ψυχῇ διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων εἶναι, οὔτε τὸ κινεῖ- 25 
23 σθαι αὐτὴν καλῶς οὐδ᾽ ἀληθῶς λέγεται. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ γινώ- 


~ ΜᾺ > ‘ ‘S ‘ 3 é ¢ ‘ Ν , 
σκειν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαΐ τε Kai τὸ δοξά- 
¥ Ν \ 3 ων Ν , \ & © 3 , 
Cew, ere δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ βούλεσθαι Kat ὅλως at ὀρέξεις, 
γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἣ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπὸ τῆς 
n » 3 ¥ ‘ > \ \ ra , ῷ 
ψυχῆς, ἔτι δ᾽ αὔξη τε καὶ ἀκμὴ καὶ φθίσις, πότερον ὅλῃ 30 
τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων ἕκαστον ὑπάρχει, καὶ πάσῃ νοοῦμέν τε καὶ 4IIb 
a) ¥ a 
αἰσθανόμεθα Kat κινούμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ποιοῦμέν τε 
‘ an 
kal πάσχομεν, ἢ μορίοις ἑτέροις ἕτερα; Kai τὸ ζῆν δὴ πότερον ἔν 
? > Ν A ‘ > a aay ~ A ‘ » 
τινι τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ καὶ ἐν πλείοσιν ἢ πᾶσιν, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι 
¥ / ὃ - ‘ > # Ν * 4 
Δφαίτιον ; λέγουσι On τινες μεριστὴν αὐτήν, καὶ ἄλλο μὲν 5 
ca » \ 3 ™ [4 > , # ‘ ’ 
νοεῖν ἄλλο δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν. τί οὖν δή ποτε συνέχει τὴν ψυχήν, 
εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε σῶμα: δοκεῖ γὰρ τοὐ- 
» \ ω -" 
ναντίον μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνέχειν: ἐξελθούσης γοῦν 
διαπνεῖταν καὶ σήπεται. εἰ οὖν ἕτερόν τι μίαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ, 
> ~ / 3 ¥ 9 7 " 4 3 ΄᾿ 
ἐκεῖνο μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εἴη ψυχή. δεήσει δὲ πάλιν κἀκεῖνο ζη. 
A“ ‘4 ἡ, 7 3 4 ‘ ¥ ‘ é > 
τεῖν πότερον ἕν ἢ πολυμερές. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἕν, διὰ τί οὐκ 
»242 2 \ ἐ Ny ᾧΨ ? 4 , , Ξ ὔ 
εὐθέως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἕν; εἶ δὲ μεριστόν, πάλιν ὁ λόγος ζη- 
τήσει τί τὸ συνέχον ἐκεῖνο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ πρόεισιν ἐπὶ τὸ 
25 ἄπειρον. ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ περὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς, 



17. εἶναι om. SUX, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ΓΝ Wy Them. | ὅλον ἐν τοῖς ἢ τῷ. εἶναι 
om. pr. If || ἀπολαμβάνειν STU Wy, tuentur ἀπολαμβάνεσθαι Philop. Soph. ἢ 20. τὰ 
om STU V Wy || 22. ὑπάρξει δῆλον ὅτι fort. inserta ex margine putat Torst., tuentur 
etiam Simpl. Philop. || 23. ἢ ante 64. om. E, leg. Simpl. {| 26. οὐδ᾽ ἀληθῶς om. pr. Εὖ, 
leg, Soph., Dittenberger p. 1614 ut superflua omitti vult || ἐπειδὴ U Wy et corr. E, Bek. 
con, fuisse ἐπεὶ δὲ (‘T'rend.) || 27. τῆς om. TWy || τὸ ante d0& om. STU W Soph. ἢ} 
“8, δὲ καὶ τὸ SU WX, καὶ etiam Soph. || βουλεύεσθαι ΤΌΝ WX y et corr. ὦ Them. 
36, 29 Soph. || al om. TX, leg. Soph. || 29. ἡ om. E (Trend.) || 30. αὔξησις STUV WX 
et corr. Τὼ αὔξη etiam Soph, || gia b, 2, αἰσθ, καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ EV W Simpl, Soph. (qui 
καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα omittit) Torst., αἰσθ, καὶ κινοῦμαν καὶ X, καὶ κινούμεθα om. reliqui οὐκ ή,, 
etiam Bek. Trend. || 4. ἐστὶν ἢ ἑνὶ ἢ E, sed évl ἢ expunct. (Bhi.), ἐστὶν ἑνὶ ἢ Bek. ‘Trend. 

CH. 5 411 a 16—411 Ὁ 14 45 

not to call them animals, if they contain soul, is absurd. But az 
it would seem that the reason why they suppose soul to be 
in these elements is that the whole is homogeneous with its 
parts. So that they cannot help regarding universal soul as also 
homogeneous with the parts of it in animals, since it is through 
something of the surrounding element being cut off and enclosed 
in animals that the animals become endowed with sou]. But if the 
air when split up remains homogeneous, and yet soul is divisible 
into non-homogeneous parts, it is clear that, although one part 
of soul may be present in the air, there is another part which is 
not. Either, then, soul must be homogeneous, or else it cannot be 
present in every part of the universe. 

From what has been said it is evident that it is not because the 22 
soul is compounded of the elements that knowledge belongs to it, 
nor is it correct or true to say that the soul is moved. Knowledge, 23 
however, is an attribute of the soul, and so are perception, opinion, 
desire, wish and appetency generally; animal locomotion also is 
produced by the soul; and likewise growth, maturity and decay. 
Unityor  chall we then say that each of these belongs to the whole 
soul. soul, that we think, that is, and perceive and are moved 
and in each of the other operations act and are acted upon with 
the whole soul, or that the different operations are to be assigned 
to different parts? And what of life itself? Does it reside in any 
single one or more or all of these parts? Or has it a cause 
entirely distinct? Now some say that the soul is divisible and 24 
that one part of it thinks, another desires. What is it then which 
holds the soul together, if naturally divisible? Assuredly it is not 
the body: on the contrary, the soul seems rather to hold the body 
together; at all events, when it has departed, the body disperses 
in air and rots away. If, then, the unity of soul is due to some 
other thing, that other thing would be, properly speaking, soul. 
We shall need, then, to repeat the enquiry respecting it also, 
whether it is one or manifold. For, if it has unity, why not 
attribute unity to the soul itself at the outset? If, however, it 
be divisible, then again reason will go on to ask what it is that 
holds zz together, and so the enquiry will go on to infinity. It 25 
might also be asked what power each of the parts of the soul 
Torst. {|| καὶ πᾶσιν TU WX y, ἢ καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν SV Soph. || 5. 6éST UV || 5 et 6. ἄλλο 
EW Torst., probat etiam Noetel, Zeitschr. f. Gymn. 1864, p. 141, reliqui ante Torst. 
omnes ἄλλῳ, etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. 37, 27 (v. 1. ἄλλο) vet. transl. || 7. ye ante τὸ 
TV, om. SUWXy || το. ἡ ψυχή TV Wy, ἡ om. etiam Them. Philop. || δὲ καὶ πάλιν 

Το Χ Bek. Trend., καὶ om. y et E (Bek. teste Torstrikio et Trend.) || 12. καὲ τὴν ψυχὴν 
ἕν SUWX, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὃν εἶναι Ty, ἐν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι V. 

46 DE ANIMA I CH. 5 

» 3 ¥ / ν 9 “~ A 3 A e a 
τίν ἔχει δύναμιν ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ σώματι. εἰ yap ἡ ὅλη 15 
a) “a ‘\ ΓᾺ 
ψυχὴ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα συνέχει, προσήκει καὶ τῶν μορίων 
ἕκαστον συνέχειν τι τοῦ σώματος. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἀδυνάτῳ' 
ποῖον γὰρ μόριον ἢ πῶς ὁ νοῦς συνέξει, χαλεπὸν καὶ πλά- 
»᾿ \ Ν Ν Ν A “~ Ν an, 
26 σαι. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ φυτὰ διαιρούμενα ζῆν Kat τῶν 
ΡᾺ 5 Ν ~ 
ζῴων ἔνια τῶν ἐντόμων, ws THY αὐτὴν ἔχοντα ψυχὴν τῷ 20 
\ ~ “ 
εἴδει, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀριθμῷ: ἑκάτερον yap τῶν μορίων αἴσθησιν 
ἔχει καὶ κινεῖται κατὰ τόπον ἐπί τινα χρόνον. εἰ δὲ μὴ 
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διατελοῦσιν, οὐθὲν ἄτοπον" ὄργανα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὥστε σώ- 
᾿ , 3 3 ΔΝ Ὁ 3 ε 7 ΤᾺ ΄ 
ζειν τὴν φύσιν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τῶν μορίων 
Ψ , Ν an ἌᾺ “Ἂ 
ἅπαντ᾽ ἐνυπάρχει τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὁμοειδεῖς εἰσὲὶν ᾽ς 
ἀλλήλαις καὶ τῇ ὅλῃ, ἀλλήλων μὲν ὡς οὐ χ ὦ 
ήλαις ὅλῃ, ἥλων μὲν ὡς οὐ χωριστὰ ὄντα, 
~ G ΤᾺ ~ » 
27 τῆς ὃ ὅλης ψυχῆς ὡς διαιρετῆς οὔσης. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν 
A ran) Ἀ 4 > 
τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀρχὴ ψυχή τις εἶναι: μόνης yap ταύτης κοι- 
ΜᾺ \ ia ‘ »“Ὰ 
νωνεῖ καὶ ζῷα καὶ φυτά: καὶ αὕτη μὲν χωρίζεται τῆς 
? θ a > ΜᾺ ¥ θ δ᾽ ὑθὲ ¥ / ἂν 
αἰσθητικῆς ἀρχῆς, αἰσθησιν δ᾽ οὐθὲν ἄνευ ταύτης ἔχει. 30 
17. ἀδύνατον Philop. {{|Ἀτὃ, συνέχει EV οἱ fort. Simpl. (cf. p. gs, 31), συνέξει etiam 
Them. Philop. Soph. || ar. μὴ καὶ || yap] γοῦν SVX Soph, Bek. Trend., οὖν UW, 
yap in paraphr, Them. Philop. || 23. ὁμοειδῇ εἰσὶν ἀλλήλοις W et nunc ὦ (Trend.) Soph. 
Bek. Trend. Rodier, ὁμοειδεῖς εἰσὶν ἀλλήλαις reliqui σού, et pr. Κα (Bek.), etiain Philop. 
Simpl. Torst. Biehl || 26. ἀλλήλων} ἀλλήλοις W Soph., ἀλλήλαις Δ΄, ἀλλήλων etiam 
Simpl. Philop. || 28. ψυχὴ ante ἀρχὴ T Torst., om. SU, ψυχὴ post ἀρχὴ videntur legisse 

etiam Them. 34, 22sq. Philop. 202, 5.6 || 2g. καὶ τὰ ζῶα E, τὰ om. etiam Simpl. Soph., 
kal τὰ ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ in interpr. Them, 

CH. 5 ΔΙῚ Ὁ 15-411 Ὁ 30 47 

exercises in the body. For, if the entire soul holds together the 
whole body, then each of its parts ought properly to hold together 
some part of the body. But this seems impossible. For it is 
difficult even to conjecture what part the intellect will hold together 
or how it can hold any part together. It is found that plants, and 26 
among animals certain insects or annelida, live when divided, which 
implies that the soul in their segments is specifically, though not 
numerically, the same. At any rate, each of the two segments 
retains sentience and the power of locomotion for some time: that 
they do not continue to do so is not surprising, as they lack the 
organs requisite to maintain their nature. But none the less all 
the parts of the soul are contained in each of the two segments, 
and the two halves of the soul are homogeneous alike with one 
another and with the whole; a fact which implies that, while the 
parts of the soul are inseparable from one another, the soul as a 
Thesour Whole is divisible. It would seem that the vital principle 27 
in plants. jin plants also is a sort of soul. For this principle is 
the only one common to plants and animals; and, while it can 
be separated from the sensitive principle, no being which has 
sensation is without it. 


1 Ta μὲν δὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον παραδεδομένα περὶ ψυ- 
χῆς εἰρήσθω' πάλιν δ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἐπανίωμεν, πει- 
ρώμενοι διορίσαι τί ἐστι ψυχὴ καὶ τίς ἂν εἴη κοινότατος 

2 λόγος αὐτῆς. λέγομεν δὴ γένος ἕν τι τῶν ὄντων τὴν οὐσίαν, 

7 \ ‘ \ ε Na a > € oN Ν 3 a a 
ταύτης δὲ TO μὲν ὡς ὕλην, ὃ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι τόδε 
Y ‘\ \ 4 3 > aA ¥ ᾽ ta 
τι, ἕτερον δὲ μορφὴν Kai εἶδος, καθ᾽ ἣν ἤδη λέγεται τόδε 

‘ la ν 3 , ¥ 2 ¢ ‘ Ψ , Ν 
τι, καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἐκ τούτων. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ὕλη δύναμις, τὸ 
> > 2 ’ Ν a“ ω Ν Ν ε > / 
δ᾽ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια, καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς, TO μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, 
Ν > ς Ν ~ > 7 Ν Ζ > > ΓᾺ ἈΝ 
370 δ᾽ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. οὐσίαι δὲ μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι δοκοῦσι τὰ σώ- 
\ al κω Me 
para, καὶ τούτων τὰ φυσικά: ταῦτα yap τῶν ἄλλων ap- 
la ca δὲ Δ Ν Ν ¥ ΄ ‘ δ᾽ 5 » 
yat. τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν τὰ μὲν ἔχει ζωήν, τὰ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔχει: 
Ν ‘ ΄ ‘ . > A , \ ¥ \ 
ζωὴν δὲ λέγομεν τὴν δι αὐτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ 
Ψ a) ~ “Ἂ 
φθίσιν. wore πᾶν σῶμα φυσικὸν μετέχον ζωῆς οὐσία ἂν 
¥ > 9 3 Ψ € f > Ν > 5 ‘ ‘ Saal 

4 εἴη, οὐσία δ᾽ οὕτως ὡς σννθέτη. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ σῶμα τοι- 
/ 5 Ν ‘ ¥ 7 wh» 7 ‘ an € , > 
ὄνδε, ζωὴν yap ἔχον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη TO σῶμα ἡ ψυχή: οὐ 
γάρ ἐστι τῶν καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τὸ σῶμα, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ὡς 
ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὕλη. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν 
μ᾽ ε to » ca ὃ ’ ‘ ¥ 
εἶναι. ws εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν éyor- 
τος. ἡ 8 οὐσια ἐντελέχεια. τοιούτου apa σώματος ἐν- 

412 ἃ, 3. Τὰ μὲν...4., ἐπανίωμεν] Harel δὲ τὰ παραδεδομένα περὶ ψυχῆς παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, 
ἐφ᾽ ὅσον (ὅσων X), ἕκαστος ἀπεφήνατο (τῶν Ik) πρότερον (πρῶτον WX), εἴρηται σχεδόν, 
νῦν (νῦν δὲ W), ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν ὃ Ὁ ΚΝ δὶ τὶ Soph. et E fol. 186 (vide 
appendicem). ‘Them. Simpl. Vhilop. et vetusta translatio latina sine dubio vulgatam 
legerunt || 3. προτέρων Vy || 4. εἴρηται margo E, εἰρήσθω etiam Simpl. || §. ἐστι ψυχὴ E 
et fol. 186 et 187 (BhI.), ἡ om. etiam Them. Soph. || av ef) ἔστι SU WX, ἂν εἴη etiam 
Them. Soph. || κοινὸς UWX, κοινότατος etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. || 6. λέγομεν... 
12. φυσικά vid. append., vulgatam legerunt etiam Alex. ἀπ, καὶ Ave. 74, 32 et Them. ἢ 
6. δὲ UV, δὴ Alex. 1.1. Them. || & τὶ γένος S WX, γένος ἕν τι etiam Alex. 1. 1. Them. 
Soph. || 9. δυνάμει y Vhilop. et, ut videtur, Them. 39, 7. ro Simpl. 84, 1 (cf. $3, 30. 34), 
δύναμις etiam Soph. || ct. os τὸ om. If et margo E, leg. Them. If 14. ἑαυτοῦ Them., 
αὐτοῦ ctiam Simpl. Soph. 41, 5 (in cod. Vindob., teste Biehlio, δὲ αὐτοῦ ὁ cade, 
Ifayduck) || 16. δή ἐστι Ey y et, ut videtur, Them. 39, 33, qui interpretatur τοίνυν, re. E 






So much for the theories of soul handed down by our pre- ] 
Soulinthe accessors. Let us, then, make a fresh start and try to 
widest _ determine what soul is and what will be its most com- 
application . .. . . 
oftheterm prehensive definition. Now there is one class of existent 2 
Cehned. things which we call siibstance, including under the 
term, firstly, matter, which in itself is not this or that; secondly, 
shape or form, in virtue of which the term this or that is at once 
applied ; thirdly, the whole made up of matter and form. Matter 
is identical with potentiality, form with actuality. And there 
are two meanings of actuality: knowledge illustrates the one, 
exercise of knowledge the other. Now bodies above all things 3 
are held to be substances, particularly such bodies as are the work 
of nature; for to these all the rest owe their origin. Of natural 
bodies some possess life and some do not: where by life we mean 
the power of self-nourishment and of independent growth and 
decay. Consequently every natural body possessed of life must 
be substance, and substance of the composite order. And since 4 
in fact we have here body with a certain attribute, namely, the 
possession of life, the body will not be the soul: for the body is 
not an attribute of a subject, it stands rather for a subject of 
attributes, that is, matter. It must follow, then, that soul is 
substance in the sense that it is the form of a natural body having 
in it the capacity of life. Such substance is actuality. The soul, 

(Rr.) et reliqui δ᾽ ἐστὶ, etiam Soph. || καὶ ante σῶμα om. UV WX P Soph. Bek. Trend. 
Rodier Zeller II, 23, p. 480 || τοιόνδε ETP, καὶ τοιονδὲ τοῦτο SUV WX Rodier, καὶ 
τοιονδίέ y Trend. Hunc v. varie interpretantur; ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς σῶμα, ἀλλὰ σῶμα τοιονδέ 
Them., Philop. modo καὶ σῶμά ἐστι καὶ τοιονδί 215. 5, modo σῶμά ἐστι τοιονδί 215, 756.» 
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ σῶμα καὶ τοιόνδε σῶμα Soph. || 17. τὸ om. SU Zeller, Archiv f. G. d. Ph. 
IX, p. 538 ll ἡ ψυχή SUV ΝΥ ΧΥ Philop. 215, 11. 18. 22 Alex. ap. Philop. Zeller 1. L, 
ἡ om. E T Bek. Trend. Torst. Biehl Rodier, etiam Soph., de Them. non liquet, qui, cum 
39, 35 οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν εἴποι τὸ σῶμα εἶδος τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος, tum 40, 4 ὅτι γὰρ οὐ σῶμα ἡ 
ψυχὴ δέδεικται interpretatur: cf. 40, 34 || εἶδος pro ψυχή coni. Innes, Cl. Rev. XVI, 
p- 462. . 

H, 4 


5 τελέχεια. αὕτη δὲ λέγεται διχῶς, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, 
ξ + ε Ἁ ΝᾺ Ν, 5 Ψ ε 3 7 3 ‘ 
ἡ δ᾽ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ὡς ἐπιστήμη" ἐν yap 
τῷ ὑπάρχειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὕπνος καὶ ἐγρήγοροίς ἐστιν, 
ἀνάλογον δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἐγρήγορσις τῷ θεωρεῖν, ὁ δ᾽ ὕπνος τῷ 25 
ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν " προτέρα δὲ τῇ γενέσει ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ 
e 3 , ὃ ΝΕ f 3 3 λέ ε , , 
ἡ ἐπιστήμη. διὸ ἡ ψνχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος 
6 φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. τοιοῦτο δέ, ὃ ἂν ἢ ὀργανι- 
κόν. ὄργανα δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν μέρη, ἀλλὰ παντελῶς 412b 
ε Δ ry Ν , ΄ 7 Ν 4 
ἁπλᾶ, οἷον τὸ φύλλον περικαρπίου σκέπασμα, τὸ δὲ πε- 
κάρπιον ποῦ" αἱ δὲ ῥίζαι τῷ στό ivddoyov: apd 
ρικάρπιον καρποῦ" αἱ δὲ ῥίζαι τῷ στόματι ἀνάλογον ayuda 
ba ¥ ‘ - > / Ν a oN , ΜᾺ 
γὰρ ἕλκει τὴν τροφήν. «i δή τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς 
ὃ “Ὁ a ¥ KN 3 , ξ 4 ? a 
et λέγειν, εἴη ἂν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ 
5 ω ‘\ ‘ > “ “ > <A ε ‘ ‘ ‘ “ 
7 ὀργανικοῦ. διὸ καὶ οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν εἰ ἐν ἡ ψυχὴ Kal TO σῶμα, 


Yy δὲ ‘ Ss N ‘ o~ δ᾽ Ψ A € 7 
ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν κηρὸν καὶ TO σχῆμα, οὐδ᾽ ὅλως THY ἑκάστου 
Ὁ Ἅ A i e - 4 ‘ é N \ ΩΝ > Ν 
ὕλην καὶ τὸ οὗ ἡ ὕλη" τὸ γὰρ ἕν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐπεὶ πλεονα- 
χῶς λέγεται, τὸ κυρίως ἡ ἐντελέχειά ἐστιν. 
7 Ν εν » "5 € ra > »ἢ \ ς Ν 
8 καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἰρηται τί ἐστιν ἢ ψυχή" οὐσία γὰρ ἡ κατὰ 
\ 4 “w \ ‘ 4% ἊΝ Lm) x F - ἂν 
τὸν λόγον. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῳδὶ σώματι, καθάπερ εἴτι 
a’ 3 a \ > nm εν 7 εν \ x "ἊΝ 
τῶν ὀργάνων φυσικὸν ἣν σῶμα, οἷον πέλεκυς" ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἂν 
τὸ πελέκει εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο" χωρι- 
σθείσης δὲ ταύτης οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πέλεκυς Fv, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὅμω- 
νύμως. νῦν δ᾽ ἐστὶ πέλεκυς: οὐ γὰρ τοιούτου σώματος τὸ Tits 
ἦν εἶναι καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ φυσικοῦ τοιουδὶ ἔχον- 
οτος ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν ἑαυτῷ. θεωρεῖν δὲ καὶ 
3 ΜᾺ ῬᾺ ὃ ~ ‘ λ θέ > 4 > ¢ »% \ »Ἂ 
ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν δεῖ τὸ λεχθέν. εἰ γὰρ ἣν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ζῷον, 
\ x +) > Ἂ ΨᾺ 
ψυχὴ ἂν ἦν αὐτοῦ ἡ ὄψις’ αὕτη γὰρ οὐσία ὀφθαλμοῦ ἡ 
κατὰ τὸν λόγον. ὁ δ᾽ ὀφθαλμὸς ὕλη ὄψεως, ἧς ἀπολει- 20 
᾽, ϑ ΑΣ 5 4 Ἀ e f f € é 
πούσης οὐκέτ᾽ ὀφθαλμός, πλὴν ὁμωνύμως, καθάπερ ὁ λί- 



“ὅ, δὴ E (Bus.) οἱ Uy, reliqui omnes δὲ || 27. διὸ ἡ γ. ET Vy Biehl Rodier, 7 om, 
reliqui, etiam Soph. |} 28. τοιοῦτον STV WX | 412 b, 4. δὲ EST Vy, δὴ etiam Them. 
Soph. Philop. ad 402 b, 5 (37, 15) et in prooemio ad lib. II. (205, 15) Bek. Trend. Torst. ἢ 
5. ἡ πρώτη ἐντ, WX, vulgatam tuetur etiam Them. {| 8. οὗ ὕλη SUWX Soph. Bek. 
Trend. Torst. || 9. Ἀέγεται om. SU WX Them., leg. etiam Soph. | 12. μὲν (Trend. 
Bus.) et y Torst. Belger in ed. alt. Trend. Biehl Rodicr, om. reliqui, etiam Philop. || 
13. τὸ] τῷ ET W et re. X || 14. δὲ] γὰρ SX Bek. Trend. Torst., “autem” vet. transl., 
διὸ dredGotons P || 15. νῦν δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν coni. Torst., neque Them. neque Philop. neque 
Soph. οὐ legerunt || 16. τοιουδὲ etiam Soph., τοῦ Alex. ἀπ, καὶ λ, 76, τῷ et Vhilop. ἢ 
x7. αὐτῶ SUVW Alex. 1. 1, αὐτῷ X, ἑαυτῷ etiam Philop. || 20. Torst. coni. ὁ δ᾽ 
ὀφθαλμὸς τὸ σύνολον, ἡ δὲ κόρη ὕλη ὄψεως, iisdem fere verbis interpretatur Them., 
ὁ δ',, ὄψεως in parenth. ponenda, puncto post λόγον ἀοϊείο, censet Bywater, J. of Ph. 

CH. I 412 a 22—412b 21 51 

therefore, is the actuality of the body above described. But the 5 
term ‘actuality’ is used in two senses; in the one it answers to 
knowledge, in the other to the exercise of knowledge. Clearly in 
this case it is analogous to knowledge: for sleep, as well as waking, 
implies the presence of soul; and, whilst waking is analogous to 
the exercise of knowledge, sleep is analogous to the possession 
of knowledge without its exercise; and in the same individual 
the possession of knowledge comes in order of time before its 
exercise. Hence soul is the first actuality of a natural body having 
in it the capacity of life. And a body which is possessed of organs 6 
answers to this description.—We may note that the parts of plants, 
as well as those of animals, are organs, though of a very simple 
sort: for instance, a leaf is the sheath of the pod and the pod of 
the fruit. The roots, again, are analogous to the mouths of animals, 
both serving to take in nourishment.—lIf, then, we have to make 
a general statement touching soul in all its forms, the soul will 
be the first actuality of a natural body furnished with organs. 
Hence there is no need to enquire whether soul and body are 7 
one, any more than whether the wax and the imprint are one; 
or, in general, whether the matter of a thing is the same with that 
of which it is the matter. For, of all the various meanings borne 
by the terms unity and being, actuality is the meaning which 
belongs to them by the fullest right. 

It has now been stated in general terms what soul is, namely, 8 
substance as notion or form. And this is the quiddity of such 
and such a body. Suppose, for example, that any instrument, 
Ulustra- say, an axe, were a natural body, its axeity would be 
ae its substance, would in fact be its soul. If this were 
axeity of taken away, it would cease, except in an equivocal sense, 
"ΣΝ to be an axe. But the αχεῖβ after all an axe. For 
it is not of a body of this kind that the soul is the quiddity, 
that is, the notion or form, but of a natural body of a particular 
sort, having in itself the origination of motion and rest. 

Further, we must view our statement in the light of the parts of 9 

the body. For, if the eye were an animal, eyesight 
{2) the eye- . - . . 
sightofan would be its soul, this being the substance as notion 
“yer or form of the eye. The eye is the matter of eyesight, 
and in default of eyesight it is no longer an eye, except equivocally, 

XVII, p. 54, cui assentitur Susemihl, vulgatam tuentur etiam Philop. 221, 24 Simpl. et 
vet. transl. || ἀπολιπούσης TVW Them. Simpl. Trend., ἀπολειπούσης etiam Soph. | 
21. οὐκ ἔστιν STU VW Bek. Trend., οὐκέτι EX, οὐκέτ᾽ Them. Torst., οὐκέτι ἐστὶν in 
interpr. Simpl. 93, 32, οὐκέτι ἔσται Soph. || ὁμώνυμος E. 



ΜᾺ »" Ν 3 
θινος καὶ ὁ γεγραμμένος. δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους ἐφ 
rs “n \ ‘ 
ὅλου τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος: ἀνάλογον yap ἔχει ws TO pé- 
¢ μέ Ν , ¢ 
pos πρὸς TO μέρος, οὕτως ἡ ὅλη αἴσθησις πρὸς TO ὅλον 
“ A 3 f Ὁ n ¥ δὲ 3 \ 3 λ Ἁ 
10 σῶμα τὸ αἰσθητικόν, % τοιοῦτον. ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ ἀποβεβληκὸς 25 
Ν Ν Ν ’ x Ψ “ > Ν ‘ + ‘ δὲ 
τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ δυνάμει dv wate ζῆν, ἄλλα τὸ ἔχον" τὸ OE 
11 σπέρμα καὶ ὁ καρπὸς τὸ δυνάμει τοιονδὲ σῶμα. ὧς μὲν 
οὖν ἡ τμῆσις καὶ ἡ ὅρασις, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγρήγορσις ἐντελέ- 
ς 3 ς Ἂν ἃ ε δύ ῪῪ 3 A ε an 
yea, ὡς δ᾽ ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ δύναμις τοῦ ὀργάνου, ἢ Wry’ 4138 
τὸ δὲ σῶμα τὸ δυνάμει ὄν: ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμὸς ἡ 
a ‘ ς ¥ > ΜᾺ ξ ‘N A ‘ a “A Y 
12 Κόρη Kal ἡ ὄψις, κἀκεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ TO σώμα ζῷον. ὅτι 
μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ χωριστὴ τοῦ σώματος, ἢ μέρη 
τινὰ αὐτῆς, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν, οὐκ ἄδηλον: ἐνίων γὰρ ἢ 5 
ἐντελέχεια τῶν μερῶν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἔνιά γε 
+f , Ν δ \ εν , > ΄ 
οὐθὲν κωλύει, διὰ τὸ μηθενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελεχείας. 
¥ \ ¥ 3 ν 3 / ἰῳ , ε ‘\ 
13éru δὲ ἄδηλον εἰ οὕτως ἐντελέχεια τοῦ σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ 
ὥσπερ πλωτὴρ πλοίου. τύπῳ μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ διωρίσθω καὶ 
ὑπογεγράφθω περὶ ψυχῆς. 10 
2 “Bret δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφῶν μὲν φανερωτέρων δὲ γίγνε- 
ται τὸ σαφὲς καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον γνωριμώτερον, πειρα- 
τέον πάλιν οὕτω γ᾽ ἐπελθεῖν περὶ αὐτῆς" οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὸ ὅτι 
δεῖ τὸν ὁριστικὸν λόγον δηλοῦν, ὥσπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ὅρων 
λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐνυπάρχειν καὶ ἐμφαίνε- 
~ >, ἡ ? > € ΄ “ a 3 a 
σθαι. viv δ᾽ ὥσπερ συμπεράσμαθ' οἱ λόγοι τῶν ὅρων εἰσίν' 
οἷον τί ἐστιν ὁ τετραγωνισμός; τὸ ἴσον ἑτερομήκει ὀρθογώνιον 
εἶναι ἰσόπλευρον. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὅρος λόγος τοῦ συμπεράσμα- 
τος. ὁ δὲ λέγων ὅτι ἐστὶν 6 τετραγωνισμὸς μέσης εὕρεσις, 
‘on , ΄ ‘ ¥ , > > ᾿ ΄ 
2 τοῦ πράγματος λέγει τὸ αἴτιον. λέγομεν οὖν ἀρχὴν λαβόν- 20 
κω 4 é \ ¥ o 3 ν᾽, “ 
τες τῆς σκέψεως, διωρίσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου τῷ 
ζῆν. πλεοναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου, κἂν ἕν τι τούτων 

| oe 


22. δὲ VX, δὴ etiam Them., τοίνυν interpr. Simpl. || 24. οὕτως om. UV WX Soph., 
leg. Philop. Simpl. (| 25. τοιοῦτο UW Bek. Trend, τοιοῦτον reliqui codd. et F (Bus.) 
Philop. Soph. Torst. || 27. τοιόνδε Alex. dar. καὶ λ, 76, 25 || 28. rufots codd., αἴσθησις 
coni. Christ {| 413.0, 2. ὁ 660. TU WX Simpl. Soph. Bek. Trend., ὁ om. Philop. ad 
412 Ὁ, 17 (231, 22) et Them, || 3. τὸ ζῶον SU WX Them. Simpl. Soph. Bek. Trend. ἢ 
5. ἐνίων γὰρ ἡ ἐντελόχεια) tua “γὰρ ἐντελέχειαι forsitan legerit Soph. 44, 29 [| 8. re E, 
δὲ etiam Philop. ad gira, 26 (139, 35) et Soph. ἢ 13. οὕτω E (Bhl.) P, reliqui οἱ 
scripti et ante Biehlium jimpressi omnes οὕτως || y’ ἐπελθεῖν EP Soph., reliqui et 
scripti et ante Hiehlium impressi omnes om. γε, ἐπανελθεῖν S Philop. 230, 6 Simpl. | 
17. ἐστι τετραγωνισμός VW Them. Soph. Bek. Trend. Torst. |] 18. λόγος om. ET V ἢ 
ty. ὁ post ἐστὶν om. WX Them. || οὔρησα TU WX || 20. λέγωμεν TW Alex. 77, 2, 

CHS. I, 2 412 Ὁ 22—413 a 22 53 

like an eye in stone or in a picture. What has been said of the 
part must be understood to apply to the whole living body; for, 
as the sensation of a part of the body is to that part, so is sensation 
as -a whole to the whole sentient body as such. By that which 
has in it the capacity of life is meant not the body which has lost 
its soul, but that which possesses it. Now the seed in animals, 
like the fruit in plants, is that which is potentially such and such 
a body. As, then, the cutting of the axe or the seeing of the eye 
is full actuality, so, too, is the waking state; while the soul is 
actuality in the same sense as eyesight and the capacity of the 
instrument. The body, on the other hand, is simply that which is 
potentially existent. But, just as in the one case the eye means 
the pupil in conjunction with the eyesight, so in the other soul and 
body together constitute the animal. 

Now it needs no proof that the soul—or if it is divisible into 
Soul in- parts, certain of its parts—cannot be separated from the 
separable | body, for there are cases where the actuality belongs to 

the parts themselves. There is, however, no reason why 
some parts should not be separated, if they are not the actualities 


of any body whatever. Again, it is not clear whether the soul 13 

Apossible may not be the actuality of the body as the sailor is of the 
analogy. ship. This, then, may suffice for an outline or provisional 
sketch of soul. 

But, as it is from the things which are naturally obscure, though 2 

more easily recognised by us, that we proceed to what is clear 
and, in the order of thought, more knowable, we must employ 
this method in trying to give a fresh account of soul. For it is 
Testofa "ot enough that the defining statement should set forth 
good the fact, as most definitions do; it should also contain 
definition. : . . 

and present the cause: whereas in practice what is stated 
in the definition is usually no more than a conclusion. For 
example, what is quadrature? The construction of an equilateral 
rectangle equal in area to a given oblong. But such a definition 
expresses merely the conclusion. Whereas, if you say that 
quadrature is the discovery of a mean proportional, then you state 
the reason. 

We take, then, as our starting-point for discussion that it is life 2 

which distinguishes the animate from the inanimate. But the 
term life is used in various senses; and, if life is present in but a 

λέγομεν etiam Them. Philop. Soph. {τὴν ἀρχὴν Alex. 1. 1.» τὴν om. Them. Philop., 
ἄλλην ἀρχὴν coni. Susemihl || 21. σκέψεως τοῦ πράγματος SU WX Alex. 1. 1., τοῦ πράγ. 
om. etiam Soph. || 22. ζἢ»] ξυὴν ἔχοντι σώματι Alex, 1. 1, 


3 , », ΝᾺ > 4 a ΜᾺ ¥ ? 
ἐνυπάρχῃ μόνον, ζῆν αὐτό φαμεν, οἷον νοῦς, αἴσθησις, κί. 
vyois καὶ στάσις ἡ κατὰ τόπον, ἔτι κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τρο- 
8φὴν καὶ φθίσις τε καὶ αὔξησις. διὸ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα 25 
πάντα, δοκεῖ ζῆν: φαίνεται γὰρ ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχοντα δύναμιν 
\ 3 Ν 2 ὃ 3 “Ὁ » , A Ad λ 
καὶ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, δι ἧς αὔξησίν τε καὶ φθίσιν λαμ.- 
βάνουσι κατὰ τοὺς ἐναντίους τόπους" οὐ γὰρ ἄνω μὲν av&e- 
? 5» ¥ 5 3 ε 4 > 3 ¥ A 4 iy ἡ", 
ται, κάτω δ᾽ ov, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ ἄμφω καὶ πάντῃ, ὅσα αεὶ 
τρέφεταίΐ τε καὶ Ly διὰ τέλους, ἕως ἂν δύνηται λαμβάνειν 
4 τροφήν. χωρίζεσθαι δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τῶν ἄλλων δυνατόν, τὰ 
> ¥ / > f 5 m~ ~ 4 2 ,» Ν 
δ᾽ ἄλλα τούτου ἀδύνατον ἐν τοῖς θνητοῖς. φανερὸν δ᾽ ἐπὶ 
ao ΄ 3 , ‘ 3 ~ ε 4 4 ¥ 
τῶν φνομένων: οὐδεμία yap αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει δύναμις ἄλλη 
ψυχῆς. τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ὑπάρχει τοῖς 4130 
“ \ ἢ ml Ν 4 Ὁ» ᾿ Ν . A 
ζῶσι, τὸ δὲ ζῷον διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρώτως: καὶ yap τὰ 
N - > 3 é 4 Ἂ > » 
μὴ κινούμενα μηδ᾽ ἀλλάττοντα τόπον, ἔχοντα δ᾽ αἴσθησιν 
5 faa λέγομεν καὶ οὐ ζῆ 5v0 ἰσθήσεως δὲ πρῶτον ὑπά 
, γομεν καὶ οὐ ζῆν μόνον. αἰσθήσεως ρ ρ- 
a“ € » Ψ A 4 \ ζ΄ 4 
χει πᾶσιν ἁφή. ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικὸν δύναται ywpile- 
θ ΤᾺ € ΝᾺ X ζ Ε] a Ψ ξ ξ 5 “ 
FUaL TNS ἀφῆς Kal πάσης αἰσθήσεως, OUTWS Ἢ apn Τῶν 
LAA > θ , θ ἃ δὲ λέ Ἧ on / 
ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων. θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον 
δι κι a ‘ Ν , ᾿ ‘ δ A , 
τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ καὶ τὰ φνόμενα μετέχει: τὰ δὲ Coa πάντα 
[4 Ἀ ξ . ἂν ἂν ? a 3 > ὁ 
φαίνεται τὴν ἁπτικὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα: dv ἣν δ᾽ αἰτίαν 
ἑκάτερον τούτων συμβέβηκεν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν. το 
6 νῦν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω μόνον, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ ψνχὴ τῶν 
εἰρημένωντούτων ἀρχὴ καϊτούτοις ὠρισται, θρεπτικῷ, αἰσθητικῷ, 
nw - 
7 διανοητικῷ, κινήσει. πότερον δὲ τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι ψυχὴ ἢ 
μόριον ψυχῆς, καὶ εἴ μόριον, πότερον οὕτως WOT εἶναι χωριστὸν 
/ fd A % / μ᾿ \ nm ra 9 ‘ 
λόγῳ μόνον ἢ καὶ τόπῳ, περὶ μὲν τινῶν τούτων OV χάλεπον 
8 ἰὼ a ¥ Se > , »” ¥ % > N “~ mo Ld 
ἰδεῖν, ἔνια δὲ ἀπορίαν exer. ὥσπερ yap ἐπὶ τῶν φυτῶν ἐνια 
΄ , A ‘ , , 3 9 , 
διαιρούμενα φαΐνεται ζῶντα καὶ χωριζόμενα amr ἀλλήλων, 
ὡς οὔσης τῆς ἐν τούτοις ψυχῆς ἐντελεχείᾳ μὲν μιᾶς ἐν ἑκάστῳ 
φυτῷ, δυνάμει δὲ πλειόνων, οὕτως δρῶμεν καὶ περὶ ἑτέρας 
Ν, aA Fan) ͵Ὰ >» 4 Fan’ 9 ? > ~ 
διαφορὰς τῆς ψυχῆς συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐντόμων ἐν τοῖς 20 
διατεμνομένοις:" καὶ γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἑκάτερον τῶν μερῶν ἔχει 

23. ὑπάρχη SWX Philop. || 25. φθίσιν et αὔξησιν SU WX Soph. Trend. Rodier { 
29. πάντη ἐκτρέφεταί re καὶ SUX Rodier, πάντη ὅσα ἀεὶ τρέφεταί re καὶ ET et omisso 
re W, πάντοσε καὶ τρέφεται καὶ V Bek. Trend., πάντοσε" καὶ rpéperal re καὶ Torst., πάντη" 
kal τρέφεται διὰ rédous καὶ ζῇ Ὁ, πάντῃ ὅσα καὶ τρέφεται, καὶ de coniectura scripsit Biehl || 
30. post τέλους virgulam Bek. Trend., om. Torst. || 413 Ὁ, 1. τοῖς ἢ] πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσι S U 
Them. Soph., rots ζῶσι πᾶσι X || 4. ὑπάρχει πρῶτον πᾶσιν 8, πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει πρῶτον X, 
τρῶτον ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ceteri, etiam P || 5. δὲ] γὰρ X, δὲ etiam Them. Philop. || 8. φυτὰ 





CH. 2 4138 23—4I3b 21 55 

single one of these senses, we speak of a thing as living. Thus 
Various there is intellect, sensation, motion from place to place 
vital func- and rest, the motion concerned with nutrition and, 
operations. further, decay and growth. Hence it is that all 3 
plants are supposed to have life. For apparently they have within 
The ming.  tnemselves a:faculty and principle whereby they grow 
mum in and decay in opposite directions. For plants do not 
plants. grow upwards without growing downwards; they grow 
in both directions equally, in fact in all directions, as many as 
are constantly nourished and therefore continue to live, so long 
as they are capable of absorbing nutriment. This form of life 4 
can be separated from the others, though in mortal creatures the 
others cannot be separated from it. In the case of plants the fact 
is manifest: for they have no other faculty of soul at all. 

It is, then, in virtue of this principle that all living things live, 
Sensation Wether animals or plants. But it is sensation primarily 
in all which constitutes the animal. For, provided they have 
animals. . Ν - 

sensation, even those creatures which are devoid of move- 
ment and do not change their place are called animals and are 
not merely said to be alive. Now the primary sense in all animals 5 
is touch. But, as the nutritive faculty may exist without touch 
or any form of sensation, so also touch may exist apart from the 
other senses. By nutritive faculty we mean the part of the soul 
in which even plants share. Animals, however, are found uni- 
versally to have the sense of touch: why this is so in each of the 
two cases will be stated hereafter. 

For the present it may suffice to say that the soul is the origin 6 
of the functions above enumerated and is determined by them, 
namely, by capacities of nutrition, sensation, thought, and by 
Mutual motion. But whether each one of these is a soul or part 7 
connection of a soul and, if a part, whether it is only logically 
functions. distinct or separable in space also is a question, the 
answer to which is in some cases not hard to see: other cases 
present difficulties. For, just as in the case of plants some of them 8 
are found to live when divided and separated from each other 
(which implies that the soul in each plant, though actually one, 
is potentially several souls), so, too, when insects or annelida are 
cut up, we see the same thing happen with other varieties of soul: 
I mean, each of the segments has sensation and moves from place 

SU X Bek. Trend. || 12. θρεπτικῷ <dpexrixg > coni. Susemihl || 13. post κινήσει addendum 
ὀρέξει putat Steinhart || 15. τούτων om. SU WX Them. Soph. || 18. αὐτοῖς 5 UvVx 
Them. Soph. 

56 DE ANIMA Il CH. 2 

Ν [4 Ν Ν la > 3 » Ἁ 4 
καὶ κίνησιν τὴν κατὰ τόπον, εἶ δ᾽ αἴσθησιν, καὶ φαντασίαν 
\ » μέ Ν Ν » θ ‘\ hv Ν ἡ ὃ ’ὔ 
καὶ ὄρεξιν: ὅπου μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις, καὶ λύπη τε καὶ Ἠδονή, 
§ ω \ ἴω ~ 
9 ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἐπιθυμία. περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ 
Ἀ ‘an at ὃ / NOE / IAA ¥ 
καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδέν Tw φανερόν, ἀλλ ἔοικε 25 
ἮΝ ιν “Ὁ ~ ΄ 
ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρί- 
10 ζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ ἀΐδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μόρια 
τῆς ψυχῆς φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι χωριστά, καθάπερ 
f “~ ‘ / a ν / > θ “ 
τινές φασιν: τῷ δὲ λόγῳ ὅτι ἕτερα, φανερόν: αἰσθητικῳ 
Ἃ εὺ ‘ wn v » ‘ Ν > , 
γὰρ εἶναι Kat δοξαστικῷ ἕτερον, εἴπερ Kal τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι 30 
wn , [1 A N Ν ἴω μέ Ὁ “ 3 4 
τοῦ δοξάζειν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημέ- 
irvev. ἔτι δ᾽ ἐνίοις μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἅπανθ᾽ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, 
Ν / ? ς ἢ Ν ἃ ‘a ‘a Ν , 
τισὶ δέ τινα τούτων, ἑτέροις δὲ ἕν μόνον (τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσει 
διαφορὰν τῶν ζῴων)" διὰ τίνα δ᾽ αἰτίαν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. 4148. 
la \ ‘ ‘ Ν 9 7 / δ Ν Ν 
παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις συμβέβηκεν" τὰ μὲν γὰρ 
ἔχει πάσας, τὰ δὲ τινάς, τὰ δὲ μίαν τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην, ἁφήν. 
& “Ἢ ν᾿ 
2 ἐπεὶ δὲ ᾧ ζῶμεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα διχῶς λέγεται, 
καθάπερ ᾧ ἐπιστάμεθα (λέγομεν δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμην 5 
τὸ δὲ ἦν, ἑκατέρῳ γὰρ τούτων φαμὲν ἐπίστασθαι) 
ψνχήν, ἑκατέρῳ yap των Pap τ υ)» 
ξ ‘a Α Ἀ Ὄ ¢ 4 ‘ Ν ἕ ? ‘ ‘ / 
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ᾧ ὑγιαΐνομεν τὸ μὲν ὑγιείᾳ τὸ δὲ μορίῳ 
τινὶ τοῦ σώματος ἢ καὶ ὅλῳ: τούτων δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη 
." ς # Ἀ Ἀ / ‘ , Ν "Δ + » 
τε καὶ ὑγίεια. μορφὴ καὶ εἶδός τι καὶ λόγος καὶ οἷον ἐνέρ- 
γειὰ τοῦ δεκτικοῦ, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὑγιαστικοῦ 
ra ‘ σι “-" 
(δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι καὶ διατιθεμένῳ ἡ τῶν ποιητι- 
ΜᾺ € A 2 ἢ ¢ ‘ \ “ © A ‘ 
κῶν ὑπάρχειν ἐνέργεια) ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦτο ᾧ ζῶμεν καὶ 
ἰσθανόμεθα καὶ ὃ μεθ TMS’ ὥστε λό ἂν εἴ 
αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ διανοούμεθα πρώτως" ὥστε λόγος τις ἂν Ely 



2%. καὶ φαντασίαν deleri vult reudenthal, Ueber den Begriff φαντασία bei Arist. 
p- 8, cui assentiuntur Schieboldt, De imag. disquis., p. 44 et Susemihl, ἢν. J. 
LXXXVITI, 12, virgulam post αἴσθησιν delere, post φαντασίαν ponere in scholis maluit 
ΠῚ, Jackson || 23. καὶ ante λύπη om. SU WX Soph. || 23. οὐδέπω TUVWy οἱ 
Philop. in prooemio ad lib. 1 (11, 1) et ad gira, 26 (τ04., 10), sed hoc loco et ad giga, αι 
(261, 14. 16) οὐδέν rw, quod etiam Them. legit: ch Them. pp. 46, 4. 10% 12. 103, 7. J 
a6. xatom. 5. Cf. Ileinzii crit. adn. ad Them. 46, 5. τοῦ, 13. 103, 7 (immo, 8] ἢ 
ἐνδέχεται omnes codd. Soph. et Philop. ter hoc loco et ad 411 a, 26 (194, 11}, 561 δὰ 
4158, 11 (261, 18) ἐνδέχεσθαι et eam quoque seripturam ferri et ab Alexandro legi traclit 
ad πῆς locum Philop., ἐνδέχεσθαι etiam Them. 46, 5 || χωρίζεσθαι om. X, Cf, Them. 
1.1. fl 33. τοῦτο, 4χ4.ἃ, τ. Sour cum Torst. in parenthesi posuit Biehl || 33. ποιεῖ SUX YP 
Simpl. 103, 19 Philop. vet. transl, Bek. Trend. Torst., ἐποίησε Soph. || 4t4a, τ. διαφομὰτν 
TV XP, διαφορὰν etiam Philop. Simpl. Soph. {| 2. τὰς om. 1 et re. T, leg. etiam Soph. ἢ 
4. de hoc loco dmret...14. ὑποκαίμενον cf. Bon. stud. Ar. II, IIL. 120, ἐπεὶ 58...28. φανερὸν 
ἐς τούτων suspecta videntur Susemihlio, Oecon. p. 84, pro ἐπεὶ δὲ coni. ὅτε δὲ Trend., ἐπεὶ 
δὲ etiam Soph. || 5. post ἐπιστάμεθα virgulam Bek. Trend. Torst., delevit Bon. | M-youer... 

CH, 2 413 Ὁ 22--- 414 ξὶ 13 57 

to place, and, if it has sensation, it has also imagination and 
appetency. For, where there is sensation, there is also pleasure 
and pain: and, where these are, desire also must of necessity be 
Thecase or Present. But as regards intellect and the speculative 
intellect faculty the case is not yet clear. It would seem, how- 
not clear. * 4s - . - 

ever, to be a distinct species of soul, and it alone is 
capable of separation from the body, as that which is eternal from 
that which is perishable. The remaining parts of the soul are, 
as the foregoing consideration shows, not separable in the way 
that some allege them to be: at the same time it is clear that they 
are logically distinct. For the faculties of sensation and of opinion 
taken in the abstract are distinct, since to have sensation and to 
Opine are distinct. And so it is likewise with each of the other 
faculties above mentioned. Again, while some animals possess 
all these functions, others have only some of them, others only 
one. It is this which will differentiate animal from animal. The 
reason why this is so must be investigated hereafter. The case is 
similar with the several senses: some animals have all of them, 
others some of them, others again only one, the most indispensable, 
that is, touch. 

Now “that by which we live and have sensation” is a phrase 
Asecond With two meanings, answering to the two meanings of 
free = that “by which we know” (the latter phrase means, 
definition. firstly, knowledge and, secondly, soul, by either of which 
we say we know). Similarly that by which we have health means 
either health itself or a certain part, if not the whole, of the body. 
Now of these knowledge and health are the shape and in some 
sort form, the notion and virtual activity, of that which is capable 
of receiving in the one case knowledge, in the other health: 
that is to say, it is in that which is acted upon or conditioned 
that the activity of the causal agencies would seem to take 
effect. Now the soul is that whereby primarily we live, per- 
ceive, and have understanding: therefore it will be a species of 

6. ἐπίστασθαι in parenth. posui || λέγω coni. Torst., λέγομεν etiam Simpl. et sine dubio 
Soph. |] δὲ unc. incl. Bon., cui adversatur Bywater, p. 55 || 6. ἑκατέρῳ. .«.ἐπίστασθαι 
in parenth. posuit Bon. {| 7. ᾧ unc. incl. Bywater || ὑγίειαν X et pr. S, reliqui codd. 
et Bek. Trend. ὑγίεια, ὑγιείᾳ de coniect. Trend. a Torst. receptum probat Bon., ὑγιείᾳ 
iam Soph. || 8. ὅλῳ. τούτων Bek. Trend., post ὅλῳ colon Torst. Bon. {| 9. καὶ ante 
οἷον om. S UX {|{ το. τῶν δεκτικῶν X Philop. et in paraphr. Them. Simpl. || ὑγιαστοῦ 
XP Simpl. Philop. Soph. 50, 19, quod probat Hayduck. progr. Gryph. 1873 ἢ. 1, 
recepit Rodier, ὑγιαστικοῦ ceteri, etiam Bon. Ind. Ar. s.v. Barco || 12. Torst. incipit 
apodosin ab ἡ ψυχὴ, Bon. ab ὥστε 13, idque recte. || 13. πρώτως, ὥστε Bek. Trend., post 
“ρώτως colon Torst. Bon. 




58 DE ANIMA II CHS. 2, 3 

\ > 3 3 > Ψ Ν Ν ε , ‘A \ 

13 καὶ εἶδος, GAN οὐχ ὕλη καὶ TO ὑποκείμενον. τριχῶς yap 
» a 

λεγομένης τῆς οὐσίας, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ὧν τὸ μὲν εἶδος, 


τὸ δὲ ὕλη, TO δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τούτων δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ὕλη δύναμις, 
‘ μ᾿ ἐὺ 9 , 3 Ν μ᾿ Ψ 3 ἰὼ ¥ > 
τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἔμψυχον, ov 
Ν ΝᾺ ’ > 3 / ΝᾺ 3 > Ψ , id 
TO σώμά ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ψυχῆς, GAN αὐτὴ σωματός τι- 
τάνος. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οἷς δοκεῖ μήτ᾽ 
ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι μήτε σῶμά τι Q ψυχή" σώμα μὲν 20 
γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι, σώματος δέ τι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν σώματι 
ὑπάρχει, καὶ ἐν σώματι τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ πρότε- 
ρον εἰς σῶμα ἐνήρμοζον αὐτήν, οὐθὲν προσδιορίζοντες ἐν τίνι 
καὶ ποΐῳ, καίπερ οὐδὲ φαινομένου τοῦ τυχόντος δέχεσθαι τὸ 
τῷ τυχόν. οὕτω δὲ γίνεται καὶ κατὰ λόγον" ἑκάστου γὰρ ἡ ἐν- 25 
τελέχεια ἐν τῷ δυνάμει ὑπάρχοντι καὶ τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὕλῃ πέ- 
5 , Ψ \ ΜΝ 3 ld 4 a > ‘ é 
φυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐντελέχειά Tis ἐστι Kal λόγος 
΄-“ > 
τοῦ δύναμιν ἔχοντος εἶναι τοιούτου, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων. 
89 Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λεχθεῖσαν τοῖς μὲν 
ἴω ᾽ὔ wy " “ὋΝ 
ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τοῖς δέ τινες εὐτῶν, 30 
9. ἢ Ν ᾿ ῥ f > ¥ an 3 
ἐνίοις δὲ pia μόνη. δυνάμεις δ᾽ εἴπομεν θρεπτικόν; dpe- 
2KTUKOV, αἰσθητικόν, κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν. ὑπ 
vd de ἊἊ δ “ \ θ \ ¢ ec 7 δὲ 
άρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ 
oa Ff ‘ ‘ ? f 3 ‘ ‘ 3 ? ‘ \ 3 
τοῦτό τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν. εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ TO dpe- 414b 
/ ¥ μ᾿ ‘ 3 - ‘ ‘ ‘ δ 
κτικόν. ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις, 
᾿ δὲ “~ ¢ > » [4 “ > A / % e 7 . 
Ta δὲ ζῷα πάντ᾽ ἔχουσι μίαν ye τῶν αἰσθήσεων, THY ἀφήν 

Ὄ δ᾽ + θ ξ ,ὔ ἢ ἡ Fd \ λύ - ἂν 
@ AOUNTLS ὑπάρχει, TOUT NOovy TE καὶ Λυπὴ Καὶ TO 


ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷς δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία: τοῦ 5 
3 γὰρ ἡδέος ὄρεξις αὕτη. ἔτι δὲ τῆς τροφῆς αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν' 
ἡ γὰρ ἁφὴ τῆς τροφῆς αἴσθησις. ξηροῖς γὰρ καὶ ὑγροῖς 
καὶ θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς τρέφεται τὰ ζῶντα πάντα (τούτων 
δ᾽ αἴσθησις ἁφή, τῶν 8 ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν κατὰ συμβεβὴη- 
κός)" οὐθὲν γὰρ εἷς τροφὴν συμβάλλεται ψόφος οὐδὲ χρῶμα 



14. οὐχὶ ἡ ἊΝ, οὐχ ὡς SUV Xy Simpl. || pro yap coni. δὲ Hayduck. 1. 1. ff 14... 
19. cf. Bon. stud. Ar. II, IIL. 58 || 16. δ᾽ om. P || 17. post ἐντέλ, colon Tek. Trend. 
Torst., virguiam Bon. || ἐπεὶ τὸ] ἔπειτα τὸ E (Bek. Rr.) ἐπεὶ τὰ τὸ FE (Bhd), ut videtur, 
dra δὲ τὸ STP Bek. Trend. in ed. pr. Torst., δὲ auctore Trend. om. Belger, quod 
probat Bon. stud. Ar. II, ILL. 58, leg. δὲ Them. Philop. |] 20. μὲν om. SU X, 
leg. Them. Soph. || 23. προσδιορίσαντες SUX Soph., προσδιορέζοντες ctiam Philop. { 
45. οὕτω] τοῦτο Soph. g1, 38, ubi verbatim laudare videtur || 28. τοιουδὶ εἶναι SU X, 
εἶναι τοιούτου Them. Soph. || 30. dewep αἴπομεν W, om. ET y, καθάπερ εἴπομεν etiam 
Them. Soph. || 31. ὁρεκτικόν post αἰσθητικόν U VX Them. Belg., vulgatam tuetur Soph. 
“τα Ὁ, τ, αὐτό SW Soph., τοῦτό etiam Philop. || 2. ὀρέξεις E (Trend.) i 4. καὶ τὸ] 

CHS. 2, 3 414 δ 14---414 Ὁ Io 59 

notion or form, not matter or substratum. Of the three meanings 13 
of substance mentioned above, form, matter and the whole made 
up of these two, matter is potentiality and form is actuality. And, 
since the whole made up of the two is endowed with soul, the body 
is not the actuality of soul, but soul the actuality of a particular 

body. Hence those are right who regard the soul as not 14 
Soul is . . . 
not inde- independent of body and yet at the same time as not itself 
eee’ ἃ species of body. It is not body, but something be- 
boay longing to body, and therefore resides in body and, what 

is more, in such and such a body. Our predecessors were 
wrong in endeavouring to fit the soul into a body without further 
determination of the nature and qualities of that body: although 
we do not even find that of any two things taken at random the 
one will admit the other. And this result is what we might expect. 15 
For the actuality of each thing comes naturally to be developed 
in the potentiality of each thing: in other words, in the appropriate 
matter. From these considerations, then, it is manifest that soul is 
a certain actuality, a notion or form, of that which has the capacity 
to be endowed with soul. 

Of the powers of soul above mentioned, namely, those of 3 
The vital nutrition, appetency, sensation, locomotion and under- 
sanctions standing, some living things, as we remarked, possess 
tributed. 41], others some, others again only one. Plants possess 2 
the nutritive faculty only: other things along with this have 
Appetency sensation ; and, if sensation, then also appetency : where 
implied under appetency we include desire, anger and wish. But 
in touch. : “ 

all animals have at least one sense, touch: and, where 
sensation is found, there is pleasure and pain, and that which 
causes pleasure and pain; and, where these are, there also is desire, 
desire being appetite for what is pleasurable. Again, they have 3 
a sensation concerned with nutriment, touch being such a sense. 
For it is by what is dry and moist, hot and cold, that all living 
things are nourished (and these qualities are perceived by touch, 
whereas the other sensibles are not, except incidentally): for sound, 
colour and odour contribute nothing to nutriment, while flavour 
κατὰ τὸ coni. Barco || 5. re om. ET, leg. Simpl. Soph. || καὶ ἡ om. SU, ἡ om. V Philop. 
253, 2256. Soph. || 6. ὄρεξίς ἐστιν αὕτη ST UX, ἐστὶν ὄρεξις αὕτη Soph., ἐστιν om. etiam 
Philop. || δὲ om. EW y || 8. ζῶα T U VX Bek. Trend. Torst., ζῶντα etiam Them. Philop. 
250, 7 et vet. transl. || τούτων...9. συμβεβηκός in parenth. posui || 9. post ἁφή colon vulg. || 
rois δ᾽ ἄλλοις αἰσθητοῖς Torst. et Belg. in ed. alt. Trend., secuti Sophoniam, qui interpre- 
tatur τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν, vulgatam praeter omnes codd. tuentur Simpl. Philop. 
252, 36 et Alex. ap. Philop. 253, 13 et, ut videtur, Them. 47, 32 |] 10. post συμβεβηκός 

punctum Biehl Rodier || οὐθὲν...11. ἁπτῶν ἐστίν ante ξηροῖς.. συμβεβηκός collocanda 
censet Christ {| 10. οὐδὲ χρῶμα om. E, tuentur haec verba Them. Philop. Soph. 

60 DE ANIMA Il CH. 3 

? Ἀ 3 , ξ \ ‘ 4 ~ ε “Ἂ > a ~ δὲ ‘ 
οὐδὲ ὀσμή, ὃ δὲ χυμὸς ἕν TL τῶν ἁπτῶν ἐστίν. πεῖνα O€ καὶ 
/ 3 4 Ἀ e ‘N ~ a ‘ ~ e Ν 
δίψα ἐπιθυμία, καὶ ἡ μὲν πεῖνα ξηροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ, ἡ δὲ 
δίψα ψυχροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ: ὁ δὲ χυμὸς οἷον ἥδυσμά τι τούτων 
ἐστίν. διασαφητέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ὕστερον, νῦν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον 

3 , wa δ᾽ , “ x ς Ἁ Ν πὰ ¢ ¢ 
εἰρήσθω, ὅτι τῶν ζῴων τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἁφὴν καὶ ὄρεξις ὑπαρ- 
Ἀ Ν 4 » Ψ > 3 - 9. καὶ 
4 χει. περὶ δὲ φαντασίας ἄδηλον, ὕστερον δ᾽ ἐπισκεπτέον. ἐνί- 



ous δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὑπάρχει καὶ TO κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, 
ἑτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις καὶ 
εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τιμιώτερον. 
ΜᾺ “Δ wd ‘ > Ν , ©. RK ¥ ¢ “ Ἁ 
5. ὃδῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἷς ἂν εἴη λόγος ψυχῆς τε καὶ 20 
σχήματος" οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖ σχῆμα παρὰ τὸ τρίγωνόν ἐστι καὶ τὰ 
3 a ¥y o> 2 os Ν ‘\ \ > ᾽ ᾿ 3 
ἐφεξῆς, οὔτ᾽ ἐνταῦθα ψυχὴ παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας. γίνοιτο δ᾽ ἂν 
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων λόγος κοινός, ὃς ἐφαρμόσει μὲν πᾶσιν, 
"4 3 9 \ ¥ ¢ € [4 \ ‘ 7% a > 
ἴδιος δ᾽ οὐδενὸς ἔσται σχήματος. ὁμοίως δὲ Kal ἐπὶ Tats εἰ- 
ρημέναις ψυχαῖς. διὸ γελοῖον ζητεῖν τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ 25 
24 7 ν 272 ¢ » ὰ > Lo» A ¥ ¥ 
ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἑτέρων, ὃς οὐδενὸς ἔσται τῶν ὄντων ἴδιος 
λόγος οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸ ἄτομον εἶδος, ἀφέντας τὸν 
6 τοιοῦτον. παραπλησίως δ᾽ ἔχει τῷ περὶ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ 
Ν ‘N ‘4 7 oN ‘ 9 “ > a € / 4 
τὰ κατὰ ψυχήν: del yap ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχει δυνάμει 
τὸ πρότερον ἐπί τε τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, 30 
® “~ 
οἷον ἐν τετραγώνῳ μὲν τρίγωνον, ἐν αἰσθητικῷ δὲ τὸ θρεπτι- 
Ψ ra 
κόν. ὥστε kal” ἕκαστον ζητητέον, τίς ἑκάστου ψυχή, οἷον τίς 
a N σι 5 ,ὕ BN , Ν , > >» » mo» 
7 φυτοῦ καὶ τίς ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου. διὰ τίνα δ᾽ αἰτίαν τῷ ἐφε- 
Ly ΓΝ ΡὋᾺ ~ 
Ens οὕτως ἔχουσι, σκεπτέον. ἄνευ μὲν yap τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ τὸ 4rsa 
+] ‘ 3 ἂν a) ? 3 ΡᾺ a ἈΝ ΝἍ 
αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν" τοῦ δ᾽ αἰσθητικοῦ χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτικὸν 
> n A , > » ‘ ~ ¢ n ~ ¥ 
ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. πάλιν δ᾽ ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ τῶν ἄλλων 
αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμία ὑπάρχει, ἁφὴ δ᾽ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρ- 
- λλὰ %, ΜᾺ 4 ¥ > ¥ ¥y 3 3 ‘ call 
χει: πολλὰ yap τῶν ζῴων ovr ὄψιν οὔτ᾽ ἀκοὴν ἔχουσιν 5 
2 aN “ 
οὔτ᾽ ὀσμῆς αἴσθησιν. καὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν 
¥ a 
ἔχει TO κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, τὰ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔχει. τελευταῖον 

χα, post ὁσιμή punctum vulg. |] 12. θερμοῦ καὶ ξηροῦ SX, ξηρ. καὶ θερ. etiam Them. Simpl. 
Soph. || 13- ὑγροῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ X Soph., καὶ ψυχ, καὶ ὑγρ. ὃ, ψυχροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ etiam Them, 
Simpl. || room. SUV, leg. Philop. || 15. διωρίσθω SU VX Them. Soph. {{τ8. κἂν post 
ἀνθρώποι X Vhilop. 255, 6, καὶ reliqui, etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. || ry. ἐστιν ἔτεμον SUV 
Them., ἕτερόν ἐστιν ceteri, etiam Simpl. Soph., ἐστὶν om. Philop. ἢ ἢ καὶ ron, UN Them. 
Bek. Trend. Torst., καὶ omissy ἢ Philop., καὶ om. etiam Soph. { 22. ἡ ψυχὴ EVy 
Simpl., ἡ om. Soph. || yévocro ὃ UV X Soph. Bek. Trend. Torst. ji 25. κοινὸν «Ὁ μόνον 1» 
coni. Susemihl, τῷ κοινῷ λόγῳ ἀρκεῖσθαι μόνῳ interpretatur Philop. 257, 13. {| 26. ἐστι 
SUX) Soph., ἔσται Them. {| 27. post λόγος vulg. virgulam sustuli ἢ οὐδὲ δεῖ fort. 

CH. 3 414 Ὁ r1I—415 a 7 61 

is one of the tangible objects. Hunger again, and thirst are forms 
of desire, the one for what is hot or dry, the other for what is cold 
or moist. Flavour is, as it were, the seasoning of these. We will 
deal with these in detail hereafter: at present let it suffice to say 
that all animals which have the sense of touch are also endowed 
with appetency. Whether they have imagination is not clear: this, 
Higher too, must be considered later. Some have in addition 4 
functions. the power of locomotion. Others—that is to say, man 
and any other species like man or, possibly, superior to him—have 
also the thinking faculty and intellect. 

From this it is clear that there is one definition of soul exactly 5 

A single as there is one definition of figure: for there is in the 
of soul, os one case no figure excepting triangle, quadrilateral and 
offigure. the rest,.nor is there in the other any species of soul 

apart from those above mentioned. Again, a definition might be 
constructed which should apply to all figures, but not specially 
to any species of figure. And similarly with the species of soul 
above enumerated. Hence it would be-absurd here as elsewhere 
to seek a general definition which will not be properly a definition 
of anything in existence and will not be applicable to the particular 
irreducible species before us, to the neglect of the definition which 
is so applicable. 
The types of soul resemble the series of figures. For, alike 6 

in figures and in things animate, the earlier form exists 

The as- . . . . 
cending potentially in the later, as, for instance, the triangle 
vital potentially in the quadrilateral, and the nutritive faculty 

in that which has sensation. So that we must examine 
in each case separately, what is the soul of plant, of man or of 
beast. Why they are related in this order of succession remains 7 
to be considered. There is no sensitive faculty apart from the 
nutritive: and yet the latter exists without the former in plants. 
Again, none of the other senses is found apart from touch; while 
touch is found apart from the others, many animals having neither 
sight nor hearing nor sense of smell. Also of those which possess 
sensation, some can move from place to place, others’ cannot. 

Soph. interpretationi accommodatius esse censet Rodier IT, 220 || καὶ τὸ ἄτομον E Ty, τὸ 
om. Simpl. et, ut videtur, Soph. 54, 30. Bek. Trend. Torst. || 28. καὶ ra...30. σχημάτων 
om. V || 29. κατὰ] περὶ τὴν SUV X || 31. μὲν τὸ τρί. V Soph. 54, 6 || 32. ὥστε καὶ 
καθ᾽ suscepit Torst. e prima editione E, reliqui omnes om. καὶ, etiam Soph. || 33. τῷ] 
τὸ PU Soph., om. V || 415 a, 3. οἷον ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς suscepit Torst. e prima editione E, 
οἷον om. reliqui. || 6. ὀσμῆς ὅλως αἴσθησιν STU WX Soph. Bek. Trend., ὅλως om. E 
(Trend.) y Torst. Belger. 

62 DE ANIMA If CHS. 3, 4 

‘ Ἀ 3 / ‘ “ 4 © ‘\ Ν ς 
δὲ καὶ ἐλάχιστα λογισμὸν καὶ διάνοιαν: οἷς μὲν γὰρ ὑπ- 
άρχει λογισμὸς τῶν φθαρτῶν, τούτοις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, 
οἷς δ᾽ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, οὐ πᾶσι λογισμός, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν το 
9 ‘ - ‘ \ f ΄ a ‘ ‘ ua) 
οὐδὲ φαντασία, τὰ δὲ ταύτῃ μόνῃ ζῶσιν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρη- 
τικοῦ νοῦ ἕτερος λόγος. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὁ περὶ τούτων ἑκάστου 
λόγος οὗτος οἰκειότατος καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς, δῆλον. 
9 ~ ‘\ Ἃ ? Ν 7 4 Δ 
4 ᾿Αναγκαῖον δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τούτων σκέψιν ποιεῖσθαι 
a) μ᾿ 3 “a 5» > /pP Ψ Ν ΡᾺ 2 * 
λαβεῖν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ti ἐστιν, εἶθ᾽ οὕτως περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων 15 

Ν Ν a ¥ > ἰοὺ 3 ‘ N ᾿ -.h6mY¢ 

καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιζητεῖν. εἰ δὲ χρὴ λέγειν τί ἕκαστον 
> A © , Ν Ἀ a ‘ > ‘ a 4 , 
αὐτῶν, οἷον τί τὸ νοητικὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ τὸ θρεπτικόν, 

/ ¥ fa a ‘ o “A ’ “ > ¢ ‘a 
πρότερον ἔτι λεκτέον Ti TO νοεῖν καὶ τί TO αἰσθάνεσθαι" πρό- 
τεραι γάρ εἶσι τῶν δυνάμεων at ἐνέργειαι καὶ αἱ πράξεις κατὰ 
τὸν λόγον. εἰ δ᾽ οὕτως, τούτων δ᾽ ἔτι πρότερα τὰ ἀντικείμενα, 20 
δεῖ τεθεωρηκέναι, περὶ ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἂν δέοι διορίσαι διὰ τὴν 

2 αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, οἷον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ νοητοῦ. wore 
πρῶτον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ γεννήσεως λεκτέον: ἡ γὰρ θρεπτικὴ 
ψυχὴ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη 

- ¢ 2 a a ἃ ς , ‘ ΝᾺ Kd ? Ἀ 
δύναμίς ἐστι ψυχῆς, καθ᾽ ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν. ἧς ἐστὶν 25 
ἔργα γεννῆσαι καὶ τροφῇ χρῆσθαι: φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν 
ἔργων τοῖς ζῶσιν, ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα ἣ τὴν γένε- 
> - ¥ \ a’ vd * > F ~ \ 
σιν αὐτομάτην ἔχει, TO πονῆσαι ἕτερον οἷον αὐτό, ζῷον μὲν 
ζῷον φ ‘ δὲ μά ~ FN ‘ vs θ ¢ a e 
wov, φυτὸν ὃὲ φυτόν, ἱνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ TOU θείου μετέχωσιν ἢ 
δύνανται" πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πράττει 415Ὁ 
μέ ΄ ‘ ; ‘ > " τ ΄ Ὰ ᾿ Ἂν ‘ 
ὅσα πράττει κατὰ φύσιν. τὸ δ᾽ οὗ ἕνεκα διττόν, τὸ μὲν οὗ, τὸ 

πὶ ἴω ων »Ὁῳ ~ 
δὲ ᾧ. ἐπεὶ οὖν κοινωνεῖν ἀδυνατεῖ TOU ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου TH συν- 

΄ ‘ Ν \ 2 2 "Ἂ a > A ‘ 
εχείᾳ, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν φθαρτῶν ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν 
ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν, ἦἧ δύναται μετέχειν ἕκαστον, κοινωνεῖ κ 

8, ἐλάχιστον SUVWX, ἐλάχιστα etiam Philop. Soph. || διάνοιαν, οἷον ὁ (δ tan. E 
at Soph.) ἄνθρωπος Fre (ἢ εἴ τι Soph.) τοιοῦτον ἄλλο ὑπάρχει. οἷς Wy εἴ a prima manu 
margo Τὰ (Trend.) et Soph. || ri. ταύτη μόνον SUX, ταύτῃ μόνῃ Them. Philop. Soph. ἡ 
15. τί ἐστιν om. SUX, leg. Them. Simpl. Philop. || 16. ἢ καὶ SUX Bek. ‘Trend., ἢ 
om. Simpl. Soph. Torst. || (8. πρότεραι] πρότερον STUVWX Bek. Trend., πρότεραι 
KX. (Trend. Bus.) y Them. Soph. Torst. Kelger in ed. alt. Trend. [| 20. var om. BE 
Soph. || 8 ante ἔτι omnes codd., insertum E (Trend.) {| a1. de? τεθ, om. W, leg. 
Philop. Soph., ded τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν post τεθεωρηκέναι transponenda esse censet Christ ἢ 
23. γενέσεως I’, καὶ γεννήσεως deleri vult Essen, progr. Stargard 1864, p. 23. {f 
24. καὶ ante τοῖς om. V, ante wp. om. UVXy ἢ 25. as] ols VW, ἧς etiam Them. 
Philop. Soph. || 26. γεννῆσαί re καὶ W, etiam Philop. Soph. ij χρήσασθαι STU VX 
Soph. Trend., χρῆσθαι Philop. ad hune locum et ad 4164, τ (279, 1) 1 φυσικώτερον E 
(Trend.) et pr. y, φυσικώτατον etiam Simpl. Philop. Seph. ff 27. ζώοις SX, ζῶσι Them. 

CHS. 3, 4 415 a 8—q415bD 5 63 

Lastly and most rarely, they have the reasoning faculty and 
thought. For those perishable creatures which possess reason are 
endowed with all the other species of soul, but not all those which 
possess each of the other faculties have reason. Indeed, some of 
them have not even imagination, while others live by imagination 
alone. As for the speculative intellect, it calls for a separate 
discussion. Meanwhile it is clear that an account of the several 
faculties is at the same time the most appropriate account of 

The enquirer who approaches this subject must ascertain what 4 
Order of each of these faculties is before he proceeds to investigate 
procedure. the questions next in order and so forth. But if we are 
asked to state what each of these is; that is to say, what the cogni- 
tive, sensitive and nutritive faculties respectively are, we must begin 
by stating what the act of thinking is and what the act of sensation 
is. For activities and functions are logically prior to faculties. 
But, if so, and if a study of the correlative objects should have 
preceded, these objects will for the same reason have to be defined 
first: I mean, nutriment and the sensible and intelligible. Con- 2 
sequently we have first to treat of nutriment and of generation. 

The nutritive soul belongs to other living things as well as 
man, being the first and most widely distributed faculty, in virtue 
of which all things possess life. Its functions are repro- 

The teleo- : . . ._ 
logical duction and assimilation of nutriment. For it is the 
aspect of . . .ν, . . 

repro- most natural function in all living things, if perfect 

and not defective or spontaneously generated, to repro- 
duce their species; animal producing animal and plant plant, in 
order that they may, so far as they can, share in the eternal and 
the divine. For it is that which all things yearn after, and that is 
the final cause of all their natural activity. Here final cause is an 
ambiguous term, which denotes either the purpose for which, or 
the person for whom, a thing is done. Since, then, individual 
things are incapable of sharing continuously in the eternal and 
the divine, because nothing in the world of perishables can abide 
numerically one and the same, they partake in the eternal and 

Philop. Soph. {| 28. αὐτόματον 5 Ὁ W Soph., αὐτομάτην Them. Simpl]. Philop. || 29. μετέ- 
χουσιν E (Trend.) et U Soph. v.1. (μετέχωσιν e codd. Hayduck, 57, 1), μετέχωσιν 
etiam Them. Philop. || 415 Ὁ, 1. καὶ ἐκείνου TU V W et E (Bus.) Them., κἀκείνον reliqui 
ante Biehlium omnes, etiam Soph. || 2. post φύσιν et post 3. @, pro vulg. punctis, cola 
posuit Rodier || τὸ δ᾽ οὗ...3. @ unc. incl. Trend. (cf. Ὁ, 20), leg. haec verba hoc loco 
Them. Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 3. ἐπεὶ οὖν...τῇ συνεχείᾳ] καθόσον δύναται" δύναται δὲ τῇ 
συνεχείᾳ μόνῃ in interpr. Them. 50, 19 || 4. τὸ αὐτὸ SUX Soph., ταὐτὸ Them. | 
5. ταύτη κοινωνεῖ SUX Them. 

64. DE ANIMA II CH. 4 

) > μὲν parr ) δ᾽ ἧττον: καὶ διαμέ IK αὐτὸ 
ταύτῃ, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον τὸ δ᾽ ἧττο at διαμένει οὐκ αὐτὸ 
3 3 ee Yr a > ΝᾺ ᾿ 3 Ψ ¥ > ᾿ 
ἀλλ᾽ οἷον αὐτό, ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐχ ἕν, εἴδει δ᾽ ἕν. 
¥ \ ¢ Ἀ “ A ’ > # ‘\ 3 ? “~ 
83 ἔστι δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος αἰτία Kal ἀρχή. ταῦτα 
᾿ A / c , 29 ¢ Ν \ ‘ ΄ 
δὲ πολλαχῶς λέγεται. ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ τοὺς διωρισμένους 
τρόπους τρεῖς αἰτία: καὶ γὰρ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις αὐτή, καὶ οὗ τὸ 
ἕνεκα, καὶ ὧς ἡ οὐσία τῶν ἐμψύχων σωμάτων ἡ ψυχὴ 
4 αἰτία. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ws οὐσία, δῆλον" τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι 
“A ς 3 f ἈΝ Ἁ ΜᾺ a ἰοὺ ‘ > / 3 > ¢ ‘ 
πᾶσιν ἡ οὐσία, τὸ δὲ ζῆν τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ εἶναί ἐστιν, αἰτία δὲ 
ν΄ 9 \ , ς ΄ ¥ a ϑ ΄ ¥ , ε 
καὶ ἀρχὴ τούτου ἡ ψυχή. ἔτι τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος λόγος ἡ 
> / ‘ δ᾽ ¢ Ν ® ¢ ς \ > “Ζ 
5 ἐντελέχεια. φανερὸν ὡς καὶ οὐ ἕνεκεν ἡ ψυχὴ atria: 
ὥσπερ γὰρ ὃ νοῦς ἕνεκά TOV ποιεῖ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ 
φύσις, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν αὐτῆς τέλος. τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἡ 
ψυχὴ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν: πάντα γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα τῆς 
ψυχῆς ὄργανα, καὶ καθάπερ τὰ τῶν ζῴων, οὕτω καὶ τὰ 
“ am [1 Ψ a ΤᾺ » ΜᾺ \ XN κυ 
τῶν φυτῶν, ὡς ἕνεκα τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντα. διττῶς δὲ τὸ οὗ 20 
6 ἕνεκα, τό τε οὗ καὶ τὸ ᾧ. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅθεν πρῶτον ἡ 
κατὰ τόπον κίνησις, ψνχή. οὐ πᾶσι δ᾽ ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῶσιν 
ε δύ ¥ ¥ δὲ ‘\ λλ - ‘ ἂν * 
ἡ δύναμις αὕτη. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀλλοίωσις Kal αὔξησις κατὰ 
/ £ Ν Ν ¥ 2 ? 4 > ~ > 
ψυχήν: ἡ μὲν yap αἴσθησις ἀλλοίωσίς τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, ai- 
, > 302 λ ἃ Ν , ΄ ε ’ ‘ Ν ‘ > 
σθάνεται δ᾽ οὐθὲν ὃ μὴ μετέχει ψυχῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ av- 
ξήσεώς τε καὶ φθίσεως ἔχει. οὐδὲν γὰρ φθίνει οὐδ᾽ αὔξεται 
ΤᾺ ‘ - 
φυσικῶς μὴ τρεφόμενον, τρέφεται δ᾽ οὐθὲν ὃ μὴ κοινωνεῖ 
“ 2. Ἵ a > ? ΤᾺ ¥ ra 4 \ 
7 Cans. ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς δ᾽ οὐ καλῶς εἴρηκε τοῦτο, προστιθεὶς τὴν 
αὔξησιν συμβαίνειν τοῖς φυτοῖς κάτω μὲν συρριζουμένοις 
Ν ‘ Ν ΓᾺ Y ΄ ‘ , ¥ ‘ ‘ 
διὰ τὸ THY γῆν οὕτω φέρεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν, ἄνω δὲ διὰ τὸ 416a 
ἴω € / ¥ ‘ x » % - ΄-, # 
πῦρ ὡσαύτως. οὔτε yap TO ἄνω Kal κάτω καλῶς λαμβά- 
νει" οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ τῷ παντί, 
3 > « ξ Ἀ ων , 7 ε ef “~ ~ 
ἀλλ᾽ as ἡ κεφαλὴ τῶν ζῴων, οὕτως αἱ ῥίζαι τῶν uray, 




7. post δ᾽ ἕν addit διόπερ τὸ σπέρμα τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν φυτῶν ὄργανόν ἐστι τῆς 
ψνχῆς T, οἵ singulis verbis mutatis vel omissis VX Um, apud veteres commentatores 
practer Sophoniam nullum huius additamenti vestigium {| 8. ἔστε δὲ,..χ8. ζωῆς num 
ab Ar. seripta fuerint dubitat Susemihl, Ocecon., p. 84, et ne sequentia quidem 
aS. "Humedoxdijs...416a, 18 ὕλης satis conexa esse cum praecerentibus et sequentilus 
opinatur {| g. duws SUWX, ὁμοίως etiam Them. Philop. || siypyudvovs SU et pr. 
X, διωρισμένους Them. Vhilop. 273, 9 || to. αὐτῇ unc. inclusit Biehl, αὐτῇ FS, 
αὕτη Rodier, αὐτή reliqui omnes || 11. 4 ante οὐσία om. UX || 13. αἴτεον E, αἰτίᾳ 
etiam Philop. Soph. {| 14. τούτου EF. fol. 1 τὸ (vid. append.) ἢ Soph. 58, 31 et, ut videtur, 
Simpl. rrr, 13 Philop. 471, 34. 37- 273) 19 Sq,, recepit Rocdier, ceteri et scripti et 
impressi τούτων || rod ἐν Bur. SUX, ἐν om. Simpl. || 15. ἕνεκα STUVWX Soph. ἢ 
16. νοεῖ ES TV, ποιεῖ etiam Philop. Soph. {| 17. αὐτῇ UV WX Soph. Bek. Trend, 

CH. 4 415 Ὁ 6—416a 4 65 

divine, each in the only way it can, some more, some less. That is 
to say, each persists, though not in itself, yet in a representative 
which is specifically, not numerically, one with it. 

Now the soul is cause and origin of the living body. But cause 3 
Digression and origin are terms used in various senses: accord- 
on the sou! ingly soul is cause in the three senses of the word 
fold cause. already determined. For the soul is the cause of 
animate bodies as being in itself the origin of motion, as final 
cause and as substance. Clearly it is so as substance, substance 4 
being the cause of all existence. And for living things existence 
means life, and it is the soul which is the cause and origin of life. 
Furthermore, actuality is the notidm or forn’ of that which has -- 
potential existence. Manifestly, too, the soul is final cause. For 5 
nature, like intelligence, acts for a purpose, and this purpose is 
for it an end. Such an end the soul is in animals, and this in the 
order_of nature, for all the natural bodies are instruments of soul: 
and this is as true of the bodies of plants as of those of animals, 
shewing that all are means to the soul as end; where end has two 
senses, the purpose for which and the person for whom. Moreover, 6 
the soul is also the origin of motion from place to place, but not 
all living things have this power of locomotion. Qualitative change, 
also, and growth are due to soul. For sensation is supposed to bea 
sort of qualitative change, and nothing devoid of soul has sensation. 
The same holds of growth and decay. For nothing undergoes 
natural decay or growth except it be nourished, and nothing is 
nourished unless it shares in life. 

Empedocles is mistaken in adding that in plants, in so far as 7 
Error of they strike their roots downwards, growth takes place 
Empe- because the earth in them has a natural tendency in 
docles. . . . . 

this direction and that, when they shoot upwards, it 
is because the fire in them has a similar tendency upwards. He 
is wrong in his view of up and down. For up and down are not the 
same for all individuals as for the universe. On the contrary, the 
roots of plants correspond to the heads of animals, if we are to 

αὐτῆς etiam Philop. Torst. || 18. καὶ ante κατὰ φύσιν excepto U omnes codd., om. 
Trend., unc. incl. Torst., καὶ leg. etiam Simpl. Soph. || scripsisse Arist. ἔμψυχα σώματα, 
suspicatur Torst. || 20. διττῶς...21. @ leg. haec νεῦρα hoc loco etiam Simpl. Philop. 
Soph. || 25. ψυχὴν ἔχει SU X Them. Soph., ἔχει ψυχήν W Bek. Trend., μετέχει ψυχῆς 
ETYV Torst. || 26. αὐξάνεται TVX, αὔξεται etiam Them. Philop. || 27. μετέχει ψυχῆς ΝΥ, 
μετέχει ξωῆς Philop., κοινωνεῖ ζωῆς Them. Simpl. Soph. || 28. post τοῦτο virg. om. Diels || 
προσθέσει coni. Karsten, Emped., p. 454 || 29- ῥιζουμένων SUV WX, ῥιζουμένοις T 
Soph., verbum simplex etiam Them. || 416 a, 3. τὸ αὐτὸ E (Bus.) Them. Simpl. Philop. 
Torst., ταὐτὸ reliqui, etiam Soph. || kal τῷ παντί unc. incl. Susemihl. 

H. 5 


3 ‘ Α ¥ , v4 ‘ > N “ μὴ 
εἰ χρὴ τὰ ὄργανα λέγειν ἕτερα καὶ ταὐτὰ τοῖς ἔργοις. 5 
,) ΝᾺ 
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τί τὸ συνέχον εἰς τἀναντία φερόμενα τὸ πῦρ 
ΜᾺ , » ‘ 
καὶ τὴν γῆν; διασπασθήσεταν yap, εἰ μή TL ἔσται TO κω- 
λύον-: εἰ δ᾽ ἔσται, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ αὐὖ- 
8 ξάνεσθαι καὶ τρέφεσθαι. δοκεῖ δέ τισιν ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς φύσις 
ῪΝᾺ ΜᾺ “~ > ων 
ἁπλῶς αἰτία τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως εἶναι" καὶ γὰρ το 
nw “~ , 
αὐτὸ φαίνεται μόνον τῶν σωμάτων ἢ τῶν στοιχείων τρεφό- 
“~ \ ἴω 
μενον καὶ αὐξόμενον. διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς 
rd ε ᾽ “ἃ, ~ 5 ‘\ > , ‘ δὲ 
ζῴοις ὑπολάβοι τις ἂν τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἐργαζόμενον. τὸ δὲ 
συναίτιον μέν πώς ἐστιν, οὐ μὴν amas γε αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ 
a) ε f € “A Ν a Ν Ὗ > Ἂν 
μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχή: ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ πυρὸς αὔξησις εἰς ἄπει- 
ρον, ἕως ἂν ἢ τὸ καυστόν, τῶν δὲ φύσει συνισταμένων πάν- 
των ἐστὶ πέρας καὶ λόγος μεγέθους τε καὶ αὐξήσεως" ταῦτα 
δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πυρός, καὶ λόγου μᾶλλον ἢ ὕλης. 
9 ‘ > € 9 Ν - 7 nn ‘ ‘N la 
9 ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ αὐτὴ δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς θρεπτικὴ Kal γεννητική, 
Ά, Ν ΡᾺ 9 on ΄ o~ > ? \ 
καὶ περὶ τροφῆς ἀναγκαῖον διωρίσθαν πρῶτον" ἀφορίζεται yap 20 
΄ Ν ¥ , “ἊΨ " “ΟΡ κ᾿ Ps 
πρὸς TAS ἄλλας δυνάμεις τῷ ἔργῳ τούτῳ. δοκεῖ δ᾽ εἶναι ἡ 
“ x‘ 5 é ~ 3 f > ~ Ν 4 3 : YF nw 
τροφὴ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ, ov πᾶν δὲ παντί, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα τῶν 
3 ΄ 4 ἢ , 9 > ΄ Ὁ 5 ‘ ᾿ 
ἐναντίων μὴ μόνον γένεσιν ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἔχουσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ 
αὔξησιν: γίνεται γὰρ πολλὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πάντα 
, ῖ͵ € % 3 / , δ᾽ 10° > Ὁ » 
Toad, οἷον ὑγιὲς ἐκ κάμνοντος. φαΐνεται δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τὸν 25 
αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀλλήλοις εἶναν τροφή, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ 
a ‘ 4 ‘ Ν a 2 μὲ Ν 58 Ψ ‘ iy 
τῷ πυρὶ τροφή, τὸ δὲ πῦρ οὐ τρέφει τὸ ὕδωρ. ἐν μὲν οὖν 
ΡΝ e ra) ΄ ae > ny , Ἄ Ἀ 
τοῖς ἁπλοῖς σώμασι ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι δοκεῖ μάλιστα τὸ μὲν 
‘ \ μ᾿ , 2 ᾽ > »¥ % “ € 
τοτροφὴ τὸ δὲ τρεφόμενον. ἀπορίαν δ᾽ ἔχει" φασὶ yap ot 
4 ‘ πὰ ΝᾺ € f », rd ‘ ἃ / 
μὲν τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ τρέφεσθαι, καθάπερ καὶ αὐξά- 30 
“ ΄ ~~ 
νεσθαι, τοῖς δ᾽ ὥσπερ εἴπομεν τοὔμπαλιν δοκεῖ, TO ἐναντίον 
τῷ ἐναντίῳ, ὡς ἀπαθοῦς ὄντος τοῦ ὁμοίου ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου, 
τὴν δὲ τροφὴν μεταβάλλειν καὶ πέττεσθαι. ἡ δὲ μετα- 
‘ A > ~ 9 , a 5 , ν , 
Born πᾶσιν εἰς τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἢ τὸ μεταξύ. ἔτι πάσχει 
ε " ε » “~ , 3 > 2 om € Ἂς *~ 
TL ἡ τροφὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ TpEhopévov, ἄλλ᾽ οὐ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τῆς 35 



5 post ἔργοις addunt edit. Ald. et Basil.: τὸ 3° αὐτὸ λέγειν ὄργανον ᾧ ἂν F τὸ αὐτὸ 
ἔργον, quae fluxisse ¢ prima editione iudicat Torst., nihil huius additamenti habent 
veteres interpretes || 7. κωλῦσον SUV W Soph. Bek. Trend. || 11. ἢ τῶν στοιχείων une. 
incl. Torst., leg. haec verba omissis verbis τῶν σωμάτων ἢ Them. Simpl., Soph. habet 
τῶν σωμ. καὶ τῶν oroty. 50. 33 || 12. αὐξανόμενον SUV WX Them., αὐξόμενον ctiam 
Philop. Soph. || 1g. ἡ ante y. insert. Ἐς (BhI.), leg. Them. || 17. μεγέθους re cal] re om. 
TUVX, καὶ μογέϑους καὶ S Them, || 18. τῆς om. SU V WX Bek. Trend. Them. Soph. 

et, ut videtur, Philop. 278, 9 || 20. καὶ περὶ ET W, καὶ om. Philop, Them. Bek. Trend. 

CH. 4 4168 5—416a 35 67 

make identity and diversity of organs depend upon their functions. 
Besides, what is it that holds together the fire and the earth, 
tending, as they do, in opposite directions? For they will be rent 
asunder, unless there is something to prevent it: while, if there 
is, it is this which is the soul and the cause of growth and nourish- 

Some hold the nature of fire to be singly and solely the cause 8 
Fire not of nourishment and growth. For it would seem that fire 
the cause is the only body or element which of itself is nourished 

and grows. Hence fire might be supposed to be the 
operative cause, both in plants and animals. Whereas, though it is 
in a sense a joint cause, it is not a cause absolutely: it is rather the 
soul which is so. For fire goes on growing to infinity, as long 
as there is fuel to be consumed, but in natural wholes there is 
always a limit or proportion which determines growth and size. 
But this belongs to the soul and not to fire, to form rather than 
' to matter. 

The nutritive faculty of the soul being the same as the repro- 9 
ductive, it is necessary first to give a definition of fhitriment. For 
it is by the nutritive function that this faculty is separated off 
from the others. The common view is that contrary is nutriment 
to contrary; though not in every case, but wherever each 
of two contraries is not only generated by, but derives 
growth from, the other. For many things are derived from one 
another, but not all of them are quantities: thus the sick man 
becomes well. But it is found that even the contraries supposed 
to derive growth from each other are not fed by one another in the 
same way: while water serves to feed fire, fire is not nutriment 
to water. It would seem, then, that it is in the simple bodies 
above all that of two contraries one is nutriment and the other 
is nourished. Yet here is a difficulty. It is said by the one τὸ 
side that like is nourished by, as well as derives its growth from, 
like; while the others, again, as we explained, hold that con- 
trary is nourished by contrary, on the ground that like cannot be 
affected by like, while food undergoes change and is digested. 
Now change is always in the direction of the opposite, or of the 
intermediate state. Further, nutriment is acted upon by that 
which it nourishes, and not the latter by the former: just as 

Torst. || διορίσαι UW Soph., διορίσασθαι y Them., διωρίσθαι etiam Philop. || 23. γέννησιν 
E, γένεσιν Soph. et, ut videtur, Them. κι, 30 || 24. πάντα om. SU Xy et corr. E | 
25. wood om. U W, in rasura E (Trend.) || 28. ἄλλοις 5 Ὁ X Philop., ἁπλοῖς etiam Soph. || 
32. ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου om. EW, tuentur Them. Philop. || 34. τὸ post ἢ insert. E (Stapf.), 
καὶ τὸ Them. codd. (ex Arist. corr. ἢ τὸ Heinze) Philop. 


5-- 2 


A Ψ 3 3 ε 3 3 4 
τροφῆς, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ὁ τέκτων ὑπὸ τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἐκεί- 416b 
5 > ’ 3 
vou αὕτη" ὃ δὲ τέκτων μεταβάλλει μόνον εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐξ 
A a 
τι ἀργίας. πότερον δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ τροφὴ τὸ τελευταῖον προσγινό- 
= 4 ἊΝ » ὃ 7 > δ᾽ ¥ IAA. ε 
μενον ἢ τὸ πρῶτον, ἔχει διαφοράν. εἰ ἄμφω, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ 
Ἄ, , A 
μὲν ἄπεπτος ἢ δὲ πεπεμμένη, ἀμφοτέρως ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τὴν 5 
τροφὴν λέγειν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἄπεπτος, τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναν- 
- 4 ld \ Ψ ~ e [4 Ly 
τίῳ τρέφεται, ἡ δὲ πεπεμμένη, τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ. WOTE 
‘ 5 “~ A 
φανερὸν ὅτι λέγουσί τινα τρόπον ἀμφότεροι καὶ ὀρθῶς καὶ 
5 ΕἸ ἴω 3 Ν 3 > A , \ ? Ἂ \ ¥ 
12 οὐκ ὀρθῶς. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὐθὲν τρέφεται μὴ μετέχον ζωῆς, τὸ ἐμ- 
A Ὄ ν Ν 
ψυχον ἂν εἴη σῶμα τὸ τρεφόμενον, ἡ ἔμψυχον, ὥστε Kat 10 
ε ‘ . »"» , 5 \ 5 Ν ΄ ¥ 
13 ἡ τροφὴ πρὸς ἔμψυχόν ἐστι καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἔστι 
δ᾽ ἕτερον τροφῇ καὶ αὐξητικῷ εἶναι: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποσόν τι 
Ἀ » 3 ’ἤ Koy ‘ , A > id ,ἤ 
τὸ ἔμψυχον, αὐξητικόν, ἢ δὲ τόδε TL καὶ οὐσία, τροφή᾽ 
σώζει γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ μέχρι τούτον ἐστὶν ἕως ἂν 
τρέφηται" καὶ γενέσεως ποιητικόν, οὐ τοῦ τρεφομένου, ἀλλ᾽ 
a ‘ 7) »Ὰ ? 3 3 Δ ε > ‘a “A 3 
οἷον τὸ τρεφόμενον᾽ ἤδη γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία, γεννᾷ ὃ 
S/N > A ε di 3 Ν 7 Ψ Ψ e A 7 ΤᾺ 
οὐθὲν αὐτὸ ἑαυτό, ἀλλὰ cole. ὠσθ᾽ ἡ μὲν τοιαύτη τῆς 
ῪΝᾺ 5 \ vd , 3 Ψ 4 Ν ¥ 9 \ i) 
ψυχῆς ἀρχὴ δύναμίς ἐστιν ola σώζειν τὸ ἔχον αὐτὴν ἢ 
τοιοῦτον, ἡ δὲ τροφὴ παρασκευάζει ἐνεργεῖν. διὸ στερηθὲν 
A > ? Oy 3 “ x 5 ‘ ΄ Ν, ld 
14 τροφῆς ov δύναται εἶναι. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τρία, τὸ τρεφόμενον 20 
A @ la ‘ Ν - \ \ , > A ς 
καὶ ᾧ τρέφεται καὶ τὸ τρέφον, τὸ μὲν τρέφον ἐστὶν ἡ 
, , \ Se , ν ἡ , A @ 
πρώτη ψυχή. TO O€ τρεφόμενον TO ἔχον ταύτην σῶμα, ᾧ 
x. 3 ε 4 3 Ν ‘ > Ἀ a) , Ψ 
15 δὲ τρέφεται, ἡ τροφή. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους ἅπαντα 
προσαγορεύειν δίκαιον, τέλος δὲ τὸ γεννῆσαι οἷον αὐτό, 

¥ «ἡ ¢ / ‘ ‘ Φ 5. 2 ¥ Ν ® ᾽ 
16 εἴη ἂν ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ γεννητικὴ οἷον αὐτό. ἔστι δὲ ᾧ τρέ. 25 



f 9 N & ΝᾺ Α ξ ‘\ ‘ “ 
φεται διττόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ᾧ κυβερνᾷ, καὶ ἢ χεὶρ καὶ τὸ πη- 
δ A Ν 
δάλιον, τὸ μὲν κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον, τὸ δὲ κινούμενον «μόνον». 


416 Ὁ, 3. προσκρινόμενον in interpr. Them. Philop., προσγινόμενον etiam Soph. | 
11. πρὸς τὸ ἔμψ, Them. Simpl., post ἔμψυχον addendum ἢ ἔμψυχον aut καὶ delendum 
censet Susemihl || 12. τροφὴ E Soph. v. 1. (τροφῇ e codd. Elayduck 62, 6), τροφῇ etiam 
Them. || 14. ἂν καὶ τρέφηι TW, ἂν τρέφῃ E (Stapf.), ἂν τρέφηται P Soph., ἂν τρέφῃ y, 
vulgo ἂν καὶ τρέφηται || 15. γεννήσεως ES Soph., γενέσεως etiam Them. Philop. || post 
ποιητικόν virgulam posuit Torst. {| 16. αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία ST VWX Soph., ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ 
Philop., αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία Ἐ Ὁ vet. transl. Bek. Trend., Them. interpretatur τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστιν, 
unc. incl. haec verba Torst. || 17. αὐτὸ om. ἘΞ (Trend.) εἰ TV W, leg. Philop. Soph. { 
18. ἔχον etiam Philop. Soph., δεχόμενον E Wy || 22. ταύτην TXy et E (Bus.) et, ut 
videtur, Them. 53, 19, αὐτὴν reliqui ante Biehlium omnes, etiam Philop. Soph. | 
23. ἐπεὶ δὲ...25. αὐτό collocanda esse ante 20 ἐπεὶ censet Torst., eodem loco, quo 
vulgata, haec verba legerunt Them. Philop. Soph. || 25. γεννητικὸν EST WX, 
γεννητικὴ etiam Soph. || rpépe Ty et, ut videtur, Them. 53, 26, τρέφεται etiam Soph. ἢ 

CH. 4 ΑΙΘΌ 1—416b 27 69 

the carpenter is not affected by his material, but on the contrary 
the material by the carpenter. The carpenter merely passes to 
activity from inaction. But it makes a difference whether by 
nutriment we mean the final, or the primary, form of what is 
added. If both are nutriment, the one as undigested, the other as 
digested, it will be possible to use the term nutriment in conformity 
with both theories. For, in so far as it is undigested, contrary is 
nourished by contrary: and, in so far as it is digested, like by like. 
So that clearly both sides are in a manner partly right and partly 
wrong. But, since nothing is nourished unless it possesses life, 
that which is nourished must be the animate body as such: so that 
nutriment also is relative to the animate being which it nourishes: 
and this not incidentally merely. 

There is, however, a difference between nutritivity and con- 
ducivity to growth. In so far as the animate thing is 
quantitative, what is taken promotes growth; in so far 
as it is a definite individual, what is taken nourishes. For the 
animate thing preserves its substance or essential nature and exists 
as long as it is nourished: and it causes the production, not of that 
which is nourished, but of another individual like it. Its essential 
nature already exists, and nothing generates itself, it only main- 
tains its existence. Hence the above described principle of the 
soul is the power to preserve in existence that which possesses it 
in so far as it is a definite individual, while nutrition prepares it 
for activity. Therefore it cannot live when deprived of nutriment. 
There are, then, these three things, that which is nourished, that 
with which it is nourished, and that which nourishes it. The last 
of the three is the primary soul, that which is nourished is the 
body which contains the soul, that wherewith it is nourished is 
nutriment. As, however, it is right to name all things from the 
end they subserve, and the end here is reproduction of the species, 
the primary soul is that which is capable of reproducing the 
species. That with which the living thing is nourished may be 
Vital heat understood in two senses, just as that with which one 
and nutri- steers may mean the hand or the rudder; the former, the 
ment hand, both causing motion and being moved, the latter, 


26. καὶ ante ᾧ om. SUWX || καὶ ἡ χεὶρ EVy, καὶ om. reliqui et scripti et ante 
Biehlium impressi omnes, leg. Simpl. et sine dubio Them., qui interpretatur τῇ 
τε χειρὶ καὶ || 27. κινούμενον <pdvov>] κινούμενον E sine rasura (Trend.) Rodier, 
reliqui codd. κινοῦν μόνον, etiam Simtpl. Alex., teste Philopono, vet. transl., Bek. Trend. 
Torst., κιγούμενον μόνον, ut videtur, Them. 53, 30 8qq., κινούμενον μόνον interpretatur 
Philop., κινούμενον μόνως Soph., κινούμενον μόνον defendit etiam Dittenberger p. 1613. 



7ο DE ANIMA II CHS. 4, 5 

ΜᾺ 4 5 - 
πᾶσαν δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον τροφὴν δύνασθαι πέττεσθαι, ἐργάζεται 
\ “Ὁ ¥ ¥ ? 
δὲ τὴν πέψιν τὸ Oeppov: διὸ πᾶν ἔμψυχον ἔχει θερμότητα. 
» » 3 
τύπῳ μὲν οὖν ἡ τροφὴ τί ἐστιν εἴρηται: διασαφητέον δ᾽ 30 
A ~ 3 Δ ? 
ἐστὶν ὕστερον περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις λόγοις. 
al ‘ - > 
5 δΔιωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λέγωμεν κοινῇ περὶ πάσης αἰ- 
“~ ΜᾺ a “ ᾽ 
σθήσεως. ἡ δ᾽ αἴσθησις ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ πάσχειν 
, 7 » . ὃ ΜᾺ ‘ AX , ? ον 
συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴρηται' δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀλλοίωσίς rus εἷ- 
A / 
vat. φασὶ δέ τινες Kat τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πάσχειν. 35 
A Q A \ a ὃ , 3. 4 3 a Abr 
τοῦτο δὲ πῶς δυνατὸν ἢ ἀδύνατον, εἰρήκαμεν ἐν τοῖς καθόλου 417A 
~ ΜᾺ > / “ cd 

2 λόγοις περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν. ἔχει δ᾽ ἀπορίαν διὰ τί 

‘ an 3 , 7 A > [4 » θ ‘ ὃ Ν / 
καὶ Tov αἰσθήσεων αὐτῶν ov γίνεται αἴσθησις, Kat διὰ τί 

A ΜᾺ » \ ~ ‘ 
ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω ov ποιοῦσιν αἴσθησιν, ἐνόντος πυρὸς καὶ γῆς καὶ 
A ΕἾ 4 ® 3 \ ε 3» θ θ᾽ {ΠΝ Δ ‘ 
Tov ἄλλων στοιχείων, ὧν ἐστὶν ἢ αἰσθησις καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ἢ τὰ: 
f , on Ss Ψ Ν 5 θ \ > ¥ 

συμβεβηκότα τούτοις. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν 
3 rd 9 Ν ὃ , / ὃ ‘ A / \ \ > 
ἐνεργείᾳ, ἀλλα δυνάμει μόνον. διὸ καθάπερ τὸ κανστὸν οὗ 
καίεται αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἄνευ τοῦ καυστικοῦ! ἔκαιε γὰρ ἂν 
δ ? ‘ 3 Δλὰ 3 μω ~ 53 * Ν » > ~ 
ἑαυτό, καὶ οὐθὲν édetro τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ πυρὸς ὄντος. ἐπειδὴ 
δὲ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγομεν διχῶς (τό τε γὰρ δυνάμει ἀκοῦον 10 
καὶ ὁρῶν ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν λέγομεν, κἂν τύχῃ καθεῦδον, καὶ 
. ἋΚῪ 9 A κ᾿ a , \ ε ¥ e \ 
τὸ ἤδη ἐνεργοῦν), διχῶς ἂν λέγοιτο καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, ἡ μὲν 
ε 4 € \ ε 3 ’ ε 7 δὲ ‘ Ν 2 [ᾳ 
ὧς δυνάμει, ἡ δὲ ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνε- 

3 σθαι, τό τε δυνάμει ὃν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὡς 
τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν 15 
λέγωμεν: καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις ἐνέργειά τις, ἀτελὴς μώ- 
τοι, καθάπερ ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρηται. πάντα δὲ πάσχει καὶ κινεῦται 
ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος. διὸ ἔστι μὲν ὧς ὑπὸ τοῦ 
ὁμοίου πάσχει, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνομοίου, καθάπερ εἴπο.-. 
μεν" πάσχει μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, πεπονθὸς δ᾽ ὅμοιόν ἔστιν. 20 

82. λέγομεν VWX Them. Soph., λέγωμεν etiam Alex. ἀπ. καὶ No. 82, 23 || 33- rej 
τι STWX et sine dubio Them. Simpl. Marchl, Arist. Tierseele, De 17, 3» TL TO 
αἰσθητήριον V, Alex. variat, 1. 1. p. 82, 27 et 86, 20 τι, sed p- 86, 5 τε ll 4178» 1. εἴρηται 
V, εἴρηται μὲν Simpl. Philop. ad hunc locum et Alex. ap. Philop., εἴρηται μὲν καὶ S et κα 
417 a, 14. Philop., εἰρήκαμεν καὶ T WX, reliqui εἰρήκαμεν, etiam, ut videtur, Soph. 63, 23 {] 
καὶ ἐν STU WX Il 2. post πάσχειν Alex. ap. Philop. tradit ferri etiam lectionem : 
λεκτέον δὲ καὶ νῦν, quod additamentum fort. leg. et Them. et Soph., non leg. Simpl. 
Philop. || 3. οὐ post 2. τ SUX ῃ 4. αἰσθήσεις SUX || 7. διὸ om. VW, leg. Philop. ack 
417 Ὁ, 16. || καθάπερ] καὶ καθάπερ U, οὐκ αἰσθάνεται καθάπερ TX, καθάπερ οὐκ alo θάν «τας 
S || 8. καθ᾽ ἑαντὸ E Torst., ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ S Them., ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ U V, καθ᾽ αὑτὸ etiam Soph. {} 

9. αὑτό UX || το. τὸ αἰσθανόμενον Soph. || ἀκοῦον καὶ ὁρῶν omnes codd., etiam E 
(Trend. et, Torstrikio teste, Bek.) || 13. δύναμις et ἐνέργεια P || ὁμοίως... 14. ἐνεργείᾳ, que 

CHS. 4, 5 416 b 28—417 a 20 71 

the rudder, being simply moved. Now it is necessary that all food 
should be capable of digestion, and digestion is promoted by heat ; 
this explains why every animate thing has warmth. This, then, 
is an outline of what nutriment is. It must be more clearly 
defined hereafter in the discussion devoted specially to it. 

Now that these points have been determined, let us proceed 5 

to a general discussion of all sensation. As above 
remarked, sensation consists in being moved and acted 
upon, for it is held to be a species of qualitative change. Some 
add that like is in fact acted upon by like. How far this is 
possible or impossible we have explained in the general discussion 


of action and passivity. The question arises why there is no 2 

sensation of the senses themselves: that is, why they produce no 
sensation apart from external sensibles, though the senses contain 
fire, earth and the other elements, which are the objects of sensation 
either in themselves or through their attributes. Evidently it 
Sensation follows that the faculty of sensible perception exists not 
fal ae in activity, but only in potentiality. Hence it must be 
tual. here as with the fuel which does not burn of and in 
itself without something to make it burn; otherwise it would 
kindle itself and would have no need of the fire which is actually 
existent. Now to have sensation has two meanings: we use the 
terms hearing and ‘seeing “of that which has the capacity to hear 
and see, even though it be at the time asleep, just as we do of 
that which already actually hears and sees. And therefore sensa- 
tion, too, will have two meanings: it may mean either potential 
or actual sensation. Similarly with having sensation, whether 
potential or actual. 

Let us then first proceed on the assumption that to be acted 3 

Agent ana Upon or moved is identical with active operation. For 
patient. movement is in fact active operation of some sort, 
though incomplete, as we have elsewhere explained. But in 
every case things are acted upon and moved by an agent in 
actual operation. It follows that in one sense what is acted upon 
is acted upon by what is like it, in another sense by what is unlike 
it, as we have explained. That is to say, while being acted upon it 
is unlike, after it has been ‘acted upon it is like the agent. 

Trend. suspecta videntur, unc. incluserunt Biehl Rodier, αἰσθητόν pro αἰσθάνεσθαι scripsit 
Torst. ex Alex. ἀπ. καὶ Nic. 83, 6, probat Brentano, die Psych. des Arist. 141, recepit etiam 
Rodier, totum hunc locum leg. etiam Them. Philop. vet. transl., defendit Barco, Aristotele, 
dell’ anima vegetativa e.sensitiva p. 43 || 15. post πάσχειν addendum re censet Susemihl || 

τοῦ ante ἐνεργεῖν om. EV Wy Philop. Soph. || τό. λέγομεν STU WX y Simpl. Philop. 
Soph. || 17. wdvra,..20. ἔστιν secludenda censet Susemihl. 





4 διαιρετέον δὲ Kat περὶ δυνάμεως καὶ ἐντελεχείας" νῦν 
γὰρ ἁπλῶς λέγομεν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐπι- 
στῆμόν τι ὡς ἂν εἴποιμεν ἄνθρωπον ἐπιστήμονα, ὅτι ὁ 
ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐπιστημόνων καὶ ἐχόντων ἐπιστήμην" ἔστι δ᾽ 
Ξ ‘ 
as ἤδη λέγομεν ἐπιστήμονα τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν γραμματικήν" 5 2 
ἑκάτερος δὲ τούτων οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δυνατός ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ 
ὁ μὲν ὅτι τὸ γένος τοιοῦτον καὶ 7 ὕλη, ὁ δ᾽ ὅτι βουληθεὶς 
δυνατὸς θεωρεῖν, ἂν μή τι κωλύσῃ τῶν ἔξωθεν: ὁ δ᾽ ἤδη 
᾿ a 2 , Ὁ Ν , > , “ \ 
θεωρῶν, ἐντελεχείᾳ ὧν Kal κυρίως ἐπιστάμενος τόδε TO A. 
ἀμφότεροι μὲν οὖν οἱ πρῶτοι κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπιστήμονες, 30 
ἀλλ: ὁ μὲν διὰ μαθήσεως ἀλλοιωθεὶς καὶ πολλάκις ἐξ 
ἐναντίας μεταβαλὼν ἔξεως, ὁ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν 
~ ΝᾺ 4 
ἢ τὴν γραμματικήν, μὴ ἐνεργεῖν δ᾽ εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ἄλλον 417b 
4 3 ¥ 3 € ων > A Ν ᾽ 3 Ν Ν ‘\ 
5 τρόπον. οὐκ ἔστι δ᾽ ἁπλοῦν οὐδὲ TO πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ TO μὲν 
φθορά τις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίον, τὸ δὲ σωτηρία μᾶλλον τοῦ δυνά- 
¥ ε Ν, ~ 3 if ¥ Ν ε ’ Ψ € , 
μει ὄντος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος καὶ ὁμοίου οὕτως ὡς δύ- 
vapus ἔχει πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν: θεωροῦν γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ ἔχον 5 
Ἁ 9 ? y “Ὁ, 3 ¥ 2 ~ 3 > \ Ν ¢ 
τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὅπερ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι (Eis αὐτὸ yap ἡ 
> » ‘ > 3 , λ sd δ 3 ? 
ἐπίδοσις καὶ eis ἐντελέχειαν) ἢ ἕτερον γένος ἀλλοιώσεως. 
διὸ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέ 5 UY, ὃ ), ἀλλοιοῦ 
ς ἔχει λέγειν τὸ φρονοῦν, ὁταν Ppovy, ἀλλοιοῦ- 
ν 3Q\ \ 3 ’ Ψ 3 “ \ % > 
σθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ TOV οἰκοδόμον ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν 
εἰς ἐντελέχειαν ἄγον ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος κατὰ τὸ νοοῦν καὶ το 
~ > 7 9 3 c 6 6f > [4 ¥ a 
φρονοῦν ov διδασκαλίαν ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέραν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν δί- 
καιον: τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος μανθάνον καὶ λαμβάνον ἐπι- 
é € Ν ΜᾺ 9 ’, » Ν Ξε 9 ‘ 
στήμην ὑπὸ TOU ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος Kal διδασκαλικοῦ ἤτοι οὐδὲ 

21. νῦν μὲν γὰρ TW, μὲν om. Soph., οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς coni. Roeper in Philol. ΝΠ, 
Ῥ. 238 || 22. ἐλέγομεν coni. Torst., λέγομεν etiam Philop. Soph. || 23. εἴπωμεν 
ETUVWy, εἴποιμεν etiam Soph. || 24. καὶ τῶν ἐχ. SUX || 25. ἤδη hoc loco 
positum suspectum videtur Torst., defendit Wahlen, Arist. Aufsiitze II, p. 26 | 
26. éxdrepos...28. ἔξωθεν in parenth. Torst., quod vituperat Vahlen 1. 1. || 27. om. ἡ 
Simpl. 121, 19, leg. etiam Philop. Soph. || 28. κωλύῃ Simpl., κωλύσῃ etiam Philop. | 
τρίτος δ᾽ ὁ ἤδη e Soph. scripsit Torst., τρίτος δ᾽ habet etiam Them., sed haud dubie 
per interpretamentum, vulgatam defendit Vahlen 1. 1. || 29. post θεωρῶν virgulam 
Torst. || ἄλφα literis scriptum E (Trend.) |} 30. πρῶτοι unc. incl. Torst., tuentur 
Simpl. Soph. et sine dubio Them. 55, 24 || Torst. coni. ἀμφότεροι μὲν οὖν οἱ κατὰ 
δύναμιν ἐπιστήμονες ἐνεργείᾳ γίνονται ἐπιστήμονες, ἀλλ᾽, tuetur vulgatam etiam Soph. ἢ} 
82. pro αἴσθησιν coni. Torst. ἀριθμητικὴν, quod re vera habet Them., αἴσθησιν leg. 
Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 417 Ὁ, 4. virgulam post ὁμοίου (Bek. Trend.) delevit Torst. || 
5. γὰρ tuentur praeter omnes codd. Them. Simpl. Philop. Alex. ἀπ, καὶ λύσ. 80, 4. 
81, 11. 84, 7 || 6. τὴν om. SX Alex. 80, 4, leg. Them. Philop. Alex. 81, rr. 84, 7 | 
ἑαυτὸ X Soph., αὑτὸ Trend., probat Beare, Greek Theories, p. 234, adn. 2, αὐτὸ leg. 

CH. 5 417 a 21---417 Ὁ 13 73 

We must also draw a distinction in regard to the terms 4 
potentiality and actuality: at present we are using them without 
Twomean- qUalification. For instance, we may use the term wise, 

i f > - Φ . 
poten. firstly, in the sense in which we might speak of man 
tality as wise, because man is one of the genus of beings 

which are wise and have wisdom; secondly, in the sense in 
which we at once call the man wise who has learnt, say, 
grammar. Now of these two men each possesses the capacity, but 
in a different sense: the one because the genus to which he 
belongs, that is to say, his matter, is potentially wise; the other 
because he is capable, if he chose, of applying the wisdom he has 
acquired, provided there is nothing external to hinder. Whereas 
he who is at the moment exercising his wisdom is in actuality and 
is wise in the proper sense of the term: for example, he knows the 
A before him. Thus the first two are both potentially wise: the 
first becomes wise actually after he has undergone qualitative 
change through instruction and often after transition from the 
reverse condition; while in the latter case it is by another kind 
of transition that the man passes from the mere possession, with- 
out the use, of sensation or grammar to the use of it. 

To suffer or be acted upon, too, is a term of more than one 5 
meaning. Sometimes it means a sort of destruction by the 
and of contrary, sometimes it is rather a preservation of what 
beingacted is potentially existent by what is actually existent and 
“pew like it, so far as likeness holds of potentiality when 
compared with actuality. For it is by exercise of knowledge that 
the possessor of knowledge becomes such in actuality: and this 
either is no qualitative change (for the thing develops into its own 
nature and actuality), or else is qualitative change of a different sort. 
Hence it is not right to say that that which thinks undergoes 
change when it thinks, any more than that the builder undergoes 
change when he builds. That, then, which works the change from 
potential existence to actuality in a thinking and intelligent being 
should properly receive a different name and not be called in- 
struction : while that which learns and is brought from potential to 
actual knowledge by that which is in actuality and capable of 
instructing should either not be said to suffer or be acted upon at 

Simpl. Philop. Them. 55, 38. 28, 30. Alex. 81, 12. 84, τὸ || 9. τὸ μὲν...11. δίκαιον suspecta 
videntur Hayduckio, progr. Meldorf 1877, p. 11 || 10. Torst., cui assentitur Susemihl, 
coni. ἄγειν, leg. ἄγον Alex. 81, 15 et, ut videtur, Philop. 304, 6. 306, 2 || κατὰ unc. 
incl. Torst., leg. Alex. 81, 15 || 12. ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος unc. incl. Torst., tuentur Philop. 
Soph. Them. 28, 29 sq. || 13. Hayduck 1. 1. legendum esse censet: οὐδὲ τοῦτο πάσχειν. 

74 DE ANIMA II CHS. 5, 6 

» A A ’ > 9 
πάσχειν φατέον, [ὥσπερ εἴρηται,] ἢ δύο τρόπους εἶναι ἀλ- 
᾿ , Ν 
λοιώσεως, τήν τε ἐπὶ τὰς στερητικὰς διαθέσεις μεταβολὴν 
Ἀ \ > \ Ν Ψ \ Ν , “A δ᾽ 3 θ m e€ ‘ 
6 καὶ THY ἐπὶ τὰς ἕξεις Kal THY φύσιν. τοῦ δ᾽ αἰσθητικοῦ ἡ μεν 
Ν ~ ao [τὰ 4 
πρώτη μεταβολὴ γίνεται ὑπὸ τοῦ γεννῶντος, ὅταν δὲ yev- 
~ δ A 
νηθῇ, ἔχει ἤδη ὥσπερ ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι. καὶ 
ἴω a , 
τὸ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν δὲ ὁμοίως λέγεται τῷ θεωρεῖν: διαφέρει 
ἴω ΜᾺ ’ »Ὰ᾽ ‘\ € Ν 
δέ, ὅτι τοῦ μὲν τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἔξωθεν, TO ὁρατον 20 
‘ \ 3 , e , δὲ Ν ν᾿ λ ον ω 3 θ “ 
καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. 
» > ¢ ~ » εχ ε > 5 2 »ν θ ε 
αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἡ Kar ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις, ἡ 
A A 3 9. A , 9 an 
δ᾽ ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου: ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῇ πώς ἐστι TH 
» Ἁ “N ‘ 39 3 > OA ε 7 ᾽’ > - 
ψυχῇ. διὸ νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ, ὁπόταν βούληται, αἰσθά- 
9 3 3 3 3 “ > Ἂ ‘\ ε - A 3 θ 
νεσθαι δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπ᾿ αὐτῷ" ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τὸ αἰσθη- 25 
ἴσω “~ “~~ ~ 3 
τόν. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔχει κἄν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ταῖς τῶν αἱ- 
ων Ά Ν \ > AN > 7 “4 ‘“ > ‘ ΝᾺ 3 
σθητῶν, καὶ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι τὰ αἰσθητὰ τῶν καθ 



ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων διασα- 

» φῆσαι καιρὸς γένοιτ᾽ ἂν καὶ εἰσαῦθις. νῦν δὲ διωρίσθω 
τοσοῦτον, ὅτι οὐχ ἅπλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ δυνάμει λεγομένου, 30 
3 Ν [οὶ Ν Y a ¥ \ τὸ ὃ ; θ 
ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰποιμὲν τὸν Tala ὀύνασθαι 
στρατηγεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ὡς τὸν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ὄντα, οὕτως ἔχει τὸ 
αἰσθητικόν. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἀνώνυμος αὐτῶν ἡ διαφορά, διώρισται 4188 
δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ὅτι ἕτερα καὶ πῶς ἕτερα, χρῆσθαι ἀναγκαῖον τῷ 

, ‘ 3 ΜᾺ € a > # Ν 3 > 
πάσχειν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ὡς κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν. τὸ δ᾽ αἰσθη- 

\ 5 4 > Ν Ὄ \ > Ἁ ¥ 3 - , 
τικὸν δυνάμει ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχείᾳ, καθά- 
TEP εἴρηται. πάσχει μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅμοιον ὄν, πεπονθὸς δ᾽ 5 
ὡμοίωται καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ἐκεῖνο. 

6 Δεκτέον δὲ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν 
πρῶτον. λέγεται δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τριχῶς, ὧν δύο μὲν Kal! 

ε ’ 
αὑτά φαμεν αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἐν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. τῶν 
δὲ ὃ 4 δ ‘ Lo ’ 3 ε a > a ‘ ‘\ ‘ 

€ OVO TO μὲν LOLOY ἐστιν ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν το 

ΡΜᾺ 3 
“πασῶν. λέγω δ᾽ ἴδιον μὲν ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἑτέρᾳ αἰσθήσει 

3 , \ ~ 
αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀπατηθῆναι (οἷον 

14. ὥσπερ εἴρηται praeeunte Hayduckio unc. incl. Biehl, om. SUX Alex. 84, 26 
Them. Philop., leg. quidem Soph., fort. post # transponenda censet Susemihl | 
18. kal post alc. om. EU, καὶ τὸ om. V, leg. καὶ τὸ Simpl. Philop. Alex. 85, 3 || 
19. δὲ om. SV, post ὁμοίως ponit E, κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν δὲ leg. etiam Philop. Alex. 85, 4 ll 
24. ὅταν V WX Soph. || 31. εἴπωμεν SUX, εἴποιμεν etiam Soph. || 418 a, 2. τὸ T et E 
(Trend.) || 3. δ᾽ om. ES, τὸ δὲ Soph. || 4. καθάπερ εἴρηται ante 6. ἔστιν transponenda 

censet Essen || 8. δυοῖν SUX || 11. pro πασῶν et 19. πάσαις Schieboldt, De imag. p- 15, 
coni. πλειόνων et πλείοσιν || 12. οἷον...14. διαφοράς in parenth. posui. 

CHS. 5, 6 417 Ὁ 14—418 a 12 75 

all, or else two modes of change should be assumed, one to the 
negative states and the other to the normal habits and the true 

In the sensitive subject the first change is due to the6 
parent: once generated it possesses sensation exactly in the same 
sense as we possess knowledge. And to have actual sensation 
Actual corresponds to exercise of knowledge. There is this 
sensation —=_ difference, however, that in the one case the causes of 
tioned by the activity are external: as, for instance, the objects of 
ternal sight, hearing and the other senses. The reason is 
sensible. that actual sensation is always of particulars, while 
knowledge is of universals: and these universals are, in a manner, 
in the soul itself. Hence it is in our power to think whenever we 
please, but sensation is not in our power: for the presence of the 
sensible object is necessary. It is much the same with the sciences 
which deal with sensible objects; and for the same reason, namely, 
that sensibles are particulars and are external. 

But we shall have a further opportunity of making this clear 
hereafter. For the present let us be content to have established 7 
that of the two meanings of potentiality, the one according to 
which a child might be called potentially a general, and the other 
according to which a man of full age might be so called, it is the 
latter which applies to the faculty of sense-perception. But as this 
distinction has no word to mark it, although the fact and the 
nature of the distinction have been established, we are compelled 
to use the terms to suffer or be acted upon and to be qualitatively 
changed as if they were the proper terms. Now, as has been 
ΜΕ explained, the sensitive faculty is potentially such as the 
tion of sensible object is in actuality. While it is being acted 
chiectin upon, it is not yet similar, but, when once it has been 
actuation, acted upon, it is assimilated and has the same character 

as the sensible object. 

In considering each separate sense we must first treat of their 6 
Thesensi.  rsJects. By the sensible object may be meant any one 
ble object: of three things, two of which we say are perceived in 
atucewea themselves or directly, while the third is perceived 


(a) by whe per accidens or indirectly. Of the first two the one is 
several the special object of a particular sense, the other an 

object common to all the senses. By a special object of 2 
a particular sense I mean that which cannot be perceived by any 
other sense and in respect to which deception is impossible; for 

76 DE ANIMA II CHS. 6, 7 

ἈΝ ΜᾺ “~ e 
ὄψις χρώματος Kal ἀκοὴ ψόφου Kal γεῦσις χυμον, ἢ 
3 » e / ΄ 
δ᾽ ἁφὴ πλείους μὲν ἔχει διαφοράς), ἀλλ᾽ ἑκάστη γε Κρίνει 
κι Y A 5» ¢ , 
περὶ τούτων, Kal οὐκ ἀπατᾶται ὅτι χρῶμα οὐδ᾽ ὁτι ψόφος, 
ἴω A I Ν ΡᾺ jx o~ \ 
3 ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κεχρωσμένον ἣ ποῦ, ἢ τί TO ψοφοῦν ἢ που. τὰ 
’ὔ Ν Ν ’ 3 
μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα λέγεται ἴδια ἑκάστου, κοινὰ δὲ κίνησις, ἦρε- 
Ὺ Ν Ν ~ 9 “~ 
pla, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος" τὰ yap τοιαῦτα οὐδεμιᾶς 
3 Ἀ ¥ 3 Ν Ν ? Ἁ Ν ε ἰοὺ , a , 
ἐστὶν ἴδια, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάσαις. καὶ yap apy κίνησίς Tis 
δ Ν - 3 
4 ἐστιν αἰσθητὴ καὶ ὄψει. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ λέγεται αἱ- 
a Ὄ 9 Ν Ν ¥ »ἤ ce? Ν 
σθητόν, οἷον εἰ τὸ λευκὸν εἴη Διάρους υἱός: κατὰ συμβε- 
\ \. , 3 , Ψ a A , 
βηκὸς yap τούτον αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι τῷ λευκῷ συμβέβηκε 
᾿ a a ΩΝ o~ Ν ~ 
τοῦτο οὗ αἰσθάνεται. διὸ καὶ οὐδὲν πάσχει ἢ τοιοῦτον ὕπο TOU 
ΕῚ A“ Pr \ 5 e A > ~ , -»¥ ? > \ 
αἰσθητοῦ. τῶν δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ αἰσθητῶν τὰ ἴδια κυρίως ἐστὶν 
3 / Ἁ \ a ε 3 [4 ’ ξ [4 3 a 
αἰσθητά, καὶ πρὸς a ἡ οὐσία πέφυκεν ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως. %5 
7 O8 μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ὄψις, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁρατόν. ὁρατὸν δ᾽ 
3 Ν ω ? αν ἃ va \ ἂν 3 ΓᾺ 5 - δὲ 
ἐστὶ χρῶμα μέν, καὶ ὃ λόγῳ μὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀνώνυμον δὲ 
“ + on de » a - ~ 2 
τυγχάνει ὄν' δῆλον δὲ ἔσται ὃ λέγομεν προελθοῦσι μά- 
λιστα. τὸ γὰρ ὁρατόν ἐστι χρῶμα. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ 
καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὁρατοῦ: καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ οὐ τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἐν 30 




ἑαυτῷ ἔχει TO αἴτιον Tov εἶναι ὁρατόν. πᾶν δὲ χρῶμα κινη- 
4 3 a 9.5. 92 ἰδὶ ‘\ mn fs ¥ b J 1 
τικόν ἐστι τοῦ Kar ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς, καὶ TOUT ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ 4180 
7 7 3 € Ν id » 3 Ν ων \ oe Ud 
φύσις. διόπερ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἄνευ φωτός, ἀλλὰ πᾶν TO ἑκάστου 
A 3 N cla \ \ \ A , ΄ 
χρῶμα ἐν φωτὶ ὁρᾶται. διὸ περὶ φωτὸς πρῶτον λεκτέον τί 
2 ἐστιν. ἔστι δή τι διαφανές. διαφανὲς δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔστι μὲν 
ε / > 3 ¢ Ν δὲ ε Ν € € a > ~ 3 ‘ ? 
ὁρατόν, ov καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι 5 
3 , A“ a 43> La \ & Ἂ ‘ 
ἀλλότριον χρῶμα. τοιοῦτον δέ ἐστιν ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πολλὰ 
τῶν στερεῶν: οὐ γὰρ 7 ὕδωρ οὐδ᾽ ἣ ἀήρ, διαφανές, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι 

13. post χυμοῦ vulg. punct. || 13. ἡ...14. διαφοράς in parenth. ponenda censet Susemihl {} 
14. post διαφοράς vulg. colon, post διαφοράς signum orationis imperfectae ponit Torst., cui 
adversatur Barco || ante ἑκάστη addendum ὡς censet Essen {ἕκαστον P || 17. ἑκάστης 
W Soph. 7o, 33, de Them. 57, 36 non liquet, ἑκάστη X, vulgatam defendit Barco || 
19. πάσαις om. Ὁ X et pr. S, πάντων το. 5, πασῶν videtur legisse Philop. 315, τὸ || γὰρ 
ἡ ἁφῇ E (Bhl.) || 20. ὄψει] γεύσει coni. Steinhart || post ὄψει editi ante Bekkerum omnes, 
ut videtur: καθ᾽ αὑτὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν αἰσθητὰ ταῦτα, quae legit etiam Soph. |] 21. διάρρους 
υἱὸς E'T Soph. v. 1. (Διάρους υἱὸς e codd. Hayduck 71, 4), διάρρου υἱὸς Ψ, υἱὸς om. ὟΝ, 
Διάρους vids Simpl., et Διάρους υἱὸς et Διάρης Them., Διάρης Philop., qui in nonnullis 
ἀντυγράφοις etiam scripturam esse Διάρους υἱὸς commemorat || 23. οὗ αἰσθάνεται ante 
22. συμβέβηκε transponenda censet Essen || xatom.S UV || ἦ οτὰ. SU X, tuentur et καὶ 
et 7 Them. Soph. || 26. ἡ om. SU || 27. μέν post χρῶμα EW Biehl Rodier, re το] αἱ 
omnes, etiam Philop. Simpl. || 28. προελθοῦσι: μάλιστα γὰρ coni. Essen II, 42 | 
μάλιστα om. 5 U X, leg. Soph. || 29. rofro...31. ὁρατόν unc. includenda censet Susemihl |{ 
29, 30. τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὁρατῶν TW et E, (Bus.), τοῦ.. ὁρατοῦ etiam Simpl. Philop. Soph. || 

CHS. 6, 7 418 a 13—418b 7 77 

example, sight is of colour, hearing of sound and taste of flavour, 
while touch no doubt has for its object several varieties. But at 
any rate each single sense judges of its proper objects and is not 
deceived as to the fact that there is a colour or a sound; though as to 
what or where the coloured object is or what or where the object is 
which produces the sound, mistake is possible. Such then, are the 3 
special objects of the several senses. By common sensibles are 

or (2) by meant motion, rest, number, figure, size: for such 
phe senses qualities are not the special objects of any single sense, 
mon. but are common to all. For example, a particular motion 

can be perceived by touch as well as by sight. What is meant 4 
by the indirect object of sense may be illustrated if we 

The thi . . . . 
which have suppose that the white thing before you is Diares’ son. 
the attri- . : ἢ : ᾿ . 

butes are You perceive Diares’ son, but indirectly, for that which 

πύλην ιων ἢ you perceive is accessory to the whiteness. Hence you 

are not affected by the indirect sensible as such. Of the 
two classes of sensibles directly perceived it is the objects special 
to the different senses which are properly perceptible: and it is 
to these that the essential character of each sense is naturally 

The object, then, of sight is the visible: what is visible is colour 7 
Sightana and something besides which can be described, though 
colour. it has no name. What we mean will best be made clear 
as we proceed. The visible, then, is colour. Now colour is that 
with which what is visible in itself is overlaid: and, when I say 
in itself, I do not mean what is visible by its essence or form, but 
what is visible because it contains within itself the cause of 
visibility, namely, colour. But colour is universally capable of 
exciting change in the actually transparent, that is, in light; this 
being, in fact, the true nature of colour. Hence colour is not 
visible without light, but the colour of each object is always seen 
in light. And so we shall have first to explain what light is. 

There is, then, we assume, something transparent; and by this 2 
The I mean that which, though visible, is not properly 
medium. sneaking, visible in itself, but by reason of extrinsic 
colour. Air, water and many solid bodies answer to this de- 
scription. For they are not transparent gud air or gud water, 
31. αὑτῶ X, αὐτῷ ὌΝ, éaurg videntur legisse Them. 58, 31 Philop. 320, 18 || post χρῶμα 
add. ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔχει et κινητικόν...Ὁ, 1. διαφανοῦς unc. incl. Essen || 418 b, 2. πάντως 
ἕκαστον SUX Them. et fort. Simpl., πᾶν τὸ éxdorov etiam Soph. || 3. ὁρᾶται ET y 
Soph. Torst., reliqui ante Torst. omnes ὁρατόν || 6. χρῶμα deleri vult Siebeck, Philolog. 

XL, p. 347, probat Susemihl, xp. leg. etiam Theoph. ap. Prisc. 7, 28 || 7- post στερεῶν 
add. οἷον ὕελος κρύσταλλος T et margo U, similia in paraphr. Them. Philop. Soph. 


ε > AN > , 9 Ν 
ἐστὶ φύσις ὑπάρχουσα ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν τούτοις ἀμφοτέροις καὶ 
~ oe ~ ’ ἰω 4 3 ε 7 > - 
ἐν τῷ ἀϊδίῳ τῷ ἄνω σώματι. φῶς δέ ἐστιν 7 τούτου ἐνέργεια, 
ς »-"Ψ , \ 59 ® ma > 5 ‘\ Ν μ᾿ 
τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἢ διαφανές. δυνάμει δὲ ἐν ᾧ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ τὸ 
ἴω “ν ῪᾺ vd 3  Ἂ A“ > 
σκότος. τὸ δὲ φῶς οἷον χρῶμά ἐστι τοῦ διαφανοῦς, ὅταν ἢ 
\ ε \ ‘ aA , ® XN 
ἐντελεχείᾳ διαφανὲς ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου οἷον TO ἄνω 
ε , a Ν 53. / ΄ \ > 
σῶμα: Kal yap τούτῳ TL ὑπάρχει ἕν καὶ ταὐτόν. τί μὲν οὖν 
A ¥ Ψ ¥ ΄Ὰ »239 
τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ τί τὸ φῶς, εἴρηται, ὅτι OVTE πῦρ OVH ὅλως 
7 3 / ¥ Ν jh ΓᾺ , ‘\ . 
σῶμα οὐδ᾽ ἀπορροὴ σώματος οὐδενός (εἴη yap ἂν σῶμά τι καὶ 15 
Ν / 3 “~ 
οὕτως), GANG πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου τινὸς παρουσία ἐν τῷ διαφα- 
Νὰ > A 
νεῖ: οὐδὲ yap δύο σώματα ἅμα δυνατὸν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι: 
lan ~ / ¥ \ Ν / 
3 δοκεῖ Te τὸ φῶς ἐναντίον εἶναι τῷ σκότει" ἔστι δὲ τὸ σκότος 
ΤᾺ A 9 “A Y 
στέρησις τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἐκ διαφανοῦς, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι 
a Ἁ 3 3 ~ 5 , 
καὶ ἡ τούτου παρουσία τὸ φῶς ἐστίν. Kat οὐκ ὀρθῶς Ἔμπε- 20 
A y ¥ ε , σι 
δοκλῆς, οὐδ᾽ εἴ τις ἄλλος οὕτως εἴρηκεν, ὡς φερομένον τοῦ 
A Ἃ a a Ν ΝᾺ 
φωτὸς καὶ γιγνομένου ποτὲ μεταξὺ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ περι- 
“A ~ / 3 Ἃ δὴ 
έχοντος, ἡμᾶς δὲ λανθάνοντος: τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι καὶ παρὰ 
/ + 
τὴν τοῦ λόγον ἐνάργειαν καὶ παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενα: ἐν μι- 
A ὃ > 59 A > 9 \ 
κρῷ μὲν yap διαστήματι λάθοι av, am ἀνατολῆς δ᾽ ἐπὶ 25 
’ . 4 ¥y ‘ ra 
4 δυσμὰς τὸ λανθάνειν μέγα λίαν τὸ αἴτημα. ἔστι δὲ xpd- 
y c4 ‘ \ ¥ 
ματος μὲν δεκτικὸν τὸ ἄχρουν, ψόφου δὲ τὸ ἄψοφον. 
ϑ, 3 9 A SX ὃ \ XN A 9. ἢ A A sr 
ἄχρουν δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον ἢ τὸ μόλις 
“Ἂ a’ Q 
ὁρώμενον, οἷον δοκεῖ τὸ σκοτεινόν. τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ διαφανὲς 
> F 
μέν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὅταν ἢ ἐντελεχείᾳ διαφανές, GAN ὅταν Sv- 30 
᾽ὔ € ‘\ 3 Ἁ 4 £ ἢ Ἁ ‘a ε Ν δὲ “ 
paper’ ἢ γὰρ αὐτὴ φύσις ὁτὲ μὲν σκότος ὁτὲ δὲ φῶς 
ἐστίν. ov πάντα δὲ ὁρατὰ ἐν φωτί ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἑκάστου 419a 
τὸ οἰκεῖον χρῶμα: ἔνια γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ φωτὶ οὐχ ὁρᾶται, 
3 de ~ / A » θ ® Ν, ἠὃ ή 
ἐν 0€ τῷ σκότει ποιεῖ αἰσθησιν, οἷον τὰ πυρώδη φαινόμενα 
Ν , > F δ᾽ 3 \ a εν". 29 » i 
καὶ λάμποντα (ἀνώνυμα ἐστί ταῦτα ἑνὶ ὀνόματι), οἷον 
8, ἐστί τις φύσις UX Them. Simpl. Soph. Torst., om. τις reliqui || ἐνυπάρχουσα 
SU VX Them. Bek. Trend. || cat...9. σώματι unc. includenda censet Susemih] | 9. Virgulam 
post évépy. om. Bek. Trend., ἐνέργεια καὶ τοῦ διαφανοῦς coni. Trend. || το. virgulam post ἐστὶ 
Bek., post d¢Torst., δυνάμει δὲ καὶ ἐν ᾧ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστί, τὸ σκότος coni. Steinhart || xz. Jom.E ἢ} 
12. 4...13- ταὐτόν unc. includenda censent Susemihl et Essen II, 43 || 14. εἴρηται καὶ τί τὸ 
φῶς V, similiter in paraphr. Them. || 15. post σῶμα transferenda esse, quae nunc 
17. leguntur, ita: σῶμα (οὐδὲ γὰρ... εἶναι), οὐδ᾽ ἀπορροὴ censet Torst., eundem, quem 
vulgata, ordinem servant Them. Simpl. Philop. || οὔτε TV W, οὐδὲ etiam Them. || 16. ἢ 
τοιούτου τινὸς unc. includenda censet Susemihl || 18. re] δὲ TU VX Bek. Trend. || σκότω 
ES || ὁ TU, om. V || 20. τὸ φῶς ἡ τούτον παρουσία SU X, vulgatam tuetur Them. | 

22. τεινομένον EV et vet. transl. Stapfer, Krit. Stud. p- τό Biehl Rodier, vulgo γιγνομένου, 
etiam Them. 60, 28 Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokr. Ρ. 170, 38 || ποτὲ] πρότερον als τὸ 

CH. 7 418 Ὁ 8---4108 4 70 

but because there is a certain natural attribute present in both 
of them which is present also in the eternal body on high. Light 
is the actuality of this transparent gud transparent. But where 
the transparent is only potentially present, there darkness is 
actually. Light is a sort of colour in the transparent when 
made transparent in actuality by the agency of fire or something 
resembling the celestial body: for this body also has an attribute 
which is one and the same with that of fre. What the transparent 
Lightnot 1s, and what light is, has now been stated ; namely, that 
corporeal. + it is neither fire nor body generally nor an effluence from 
any body (for even then it would still be a sort of body), but the 
presence of fire or something fiery in the transparent. For it 
is impossible for two bodies to occupy the same space at the 
same time. 

Light is held to be contrary to darkness. But darkness 3 
is absence from the transparent of the quality above described: 
so that plainly light is the presence of it. Thus Empedocles and 
whe velo. Others who propounded the same view are wrong when 
cityoflight they represent light as moving in space and arriving 
neredibie- at a given point of time between the earth and that 
which surrounds it without our perceiving its motion. For this 
contradicts not only the clear evidence of reason, but also the facts 
of observation: since, though a movement of light might elude 
observation within a short distance, that it should do so all the 
way from east to west is too much to assume. 

It is that which is colourless which is receptive of colour, as 4 
it is that which is soundless which is receptive of sound. And 
the transparent is colourless, and so is the invisible or the dimly 
visible which is our idea of the dark. Such is the transparent 
medium, not indeed when it is in actuality, but when potentially 
transparent. For it is the same natural attribute which is at one 
time darkness and at another time light. It is not everything 
visible which is visible in light, but only the proper colour of each 
thing. Some things, indeed, are not seen in daylight, though they 

produce sensation in the dark: as, for example, the 
Phosphor- . . . - 
escent things of fiery and glittering appearance, for which 
objects. there is no one distinguishing name, like fungus, horn, 

coni. Essen, coll. De Sensu 6, 446 b, 29, 30 {| τῆς yijs...23. περιέχοντος unc. incl. Essen | 
24. τὴν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ SUX Them. Bek. Trend. τὴν τοῦ λόγου etiam Soph. || ἐνάργειαν 
T Wy Soph. 75, 27 Torst., ἐνέργειαν E (Trend.), ἀλήθειαν reliqui ante Torst. omnes, 
etiam Them. || ἐν μικρῷ. ..“6. αἴτημα unc. incl. Essen || 419 a, 3. σκότωι E, σκότῳ Them., 
σκότει Soph. 


ld ‘ > 
μύκης, κέρας, κεφαλαὶ ἰχθύων καὶ λεπίδες καὶ ὀφθαλ- 5 

~ XN 5 ow“ an) 3 a 

μοί: ἀλλ᾽ οὐδενὸς ὁρᾶται τούτων τὸ οἰκεῖον χρῶμα. de ἣν 
> A a“ ¥ / nN > 3 _ ON 

5 μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν ταῦτα ὁρᾶται, ἄλλος λόγος: νῦν δ᾽ ἐπὶ το- 
ῷ \ ε ’, “ 

σοῦτον φανερόν ἐστιν, ὅτι TO μὲν EV φωτὶ ὁρώμενον χρῶμα. 

“A a) \ 5 3 a \ 
διὸ καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾶται ἄνευ φωτός: τοῦτο yap ἦν αὐτῷ TO 
χρώματι εἶναι, τὸ κινητικῷ εἶναι τοῦ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν διαφα- το 

κι ἴα: ἴω a “ ἈΝ ΄ 
νοῦς" ἡ δ᾽ ἐντελέχεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς φῶς ἐστίν. σημεῖον δὲ τού- 
Aw » os 5» 2’ A 
του φανερόν: ἐὰν yap τις θῇ τὸ ἔχον χρῶμα ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν 
τὴν ὄψιν, οὐκ ὄψεται: ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν χρῶμα κινεῖ τὸ δια- 
ra » ΡΝ 
φανές, οἷον τὸν ἀέρα, ὑπὸ τούτου δὲ συνεχοῦς ὄντος κινεῖται 
~ , » 2 
6 τὸ αἰσθητήριον. οὐ γὰρ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγει Δημόκριτος οἱό- 
3 ’ ‘ Ἃ - e o θ ih ? ῪᾺ Ν 
μενος, εἶ γένοιτο κενὸν τὸ μεταξύ, ὁρᾶσθαι ἂν ἀκριβῶς, καὶ 
εἰ μύρμηξ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ εἴη" τοῦτο γὰρ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν. πά- 
σχοντος γάρ τι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ γίνεται τὸ ὁρᾶν" ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ 
Α oy ~ € - / LOU ? on e ‘ 
μὲν οὖν TOD ὁρωμένου χρώματος ἀδύνατον: λείπεται δὴ VITO 
τοῦ μεταξύ, ὥστ᾽ ἀναγκαῖόν τι εἶναι μεταξύ: κενοῦ δὲ γενο- 20 
μένου οὐχ ὅτι ἀκριβῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλως οὐθὲν ὀφθήσεται. 
5 ἃ ‘ μὰ 9 2“ Ν a > ω 3 VN € ἡ 
7 Ov ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν τὸ χρῶμα ἀναγκαῖον ἐν φωτὶ ὁρᾶσθαι, 
¥ “ δὲ 3 3 a“ en XN 3 é \ 3 ? 
εἴρηται. πῦρ dé ἐν ἀμφοῖν ὁρᾶται, Kal ἐν σκότει καὶ ἐν φωτί, 
‘ a 3 > 4 Ἁ Ν ὃ Ν € Ν ’ ‘a 
καὶ τοῦτο ἐξ ἀνάγκης" τὸ yap διαφανὲς ὑπὸ τούτου γίνεται 
8 διαφανές. ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ ψόφου Kal ὀσμῆς 25 
ἐστίν: οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενον τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ποιεῖ τὴν 
¥ θ 9 3 € “A δ 3 ao Ἀ ’ A ‘ 
αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ μὲν ὀσμῆς καὶ ψόφου τὸ μεταξὺ κι- 
~ € \ δὲ ’’ “ 3 θ , € ᾽ « + ὃ᾽ > 3 
νεῖται, ὑπὸ δὲ τούτον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἑκάτερον- ὅταν δ᾽ ἐπ 
9 ‘4 3 θη ‘ 3 θ 4 Ἁ “~ A \ »*¥ 9 4 
αὐτό τις ἐπιθῇ τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὸ ψοφοῦν ἣ τὸ ὄζον, οὐδεμίαν 
3» θ ? ‘ δὲ ε fal % 4 dl ‘ 
αἴσθησιν ποιήσει. περὶ ὃὲ ἀφῆς Kal γεύσεως ἔχει μὲν 30 
£ id 3 , δέ ὃ > a δ᾽ > 9 y »¥ A 
ὁμοίως, ov φαίνεται δέ: δι’ ἣν δ᾽ αἰτίαν, ὕστερον ἔσται δῆλον. 
\ ‘ [4 
οτὸ δὲ μεταξὺ ψόφων μὲν ἀήρ, ὀσμῆς δ᾽ ἀνώνυμον’ κοινὸν 
Ν ὃ / Χθ 5. 5. 35,3 Ν “ὃ / 3 Ψ Ν 
γὰρ δή τι πάθος ἐπ’ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ τὸ δια- 
XN - Φ ”~N ¥ 9 ᾽ν 9 
φανὲς χρώματι, οὕτω τῷ ἔχοντι ὀσμὴν ὃ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις 


5. κέρας] κρέας coni. Chandler, Sugg. and emend., p. 7 || λοπίδες ἘΠ, Aewldes etiam 
Them. Philop. Soph. || 7. ὁρατά E, ὁρᾶται etiam Them. Philop. Soph. ἢ 9- Kal om. 
EUW Soph. || αὐτὸ W Trend., αὐτῷ etiam Them. Soph., tuentur Prantl, Arist. ἃ}. ἢ, 
Farben, p. 93, adn. 2, Barco p. 57, αὐτὸ ἦν pro ἦν αὐτῷ coni. Essen II, p. 45 || τὸ] τῷ 
W, om. S Them. || 10. post xp. εἶναι virgulam om. Bek. Trend. || iy δὴ ET Wy, δὲ 
ἤδη Them., δὲ etiam Simpl. Soph. || 16. virg. post ἀκριβῶς posuit Diels || 16. et 17. καὶ 
εἰ] καὶ εἰ etiam Soph. 83, 32, κἂν εἰ Philop. 350, 8 || 17. ἐστιν ἀδύνατον SU X, ἀδύνατόν 
ἐστιν Soph. || 18. αἰσθητηρίου VW et, ut videtur, Philop. 350, 13, αἰσθητικοῦ etiam 
Soph., αἰσθήσεως in paraphr. Them, 62, 14 || 19. δὴ ET W, δὲ reliqui ante Biehlium 

CH. 7 419 a 5—419 a 34 SI 

the heads, scales and eyes of fishes. But in no one of these cases 
is the proper colour seen. Why these objects are seen must 
be discussed elsewhere. At present this much is clear, that the 5 
object seen in light is colour, and this is why it is not seen without 
light. For the very quiddity of colour is, as we saw, just this, that 
it is capable of exciting change in the operantly transparent 
medium: and the activity of the transparent is light. There is clear 
evidence of this. If you lay the coloured object upon your eye, you 
will not see it. On the contrary, what the colour excites is the 
transparent medium, say, the air, and by this, which is continuous, 
the sense-organ is stimulated. For it was a mistake in Democritus 6 
Necessity ἴθ Suppose that if the intervening space became a void, 
ofa im even an ant would be distinctly seen, supposing there 

were one inthesky. That is impossible. For sight takes 
place through an affection of the sensitive faculty. Now it cannot 
be affected by that which is seen, the colour itself: therefore it 
can only be by the intervening medium: hence the existence of 
some medium is necessary. But, if the intermediate space became 
a void, so far from being seen distinctly, an object would not be 
visible at all. 

We have explained the reason why colour must be seen in 7 
light. Fire is visible both in light and in darkness: and necessarily 
so, for it is owing to fire that the transparent becomes transparent. 
The same argument holds for sound and odour. For no sound 8 
or scent produces sensation by contact with the sense-organ: it 
is the intervening medium which is excited by sound and odour 
and the respective sense-organs by the medium. But, when the 
body which emits the sound or odour is placed on the sense-organ 
itself, it will not produce any sensation. The same holds of touch 
and taste, although it appears to be otherwise. The reason for this 
will be seen hereafter. The medium for sounds is air, that for odour 9 
has no name. For there is assuredly a common quality in air 
and water, and this quality, which is present in both, stands to 
the body which emits odour in the same relation as the transparent 
omnes, etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. || 20 wovr’...neratd om. S Ὁ X, leg. Soph. (cf. Prisc. 
L. 10, 10) |] 22. δι ἣν...25. διαφανές unc. incl. Susemihl et Essen || 23. σκότωι E, 
σκότῳ Soph. || 29. τις ἐπιθῇ om. pr. E || τὸ ante αἰσθ. om. E || 32. codd. hoc loco non 
variant, vulgatam leg. etiam Philop. Simpl. et, ut videtur, Soph. 84, 11, sed Them. 
interpretatur: τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ ψόφου καὶ ὀσμῆς ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ, unde Brandisius coni. Them. 
legisse τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ ψόφων καὶ ὀσμῆς ἀνώνυμον, Torst. coni. ab Arist. haec fere scripta 
fuisse: τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ ψόφου μὲν καὶ ὀσμῆς ἀήρ τε καὶ ὕδωρ' τὸ δὲ κοινὸν ἀνώνυμον" Kowwdr..., 
vulgatam defendit Barco, p. 58, τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ...Ὁ, 3. λεχθήσεται unc. incl. Essen |] 33. δή 

om. SUVWXy || 34. χρώματος P || post ὀσμὴν virgulam posuit Rodier |] ὃ ἐν} ὃν SX, 
ov ἐν Pi ἐν ΤΥ. 

H. 6 

82 DE ANIMA II CHS. 7, 8 

~ , 
ὑπάρχει τούτοις: φαίνεται yap καὶ τὰ ἔνυδρα τῶν ζῴων 35 
A Ν ~ ΜᾺ 
ἔχεν αἴσθησιν ὀσμῆς. ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῶν πεζῶν 4το 
ὅσα ἀναπνεῖ, ἀδυνατεῖ ὀσμᾶσθαι μὴ ἀναπνέοντα. ἡ δ᾽ αἰ- 
τία καὶ περὶ τούτων ὕστερον λεχθήσεται. 
8 Νῦν δὲ πρῶτον περὶ ψόφου καὶ ἀκοῆς διορίσωμεν. ἔστι 
A \ ε / ε μὴ Ν, 9 7 ξ δὲ ὃ , 
δὲ διττὸς ὁ ψόφος: ὁ μὲν yap ἐνεργείᾳ τις, ὁ δὲ δυνάμει: 5 
ἈΝ Ν δ Ψ ¥ ’ Φ / κά ἐν 
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ov φαμεν ἔχειν ψόφον, οἷον σπόγγον, ἔρια, τὰ 
δ᾽ ἔχειν, οἷον χαλκὸν καὶ ὅσα στερεὰ καὶ λεῖα, ὅτι δύνα- 
A “Ὰ > 3 Ἁ 3 A ‘ ‘\ “Ἂ > an 
ται ψοφῆσαι. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ μεταξὺ Kal τῆς ἀκοῆς 
5 ~ , Ψ , ? 3 ε ? 5. ἢ , 
2 ἐμπουῆσαι ψόφον ἐνεργείᾳ. γίνεται δ᾽ ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ψό- 
dos ἀεί Tivos πρός τι καὶ ἔν τινι" πληγὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ποι- τὸ 
ΧΆ 4 \ 3 # e A ¥ ? , Ψ 
οὖσα. διὸ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἑνὸς ὄντος γενέσθαι ψόφον: ἕτερον 
γὰρ τὸ τύπτον καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον: ὥστε τὸ ψοφοῦν πρός τι 
» “ δ᾽ 3 , + “~ Ψ δ᾽ » 
ψοφεῖ! πληγὴ ὃ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φορᾶς. ὥσπερ δ᾽ εἴπομεν, 
3 ΡᾺ ¢ N e / 3 7 ἈΝ ἊΝ ‘a 
οὐ τῶν τυχόντων πληγὴ ὁ ψόφος" οὐθένα yap ποιεῖ ψόφον 
¥ λ A ἢ Ν ‘ . ¢ A ‘ a 
ἐρια ἂν πληγῇ, ἀλλὰ χαλκὸς καὶ ὅσα λεῖα καὶ κοῖλα, τς 
ε \ ‘4 Ψ ~ Ν XN “ ~ 3 4 
ὁ μὲν χαλκός, OTe λεῖος: τὰ δὲ Kotha TH ἀνακλάσει πολ- 
λὰς ποιεῖ πληγὰς μετὰ τὴν πρώτην, ἀδυνατοῦντος ἐξελθεῖν 
~ - ¥ 3 4 3 id Ν Ψ ? > 
τοῦ κινηθέντος. ἔτι ἀκούεται ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι, ἀλλ᾽ ἧττον' 
8οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ψόφου κύριος ὁ ἀὴρ οὐδὲ τὸ ὕδωρ: ἀλλὰ δεῖ 
A ‘\ - ‘ ¥ ‘ ‘ ‘ 27 
στερεῶν πληγὴν γενέσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα. 20 
~ \ ᾽ y ¢ A Ν 7% 
τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ὑπομένῃ πληγεὶς ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ μὴ δια- 
a ‘ Ἃ ~ “ ~ 
χυθῇ. διὸ ἐὰν ταχέως καὶ σφοδρῶς πληγῇ, ψοφεῖ: Set γὰρ 
\ A φ᾿ 
φθάσαι τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ ῥαπίζοντος τὴν θρύψιν τοῦ ἀέρος, 
9 3 Ν A € Ν “ ’ Ϊά 
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σωρὸν ἢ ὁρμαθὸν ψάμμου τύπτοι τις φερόμε. 
4 vov ταχύ. ἠχὼ δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος ἑνὸς γενομέ- 25 
ὃ μ δ 3 “ ‘\ ὃ ’ ‘a ~ 
vou διὰ τὸ ἀγγεῖον τὸ διορίσαν καὶ κωλῦσαν θρυφθῆναι 

410 Ὁ, 1. ὀδμῆς et 2. ὀδμᾶσθαι ET || ἀλλ᾽..,4.. διορίσωμεν) ex Themistii et Sophoniae 
interpretationibus Torst. coni. Arist. haec fere scripsisse : ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἄν θρωπος καὶ τῶν πεζῶν 
ὅσα ἀναπνεῖ ἀδυνατεῖ ὁσμᾶσθαι μὴ ἀναπνέοντα, τὰ δὲ ἔνυδρα ὀσμᾶται καὶ μὴ ἀναπνέοντα. ἡ δ᾽ 
αἰτία καὶ περὶ τούτων ὕστερον λεχθήσεται. νῦν δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον τί ἐστιν ὄψις. μετὰ 
δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον περὶ ἀκοῆς καὶ ὀσφρήσεως" καὶ πρῶτον μὲν περὶ ψόφον καὶ ἀκοῆς διορίσωμεν, 
Simplicium vulgatam legisse et ex interpret. huins loci et quae p. 138 de Alexandro dicit 
certum est, vulgatam defendit Wilson, Trans. of Ox. Philol. Soc. 1882/3, p. 6 || 4. ἀκοῆς] 
ὀσφρήσεως E WX y εἰ Soph., reliqui ἀκοῆς, etiam Them. || 5. ἐνεργείας (ie. casu dativo) 
E (Trend.) et δυνάμει E Them. Simpl. Philop. Soph. Torst., ἐνέργεια et δύναμις reliqui 
ante Torst. omnes || ris post ἐνεργείᾳ om. Soph., leg. Them. Simpl. || 7. χαλκὸς T, 
χαλκὸν etiam Them. Soph. || 8. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὲν...9. ἐνεργείᾳ unc. incl. Essen {I ro. post 
rive addendum πλήττοντος censet Chandler || 11. γίνεσθαι X Soph,, probat Susemihl ἢ 
τὸν ψόφον E, τὸν om. Soph. || 13. ἔριον ἢ πατάξαν ἢ πληγέν, ἀλλὰ VX et margo U, 

CHS, 7, ὃ 419 a 35—419 Ὁ 26 83 

to colour. For the animals that live in water also appear to have 
the sense of smell. But man and the other land-animals which 
breathe are unable to smell without inhaling breath. The reason 
for this, too, must be reserved for future explanation. 

Let us now begin by determining the nature of sound and 8 
Soundangd hearing. There are two sorts of sound, one a sound 
hearing. which is operant, the other potential sound. For some 
things we say have no sound, as sponge, wool; others, for ex- 
ample, bronze and all things solid and smooth, we say have sound, 
because they can emit sound, that is, they can produce actual 
sound between the sonorous body and the organ of hearing. When 2 
actual sound occurs it is always of something on something and 
in something, for it is a blow which produces it. Hence it is 
impossible that a sound should be produced by a single thing, 
for, as that which strikes is distinct from that which is struck, that 
which sounds sounds upon something. And a blow implies spatial 
motion. As we stated above, it is not concussion of any two 
things taken at random which constitutes sound. Wool, when 
struck, emits no sound at all, but bronze does, and so do all smooth 
and hollow things; bronze emits sound because it is smooth, while 
hollow things by reverberation produce a series of concussions after 
the first, that which is set in motion being unable to escape. 
The Further, sound is heard in air and, though more faintly, 
medium. in water. It is not the air or the water, however, which 3 
chiefly determine the production of sound: on the contrary, there 
must be solid bodies colliding with one another and with the air: 
and this happens when the air after being struck resists the impact 
and is not dispersed. Hence the air must be struck quickly and 
forcibly if it is to give forth sound; for the movement of the striker 
must be too rapid to allow the air time to disperse: just as would 
be necessary if one aimed a blow at a heap of sand or a sandwhirl, 
while it was in rapid motion onwards. 

Echo is produced when the air is made to rebound backwards 4 

like a ball from some other air which has become a single 

Echo. . . - “1° - . 
mass owing to its being within a cavity which confines 

vulgatam leg. sine dubio Philop. 359, 23 et fort. Soph. 84, 33 ἐν (ν.]. ef) πληγῇ || 18. ἐν] 
pay ἐν coni. Torst. || ἀλλ᾽ ἧττον unc. incl. Torst., om. Soph., videntur legisse Them. 
63, 20 Simpl. 140, 15 Philop. 359, 28 || 19. οὔτε TW, οὔτε δὲ E, οὐδὲ etiam Simpl. 
Soph. || 20. καὶ] Torst. coni. ἢ καὶ, quod iam Steinhart coniecerat, vulgatam tuentur 
Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 21. ὑπομείνηι E et fort. Simpl. 140, 27. 141, 6, ὑπομένῃ Soph. || 
24. ὥσπερ ἂν...25. ταχύ unc. incl. Susemihl || 24. ἂν om. STU X, leg. Soph. || σωρὸν 
ἢ delendum censet Essen ἢ tis} τὸ coni. Essen || 25. τάχει P || ἀπὸ τοῦ om. SUVX 
Torst., leg. Soph. et Alex. de anima 48, 1 (sed ὑπὸ pro ἀπὸ) || γινομένου U VW X Soph. 



“A ν ~ 
πάλιν ὁ ἀὴρ ἀπωσθῇ, ὥσπερ σφαιρα. , 
4 5 N Ἃ 
ἠχώ, GN οὐ σαφής, ἐπεὶ συμβαίνει γε ἐπι τοῦ ψόφον 
a / Ν ‘ Ν La > _N 3 a 
καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ rod φωτός- Kal yap τὸ φῶς ἀεὶ ἀνακλᾶ 
/ a“ 9 Ν , ad “Of 
ται (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἐγίνετο πάντῃ φῶς, ἀλλὰ σκότος ἔξω τοῦ 3 
“Ὁ Ψ > 7? ὦἡᾧ 
ἡλιουμένου), GAN οὐχ οὕτως ἀνακλᾶται ὥσπερ ἀφ᾽ ὕδατος 
ν ‘ οὐ 
ἢ χαλκοῦ ἢ Kab τινος ἄλλου τῶν λείων, ὥστε σκιὰν ποιεῖν, 
/ - a 
59 τὸ φῶς ὁρίζομεν. τὸ δὲ κενὸν ὀρθῶς λέγεται κύριον τοῦ 
wn 5 χὰ > 93 ἈΝ ε a 
ἀκούειν. δοκεῖ yap εἶναι κενὸν ὃ ἀήρ, οὗτος δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ ποιῶν 
ων ‘\ Ν ἊἊ 5 Ν ΝΗ ‘\ “ 
ἀκούειν, ὅταν κινηθῇ συνεχὴς καὶ εἷς. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ψαθυρὸς 35 
ἷ Ὶ i, ἂν μὴ λεῖον ἢ τὸ πληγέ ὅτε δὲ εἷς γί. 420a 
εἶναι οὐ γεγωνεῖ, ἂν μὴ λεῖον ἢ τὸ πληγέν. TO γί- 4 
Ν “Ἂ 7 5». Ὁ 
νεται ἅμα διὰ τὸ ἐπίπεδον' ἕν γὰρ τὸ τοῦ λείου ἐπίπεδον. 
> e A > - ‘al 
6 ψοφητικὸν μὲν οὖν TO κινητικὸν ἑνὸς ἀέρος συνεχείᾳ μέχρις 
nw a Ν 3 5. ¢ 
ἀκοῆς. ἀκοῇ δὲ συμφνὴς ἀήρ" διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἀέρι εἶναι, κινουμέ. 
~ ~ / Ν ”~ 3 4 
vou τοῦ ἔξω ὁ εἴσω κινεῖται. διόπερ οὐ πάντῃ TO ζῴον ἀκούει, 5 
Ν, 4 ¥ >? ‘ 
οὐδὲ πάντῃ διέρχεται ὁ arjp* ov yap πάντῃ ἔχει ἀέρα TO KL- 

, / \ > N Ν or A εξ 3. Ἀ 
νησόμενον μέρος καὶ ἔμψυχον. αὐτὸς μὲν δὴ ἀψοῴφον ὃ ἀὴρ 
ὃ Ν, \ ¥ . id δὲ λ An θ ’ θ ε » 

ιὰ τὸ εὔθρυπτον: ὅταν δὲ κωλυθῇ θρύπτεσθαι, ἢ τούτου 
, , ᾿ ε δ᾽ 3 a 2 ON > δά Ν \ 
κίνησις ψόφος. ὃ δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶν ἐγκατῳκοδόμηται πρὸς τὸ 
3. 4 > ν > a > θ id “ Ν ὃ 
ἀκίνητος εἶναι, ὅπως ἀκριβῶς αἰσθάνηται πάσας τὰς δια- το 
a ΓᾺ > 

φορὰς THs κινήσεως. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ Kal ἐν ὕδατι ἀκούο- 

ν > 3 / \ > A ‘ ~ Ff . ἰλλ᾽ 
μεν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰσέρχεται πρὸς αὗτὸν τὸν συμφνῆ ἀέρα' a 
οὐδ᾽ eis τὸ οὖς διὰ τὰς ἕλικας. ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο συμβῇ, οὐκ 
3 / ὑδ᾽ λ ε a E 7 4 \% 3 _N μῃ , δέ 
ἀκούει" οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἡ μῆνιγξ κάμῃ, ὥσπερ τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ κόρῃ δέρ- 

oY ? > ‘ ‘N “ ως 9 2 A x 4 
μα [ὅταν κάμῃ]. ἀλλὰ καὶ σημεῖον τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ μὴ τὸ 15 

ἔοικε δ᾽ ἀεὶ γίνεσθαι 

30. ob} STU VX Them., οὐδὲ etiam Soph. || 33. ἢ] ᾧ scripsit Torst. e solo Philop., 
ἡ etiam Soph. || 33. τὸ δὲ ..35. εἷς partim corrupta partim alieno loco posita esse 
putat Torst., vide eius comment. crit. p. 148, tuentur Them. Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 
420 a, x. Torst. suspicatur Arist. scripsisse τότε δὲ εἷς γίνεται καὶ dua ἀφάλλεται, 
διὰ τὸ ἐπίπεδον, similiter in interpret. Them. et Philop., vulgatam leg. etiam Soph. { 
2. dua γὰρ διὰ U, ὅλος γὰρ ἅμα κινεῖται Philop. in paraphr. 363, 27 || 4. ἀκοῇ 
δὲ συμφυὴς ἀήρ WPy Simpl. Philop. Prisc. Lyd. τό, 22 Soph. Torst. Kampe, 
Erkenntnissth. d. Ar., p. 75. Bon., Ind. Ar. 720 a, τὶ Rodier, ceteri libri et scripti 
et impressi ἀκοὴ dé συμφυὴς ἀέρι, etiam Them. 64, 16sq., sed 64, 17. 28 τῇ μήνιγγι 
συμφυὴς || διὰ τὸ ἕνα ἀέρα εἶναι coni. Steinhart, quod iam Iul. Pacius coniecerat, fort. 
recte, probat Beare, διά re τὸ, virgula ante διὰ posita, coni. dubitanter Susemihl, textum 
tuentur Simpl. Philop. | 5. τὸ SUVX Bek. Trend., ὁ leg. etiam Them. Philop. 
Torst. {ἔσω SU || xwe? STV W Bek. Trend., κινεῖται etiam Philop. Simpl. vet. 
transl. Torst., cui assentitur etiam Hayduck, progr. Gryph. 1873, p. 2 || πάντα τὸ f gor 
ἀκούει, ἀλλ᾽ ὠσίν, οὐδὲ πάντα διέρχεται 6 ἀήρ P, παντὶ μέρει τὸ ἔῷον ἀκούει ἀλλ᾽ ὠσίν" 
οὐδὲ πανταχοῦ τοῦ σώματος διέρχεται" οὐ γὰρ Wy, similia habent et Them. et Philop., 
fluxisse e priori editione putat Torst., sed nihil nisi interpretamentum est, vulgatam 
tuentur Soph. Simpl. || 6. ὁ ἀὴρ unc. incl. Torst., leg. Soph. || ἀέρα, ἀλλὰ τὸ κ΄ coni. 

CH. ὃ _ 419 b 27--4208 15 35 

it and prevents its dispersion. It seems likely that echo is always 
produced, but is not always distinctly audible: since surely the 
same thing happens with sound as with light. For light is always 
being reflected ; else light would not be everywhere, but outside the 
spot where the sun’s rays fall there would be darkness. But it 
is not always reflected in the same way as it is from water or 
bronze or any other smooth surface; I mean, it does not always 
produce the shadow, by which we define light. 
Void is rightly stated to be the indispensable condition of § 

Conditions hearing. For the air is commonly believed to be a void, 

of reson- *, 3 . - . . 
ance and and it is the air which causes hearing, when being one 
hearing. and continuous it is set in motion. But, owing to its 

tendency to disperse, it gives out no sound unless that which is 
struck is smooth. In that case the air when struck is simultaneously 
reunited because of the unity of the surface; for a smooth body 
presents a single surface. 
That, then, is resonant which is capable of exciting motion in 6 

a mass of air continuously one as far as the ear. There is air 
naturally attached to the ear. And because the ear is in air, when 
the external air is set in motion, the air within the ear moves. 
Hence it is not at every point that the animal hears, nor that the 
air passes through: for it is not at every point that the part which 
is to set itself in motion and to be animate has a supply of air. Of 
itself, then, the air is a soundless thing because it is easily broken 
up. But, whenever it is prevented from breaking up, its movement 
is sound. But the air within the ears has been lodged fast within 
walls to make it immoveable, in order that it may perceive exactly 
all the varieties of auditory movement. This is why we hear in 
water also, because the water does not pass right up to the air 
attached to the ear, nor even into the ear at all, because of its 
convolutions. Should this happen, hearing is destroyed, as it is 
by an injury to the membrane of the tympanum, and as sight is by 
an injury to the cornea. Further, we have evidence whether we 
hear or not, according as there is or is not always a ringing sound in 
Torst., ἀλλὰ non leg. Philop. Soph. || 7. ἔμψυχον etiam Philop. Soph., ἔμψοφον coni. 
Torst., cui assentiuntur Hayduck et Dittenberger, Ὁ. 1615, ἔμψυχον, ὥσπερ ἡ κόρη τὸ 
δγρόν" αὐτὸ WP y et margo U vet. transl. et, ut videtur, Philop. 366, 9. το. tx, non leg. 
Soph., καὶ yap πρὸς ἔμψνχον αὐτὸς, puncto post μέρος posito, legendum censet Essen || 
αὐτὸς e Them. scripsit Torst., cui assentiuntur Biehl et Rodier, ceteri αὐτὸ || 7. αὐτὸς μὲν 
67)...9. ψόφος ante 419 Ὁ, 33.76 δὲ transponenda coni, Steinhart, Susemihl vero, mutato δὴ 
in yap, fort. ante 419 Ὁ, 25. ἠχὼ || το. ἀμετακίνητος coni. Hayduck || 12. τὸν συμφυῆ... 
13. ἕλικας unc. incl. Torst., leg. Simpl. Philop. Soph. {{ 14. οὔτ᾽ ET {| 15. ὅταν κάμῃ 

unc. inclusit Biehl, om. ET W Py Soph. || ἀλλὰ usque ad 18. ἔδιος unc. incl. Torst., 
tuentur Them. Simpl. Philop. Soph. 




86 DE ANIMA II” CH. 8 

a > ΤΙ δ , . od ‘ > 7 ‘ “ 
ἠχεῖν αἰεὶ τὸ οὖς ὥσπερ τὸ κέρας" ἀεὶ γὰρ οἰκείαν τινὰ κι 
ΜᾺ “w ? > > ε ? 
νησιν ὁ ἀὴρ κινεῖται ὁ ἐν τοῖς ὠσίν: αλλ ὁ ψόφος αλλό- 
~ 9 , Ἂ “ Ν 
τριος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος. καὶ διὰ τοῦτό φασιν ἀκούειν τῷ κενῷ καὶ 
A a » € id ‘ 39.» ? 
ἠχοῦντι, OTL ἀκούομεν τῷ ἔχοντι ὡρισμένον TOV ἀέρα. πότερον 
A Δ ‘ , A . » , 
δὲ ψοφεῖ τὸ τυπτόμενον ἢ τὸ τύπτον; ἢ καὶ ἄμφω, τρό- 
- ΝᾺ ,ὔ 
πον δ᾽ ἕτερον: ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ψόφος κίνησις τοῦ δυναμένου κι- 
“~ “~ Ν 9 ? > Ν᾿ ω 
νεῖσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὅνπερ τὰ ἀφαλλόμενα amo τῶν 
5 A ἴω id ¥ a“ 
λείων, ὅταν τις κρούσῃ: οὐ δὴ πᾶν, ὥσπερ εἰρηται, ψοῴφεὶ 
@ , 4 / . 
τυπτόμενον καὶ τύπτον, οἷον ἐὰν πατάξῃ βελόνη βελόνην 
A > Ψ \ 27 3 π᾿ 
ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸ τυπτόμενον ὁμαλὸν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸν ἀέρα ἀθροῦν 
δ ΜᾺ 4 
ἀφάλλεσθαι καὶ σείεσθαι. αἵ δὲ διαφοραὶ τῶν ψοφούντων 
Ἢ ΝᾺ 9 Ν + 
ἐν τῷ Kar ἐνέργειαν ψόφῳ δηλοῦνται: ὥσπερ yap ἄνευ 
Ν 3 ee, Ν , 7 IO. ¥ / \ 
φωτὸς οὐχ ὁρᾶται τὰ χρώματα, οὕτως οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ ψόφου τὸ 
a ‘ ‘ 5 Ν 
ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρύ. ταῦτα δὲ λέγεται κατὰ μεταφορὰν azo 
an ἴω ¥ yy ἢ 
τῶν ἁπτῶν: τὸ μὲν yap ὀξὺ κινεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐν ὀλίγῳ 
ΝᾺ 3 4 5» 
χρόνῳ ἐπὶ πολύ, τὸ δὲ βαρὺ ἐν πολλῷ ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον. οὐ δὴ 
ταχὺ τὸ ὀξύ, τὸ δὲ βαρὺ βραδύ, ἀλλὰ γίνεται τοῦ μὲν 
διὰ τὸ τάχος ἡ κίνησις τοιαύτη, τοῦ δὲ διὰ βραδυτῆτα. 
.»Ἂ»ν 9 ὔ ¥ “~ ‘ Ν ε Ν 5 “~ ‘ 4 
καὶ ἔοικεν ἀνάλογον ἔχειν τῷ περὶ τὴν ἁφὴν ὀξεῖ καὶ ἀμ- 
βλεῖ: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀξὺ οἷον κεντεῖ, τὸ δ᾽ ἀμβλὺ οἷον ὠθεῖ 
ὃ “ δὴ α᾽ δ Ν 3 5 7 ‘ δὲ 3 Xr “ Y 
la TO κινεὺν TO μὲν ἐν ὀλίγῳ TO O€ ἐν πολλῴ, WOTE συμ- 
/ \ Ν ‘ Ν \ Ν > 
βαίνει τὸ μὲν ταχὺ τὸ δὲ βραδὺ εἶναι. 
περὶ μὲν οὖν ψόφου ταύτῃ διωρίσθω. ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ψόφος τίς 
ἐστιν ἐμψύχου" τῶν γὰρ ἀψύχων οὐθὲν φωνεῖ, ἀλλὰ Kal” ὁμοιό- 
7 nA - ΔΝ NV \ 7 ag ¥ ma 374 
Tyra λέγεται φωνεῖν, οἷον αὐλὸς καὶ λύρα καὶ ὅσα ἀλλα TOV ἀψύ- 
3 id »Ἤ N ? ‘ , y¥ Ν bd 
χων ἀπότασιν ἔχει καὶ μέλος καὶ διάλεκτον. ἔοικε yap ὅτι 
Ἀν ςε Ἁ a> ἊΨ Ν δὲ A rd 3 ¥ 
kat ἡ φωνὴ ταῦτ᾽ ἔχει. πολλὰ δὲ τῶν ζῴων οὐκ ἔχουσι 
φωνήν, οἷον τά τε ἄναιμα καὶ τῶν ἐναίμων ἰχθύες. καὶ 
m~ 3 3 » 
TOUT εὐλόγως, εἴπερ ἀέρος κίνησίς Tis ἐστιν ὁ ψόφος. GAN 
16. αἰεὶ ante τὸ om. SVX, leg. Them. Soph. || del γὰρ] καὶ γὰρ coni. Essen ἢ 
17. 6 ante ἐν om. STU WX, leg. Soph. || τὸ. τὸν om. SUVX, leg. Simpl. || 
22. ἁλλόμενα SVX, ἀφαλλόμενα Them. Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 23. κρούσῃ] ἐπικρούσῃ 
coni, Essen || 24. καὶ τύπτον om. SUVX, leg. Philop. Simpl. Soph. (qui ἢ pro 
καὶ habet) || 25. ἀβρόον STUVWX || 26. ψόφων Ty Them. Soph. Theoph. ap. 
Prisc. 17, 25, Ψοφούντων etiam Philop. Simpl. || 31. ἐπ΄ om. SUV Wy, leg. Them. 
Philop. Simpl. || οὐ δὴ] ὥστε οὐχὶ TW Soph., ὥστε οὐδὲ V, οὔτω X, οὐ δὴ etiam 
Simpl., οὐ δὴ...38. βραδυτῆτα unc. incl. Susemihl, adversatur Rodier II, 299 | 
33- κίνησις] αἴσθησις coni. Essen || 420 Ὁ, 2. pro ἀμβλὺ οἷον habet βαρὺ ὥσπερ P || 

3: συμβαίνειν ES, συμβαίνει Simpl. Philop. Soph. || 8. yap] δὲ SU V, γὰρ etiam Soph. 
post yap virgulam posuit Rodier || το. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὰ ἔναιμα πάντα, οἷον ἰχθύες P || post 






CH. ὃ 420 8. 16----420 Ὁ 11 87 

the ears, 85 in ἃ horn: for the air imprisoned there is always moving 
with a proper motion ofits own. But sound is something of external 
origin and is not native to the ear. And this is why it is said that 
we hear by means of what is empty and resonant, because that by 
which we hear has air confined within it. 

Does that which is struck emit the sound or that which strikes? 7 
Is it not rather both, but each in a different way? For sound is 
motion of that which is capable of being moved in the same 
Ianner as things rebound from smooth surfaces when struck 
sharply against them. Thus, as above remarked, it is not everything 
which, when struck or striking, emits sound: supposing, for instance, 
a pin were to strike against a pin, there would be no sound. The 
thing struck must be of even surface, so that the air may rebound 
and vibrate in one mass. 

The varieties of resonant bodies are clearly distinguished by the 8 
sound they actually emit. For, as without light colours are not seen, 
so without sound we cannot distinguish high and low 
or acute and grave in pitch. These latter terms are used 
by analogy from tangible objects. For the acute, that is, the high, 
note moves the sense much in a little time, while the grave or low 
note moves it little in much time. Not that what is shrill is 
identically rapid, nor what is low is slow, but it is in the one 
case the rapidity, in the other the slowness, which makes the 
motion or sensation such as has been described. And it would 
seem that there is a certain analogy between the acute and 
grave to the ear and the acute and blunt to the touch. For 
that which is acute or pointed, as it were, stabs, while the blunt, 
as it were, thrusts, because the one excites motion in a short, the 
other in a long time, so that per accidens the one is quick, the other 
slow. Let this account of sound suffice. 

Voice is a sound made by an animate being. No inanimate 9 
thing is vocal, though it may by analogy be said to be 
vocal, as in the case of the pipe, the lyre and all other 
inanimate things that have pitch and tune and articulation : for these 
qualities, it would seem, the voice also possesses. But many animals 
have no voice: that is to say, all bloodless animals and, among 
animals that have blood, fishes. And this is what we might 
expect, since sound is a movement of air. Those fishes which 



ἰχθύες et post 11. ψόφος virgulas ponendas et xal...11. ψόφος post 13. τοιούτῳ trans- 
ponendum censet Susemihl || 11. εἴπερ... «ψόφος fortasse corrupta esse putat Torst., leg. 
Philop. Soph. Them. (qui pro ψόφος habet φωνή) j| τίς om. SUVX et in paraphr. 
Them. Philop., leg. Soph. || 11. @AX’...13. τοιούτῳ unc. incl. Torst., leg. Them. Philop. 
Soph., defendunt Wilson, Phil. Rundschau 1882, N. 47, Trans. of Ox. Phil. Soc. 1882-3, 
p- 9 et Susemihl. 

88 DE ANIMA Il CH. 8 

ἮΝ ΓΝ 3 aA 9 ? ra A 
οἱ λεγόμενοι φωνεῖν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Αχελῴφ, ψοφοῦσι τοῖς 
Ἁ 9. 5 Ἁ -, ᾽ 
10 βραγχίοις ἢ τινι ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ: φωνὴ δ᾽ ἐστὶ ζῴου ψόφος, 
ἴω “A “ / , 
καὶ οὐ τῷ τυχόντι μορίῳ. GAN ἐπεὶ πᾶν ψοφεῖ τὐπτοντὸς 
a ἃ 9.23 3 4 a 
τινος καί τι Kat ἔν τινι, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀήρ, εὐλόγως ἂν 15 
“Ἂ Ν tad ¥ Ν ον 
φωνοίη ταῦτα μόνα ὅσα δέχεται τὸν ἀέρα. ἤδη γὰρ τῷ 
(on , > N 7 ¥ 7 
ἀναπνεομένῳ καταχρῆται ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ δύο ἔργα, καθάπερ 
A an ‘ / © ε δ 
τῇ γλώττῃ ἐπί τε τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ τὴν διάλεκτον, ὧν ἡ μὲν 
rs ~ A , e / ¢ > e 
γεῦσις ἀναγκαῖον (διὸ καὶ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχει), ἡ δ᾽ ἑρμη- 
y 5 ιν / ’ Ν 
veiw ἕνεκα τοῦ εὖ, οὕτω καὶ τῷ πνεύματι πρός τε τὴν θερ- 20 
4 \ 9 \ εξ 3 Ἂ \ δ᾽ » 3 ξ » > 
μότητα THY ἐντὸς ὡς ἀναγκαῖον (τὸ δ᾽ αἴτιον ἐν ἑτέροις εἰ- 
. ε rd \ 5 ¥ 
II ρήσεται) καὶ πρὸς τὴν φωνήν, ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ TO εὖ. opya- 
A “ 3 “ € ? e > ? Ἁ Ἀ ᾽ 7 
νον δὲ τῇ ἀναπνοῇ 6 φάρυγξ' οὗ δ᾽ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ pdoptov 
a a ¥ ‘ 
ἐστι τοῦτο, πλεύμων" τούτῳ yap τῷ μορίῳ πλεῖστον ἔχει TO 
θερμὸν τὰ πεζὰ τῶν ἄλλων. δεῖται δὲ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς καὶ 25 
a ¥ 
ὁ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν τόπος πρῶτος. διὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἴσω ava- 
πνεομένου εἰσιέναι τὸν ἀέρα. ὥστε ἡ πληγὴ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου 
ων ΄ Ν 
ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μορίοις ψυχῆς πρὸς τὴν κα- 
λουμένην ἀρτηρίαν φωνή ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ζῴου ψόφος φωνή 
μένην ἀρτηρίαν φωνή ἐστιν. ov γὰρ πᾶς Ce ος φωνή, 
θά ¥ ¥ ν᾿ Ν ἊἪᾳ λ ra ΝᾺ ΝΥ 
καθάπερ εἴπομεν (ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ ψοφεῖν καὶ 30 
ὡς οἱ βήττοντες), ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἔμψυχόν τε εἶναι τὸ τύπτον 
μ᾿ δ ? / Ν Ν [έ id 
καὶ peta φαντασίας τινός: σημαντικὸς yap δή τις ψόφος 
3 Ἁ ε ζ΄ Ά 9 “~ > al >/ ν € ‘a 
ἐστὶν ἡ φωνή" καὶ ov τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος, ὥσπερ ἡ βήξ, 
3 Ἀ » , Ν 3 “~ 3 a \ 3 ‘4 
12 ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τύπτει τὸν ἐν TH ἀρτηρίᾳ πρὸς αὐτήν. σημεῖον 4218 
‘ \ ‘\ 
dé τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι φωνεῖν ἀναπνέοντα μηδ᾽ ἐκπνέοντα, 
ἀλλὰ 2 . ΜᾺ Ν , ε rd \ δὲ 
κατέχοντα" κινεῖ γὰρ τούτῳ ὁ κατέχων. φανερὸν δὲ 
καὶ διότι οἱ ἰχθύες ἄφωνοι: ov yap ἔχουσι φάρυγγα. τοῦτο 
δὲ τὸ μόριον οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ὅτι οὐ δέχονται τὸν ἀέρα οὐδ᾽ ava- ς 
᾿ ὃ 3 ἃ μ᾿ > > # ῳ 4 > 
πνέουσιν. Ov ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν, ἕτερός ἐστι λόγος. 

13. post ψόφος Torst. censet excidisse: οὐ πᾶς δέ, vulgatam tuetur Soph. qui 
14. καὶ omisit, οὐ παντὸς δέ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ παντὶ μορίῳ in paraphr. Them. || 15. καί ante 
τι om. TW Soph., leg. Philop. Simpl. || 18. re om. SUV WX, leg. Them. Soph. 
v. L (om. τε cum codd. Hayduck 88, 36) || 19. καὶ om. ET, leg. Them. Soph. ‘II 
20. ἕνεκεν STU VWX || 21. εἴρηται SV WX Soph. et sine dubio Philop. 381, 4 ἢ} 
22. ὑπάρχοι EV, ὑπάρχει TW || 23. καὶ om. ESU Wy || 24. πνεύμων STUVWxXy 
Them. Philop. Simpl. Soph. || πλεῖον SU VWy Them. Soph., πλέον T || 28. ψυχικῆς 
δυνάμεως πρὸς Wy et Philop., vulgatam tuentur Simpl. Alex. apud Simpl. Soph. { 
80. καὶ prius om. SU VX, posterius EW, leg. καὶ utrobique Soph. || 31. re leg. etiam 
Soph., τὰ SU VX || τὸ τύπτον unc. incl. Essen || 32. δή om. 8 UV WX, leg. Soph. { 
33- ἀναπνεομένου] ἀνάγκῃ ἐκπρεομένου coni. Essen || βῆξις E Ty Them. (sed v. 1. βήξ), 

CH. 8 420 Ὁ 12—421 a 6 89 

are said to possess voice, such as those in the Achelous, merely 
make a noise with their gills or some other such part. Voice is 
sound made by an animal, and not by any part of its body in- 
differently. But, as in every case of sound there is something 
that strikes, something struck and a medium, which is air, it is 
reasonable that only creatures which inhale air should have voice. 
For here nature uses the air that is inhaled for two purposes, just 
as it uses the tongue for tasting and for speech, the former use, for 
tasting, being indispensable and therefore more widely found, while 
expression of thought isa means to well-being. Similarly nature uses 
the breath first as a necessary means to the maintenance of internal 
warmth (the reason for which shall be explained elsewhere) and, 
further, as a means of producing voice and so promoting well-being. 
The organ of respiration is the larynx, and the part to which this 
part is subservient is the lung: for it is this organ, namely, the 
lung, which enables land animals to maintain a higher temperature 
than others. Respiration is also needed primarily for the region about 
the heart. Hence, as we draw breath, the air enters: and so the 
impact upon the windpipe, as it is called, of the air breathed is 
voice, the cause of the impact being the soul which animates the 
vocal organs. For, as we said before, it is not every sound made 
by an animal that is voice. Noise can be produced even with the 
tongue or as in coughing: but it is necessary for voice that the 
part which strikes should be animate and that some mental image 
should be present. For voice is certainly a sound which has signif- 
cance and is not like a cough, the noise of air respired: rather with 
this air the animal makes the air in the windpipe strike against the 
windpipe. A proof of this is the fact that we cannot speak while 
inhaling or exhaling breath, but only while we hold it in: for 
anyone who holds his breath uses the breath so held to cause 
motion. And it is evident why fishes are voiceless. It is because 
they have no larynx. And they are without this part because 
they do not take in the air nor breathe. Why this is so does 
not concern us here. 

βήξ etiam Philop. Simpl. Soph. |] 421 a, 1. τῷ οὕτω τύπτειν coni. Essen || 3. ἀλλὰ 
κατέχοντα om. Ey et Soph. || rofro EV W Bek. Trend., τούτῳ Them. Philop. Simpl. 
Soph. vet. transl. Torst. || δὲ] γὰρ STU VW || 5. ἀναπνέουσιν. ἀλλ᾽ ol λέγοντες οὕτως 
ἁμαρτάνουσιν. δι’ SV W et vet. transl., ἀλλ᾽ of λέγοντες ὅτι φωνοῦσιν οἱ ἰχθύες διαμαρ- 

τάνουσιν. δι’ X, et certe Philoponus legit tale additamentum 384, 11 544. {| 6. μὲν οὖν] 
δ᾽ VX, om. SU || ἔσται SU VX Soph., ἔστω in paraphr. Philop. 



ω 4 ~ 
9 πΠερὶ δὲ ὀσμῆς καὶ ὀσφραντοῦ ἧττον εὐδιόριστόν ἐστι τῶν 
~ “A ΝΑ ε ε 
εἰρημένων: οὐ γὰρ δῆλον ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ἡ ὀσμή, οὕτως ὡς ὁ 
, «ἡ \ ΝᾺ ¥ > "4 Ν ͵ἱκά θ - > 
ψόφος ἢ τὸ χρῶμα. αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι τὴν αἰσθησιν ταύτην οὐκ 
“ ‘ 
ἔχομεν ἀκριβῆ, ἀλλὰ χείρω πολλῶν ζῴων: φαύλως yap 
“~ ~ > “~ 
ἄνθρωπος ὀσμᾶται, καὶ οὐθενὸς ὀσφραίνεται τῶν ὀσφραντῶν 
+ A AR A ΑΣ , e > 3, 9 ΜΝ ~A 3 θ 
ἄνευ τοῦ λυπηροῦ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος ἀκριβοῦς τοῦ alo On- 
ra ¥ 3 a Ν ‘\ λ ᾽ θ λ ~ , 
2Typiov. εὔλογον δ᾽ οὕτω καὶ τὰ σκληρόφθαλμα τῶν χρωμά- 
> 4 Ν ‘ ὃ ὃ ’ > ~ 5 Ν ὃ 
των αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ διαδήλους αὐτοῖς εἶναι Tas ὃια- 
Ν ΜᾺ ᾽ ‘ a“ ΝᾺ ‘ 3 / Ὁ 
φορὰς τῶν χρωμάτων πλὴν τῷ φοβερῷ καὶ ἀφόβῳ- οὕτω 1s 
δὲ καὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ 



3 aN ¥ Ν Ν ΜᾺ Ἁ ξ » Ἀ to a 
ἀνάλογον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν γεῦσιν Kal ὁμοίως τὰ εἰδὴ τῶν 
χυμῶν τοῖς τῆς ὀσμῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀκριβεστέραν ἔχομεν τὴν γεῦ- 
‘\ XN ἊΝ s = 6N € - ? > -¥ ‘ ¥ 
σιν διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὴν ἁφήν τινα, ταύτην δ᾽ ἔχειν THY αἵ- 
‘\ + > 4 > μ᾿ δ ~ + 
σθησιν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀκριβεστάτην: ἐν μὲν yap ταῖς addats 20 
λείπεται πολλῶν τῶν ζῴων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἁφὴν πολλῷ τῶν 
+ / 3 a Ν Ν 4. / 3 a 
ἄλλων διαφερόντως ἀκριβοῖ. διὸ Kal φρονιμώτατόν ἐστι τῶν 
ζῴων. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων παρὰ 
Ἂ 3 4 ΝᾺ 5 5 ‘an ‘ 3 a) 5 ¥ 
τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο εἶναι εὐφνεῖς καὶ adveis, παρ ἀλλο 
δὲ δέ € \ Ν / > ‘a Ἁ ὃ , 
ἐ μηδέν: οἱ μὲν γὰρ σκληρόσαρκοι ἀφυεῖς τὴν διάνοιαν, 25 
e Α ’ 9 “~ ¥ 9 4 Ν € ‘ 
30 δὲ μαλακόσαρκοι εὐφυεῖς. ἔστι δ᾽, ὥσπερ χυμὸς ὁ μὲν 
λ ‘ ε δὲ / Ψ Ν 3 / > Ν Ἀ Ν ¥ 
γλυκὺς ὁ δὲ πικρός, οὕτω καὶ ὀσμαί (ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἔχουσι 
Ν 3 ? 3 ‘ Ἀ 4 2 Ν ® ΝᾺ 
τὴν ἀνάλογον ὀσμὴν καὶ χυμόν, λέγω δὲ οἷον γλυκεῖαν 
9 ᾿ \ Ν ld Ν, ," > “ € [4 “ ‘ 
ὀσμὴν καὶ γλυκὺν χυμόν, τὰ δὲ τοὐναντίον)" ὁμοίως δὲ Kat 
δριμεῖα καὶ αὐστηρὰ καὶ ὀξεῖα καὶ λιπαρά ἐστιν ὀσμή; 30 
9 ν ¥ 
ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, διὰ TO μὴ σφόδρα διαδήλους εἶναι τὰς 
Ν ψ 
ὀσμὰς ὠσπερ τοὺς χυμούς, ἀπὸ τούτων εἴληφε τὰ ὀνόματα 
» ξ A ~ 
καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τῶν πραγμάτων: ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλυκεῖα [ἀπὸ 4210 
a“ / “~ [οὶ 
τοῦ] κρόκου καὶ μέλιτος, ἡ δὲ δριμεῖα θύμον καὶ τῶν τοιού- 
4 των. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἔστι δ᾽ ὥσπερ 


Ν, 3 \ “ 4 a io a 
Kal ἢ ἀκοὴ καὶ ἑκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ 

8. ἡ om. SUX Philop., leg. Simpl. 151, 33 || ὀδμή ET W, ὀσμή Them. Simpl. 
Philop. Soph. || 9. y. ἢ τὸ φῶς ἢ TWXy Philop. 388, 4 Simpl. et, ut videtur, 
Them. 67, 29, om. ἢ τὸ φῶς Soph. || 10. χείρονα SW Philop. 386, 5 (v. 1. χεῖρον), 
χείρων E, χεῖρον X Simpl. 152, 1 || 11. ὄσφραίνεται ET W vet. transl. Torst., αἰσθάνεται 
reliqui ante Torst. omnes et, ut videtur, Them. 67, 33 || 16. ὀδμὰς ET Wy || καὶ περὶ ras 
ὀσμὰς P, καὶ κατὰ ras ὀσμὰς coni. Christ || 21. πολλῶν] πολλῷ ES UV Bek., πολλῶν 
sine dubio Them. 67, 30 Philop. 388, 19 Simpl. 151, 21. 30, πολλοῖς Soph. οἵ, x || τῶν 
ante ζῴων om. XP || πολλῶ ESTUV Wy, etiam Them., qui 68, 9 σύμπαντα πλεονεκτοῦ- 
μεν τὰ Spa interpretatur, Philop. 386, 6. 388, 19 sq. Soph. 91, 2 Trend. Torst., om. X, 

CH. 9 421 a 7---421 Ὁ 4 ΟἹ 

Of smell and the object of smell it is less easy to speak de- 9 
finitely than of the senses above-mentioned: for the nature of 
odour is by no means so clear as is the nature of sound or of 
colour. The reason is that this sense in us is not exact, but 
Smell in inferior to that of many animals. In fact, man has 
man de- a poor olfactory sense and perceives none of the objects 

of smell unless they be painful or pleasant, which 1m- 
plies that the organ is wanting in accuracy. It is reasonable to 2 
suppose that animals with hard eyes perceive colour in the same 
vague way and do not distinguish the varieties of colour except in 
so far as they do, or do not, inspire fear. And this is the way in 
which mankind perceive odours. For it would seem that, while 
there is an analogy to taste and the varieties of flavour answer 
to the varieties of smell, our sense of taste is more exact because 
it is a modification of touch and the sense of touch is the most exact 
of man’s senses. In the other senses man is inferior to many of 
the animals, but in delicacy of touch he is far superior to the rest. 
And to this he owes his superior intelligence. This may be seen 
from the fact-that it is this organ of sense and nothing else which 
makes all the difference in the human race between the natural 
endowments of man and man. For hard-skinned men are dull of 
intellect, while those who are soft-skinned are gifted. 

As with flavours, so with odours: some are sweet, some bitter. 3 
(But in some objects smell and flavour correspond ; for example, 
Varieties they have sweet odour and sweet flavour: in other 
of odour ~~ things the opposite is the case.) Similarly, too, an odour 
flavour. may be pungent, irritant, acid or oily. But because, as 
we said above, odours are not as clearly defined as the corre- 
sponding flavours, it is from these latter that the odours have 
taken their names, in virtue of the resemblance in the things. 
Thus the odour of saffron and honey is sweet, while the odour 
of thyme and the like is pungent; and so in all the other cases. 
Again, smell corresponds to hearing and to each of the other 4 
senses in that, as hearing is of the audible and inaudible, and 

πολλῶν nulla codicum, quos quidem contulit, auctoritate Bek., confirmat P || τῶν ἄλλων 
om. X |{ 23. καὶ τὸ EST W, om. καὶ X. || 27. ὀδμαί et 28. et 29. ὀδμὴν E || 27. adda... 
29. τοὐναντίον in parenth. ponenda censet M. Alford, post 27. ὀσμαί et post 29. τοὐναντίον 
punct. vulg. || 29. τὰ δὲ τοὐναντίον ante 28. λέγω SU VX, eodem loco, quo vulgata, etiam 
Them. Philop. || 30. ὀδμή sine articulo E (Bhl.) || post ὀσμή punct. vulg. || 32. ὀδμὰς E || 
421 Ὁ, t. ἀπὸ τοῦ solus E vet. transl. Bek. Trend. Biehl, ἀπὸ τοῦ unc. incl. Rodier, 
om. reliqui, etiam Simpl. 153, 34 Torst., qui virgulam post γλυκεῖα et post 2. δριμεῖα 
posuit || 2. καὶ τοῦ uw. T Bek. Trend., τοῦ om. Simpl. || 4. καὶ ἢ om. SU VX, καὶ om. 
W Them. Bek. Trend., ἡ ἀκοὴ exstingui vult Madvig. 

92 DE ANIMA If CH. 9 

ΝᾺ ‘ 9 ’ \ ¢ ¥ 
καὶ ἀνηκούστου, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ καὶ ἀοράτου, καὶ ἢ ὄσφρη- 5 
“A > +f \ Ν Ν 
σις τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ καὶ ἀνοσφράντον. ἀνόσφραντον δὲ τὸ μὲν 
Ν ‘ Ψ δύ » 9 , \ δὲ ἃ ¥ ν 
παρὰ τὸ ὅλως ἀδύνατον ἔχειν ὀσμήν, TO OE μικρᾶν EXO 
Ν Ν, 4 ξ , δὲ \ Ν 3 λέ 
καὶ τὸ φαύλην. ὁμοίως ὃὲ καὶ TO ἀγευστον λέγεται. 
Δ rd Ὁ a? a 
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις διὰ τοῦ μεταξύ, οἷον ἀέρος ἢ ὕδατος" 
ὶ γὰρ τὰ ἔνυδρα δοκοῦσιν ὀσμῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁμοίως καὶ το 
καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἔνυδρα δοκοῦσιν ὀσμῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁμοίως 
Ν > a 9.9 ‘ Ν, 
ἔναιμα καὶ ἄναιμα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ αέρι: καὶ γὰρ 
δ Ἃ \ ν᾽ 
τούτων ἔνια πόρρωθεν ἀπαντᾷ πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν ὕποσμα 
4 N ε / 
γινόμενα. διὸ καὶ ἄπορον φαίνεται, εἰ πάντα μὲν ὁμοίως 
Ἃ 3 ¢ XN 
ὀσμᾶται, ὃ δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος ἀναπνέων, μὴ ἀναπνέων δὲ 
- “κ᾿ ¥ 
ἀλλ᾽ ἐκπνέων ἢ κατέχων τὸ πνεῦμα οὐκ ὀσμᾶται, οὔτε 15 
πόρρωθεν οὔτ᾽ ἐγγύθεν, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐπὶ τοῦ μυκτῆρος ἐντὸς τεθῇ" 
ἴω - 9 7 
καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ τιθέμενον τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἀναίσθητον 
» ‘ ,ὕὔ 3 Ν \ » A > ΝᾺ Ν 3 θ f 
εἶναι κοινὸν πάντων" ἀλλὰ τὸ avev τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν μὴ αἰσθά- 
ΝᾺ ψ 
νεσθαι ἴδιον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων" δῆλον δὲ πειρωμένοις" ὥστε 
¥ > » 
τὰ ἄναιμα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀναπνέουσιν, ἑτέραν ἂν Ti αἴσθησιν 20 
» Ἁ Ν , 9 9 δύ » ~ > ~ 
ἔχοι Tapa tas λεγομένας. ἀλλ᾽ advvarov, εἴπερ τῆς ὀσμῆς 
3 δ ε \ “~ 3 ‘a ¥ Ν ὃ IO 
αἰσθάνεται: ἣ yap Tov ὀσφραντοῦ αἴσθησις καὶ δυσώδους 
καὶ εὐώδους ὄὀσφρησίς ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ φθειρόμενα φαίνεται 
εν aA 3 A > A e7> @ ¥ a 5 , 
ὑπὸ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ὀσμῶν ὑφ᾽ ὦνπερ ἄνθρωπος, οἷον daddh- 
του καὶ θείου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ὀσφραίνεσθαι μὲν οὖν ἀναγ- 25 
ῪᾺ 3 9 3 3 ? ¥ s ἌΝᾺ 9 ᾽ ¢ 
καῖον, GAN οὐκ ἀναπνέοντα. ἔοικε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διαφέ- 
9 , A \ \ LA ¥ , y 
pew τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ὥσπερ 
Ἀ ¥ Ἁ \ nn / ‘ \ ‘ ¥ 
τὰ ὄμματα πρὸς τὰ τῶν σκληροφθάλμων: τὰ μὲν yap ἔχει 
la “ ¥ ¥ Ν , Δ Ν a 
φράγμα καὶ ὥσπερ ἔλυτρον τὰ βλέφαρα, ἃ μὴ κινήσας 
μηδ᾽ ἀνασπάσας οὐχ dpa: τὰ δὲ σκληρόφθαλμα οὐδὲν 30 
»Ἤ “ 3 > θέ e ΜᾺ ‘ / 3 “ 
Exel τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ᾽ εὐθέως δρᾷ τὰ γινόμενα ἐν τῷ δια- 
™ > 
φανεῖ: οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον τοῖς μὲν 

ἀκάλυφες εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸ ὄμμα, τοῖς δὲ τὸν ἀέρα δεχο- 4228 

2 ¥ 3 / a 3 ‘4 > 4 
μένοις ἔχειν ἐπικάλυμμα, ὃ ἀναπνεόντων ἀποκαλύπτεσθαι, 
8 διευρυνομένων τῶν φλεβίων καὶ τῶν πόρων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο 

5. καὶ τοῦ ἀνηκ. TX || καὶ τοῦ ἀορ. TX, utroque loco om. τοῦ Them. || 4 om, 
SVX, leg. Them. || 6. καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσῴρ. ST UX, om. τοῦ Them. || 7. ὀδμήν EW ἢ 
8. τὸ ante φαύλην om. S WX Bek. Trend., leg. Them. || 10. ὀδμῆς E || ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 
SUVX Philop. Bek. Trend., ὁμοίως καὶ E (Trend.) et TW || rx. τὰ ἔναιμα καὶ τὰ ἄν. 
SUVX Bek. Trend. Philop., τὰ ἔναιμα Soph. 92, 14 (--καὶ τὰ dvaipa> a Soph. omissa 
add. Hayduck) || 13. καὶ om. E || rq. et 15. ddu. E ἢ 14. μέν post ἀναπνέων SUV X 
Bek. Trend., μὲν ὀσμᾶται W, μὲν om. etiam Them. || 2} ἀναπνέων δὲ om. SU VX, leg. 
Them. || 15. ἀλλ’ ἐκπνέων om. Wy Them. || τό. post τεθῇ τό. et post πειρωμένοις το. cola 

CH. 9 421 Ὁ 5—422a 3 93 

sight of the visible and invisible, so smell is of the odorous and 
inodorous. By inodorous may be meant either that which is wholly 
incapable of having odour or that which has a slight or faint odour. 
The term tasteless involves a similar ambiguity. 

Further, smell also operates through a medium, namely, air or 5 
The water. For water animals, too, whether they are, or 
medium. are not, possessed of blood, seem to perceive odour 
as much as the creatures in the air: since some of them also 
come from a great distance to seek their food, guided by the 

Hence there is an obvious difficulty, if the process of smell is 6 
Inhalation CVerywhere the same, and yet man smells when in- 
a neces. | haling but does not smell when instead of inhaling he 
dition in is exhaling or holding his breath, no matter whether 
=e the object be distant or near, or even if it be placed 
on the inside of the nostril. The inability to perceive what 
is placed immediately on the sense-organ man shares with all 
animals: what is peculiar to him is that he cannot smell without 
inhaling. This is made plain by experiment. Consequently blood- 
less animals, since they do not breathe, might be thought to have 
a distinct sense other than those commonly recognised. But, we 
reply, that is impossible, since it is odour which they perceive. 
For perception of odour, be it fragrant or noisome, constitutes 
smelling. Moreover, it is found that these bloodless animals are 
destroyed by the same powerful odours as man, such as asphalt, 
brimstone and the like. It follows then that they do smell, but 
not by inhaling breath. 

It would seem, again, that in man the organ of this sense 7 
differs from that of the other animals, as his eyes differ from those 
of hard-eyed animals. Man’s eyes have, in the eyelids, 
a sort of screen or sheath and without moving or open- 
ing them he cannot see: while the hard-eyed animals have nothing 
of the kind, but at once see whatever is taking place in the trans- 
parent medium. So, too, it seems, the organ of smell in some 
animals is unenclosed, just as is the eye, but in those which take 
in the air it has a curtain, which is removed in the process of 
inhaling, by dilatation of the veins and passages. And this is the 8 


ponenda censet Hayduck, progr. Gryph. 1873, p. 3, recte || 19. pro ἀνθρώπων legi vult 
ὀσφραντῶν Hayduck, quod probant Susemihl, Jen. Lit. Zt. 1877, p. 7o8 Rodier II, 312 
Beare, p, 150, adn. I {| 21. ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον a sensu suspecta videntur Trend., leg. Soph. et 
sine dubio Them. || 23. δὴ Ey, δὲ etiam Them. || 29. φράγμα] πῶμα W, quod ex priore 
editione huc illatum esse suspicatur Torst. || 31. εὐθὺς S UV X et in interpret. Them. 
Soph., εὐθέως Simpl. || 422 a, 3. φλεβῶν ET Them., φλεβίων etiam Philop. 

94 DE ANIMA Il CHS. 9, 10 

A A oe A 9 A \ 
τὰ ἀναπνέοντα οὐκ ὀσμᾶται ἐν τῷ ὕγρῳ' ἀναγκαῖον yap 
» A ἰοὺ 9 “Ἂ € ΜᾺ 
ὀσφρανθῆναι ἀναπνεύσαντα, τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ 5 
~ “ Ψ ε \ Ὁ: a 
ἀδύνατον. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ ὀσμὴ τοῦ ξηροῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ χυμὸς τοῦ ὑγροῦ, 
7 a 
τὸ δὲ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον δυνάμει τοιοῦτον. 
on 3 ¥ ~ X 
10 =‘ Td δὲ yevordy ἐστιν ἅπτόν τι" καὶ τοῦτ᾽ αἴτιον TOU μὴ 
3. 3 ry \ a A tAX / ¥ a , 
εἶναι αἰσθητὸν διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀλλοτρίου ὄντος σώματος 
950." Ἁ ε ε ’ Ν \ A δὲ 3 @ ε ‘4 \ 
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἀφή. Kal TO σῶμα ὃὲ ἐν ᾧ ὃ χυμός, TO γευ- τὸ 
? 3 ε ~ oe aN . ~ > ε , ὃ \ aN > 9 
στόν, ἐν ὑγρῷ ws ὕλῃ" τοῦτο δ᾽ ἅπτόν TL. διὸ κἂν εἰ ἐν 
ὕδατι ἦμεν, ἠσθανόμεθ ἂν ἐμβληθέντος τοῦ γλυκέος' 
3. a \ A , »\\ 4 a 
χοὐκ ἦν δ᾽ ἂν ἡ αἴσθησις ἡμῖν διὰ τοῦ μεταξύ, ἀλλὰ τῷ 
~ “ ΝᾺ ~ ~ ‘N ‘ ΝᾺ 
μειχθῆναι τῷ ὑγρῷ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποτοῦ. τὸ δὲ χρῶμα 
ae) “ \ “ Fa 
οὐχ οὕτως ὁρᾶται τῷ μείγνυσθαι, οὐδὲ Tals ἀπορροίαις. ὡς 15 
4 δι \ ‘ "θέ 5 ε δὲ A Ve , y 
μὲν οὖν τὸ μεταξὺ οὐθέν ἐστιν. ὡς δὲ χρῶμα τὸ ὁρατόν, οὕτω 
τὸ γευστὸν ὁ χυμός. οὐθὲν δὲ ποιεῖ χυμοῦ αἴσθησιν ἄνευ 
ε , 5.3 ¥ 3 , rN , ε / @ ‘ 
ὑγρότητος, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει ἐνεργείᾳ 7) δυνάμει ὑγρότητα, οἷον τὸ 
ἁλμυρόν: εὐτηκτόν τε γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ συντηκτικὸν γλώττης. 
3 ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄψις ἐστὶ τοῦ τε ὁρατοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου (τὸ 20 
γὰρ σκότος ἀόρατον, κρίνει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἡ ὄψις), ἔτι τοῦ 
λίαν λαμπροῦ (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀόρατον, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τοῦ 
, ε 7 δὲ νι ς 3 Ν / Ν ΜᾺ ἐν 
σκότους), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ψόφου τε καὶ σιγῆς, ὧν 
\ Ἀ > ‘ N δ᾽ > 9 4 Ἀ , a 
TO μὲν ἀκουστὸν τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἀκουστόν, Kal μεγάλου ψόφου, 

, e Κ n A Ψ \ ς ‘ , 
καθάπερ ἡ ὄψις τοῦ λαμπροῦ (ὥσπερ γὰρ 6 μικρὸς ψόφος 25 
ἀνήκουστος, τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ὁ μέγας τε καὶ ὃ βίαιος), ἀό- 

\ Ν »" μ id ν ‘ > > » ‘ 
parov δὲ τὸ μὲν ὅλως λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλων τὸ 
"δύ \ 5? oN . ἊΝ » a ‘\ ¥ 
ἀδύνατον, TO ἐὰν πεφυκὸς μὴ ἔχῃ ἢ φαύλως, ὥσπερ 
τὸ ἄπουν καὶ TO ἀπύρηνον' οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ γεῦσις τοῦ γευστοῦ 
τε καὶ ἀγεύστου, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μικρὸν ἢ φαῦλον ἔχον χυμὸν 30 
ἢ φθαρτικὸν τῆς γεύσεως. δοκεῖ δ᾽ εἶναι ἀρχὴ τὸ ποτὸν καὶ 
7. αἰσθ. τὸ ὃ. SUX Them., τὸ om. Soph. || 10. δὲ om. SUX, leg. Simpl. | 
τα. ὕλη E (Trend.), ὕληι E (Bek. Bus.), ὕλῃ etiam ceteri codd. et Them. 70, 33 et Simpl. 
et Philop. et ap. Philop. Alex., qui etiam ὕδατι pro ὕλῃ legi tradit || car] καὶ SU VW X, 
κἂν etiam Them. || 12. εἶμεν solus E, sed e in rasura positum, videtur subfuisse ἦμεν 
(Trend.), εἶμεν Bek. Torst. {| 12. αἰσθανοίμεθ᾽ solus Ἐν Bek. Torst., alcOaviued’ T et, ut 
videtur, Them. 70, 24, ἦμεν et ἠσθανόμεθ᾽ leg. Philop. Soph. Trend. ‘‘essemus et 
sentiremus” vet. transl. || 17. αἴσθησιν χυμοῦ SU V, χυμοῦ αἴσθ. etiam Soph. || 18. ἄλλ... 
ὑγρότητα om. E, post ἁλμυρόν ponit T, vulgatam tuentur Them. Simpl. Soph. || 19. τηκτόν 
SUX Soph. || γλώσσης SUV || 20. de hoc loco ὥσπερ...31. γεύσεως vid. Bon. stud. 
Arist. If, III, 43, quem in distinguendis singulis enunciationis membris, praeeunte 
Biehlio, secutus sum || 20. re om. EW, leg. Them. Philop. Soph. || rod ante dop. om. 

STU Wy, leg. Them. Philop. Soph. || 26. virgulam post ἀνήκουστος Bon. et Madvig, 
Advers. crit. I, Ὁ. 472, et iam Them. hunc locum ita interpretatus est. vost τινὰ Rek. 

CHS. 9, 10 4228 4—422a 31 95 

reason why animals which breathe cannot smell in the water. For 
it is necessary for them to take in breath before smelling and 
this they cannot do in the water. Odour is included under that 
which is dry, as flavour under that which is moist, and the organ of 
smell is potentially dry also. 

The object of taste is a species of tangible. And this is the 10 
reason why it is not perceived through a foreign body 
as medium: for touch employs no such medium either. 
The body, too, in which the flavour resides, the proper object of 

taste, has the moist, which is something tangible, for its 
has no - . . . 
external matter or vehicle. Hence, even if we lived in water, 
medium. we should still perceive anything sweet thrown into the 
water, but our perception would not have come through the 2 
medium, but by the admixture of sweetness with the fluid, as is 
the case with what we drink. But it is not in this way, namely, by 
admixture, that colour is perceived, nor yet by emanations. 
Nothing, then, corresponds to the medium; but to colour, which is 
the object of sight, corresponds the flavour, which is the object of 
Moisture vaste. But nothing produces perception of flavour in the 
indispens- absence of moisture, but either actually or potentially the 
ante: producing cause must have liquid in it: salt, for instance, 
for that is easily dissolved and acts as a dissolvent upon the tongue. 

Again, sight is of the invisible as well as the visible (for dark- 3 
ness is invisible and this, too, sight discerns as well as light) and, 
further, of that which is exceedingly bright, which is likewise in- 
visible, though in a different way from darkness. Similarly hearing 
has to do with noise and silence, the former being audible, the latter 
inaudible, and, further, with loud noise, to which it is related as 
vision is to brightness, a loud and a violent sound being in a manner 
just as inaudible as a faint sound. The term invisible, be it noted, 
is applied not only to that which it is wholly impossible to see, 
which corresponds to other cases of the impossible, but also when 
a thing has imperfectly or not at all its natural properties, answer- 
ing to the footless and the kernel-less. So, too, taste has for object 
The object mot only that which can be tasted, but also the tasteless, 
of taste. = by which we mean that which has little flavour or hardly 
any at all, or a flavour destructive of the taste. Now in flavour 
this distinction is supposed to start with the drinkable and the 

Torst. Trend. || 27. <mh ἔχον xp@ua> post ὅλως addendum censet Essen || 27. ὥσπερ... 
28. ἀδύνατον in parenth. posuit Rodier || 28. ἂν E || 29. ἁπτὸν 5, ἁπλοῦν EB, ἄπουν 
Philop. Simpl. || 7d ante dtp. om. ETU Simpl. || δὲ ETUW Simpl., δὴ etiam 
Them. 71, 7 et Soph. 94, 28 videntur legisse || 30. καὶ τοῦ dy. SV Them., om. τοῦ 
Simpl. || 7] καὶ VX. 


96 DE ANIMA JI CHS. I0, 11 

A ; 3 Ν Ν Ν f 
ἄποτον: γεῦσις γάρ τις ἀμφότερα' ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν φαύλη 
Ν Ν a ΄ Ν δὲ ἈΝ , 4 δὲ 
4 καὶ φθαρτικὴ τῆς γεύσεως, τὸ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν. ἔστι O€ κοι- 
‘ cya \ 4 Ν i 3 ‘\ δ᾽ ς Ν x / 
νὸν ἁφῆς Kal γεύσεως TO ποτόν. ἐπεὶ ὁ ὑγρὸν TO γευστόν, 
a ¢e N > 3 
ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον αὐτοῦ μήτε ὑγρὸν εἶναι ἐντελε- 422b 
/ / ε an 
χείᾳ μήτε ἀδύνατον ὑγραίνεσθαι. πάσχει yap τι ἡ γεῦ- 
κι + 
σις ὑπὸ TOD γευστοῦ, ἡ γευστόν. ἀναγκαῖον apa ὑγρανθῆναι 
7 ‘ ξ ν / Ν 
τὸ δυνάμενον μὲν ὑγραίνεσθαι σωζόμενον, μὴ ὑγρὸν δέ, τὸ 
γευστικὸν αἰσθητήριον. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μήτε κατάξηρον οὖσαν 
‘\ a) 9 ; 4 / εξ / y δ ξ ‘ 
τὴν γλῶτταν αἰσθάνεσθαι μήτε λίαν ὑγράν" αὐτὴ yap ἀφὴ 
γίνεται τοῦ πρώτου ὑγροῦ, ὥσπερ ὅταν προγευματίσας τις 
ἰσχυροῦ χυμοῦ γεύηται ἑτέρου" καὶ οἷον τοῖς κάμνουσι πικρὰ 
πάντα φαίνεται διὰ τὸ τῇ γλώττῃ πλήρει τοιαύτης ὑγρό- 
ΜᾺ a) ¥ 
5 τητος αἰσθάνεσθαι. τὰ δ᾽ εἴδη τῶν χυμῶν, ὥσπερ Kal ἐπὶ το 
τῶν χρωμάτων, ἁπλᾷ μὲν τἀναντία, τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ 
᾽ 3 ’ δὲ “A \ ‘\ λ / a“ δὲ Ν ἐλ 7 
πικρόν, ἐχόμενα δὲ τοῦ μὲν τὸ λιπαρόν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ ἁλμυρόν" 
Ἁ Ν 3 4 Ν \ Ν 3 N Ν 4 
μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων τό τε δριμὺ Kal τὸ αὐστηρὸν καὶ στρυφνὸν 
καὶ ὀξύ' σχεδὸν γὰρ αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι διαφοραὶ χυμῶν. 
ὥστε TO γευστικόν ἐστι TO δυνάμει τοιοῦτον, γευστὸν δὲ TO ποιη- 




Ν 9 4 3 A 
TUKOV ἐντελεχείᾳ αὑτοῦ. 

Ἢ . ne A \ ν. δε) a ε "ΛΝ , 3 \ ε 
11 Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ περὶ ἀφῆς ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος" εἰ γὰρ ἡ 
ε A Ἅ a 3 A ¥ 5 Ν “ 9 Ἂ N ‘ 
aby μὴ pia ἐστὶν αἴσθησις ἀλλὰ πλείους, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰ 
ε Ἁ 9 Ν , > ¥y Ss 9% , 4 r 
ἁπτὰ αἰσθητὰ πλείω εἶναι. ἔχει δ᾽ ἀπορίαν πότερον πλείους 
εἰσὶν ἣ μία, καὶ τί τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὸ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ, πότερον 20 
ε Ν ‘ 3 a IND \ > ») Ἂ ¥ 3 ‘ “A 
ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο 
, 3 ‘ , Ν δὲ ΝᾺ 5 , x” , 
μέν ἐστι τὸ μεταξύ, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον αἰσθητήριον ἄλλο τί 
2 ἐστιν ἐντός. πᾶσά τε γὰρ αἴσθησις μιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως εἶναι 
ὃ ~ 5" » an’ ‘ 4 N 3 Ν ? ¢ N 
oKel, οἷον ὄψις λευκοῦ Kal μέλανος Kat ἀκοὴ ὀξέος καὶ 
βαρέος καὶ γεῦσις πικροῦ καὶ γλυκέος: ἐν δὲ τῷ ἁπτῷ ες 
‘ » > 4 \ / ‘ ε ’ 
πολλαὶ ἔνεισιν ἐναντιώσεις, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ξηρὸν ὑγρόν, 

λ ‘ λ 7 ‘ A ¥ v4 a) ¥ ὃ id 
σκληρὸν μαλακόν, Kal τῶν ἄλλων σα τοιαῦτα. ἔχει d€ 
τινα λύσιν πρός γε ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν, ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν 

32. ἀμφοτέρου coni. Trend. || 422 Ὁ, 1. καὶ om. Ξ5ΞΤΝΧ Them. || 4. μὲν om. 
SUV WX, leg. Philop. et, ut videtur, Them. 71, 34 || 6. γλῶσσαν Ὁ Ὁ Ν ΝΥ {{ αὕτη] 
coni. αὐτοῦ Torst., tuentur airy Philop. Simpl. Soph. || yap ἡ ἁφὴ E Simpl., ἡ om. 
Philop. Soph. || 8. χυμοῦ om. E, leg. Them. Soph. || 9. τὴν γλῶτταν πλήρη TWy ἢ 
13. τὸ ante aver. om. SV W || 16. post αὐτοῦ excidisse putat οἷον αὐτό Torst., ac re 
vera in interpret. habent οἷον αὐτό et Them. et Philop. || 17. καὶ περὶ] καὶ SU V X Soph., 

καὶ τῆς W et fort. Simpl., καὶ περὶ ἁφῆς etiam Philop. Torst. |] 20. τὸ ante τοῦ om. 
SVX Simpl. || darixod omnes codd. praeter W, qui ἁπτοῦ habet, ἁπτικοῦ etiam Simpl. 

CHS. I0, II 422a 32—422b 28 Q7 

undrinkable. Both are tastes of a sort, but the latter is poor or 
destructive of the faculty of taste, while the former is naturally 
adapted to it. The drinkable is the common object of touch and 4 
The of taste. But, since the object of taste is moist, the 
orm sense-organ which perceives it must be neither actually 
moist nor yet incapable of becoming moist. For taste is acted 
upon by the object of taste as such. The organ of taste, then, 
which needs to be moistened, must have the capacity of absorbing 
moisture without being dissolved, while at the same time it must 
not be actually moist. A proof of this is the fact that the tongue 
has no perception either when very dry or very moist. In the latter 
case the contact is with the moisture originally in the tongue, just 
as when a man first makes trial of a strong flavour and then tastes 
some other flavour; or as with the sick, to whom all things appear 
bitter because they perceive them with their tongue full of bitter 

As with the colours, so with the species of flavour, there are, 5 
Species of firstly, simple flavours, which are opposites, the sweet and 
flavour. the bitter; next to these on one side the succulent, on 
the other the salt; and, thirdly, intermediate between these, the 
pungent, the rough, the astringent and the acid. ‘These seem to 
be practically all the varieties of flavour. Consequently, while the 
faculty of taste has potentially the qualities just described, the 
object of taste converts the potentiality into actuality. 

The same account is to be given of touch and the tangible. 11 
If touch is not a single sense but includes more senses 
than one, there must be a plurality of tangible objects 
also. It is a question whether touch is several senses or only 
Is ita one. What, moreover, is the sense-organ for the faculty 
single of touch? Is it the flesh or what is analogous to this 

in creatures that have not flesh? Or is flesh, on 
the contrary, the medium, while the primary sense-organ is 
something different, something internal? We may argue thus: 2 
every sense seems to deal with a single pair of opposites, sight 
with white and black, hearing with high and low pitch, taste with 
bitter and sweet; but under the tangible are included several 
pairs of opposites, hot and cold, dry and moist, hard and soft and 
the like. A partial solution of this difficulty lies in the con- 


Soph. et, ut videtur, Them. 73, 12, ἁπτοῦ ἁπτικόν de coniect. scripsit Bek., quem secuti 
sunt Trend. Torst. || 21. ἡ om. SUVW, leg. Them. Simpl. Soph. |] 23. τε om. X, 
huic re respondet 25. δὲ, cf. Bz. Oestr. Gymn. Zeitschr. 1867, p. 680 || 26. εἰσὶν 

H. 7 

98 DE ANIMA IT CH. 11 

, « 3 “ 3 
ἄλλων αἰσθήσεών εἰσιν ἐναντιώσεις πλείους, οἷον ἐν φωνῇ οὐ 
Ἅ ’ἤ 
μόνον ὀξύτης καὶ βαρύτης, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος καὶ μικρότης 30 
A . pa AJ gy 3 N \ 
καὶ λειότης Kal τραχύτης φωνῆς καὶ τοιαῦθ᾽ ἕτερα. εἰσὶ δὲ 
‘ “ ~ N ων Ψ 3 Ν ,’ λὰ \ ἃ 
καὶ περὶ χρῶμα διαφοραὶ τοιαῦται ἕτεραι. adda τί τὸ ἕν τὸ ὑπο- 
’, y 3 Ἂ a σ΄ ma € “Ἂ 3 ¥ ¥ ὃ λ 
κεΐμενον, ὥσπερ ἀκοῇ ψόφος, οὕτω τῇ ἁφῇ, οὐκ ἐστιν ἐνδηλον. 
’ δ᾽ > ‘N A 3 θ id 3 - “ἡ » LNA. 3 
3 ΠΟΤΈΡΟΡ ἐστι TO αἰἱσὔητηριον EVTOS, Ἢ OV, a ευ- 
a A > ¥ 
θέως ἡ σάρξ, οὐδὲν δοκεῖ σημεῖον εἶναι τὸ γίνεσθαι τὴν al- 4238 
» Ἃ ᾽ 
σθησιν ἅμα θιγγανομένων. καὶ γὰρ νῦν εἴ τις περὶ τὴν σάρ- 
ms ¥ 
κα περιτείνειεν οἷον ὑμένα ποιήσας, ὁμοίως THY αἴσθησιν εὐ- 
θέως ἁψάμενος ἐνσημαίνει: καίτοι δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τούτῳ 
‘ > ᾽ 3 \ \ 4 ? ἴω ¥ 
476 αἰσθητήριον: εἰ δὲ καὶ συμφυὲς γένοιτο, θᾶττον ἔτι δι- 
" ¥ \ Ν “ ¥ 
uxvoir ἂν ἡ αἴσθησις. διὸ τὸ τοιοῦτο μόριον TOV σώματος ἔοι- 
9 “Ὁ 
κεν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ κύκλῳ ἡμῖν περιεπεφύκει ὁ 

> > a“ ‘ aA ¢ » > / Ν ’ Ν 

ἀήρ: ἐδοκοῦμεν γὰρ ἂν évi τινι αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ ψόφου καὶ 
~ ¥ LO 
χρώματος καὶ ὀσμῆς, καὶ pia τις αἴσθησις εἶναι ὄψις ἀκοὴ 
¥ a \ δ \ , > δ΄ 2 ς , 
ὄσφρησις. νῦν δὲ διὰ τὸ διωρίσθαι dv οὗ γίνονται αἱ κινήσεις, 10 
\ Ν 3 , 3 θ ΄ Ψ y 3. N de ‘a crea 
φανερὰ τὰ εἰρημένα αἰσθητήρια ἕτερα ὄντα. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἁφῆς 
~ ων ¥ > >/ N ‘ a“ Ψ > - 
τοῦτο νῦν ἄδηλον: ἐξ ἀέρος μὲν yap ἢ ὕδατος ἀδύνατον 
ΜᾺ Ἁ “ 
συστῆναι τὸ ἔμψυχον σῶμα" δεῖ γάρ τι στερεὸν εἶναι. λείπεται 
δὲ Ν > ἰοὺ N , ὧν @ nN ον € ‘ 

ὲ μεικτὸν EK γῆς Kal τούτων εἶναι, οἷον βούλεται «εἶναι» ἡ σὰρξ 
καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον: ὦστε ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ 15 
- a ΄ ὃ > κ᾿ ΄ ε 3 θ 4 , Ὁ 
ἅἁπτικοῦ προσπεφυκός, δι᾽ οὗ γίνονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις πλείους οὖ- 

ὃ λ αν δ᾽ Ψ λ “4 [2 > Ν᾿ ~ », ε ᾿ é é 
Saat. δηλοῖ ὃ ὅτι πλείους ἡ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης ἁφή" ἁπάντων 
γὰρ τῶν ἁπτῶν αἰσθάνεται κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μόριον καὶ χυμοῦ, 

3 Ν μὰ ΝΥ Ν 9 id ~ on δ. / a € 
εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ ἄλλη σὰρξ ἡσθάνετο τοῦ χυμοῦ, ἐδόκει ἂν ἡ 

oN Ἀ / > » ς a \ ¢ ε ΄ Ὰ Ν 
αὐτὴ καὶ μία εἶναι αἴσθησις ἡ γεῦσις καὶ ἡ ἁφή; νῦν δὲ 20 
δύο διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν. 

33. δῆλον SU VX, & δῆλον Ἐ, ὃν δῆλον T, ἔνδηλον etiam Simpl. Philop. ἢ 
423 8, I. post σάρξ signum interrogationis Bek. Trend., virguiam Torst. || r& E || 
2. vivom. 5 U V, leg. Them. || 4. ἁψάμενον P, ἁψαμένοις in interpret. Them., ἁψαμένοις vel 
ἁψαμένῳ coni. Trend., dyapévov coni. Torst. || ἐνσημήνεις X, ἂν ἐνσημαίνει T || 6. τοιοῦτον 
STUV WX, τοιοῦτο Philop. Them. (v.1. τοιοῦτον) || 9. ὀδμῆς ET ΝΥ, ὀσμῆς Philop. || 
to. κινήσεις καὶ al αἰσθήσεις U, αἰσθήσεις yp. S et Them. 73, 18, textum tuetur Soph. ἢ 
12. τοῦτο μὲν viv ET W, om. μὲν etiam Simpl. || γὰρ] οὖν coni. Essen {| x 3. pro ἔμψυχον 
coni. μεταξὺ ὃν Susemihl, Burs. Jahrb. IX, 351 || 14. δὴ VW Them. Bek. Trend. ἢ 
post βούλεται excidisse εἶναι καὶ coni. Torst., εἶναι e Themistio et Sophonia recepit 
Biehl, nihil desiderandum censet Rodier || 15. ἀνάλογον εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα αἴσθησις διὰ τοῦ 
μεταξύ, καὶ ἡ ἁφή Ald. Basil., quod additamentum e Themistio (cf. 73, 27) fluxisse 
recte iudicat iam Basil. in margine || ἀναγκαῖον καὶ] ἀναγκαῖον εἴναι καὶ ἘΣ, om. καὶ U 
Torst. || τὸ σῶμα εἶναι] εἶναι τὸ σῶμα U || τὸ ante μεταξύ TXy Them. Simpl. Torst., 

CH. II 422 Ὁ 29—423 a 21 99 

sideration that the other senses also apprehend more than one pair 
of opposites. Thus in vocal sound there is not only high and low 
pitch, but also loudness and faintness, smoothness and roughness, 
and soon. In regard to colour also there are other similar varieties. 
But what the one thing is which is subordinated to touch as sound 
is to hearing is not clear. 

But is the organ of sense internal or is the flesh the immediate 3 
what organ? No inference can be drawn, seemingly, from 
is the the fact that the sensation occurs simultaneously with 
organ? contact. For even under present conditions, if a sort of 
membrane were constructed and stretched over the flesh, this would 
immediately on contact transmit the sensation as before. And yet 
it is clear that the organ of sense is not in this membrane; although, 4 
if by growth it became united to the flesh, the sensation would be 
transmitted even more quickly. Hence it appears that the part 
of the body in question, that is, the flesh, is related to us as the 
air would be if it were united to us all round by natural growth. 
We should then have thought we were perceiving sound, colour 
and smell by one and the same instrument: in fact, sight, 
hearing and smell would have seemed to us in a manner to con- 
stitute a single sense. But as it is, owing to the media, by which 
the various motions are transmitted, being separated from us, the 
difference of the organs of these three senses is manifest. But in 
regard to touch this point is at present obscure. 

In fact, the animate body cannot consist of air or water 
singly, it must be something solid. The only alternative is that 
it should be a compound of earth and of these elements, as flesh 
and what is analogous to flesh profess to be. Consequently the 
body must be the naturally cohering medium for the faculty 
of touch, through which the plurality of sensations is communi- 
cated. That they are a plurality is made clear by touch in the 5 
case of the tongue, for the tongue perceives all tangible objects, 
and that at the same part at which it perceives flavour. Now, if 
the rest of the flesh also had perception of flavour, taste and touch 
would have seemed to be one and the same sense: whereas they 
are really two, because their organs are not interchangeable. 

quod probat etiam Steinhart, om. τὸ reliqui ante Biehlium omnes || 18. αἴσθεται STU | 
19. καὶ om. S Ὁ, leg. etiam Them. Simpl. 



nw » a) 5 ‘ 
6 ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἂν τις, εἰ Tay σῶμα βάθος ἔχει, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ 
\ / , ® 2 3 Ἀ , f Ν μον , 
τὸ τρίτον μέγεθος: av δ᾽ ἐστὶ δύο σωμάτων μεταξὺ σῶμά τι, 
> 9 7 “ 3 ‘4 4 ‘ δ᾽ ε 4 > ¥ 
οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ταῦτα ἀλλήλων ἅπτεσθαι" τὸ δ᾽ ὑγρὸν οὐκ ἐστιν 
¥ rd Oe \ ὃ ΄ 9 λ᾽ 3 a "ὃ > vA ¥ 
ἄνευ σώματος, οὐδὲ TO διερόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον ὕδωρ εἶναι ἢ ἔχειν 25 
»Ν-» ‘ ΜᾺ ¥ 
ὕδωρ' τὰ δὲ ἁπτόμενα ἀλλήλων ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, μὴ ξηρῶν τῶν ἄκρων 
¥ > σι "ὃ » 4 = > » λ \ Y¥ . 
ὄντων, ἀναγκαῖον ὕδωρ ἔχειν μεταξύ, οὗ ἀνάπλεα τὰ ἔσχατα 
εἰ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθές, ἀδύνατον ἅψασθαι ἄλλο ἄλλου ἐν ὕδατι, 
\ >. UN \ / Ν > ἊΜ +7 ε ? “ ¥ ε aN 
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι (ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔχει ὁ ἀὴρ 
Ν Ν > > ~ Ἅ Ν “ὃ ‘\ ‘ > ne "ὃ λ 
πρὸς τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ πρὸς τὰ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, λαν- 30 
, A a ε a) > Ἁ N > a y aa 
θάνει δὲ μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ Kal τὰ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ζῷα, 
7 εἰ διερὸν διεροῦ ἅπτεται)" πότερον οὖν πάντων ὁμοίως 423b 
ἐστὶν ἡ αἴσθησις, ἢ ἄλλων ἄλλως, καθάπερ νῦν δοκεῖ ἡ 
Ν a) N ε ε Ἀ “ Ψ e 3 ¥ A 
μὲν γεῦσις Kal ἡ ady τῷ amterOa, αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι ἄποθεν. 
4 > > ¥ 3 Ν δ \ 4 \ ‘ \ > 
τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ TO σκληρὸν Kai TO μαλακὸν δι 
ς 9, 3 / ν Ἀ Ἁ Ἂ Ν XN Ξε Ν 
ἑτέρων αἰσθανόμεθα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ψοφητικὸν καὶ τὸ δρατὸν 5 
Α \ 3 - 3 \ ‘ ‘ 4 Ν > 5 [4 Ν 
καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντόν: ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δ᾽ ἐγγύθεν. διὸ 
λανθάνει" ἐπεὶ αἰσθανόμεθά γε πάντων διὰ τοῦ μέσου" ἀλλ᾽ 
ἐπὶ τούτων λανθάνει. καίτοι καθάπερ εἴπαμεν καὶ πρότερον, 
aA 3 > ε 2 3 ΄ ~ € ΝᾺ ξ ᾽ ? 
Kav εἰ δι’ ὑμένος αἰσθανοίμεθα τῶν ἁπτῶν ἁπάντων λανθά- 
γοντος ὅτι διείργει, ὁμοίως ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν τὸ 
τῷ ὕδατι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι: δοκοῦμεν γὰρ νῦν αὐτῶν ἅπτεσθαι 
8 καὶ οὐδὲν εἶναι διὰ μέσον. ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τὸ ἁπτὸν τῶν dpa- 
τῶν καὶ τῶν ψοφητικῶν, ὅτι ἐκείνων μὲν αἰσθανόμεθα τῷ 
Ν Ἶ : ε Ρ μ τῷ 
τὸ μεταξὺ ποιεῖν τι ἡμᾶς, τῶν δὲ ἁπτῶν οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ με- 
ταξὺ ἀλλ᾽ ἅμα τῷ μεταξύ, ὥσπερ ὁ δι’ ἀσπίδος πληγείς" 15 
οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀσπὶς πληγεῖσα ἐπάταξεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἅμ᾽ ἄμφω 
~ ν 3 ΜΆ 
9 συνέβη πληγῆναι. ὅλως δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἣ σὰρξ καὶ ἡ γλῶττα, ὡς 

22. ἀπορήσειε...423 Ὁ, 3. ἄποθεν. De hoc loco vid. Torst. et Bon., stud. Arist. II, III, 62, 
quem in interpungendis singulis enunciationis membris, praeeunte Bieblio, secutus sum || 
23. δύο om. SU VX, leg. Soph. || 24. αὐτὰ EWy, ταῦτα Them. Soph. || 25. ὕδατος 
SVX, leg. ὕδωρ Simpl. |] 27. of] 6S TU VX, οὗ Them. Soph. |] 28. post ὕδατι punct. 
Bek. Trend. Torst., colon posuit Biehl || 30. τὸ om, T et E (Trend.), leg. Soph. ἢ} 
ἐν αὐτῷ τῶ ὕδ. ET Wy, ἐν αὐτῷ 85. Soph., reliqui et scripti et impressi ἐν τῷ ὕδ, || 
31. ἡμᾶς ὁ ἀὴρ pro ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ coni. Rodier II, 328 || ante καὶ, omisso ὥσπερ, legisse 
videtur τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι Philop. 428, 26, fortasse etiam Soph. 98, 5 || post tga vulg. 
virg. sustulit Rodier || 423 Ὁ, 1. ἁπάντων SUVW || 2. ἄλλως; καθ. Torst., ἄλλως, 
καθ. Bek. Trend. Bon. || 3. μὲν γεῦσις] μὲν γὰρ γεῦσις W, γεῦσις, omisso μὲν, P ἢ 
ἄποθεν; τὸ Trend., ἄποθεν. τὸ Bek. Torst. Bon. || 5. ψοφητὸν SX, ἔχον ψόφον Ῥ ἢ 
6. τὸ SVX || τὸ ΞΌΝΧ, τὰ utroque loco Soph. τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ λίαν ἐγγὺς λανθάνει P Ι 
ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν...7. λανθάνει interpolata esse censet Rodier II, 328 || post ἐγγύθεν 

CH. II 423 a 22—423b 17 IOI 

Here a question arises. All body has depth, this being the 6 
third dimension, and, if between two bodies a third body is inter- 
Contact posed, the two cannot touch one another. Now that 
in water which is fluid is not independent of body, nor is that 
and in air. . - σι « . - . 

which is wet: if it is not itself water, it must contain 
water. But when bodies touch one another in the water, since their 
exterior surfaces are not dry, there must be water between them, 
the water with which their extremities are flooded. If, then, all 
this be true, no one thing can possibly touch another in the water, 
nor yet in the air: for the air stands to the objects in the air 
as water to the things in water, but this fact we are more apt 
to overlook, just as aquatic animals fail to notice that the things 
which touch one another in the water have wet surfaces. The 7 
question then arises: is the mode of perception uniform for all 
objects or does it differ for different objects? According to the 
prevalent view, taste and touch operate by direct contact, while 
The the other senses operate at a distance. But this view ts 
medium. incorrect. On the contrary, we perceive the hard and the 
soft also mediately, just as much as we do the resonant, the visible, 
the odorous. But the latter are perceived at a distance, the former 
close at hand: and this is why the fact escapes us, since we really 
perceive all objects through a medium, though in touch and taste 
we fail to notice this. And yet, as we mentioned above, even if we 
perceived all objects of touch through a membrane without being 
aware of its interference, we should be just in the same position 
as we are now with regard to objects in the water or in the air: 
for, as it is, we suppose that we are touching the objects them- 
selves and that there is no intervening medium. But there is 8 
this difference between the tangible on the one hand and visible 
and resonant things on the other: the latter we perceive because 
the medium acts in a certain way upon us, while tangible objects 
we perceive not by any action upon us of the medium, but con- 
currently with it, like the man who is struck through his shield. 
It is not that the shield was first struck and then passed on the 
blow, but, as it happened, both were struck simultaneously. And, 9 
generally, it would seem that the flesh and the tongue are related 

colon Torst. || 7. post λανθάνει virgulam Bek. Trend., colon Torst. |] verba 7. ἐπεὶ... 
8. λανθάνει unc. incl. Essen || 8. εἴπαμεν solus E, reliqui codd. εἴπομεν excepto P, qui 
ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον habet || 9. ἠισθανοίμεθα E, αἰσθανώμεθα STU VX, αἰσθανοίμεθα 
etiam Them. || 11. ἐν om. SV Wy || »νῦὧν om. SU VX Bek. Trend. Torst., leg. etiam 
vet. transl. || 12. ὁρατικῶν ET y || 13. τῶν om. EPy Soph. || ἐκεῖνα ESTUVX, 
ἐκείνων P, etiam Soph. || μὲν om. P || τό. ἀλλ᾽ ἅμ᾽ ἄμφω e codd. solus E, etiam Them. 
Sc ph. vet. transl. Torst., az’ om. reliqui ante Torst. omnes || 17. γλῶσσα STU VXy. . 


YA 2 4 SLA 
ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ πρὸς THY ὄψιν καὶ THY ἀκοὴν καὶ THY 
4 \ 3 di ¥ 
ὄσφρησιν ἔχουσιν, οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς TO αἰσθητήριον ὥσπερ 
Aw ἴω 3 / ¢€ - 
ἐκείνων ἕκαστον. αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητηρίον απτομένου 20 
~ ἴω » a » Ὰ 
οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖ οὔτ᾽ ἐνταῦθα γένοιτ᾽ ἂν αἴσθησις, olov εὐ τις σῶμα 
a) ; ¥ “ Ν ων 
[τὸ] λευκὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄμματος θείη τὸ ἔσχατον. ἢ καὶ δῆλον 
A“ ΝᾺ ῳ A a 
ὅτι ἐντὸς τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ αἰσθητικόν. οὕτω yap ἂν συμβαΐνοι 
4 A s AN “~ ¥y 3 ἢ νὴ >, A “ 3 θ 4 
ὅπερ Kal ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων' ἐπιτιθεμένων yap ἐπὶ TO αἰσθητή- 
> , 
ριον οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν σάρκα ἐπιτιθεμένων αἰσθά- 25 
ε ΜᾺ e ’ 
νεται; ὥὦστε τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ ἡ σάρξ. 
e ‘ ‘ 4) > A ε ὃ Ἁ “ ? ἐν ΜᾺ . λ ? 
10 drat μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν at διαφοραὶ τοῦ σώματος ἢ σῶμα" λέγω 
~ ld ‘ 
δὲ διαφορὰς at τὰ στοιχεῖα διορίζουσι, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ξηρὸν 
ὑγρόν, περὶ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν στοιχείων. 
XN \ > 4 9 -~ ‘\ ε ᾽ A 3 & e 7 

Ir τὸ δὲ αἰσθητήριον αὐτῶν τὸ ἀἁπτικόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡ καλουμένη 30 

adn ὑπάρχει αἴσθησις πρώτῳ, τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτόν ἐστι μόριον. 
ad a) ® 
τὸ yap αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τι ἐστίν. ὦστε τὸ ποιοῦν οἷον αὐτὸ 4248 
ἐνεργείᾳ τοιοῦτον ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖ δυνάμει ὄν. διὸ τοῦ ὁμοίως 
“~ “ a < a \ “~ > ? / 

θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ ἣ σκληροῦ Kal μαλακοῦ οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα, 
3 Ν ~ ε ~ ε “~ 3 4 e ,ὔ A 
ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπερβολῶν, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον μεσότητός τινος 
οὔσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει 5 
τὰ αἰσθητά. τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν" γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον 

3 A ? A yy ‘N “~ ᾽ν Ἁ ? 4 
αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων' καὶ δεῖ ὥσπερ TO μέλλον αἰσθή- 
σεσθαι λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος μηδέτερον αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐνεργείᾳ, 

4 “~ 

δυνάμει δ᾽ ἄμφω (οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), Kal ἐπὶ τῆς 
e lal ‘ 

12 ἀφῆς μήτε θερμὸν μήτε ψυχρόν. ἔτι δ᾽ ὥσπερ ὁρατοῦ καὶ τὸ 
3 } > e ε 4 δ ‘ ε ‘ ΜᾺ > 
ἀοράτον ἣν πως ἡ ὄψις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ai λοιπαὶ τῶν ἄντι- 

Y N © εν 

κειμένων, οὕτω Kal 7 ἀφὴ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ Kal ἀνάπτου' ἄναπτον 

3 5 N é “\ ¥ 4 ”~ A 
δ᾽ ἐστὶ τό τε μικρὰν ἔχον πάμπαν διαφορὰν τῶν ἁπτῶν, 

ΠῚ , ε 5 Ν σι ε A ee 2 4 
οἷον πέπονθεν ὁ ἀήρ, Kal τῶν ἁπτῶν ai ὑπερβολαΐί, ὥσπερ 

“ θ + θ᾽ ξ 4 A oy ~ 9 θ 4 ¥ 
τὰ φθαρτικά. Kal ἑκάστην μὲν οὖν τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἴρηται τς 

20, ἁπτομένων ὌΝ X || 21. τὸ ante σῶμα e priori editione suscepit Torst. |] 22. τὸ ante 
λευκὸν om. 5 U VX, une. incl. Biehl || ἢ W, om. S U V, ἢ etiam Simpl, |} 23. αἰσθητήριον 
TW, αἰσθητικόν etiam Simpl. || 24. ὥσπερ SUVX || xalom. STUVWXy || 27. ἁπτὰ 
TUV Philop. Soph., αὗται P, ἁπταὶ etiam Simpl. 158, 23 sed αὗται ad hunc locum 
etiam in interpr. 164, 17. 18 || 28. αἷς SU V X et fort. Soph. roo, 28 || 29. περὶ τῶν στ. 
ET y Philop., τῶν om. Simpl. Soph. Bek. Trend. Torst. || 31. ὑπάρχει αἴσθησις πρώτῳ 
E Simpl. 158, 25, ὑπάρχει αἴσθησις καὶ πρώτω TW, αἴσθησις πρώτως y, “in quo sensus 
vocatus tactus” vet. transl., αἴσθησις om. reliqui codd., etiam Them. Soph. Bek. Trend. 

Torst. || 424 a, 2. post ἐνεργείᾳ vulg. virgulam sustuli || τὸ δυνάμει ὅν e prima editione 
scripsit Torst. || 2. ὁμοίαυ TUX, ὁμοίως etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. || 3. καὶ prius] ἢ 

CH. II 423 Ὁ 18—-424a 16 103 

to the true sense-organ as are air and water to the organs of sight, 
hearing and smell respectively. But neither in the one case nor in 
the other would sensation follow on contact with the sense-organ; 
for instance, if a body that is white were placed on the outer 
surface of the eye: which shows that the instrument that appre- 
hends the tangible is within. We should then get the same result 
as in the case of the other senses. What is placed on the sense- 
organ we do not perceive: what is placed on the flesh we do 
perceive: therefore flesh is the medium for the faculty of touch. 
It is, then, the distinctive qualities of body as body which are 
the objects of touch: I mean those qualities which determine the 
Tangible Clements, hot or cold, dry or moist, of which we have 
qualities. previously given an account in our discussion of the 
elements. And their sense-organ, the tactile organ, that is, in 
which the sense called touch primarily resides, is the part which has 
potentially the qualities of the tangible object. For perceiving is 
a sort of suffering or being acted upon: so that when the object 
makes the organ in actuality like itself it does so because that organ 
is potentially like it. Hence it is that we do not perceive what 
Sense is just as hot or cold, hard or soft, as we are, but only 
ἃ mean. the excesses of these qualities: which implies that the 
sense is a kind of mean between the opposite extremes in the 
sensibles. This is why it passes judgment on the things of sense. 
For the mean is capable of judging, becoming to each extreme 
in turn its opposite. And, as that which is to perceive white and 
black must not be actually either, though potentially both, and 
similarly for the other senses also, so in the case of touch the 
organ must be neither hot nor cold. Further, sight is in a manner, 
The in- as we saw, of the invisible as well as the visible, and 
tangible. in the same way the remaining senses deal with oppo- 
sites. So, too, touch is of the tangible and the intangible: where 
by intangible is meant, first, that which has the distinguishing 
quality of things tangible in quite a faint degree, as is the case 
with the air; and, secondly, tangibles which are in excess, such as 
those which are positively destructive. Each of the senses, then, 
has now been described in outline. 
SUW Them. Soph. || ἢ] «at V || καὶ] ἢ SUV Them. Soph. || 5. καὶ om. E, leg. 

Soph. || 6. αἰσθητήρια STUX, αἰσθητά etiam Philop. Soph. || 9. οὕτω... ἄλλων ἴῃ 
parenth. Torst. || δὴ SU W Bek. Trend., om. X || ἐπὶ ante τῆς om. ST VX. 



104 DE ANIMA II CH. 12 

> v4 ον ‘al Ψ ε 
10 Καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὁτι ἡ 
“A > “ IQA 7 ~ 
μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς 
ia) 4 ¥ “ 4 A ~ 
ὕλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ 
a “~ / \ Ν ΜᾺ KA ‘ 
χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ TO 20 
a “ 5 2 3 ὧν Ν “Ὁ fa, ε la \ 
χαλκοῦν σημεῖον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἣ χρυσὸς ἢ χαλκός ὁμοίως δὲ 
‘ n ψΨ mn my 
καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἑκάστου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα ἢ χυμὸν ἢ 
@ 3 ? ᾽ 3 > 
ψόφον πάσχει, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἣ ἕκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλ 
3 ᾿ \ a“ > 
2 ἢ τοιονδί, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. αἰσθητήριον δὲ πρῶτον ἐν 
> A 3 ἰοὺ Ψ 
ᾧ ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ταὐτόν, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι ἔτε- 25 
> \ / 
pov: μέγεθος μὲν yap ἄν τι εἴη τὸ αἰσθανόμενον: ov μὴν τό 
ἰ D εἶ ὑδ᾽ ἡ atod ἐγεθός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ λό- 
γε αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι οὐδ᾽ ἡ αἴσθησις μέγεθός ; 
3 / Ν Ν 
8γος τις καὶ δύναμις ἐκείνου. φανερὸν δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων καὶ διὰ 
Ἵ ἣν αἰσθητῶν at ὑ hat φθείρουσι τὰ αἰσθητή- 
τί ποτε τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ φθείρουσ ητή 
> a“ / € “ “ 
ρια' ἐὰν γὰρ ἢ ἰσχυροτέρα τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἡ κίνησις, λύε- 30 
“A ἐν ¥ Ψ ‘ € 
ται ὃ λόγος (τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν ἡ αἴσθησις), ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ συμ- 
- rant ΤᾺ Ὰ ‘ 
4 devia καὶ 6 τόνος κρουομένων σφόδρα τῶν χορδῶν" καὶ διὰ 
/ ? 
Ti ποτε TA φυτὰ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἔχοντά τι μόριον ψυχι- 
A “ ‘ \ 4 
κὸν Kal πάσχοντά TL ὑπὸ TOV ἁπτῶν αὐτῶν: Kal yap ψύχε- 
Ν [4 ¥ δ Ἁ ᾿ ¥ / δὲ 2 b 
ται καὶ θερμαίΐνεται' αἴτιον yap TO μὴ ἔχειν μεσότητα, μηδὲ 424 
, > ‘ ν Ν [ὃ δέ θ ἰφὶ 3 θ a SAN 
τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν οἵαν τὰ εἴδη δέχεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀ 
, Ν A λ > ’ δ᾽ ¥ > {0 » 
5 πάσχειν μετὰ τῆς VANS. ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἂν τις εἰ πάθοι av 
e > 3 ΜᾺ ‘ LOU 3 θῇ A c€  N , A 
τι UT ὀσμῆς TO ἀδύνατον ὀσφρανθῆναι, ἢ ὑπὸ χρώματος TO 
ἊΜ “ ¥ > ‘ 
μὴ δυνάμενον ἰδεῖν: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ 5 
~ ¥ € 3 Ν᾿, “ 
τὸ ὀσφραντὸν ὀσμή, εἴ TL ποιεῖ, THY ὄσφρησιν ἡ ὀσμὴ ποιεῖ" 
~ Ὄ ¢ 
ὥστε τῶν ἀδυνάτων ὀσφρανθῆναι οὐθὲν οἷόν τε πάσχειν ὑπ 
ὀδμῆς" ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων: οὐδὲ τῶν δυ- 
~ ‘ Kd 
νατῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ αἰσθητικὸν ἕκαστον. ἅμα δὲ δῆλον Kal οὕτως. 
a ¥ ‘ \ ἮΝ 
οὔτε γὰρ φῶς καὶ σκότος οὔτε ψόφος οὔτε ὀσμὴ οὐδὲν ποιεῖ 
Ν [4 9 3 3 εν > rf a 7% € ἝΝ ~ 
τὰ σώματα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν οἷς ἐστίν, οἷον ἀὴρ ὃ μετὰ βροντῆς 
6 διστησι τὸ ξύλον. ἀλλὰ τὰ ἁπτὰ καὶ οἱ χυμοὶ ποιοῦσιν" εἶ 



18. εἰδῶν om. SUX Soph. Torst., leg. Them. et sine dubio Simpl. Philop. ἢ 
10. ὁ om. ETy, leg. Them. Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 23. ἐκείνων] ἐκείνινον coni, 
Essen || 24. τὸν om. E (Trend.), τοιονδὶ κατὰ λόγον Soph. || 25. ταὐτό Ty Torst., 
ταὐτά SX, ταὐτόν Them. Philop. Simpl. || 26. τι ety] ἣν X || 28. ἐκεῖνο ἘΣ, ἐκείνου 
etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. {| 31. qv om. ET Wy, leg. Them. Soph. || τοῦτο.. αἴσθησις 
in parenth. Torst. |} 34. τι om. SUX Them. || ἁπτῶν αὐτῶν" καὶ ET ὟΝ, αὐτῶν om. 
ceteri codd. Them. Soph. Bek. Trend. Torst. Biehl in ed. pr. || 424 Ὁ, 2. δέχεσθαι τὰ 
εἴδη SVX, textum tuetur Them. || 4. τί om. ET Wy Torst., leg. etiam Them. {| édu4s 
ET || 6. ὀδμή ἘΠῚ virgulam post ποιεῖ omissam post ὄσῴρησιν ponit Bek., correxit 

CH. 12 424 a 17----424 Ὁ 12 105 

In regard to all sense generally we must understand that sense 192 
What is that which is receptive of sensible forms apart from 
sense is. their matter, as wax receives the imprint of the signet- 
tion: seal ring apart from the iron or gold of which it is made: it 
“pon we*- takes the imprint which is of gold or bronze, but not gué 
gold or bronze. And similarly sense as relative to each sensible is 
acted upon by that which possesses colour, flavour or sound, not in 
so far as each of those sensibles is called a particular thing, but 
in so far as it possesses a particular quality and in respect of its 
Faculty character or form. The primary sense-organ is that in 2 
and organ. which such a power resides, the power to receive sensible 
forms. Thus the organ is one and the same with the power, but 
logically distinct from it. For that which perceives must be an 
extended magnitude. Sensitivity, however, is not an extended 
magnitude, nor is the sense: they are rather a certain character or 
power of the organ. From this it is evident why excesses in the 3 
sensible objects destroy the sense-organs. For if the motion is too 
violent for the sense-organ, the character or form (and this, as we 
Saw, constitutes the sense) is annulled, just as the harmony and the 
pitch of the lyre suffer by too violent jangling of the strings. It is 4 

Why evident, again, why plants have no sensation, although 
piants | they have one part of soul and are in some degree af- 

sensation. fected by the things themselves which are tangible: for 
example, they become cold and hot. The reason is that they have 
in them no mean, no principle capable of receiving the forms of 
sensible objects without their matter, but on the contrary, when 
they are acted upon, the matter acts upon them as well. It might 5 
be asked whether what is unable to smell would be in any 

Senuible way acted upon by an odour, or that which is incapable 
thins of seeing by a colour, and so for the other sensibles. But, 
without if the object of smell is odour, the effect it produces, if it 

sensation ἢ . . 
produces an effect at all, is smelling. Therefore none 

of the things that are unable to smell can be acted upon by odour, 
and the same is true of the other senses: nor can things be acted 
upon when they have the power of sensation, except as they 
individually possess the particular sense required. This may also 
be shown as follows. Light and darkness do not act upon bodies 
at all; neither does sound nor odour: it is the things which possess 
them that act. Thus it is the air accompanying the thunderbolt 
which rives the timber. But, it may be said, things tangible and 6 

Trend., quem secutus est Torst. || ἢ UW, om. SVX || ὀδμὴ E | 7. ὑπ᾽ ὁδμῆς om. 
SUX |l 9. ἑκάστου pro ἕκαστον fort. legendum esse censet Rodier II, 336 || 11. ὁ ἀὴρ 5, 
ὁ ἀὴρὸ U WX, ἀὴρ. 

τοῦ DE ANIMA Il CH. I2 

᾿ \ ¥ ‘\ 3 a) 
yap μή, ὑπὸ τίνος ἂν πάσχοι τὰ aya καὶ ἀλλοιοῖτο; 
4 Fal ἴω A A € 3 3 A 
dp οὖν κἀκεῖνα ἐμποιεῖ; ἢ ov πᾶν σῶμα παθητικὸν UT ὀσμῆς 

Ν ® 
καὶ ψόφου: καὶ τὰ πάσχοντα ἀόριστα, καὶ ov μένει, οἷον 15 
>? ¥ \ ν 7 ᾽ “3. 3 Ν \ 9 ΓᾺ 
ἀήρ' ὄζει yap ὦσπερ παθών τι. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι 
\ ~ Ἁ 
παρὰ τὸ πάσχειν τι; ἢ τὸ μὲν ὀσμᾶσθαι καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, 6 

δ᾽ ἀὴρ παθὼν ταχέως αἰσθητὸς γίνεται. 

14. ἐμποιεῖ ETWy Biehl, ἐμποιήσει U, ποιεῖ Philop. in lemmate 443, 9, ποιήσει 
reliqui ante Biehlium omnes || post ἐμποιεῖ interrogationis punctum om. Biehl in ed. alt. 

Rodier ἢ ὀδμῆς ET V |] τό. et 17. τι om. SUX || 17. καὶ ante αἰσθάνεσθαι ex solo E 
(Bus.) addidit Torst., xa? om. Philop. 

CH. 12 424 Ὁ 13—424b 18 107 

flavours do so act: else by what agency are inanimate things acted 
upon or changed? Shall we, then, conclude that the objects of the 
other senses likewise act directly? Is it not rather the case that 
not all body can be affected by smell and sound, and that the 
bodies which are so affected are indeterminate and shifting; for 
example, air? For odour in the air implies that the air has been 
acted upon in some way. What then is smelling, besides a sort of 
suffering or being acted upon? Or shall we say that the act of 
smelling implies sense-perception, whereas the air, after it has been 
acted upon, so far from perceiving, at once becomes itself per- 
ceptible to sense? 


N ‘ - ed 
1 Ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις Erépa παρὰ τὰς πέντε (λέγω 22 
Α [4 ¥ 3 ‘4 ¥ ~ ε 4 ) > 4 ων 
δὲ ταύτας ὄψιν, ἀκοήν, ὄσφρησιν, γεῦσιν, ἀφὴν), ἐκ TOUT 
Oo ‘ ¥ cys ‘ 
πιστεύσειεν ἄν τις. εἶ yap παντός, οὗ ἐστὶν αἴσθησις apy, Kat 
“A \ ‘ ma κε ~ @® ε Ἁ / 
νῦν αἴσθησιν ἔχομεν (πάντα yap Ta τοῦ ἁπτοῦ ἢ ἁπτὸν πάθη 25 
ΜᾺ e “ ε “A 3 θ ᾽ὔ 3 3 ’ 3 ¥ 3 λ / EL 
τῇ ἀφῇ ἡμῖν αἰσθητά ἐστιν), ἀνάγκη τ᾽, εἴπερ ἐκλείπει Tis 
aa) / \ \ 
αἴσθησις, Kat αἰσθητήριόν τι ἡμῖν ἐκλείπειν - καὶ ὅσων μὲν 
" A cym ¢ 3 a 
αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενοι αἰσθανόμεθα, τῇ ἀφῇ αἰσθητά ἐστιν, ἣν 
’ ¥ Ψ μ᾿ \ an ‘ \ \ 9 
τυγχάνομεν ἔχοντες, ὅσα δὲ διὰ τῶν μεταξὺ καὶ μὴ αὐ- 
a Ἂ ® ‘ ¥ 
τῶν ἁπτόμενοι, τοῖς ἁπλοῖς, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι" 30 
Ν ¥ 

2 ἔχει δ᾽ οὕτως, dot εἰ μὲν Ov ἑνὸς πλείω αἰσθητὰ ἕτερα ὄντα 
> ’ ΜᾺ 2 3 4 Ἃ ¥ ‘ a > ,. 
ἀλλήλων τῷ γένει, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἔχοντα TO τοιοῦτον αἰσθητή 

3 ἊἪ 3 θ δ εν ® > 39 5.4 3 ‘ \ 3 θ 
ριον ἀμφοῖν αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι (οἷον εἰ ἐξ ἀέρος ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθη- 
> ‘ a 

τήριον, καὶ ἔστιν ὃ ἀὴρ καὶ ψόφου καὶ χρόας), εἰ δὲ πλείω 

A an} ae ‘ ? ¥ ‘ 
τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον χρόας Kal ἀὴρ Kal ὕδωρ (ἄμφω yap δια- 4258 
φανῇ), Kat ὁ τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἔχων μόνον αἰσθήσεται τοῦ δι᾽ ἀμ- 

κι A \ o£ A 3 7 , 3 ͵ 7 3 , 

3 pow τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν ἐκ δύο τούτων αἰσθητήρια μόνον ἐστίν, 
9 3? Ἁ Vd ξ ἢ A ‘a “ὃ ε δ᾽ 3 ᾿ 
ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος (ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόρη ὕδατος, ἡ δ᾽ ἀκοὴ 

“ a A a 

ἀέρος, ἢ δ᾽ ὄσφρησις θατέρου τούτων), τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἣ οὐθενὸς ἢ 5 
‘ ΄ 92 Ν \ ¥ A ’ 3 θ ΜᾺ δὲ 
κοινὸν πάντων (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἄνευ θερμότητος αἰσθητικόν), γῆ δὲ 
A - ‘ , 3 
ἢ οὐθενός, ἢ ἐν τῇ ἀφῇ μάλιστα μέμεικται ἰδίως" διὸ λείπουτ 
4 ἂν μηθὲν εἶναι αἰσθητήριον ἔξω ὕδατος καὶ dépos: ταῦτα δὲ 
22. Hine etiam cod. L || 23. τούτων EW Soph., τῶνδε δῆλον SX, τῶνδε Bek. Trend. 
Torst. Biehl in ed. pr., etiam Them. || 24. huius enunciationis εἰ γὰρ... apodosin incipit 
ab ὥστε 4258, 11. Torst., ab a, 9. rica: dpa Bon., quod iam Simpl. fecerat, in inter- 
pungendis singulis comprehensionis membris, praeeunte Biehlio, secutus sum Bon. | 
25. ἔχομεν αἴσθησιν STU W, vulgaiam tuentur Alex., ἀπ, καὶ λύσ. 89, 27 et Simpl. | 
27. Te om. L, post ἡμῖν ponit W, αἰσθητήριόν τι etiam Alex. et Simpl. {{| ἐκλιπεῖν 
pr. E (Bek.) nunc ἐκλείπειν (Trend.), ἐκλείπειν etiam Alex. go, 15 Them. Simpl. | 
28. αὐτοὶ T Wy Alex. 89, 30 et 90, 21, αὐτῶν etiam Simpl. 178, 29. 187, 21 et 
Soph. || 30. ἁπλοῖς διαστήμασι Δ. TW et margo U, ἁπλοῖς ἀποστήμασι Simpl., 

vulgatam tuentur Alex. 89, 32. 90, 23 Philop. Soph. || 32. ἀλλήλων ὄντα τῷ γένει 
STUVWy, textum receptum tuentur Alex. 90,.35 et Simpl. | 7) om. TU y Simpl., 


That there is no other sense distinct from the five, by which 1 
No sixth I mean sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, anyone may 
sense. convince himself on the following grounds. Let us 
assume that, as a matter of fact, we have sensation of every 
sensible object for which touch is the appropriate sense, all qualities 
of the tangible, as such, being perceptible to us through touch. 
Let us further assume that, when any sense is lacking to us, an 
organ of sense must also be lacking; and further, that whatever 
we perceive by actual contact is perceptible by touch, a sense 
which we do possess, while whatever we perceive mediately and 
not by actual contact is perceptible by means of the elements, 
namely, air and water. And here are implied two cases. Suppose, 2 
first, we have perception by one and the same medium of two several 
things, different in kind from one another, then whoever possesses 
the appropriate sense-organ must be percipient of both: as, for 
example, if the sense-organ consists of air and air is also 
the medium of both sound and colour. Next suppose several 
media to transmit the same object, as both air and water 
transmit colour, both being transparent, then he who possesses 
one of these alone will perceive whatever is perceptible through 
both media. Now, of the elements, air and water are the only 3 
two of which sense-organs are composed. For the pupil of the 
eye is of water, and the ear is of air, and the organ of smell 
is of one or the other, while fire, if present anywhere, enters into 
all, since nothing can be sentient without warmth. Earth, again, 
belongs to none of the sense-organs, or, at most, is a constituent 
peculiar to touch. It follows, then, that outside water and air there 
is no sense-organ. Now sense-organs composed of air and water 4 

leg. etiam Alex. go, 36 Il 425 a, 2. τοῦ δι τοῖν L, om. SUVX et pr. E Philop. 
452, 21 Bek., τοῦ δι᾽ T Wy Simpl. vet. transl. Trend. Torst. || 6. γῆ δὲ] ἡ δὲ γῆ SU W, 
γῇ δὲ etiam Them. Philop. || 7. ἢ prius om. pr. E (Trend.) W, leg. Simpl. Philop. 
453, I Soph. 106, 39, ἢ οὐθενὸς ἢ om. SUV, une. incl. Essen {|ἐδίως om. LU VXy, 
leg. Simpl. || διὸ in rasura Ἐπ (Bhl.), om. LS UVX || λίποιτ᾽ Ἐπ. λείποιτ᾽ E, (Bhl.). 


καὶ νῦν ἔχουσιν ἔνια, ζῷα: πᾶσαι ἄρα αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἔχονται 
ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀτελῶν μηδὲ πεπηρωμένων᾽ φαίνεται γὰρ καὶ 
ἢ ἀσπάλαξ ὑπὸ τὸ δέρμα ἔχουσα ὀφθαλμούς" ὥστ᾽ εἶ μή τι 
ἕτερόν ἐστι σῶμα, καὶ πάθος ὃ μηθενός ἐστι τῶν ἐνταῦθα 
σωμάτων, οὐδεμία ἃ ἂν ἐκλείποι αἴσθησις. 
ς ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν κοινῶν οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι αἰσθητήριόν τι ἴδιον, 
ὧν ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει αἰσθανόμεθα κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον τ5 
td > ΝᾺ ε ’ . ~ 
κινήσεως, στάσεως, σχήματος, μεγέθους, ἀριθμοῦ, ἑνός: ταῦτα 
ee ’ 7 Ν 
γὰρ πάντα κινήσει αἰσθανόμεθα, οἷον μέγεθος κινήσει" ὠστε καὶ 
, Ν ΜᾺ “ 3 3 ~ ae’ x 
σχῆμα" μέγεθος γάρ τι τὸ σχῆμα" τὸ δ᾽ ἠρεμοῦν τῷ μὴ κι- 
~ ~ “Ἂ ~ Ἂ Ν 50 
νεῖσθαι- ὁ δ᾽ ἀριθμὸς τῇ ἀποφάσει τοῦ συνεχοῦς, καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις" 

ξ 4 A A 3 θά » θ 4 on Ψ δύ 
ἑκάστη γὰρ ἕν αἰσθάνεται αἴσθησις. ὥστε δῆλον OTL ἀδύνατον 20 
“ > @ ν 

ὁτονοῦν ἰδίαν αἴσθησιν εἶναι τούτων, οἷον κινήσεως" οὕτω 
a ~ \ ‘ 3 ΄ on 

6 yap ἔσται ὥσπερ νῦν TH ὄψει TO γλυκὺ αἰσθανόμεθα. τοῦτο 

A ¥ a . 9 

δ᾽ ὅτι ἀμφοῖν ἔχοντες τυγχάνομεν αἴσθησιν, ἢ Kal ὅταν συμ- 

/ 9 ΄ 3 δὲ / ὃ “ a Ἰλλ᾽ Ἅ Ν 

πέσωσιν ἅμα γνωρίζομεν- εἶ δὲ μή, οὐδαμῶς ἂν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ 

συμβεβηκὸς ἠσθανόμεθα, οἷον τὸν Κλέωνος υἱὸν οὐχ ὅτι 25 

Κλέωνος υἱός, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι λευκός: τούτῳ δὲ συμβέβηκεν υἱῷ 
, > ~y Se Sy ἤδη ἔ ἔσθ , 

7 Κλέωνος εἶναι. τῶν δὲ κοινῶν ἤδη ἔχομεν αἴσθησιν κοινήν, 
3 Ά ᾿ς 3 κ᾽. 3 N POL . δ ἴω “ az 

ov κατὰ συμβεβηκός" οὐκ ap ἐστὶν ἰδία: οὐδαμῶς yap ἂν 

ἠσθανόμεθα ἀλλ᾽ ἢ οὕτως ὥσπερ εἴρηται τὸν Κλέωνος υἱὸν 



ει. σπάλαξ ES Bek., πάλαξ y, ἀσπάλαξ Them. Simpl. Philop. Soph. Trend. Torst. {| rods 
ὀφθαλμούς TU Wy, τοὺς om. etiam Them. Philop. Soph. || 13. μίαν λέποι EB, μία ἂν ἐλλείΐποι 
Ly Simpl., μία ἂν λείποιτο T, μία ἂν ἐκλείποι E,S Alex. 90, τ Them. Torst., μία ἂν ἐκλίποι 
reliqui ante Torst. omnes || 14. ἀλλὰ...Ὁ, 3. εἶναι. Totum hunc locum transponendo et 
emendando restituere voluit Susemihl, Burs. Jahresber. XXX, 42, aliter vero Essen II, 
79 sqq-, III, 14 || 1§- ὧν καὶ ἑκάστῃ E Torst., καὶ om. ceteri codd. et Simpl. 183, x 
Philop. 457, 19 || ob a Torst. coni. et a Neuhaeusero, Ar. Lehre, ἢ. 36, probatum in 
textum recepit Biehl, quamquam omiserunt omnes codd. et Them. Philop. Simpl., ‘‘non 
secundum accidens” vet, transl., οὐ non necessarium esse iudicant Zeller, Gesch. d. Phil. 
ἃ, Gr. IT, 2, p. 543 Brentano, 1. 1, 82 Kampe, d. Erkenntnistheorie des Arist. ro4 
Rodier || 15. ofov...19. συνεχοῦς in parenthesi ponenda et ante 19. καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις Jacunam 
esse censet Susemihl || 16. post ἀριθμοῦ virgulam posuit Torst., iam Philop. hune locum 
ita interpretatus est 457, 24 || évés om. V || £7. κινήσει prius] κοινῇ e Simpl. scripsit 
Torst., sed et Simpl. 183, 4. 30 habet κινήσει (quod etiam 184, 7 scripsit Hayduck), 
κινήσει etiam Them. et Soph., probat Neuhaeuser, p. 32, τῇ κινήσει Prisc, L. 21, 17, 
addendum ἄλλῃ ante κινήσει censet Essen II, 79 || post οἷον lacunam esse eamque sic 
explendam putat Torst.: κίνησιν " τὸ δὲ, vulgatam leg. Simpl. || 18. μεγέθους coni. Torst., 
μέγεθος ttiam Philop. Soph., defendit Freudenthal, Rhein. Mus. 1869, p. 396 || τι καὶ τὸ 
LTW, καὶ om. etiam Philop. Soph. || 21. obrw...24. γνωρίζομεν et 27. τῶν 52..,28. ἰδία 
posterioris, sed 24. εἰ d&...29, εἴρηται prioris recensionis esse iudicat Torst., quod refellit 
Neuhaeuser, p. 32 || 23. καὶ om. praeter E omnes codd. || 24. ἅμα γνωρίζομεν E Simpl, 
Torst., ἀναηνωρίξομεν T Bek. Trend., γνωρίξομεν reliqui ante Torst. omnes, etiam Philop. { 

CH. I 425 8 9---425 a 29 ΣΙ 

certain animals do, in fact, possess. We may infer, then, that all the 
senses are possessed by those animals which are fully developed 
and are not crippled: even the mole is found to have eyes 
beneath its skin. And thus, unless there exists some unknown 
body or some property different from any possessed by any of the 
bodies within our experience, there can be no sixth sense which 
we lack. 

Nor, again, can there be any special sense-organ for the common 5 
Common  Sensibles, which we perceive incidentally by every sense ; 
sensibles- for example, motion, rest, figure, magnitude, number, 
unity. For all of these we perceive by motion. Thus it is by 
motion that we perceive magnitude, and consequently figure, figure 
being one variety of magnitude; while that which is at rest we 
perceive by the fact that it is not moved. Number we perceive 
by the negation of continuity and by the special sense-organs 
also: for each sensation has a single object. Clearly, then, it is 
impossible that there should be a special sense for any one of these ; 
for example, motion: for in that case we should perceive them in 
the same way as we now perceive sweetness by sight (and this we 6 
do because we have a sense which perceives both, and by this 
we actually apprehend the two simultaneously when they occur 
in conjunction). Otherwise we should never have more than an 
incidental perception of them; as of Cleon’s son we perceive not 
that he is Cleon’s son, but that he is a white object, and the fact 
of his being Cleon’s son is accessory to the whiteness. But of the 7 
common sensibles we have already a common perception, which 
is direct and not indirect, so that there cannot be a special sense 
for them. For, if there were, we should never perceive them other- 
wise than in the way in which we said we saw Cleon’s son. 

25. αἰσθανοίμεθα L, αἰσθανόμεθα ET UV Wy Philop. || 26. κλέωνος yap υἱός STV W { 
τοῦτο LVX et, ut videtur, pr. E (Rr.) || 27. τῶν 6é...30. ὁρᾶν post b, 3. elvae trans- 
ponenda censet Dembowski, Quaest. Ar. duae, pp. 85-91, probat Susemihl || 27. ἔχομεν 
ἤδη αἴσθησιν LTUW, ἔχομεν αἴσθησιν ἤδη SVX || 28. οὐ κατὰ...3ο. ὁρᾶν une. incl. 
Essen III, 15. || 28. οὐκ ἄρ᾽] οὐ γὰρ coni. Essen II, 81 || ovdayds...30. ὁρᾶν, quae 
etiam Trend. suspecta‘sunt, ut prorsus hic inepta delenda censet Steinhart, cui assentitur 
Susemihl || 28. γὰρ] ἄρ᾽ coni. Essen 1.1. {| 29. 4.0m. EL TV, leg. Simpl. Philop. |i 
rTov,..dpay unc. inclusit Torst., quod probant etiam Neuhaeuser, Ὁ. 34 et Kampe et etiam 
dubitanter Dembowski, p. 89: sed v. p. 15. 


nm ‘ > / 
ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν. τὰ δ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἴδια κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθά- 30 
ε > vd 9 κὰν 3 ad IAX © ? φ 
νονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις, οὐχ ἢ αὐταί, a ἢ μία, ὅταν 
~ ral = \ ¥ 
ἅμα γένηται ἡ αἴσθησις ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον χολὴν τι πι- 425b 
Ν Ἁ 7 > ‘ δ ε 7 Ν > ~ Y ω 
κρὰ καὶ ξανθή" οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἑτέρας γε τὸ εἰπεῖν OTL ἀμῴφω 
ν Ν \ 3 a \ aN > A 4 Mh κά > 
ἕν: διὸ καὶ ἀπατᾶται, καὶ ἐὰν ἡ ξανθόν, χολὴν οἴεται εἶ. 
a > » , Ψν λ / ¥ > θ 4 
Svar. ζητήσειε δ᾽ av τις Tivos ἕνεκα πλείους ἔχομεν αἰσθήσεις, 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μίαν μόνην. ἢ ὅπως ἧττον λανθάνῃ τὰ ἀκολουθοῦντα 5 
e δ 3 2 9 ‘ 
Kat κοινά, οἷον κίνησις καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἀριθμός- εἰ γὰρ 
3. ΓᾺ a 
ἣν ἡ ὄψις μόνη, Kal αὕτη λευκοῦ, ἐλάνθανεν ἂν μᾶλλον 
3 ” 7 
κἂν ἐδόκει ταὐτὰ εἶναι πάντα διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀλλήλοις 
νά Ἂ Α / 6 “Ὁ δ᾽ 9 Ἁ \ 3 ¢ # > 
ἅμα χρῶμα καὶ μέγεθος. νῦν ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ αἱ- 
Ἂ ψ ¥ y 
σθητῷ τὰ κοινὰ ὑπάρχει, δῆλον ποιεῖ ὅτι ἄλλο TL ἕκαστον τὸ 
9 Ν 3 9 / Ψ ε a ‘\ 3 , 3 , 
Q Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἀνάγκη 
“ἃ ἊΨ > , Ψ [1 ἴω A ¢ - LAA, ξ > \ ¥ 
ἢ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ὁρᾷ, ἢ ἑτέρᾳ. GAN ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται 
a ΄ ΜᾺ 
τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου χρώματος. ὥστε ἢ δύο τοῦ 
3 ἣΝΨ» Ὁ > Ἃ εξ “-᾿ » > > Ne sf » ξ a 
αὐτοῦ ἔσονται ἢ αὐτὴ αὑτῆς. ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ καὶ ἑτέρα εἴη ἡ τῆς 15 
» ἊΨ x 9 ¥ > a 3 4 Ὺ ce A 
ὄψεως αἴσθησις, ἣ εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν ἢ αὐτή Tis ἔσται αὑτῆς. 
ν 9 Ν 
2 ὥστ᾽ ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης τοῦτο ποιητέον. ἔχει δ᾽ ἀπορίαν" εἰ γὰρ 
Ν a » 3 θ ’ θ ., ε a ς “(ἃ δὲ a ral x 
τὸ TH ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν δρᾶν, ὁρᾶται δὲ χρῶμα ἣ τὸ 
μὰ > » a Ν ec” Ν a y μ᾿ ec” A 
ἔχον, εἰ Oweral τις τὸ ὁρῶν, καὶ χρῶμα ἕξει τὸ δρῶν πρῶ- 
Ν , y 3 a Ν ἊΝ 3 / \ 
3Tov. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐχ ἕν τὸ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι- Kai 20 
νΝ Ψ Ἧ ε ὉΦῸζζ ΨΥ 
γὰρ ὅταν μὴ ὁρῶμεν, τῇ ὄψει κρίνομεν καὶ τὸ σκότος καὶ 
“ as Σλλ᾽ 3 ε 4 Ψ δὲ Ν XN ς: ἃ » ξ 
τὸ φῶς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡσαύτως. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ὁρῶν ἔστιν ὧς κε- 
id Ν \ 3 / Ν ἊᾺ 3 ~ » 
χρωμάτισται" τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητήριον δεκτικὸν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἄνευ 
30. οὐ ante κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς addendum esse censet Essen || 41. ἣ αὐταί TVW 

Simpl. 186, 5 Torst. Brentano, p. 97 Dembowski, al αὐταί EL, 7 αἱ αὐταί SUy Bek. 
Trend., ἢ αὐταί, ut videtur, Philop. 461, 5 sq. # αὗται X Soph. 107, 29 et v. 1. 
Philop., cf. Prise. 22, 4 οὐχ ἢ μεμέρισται GAN ἣ συνῆπται τῇ μιᾷ || 415 Ὁ, 1. γένηται 
om. SUV [[ χολὴν ὅτι] ὅτι χολὴ STUVWXy, χολὴν ὅτι ἘΦ, sed ν eras. (Trend, 
Bhl.), χολὴ ὅτε Biehl in ed. alt. Rodier, οἷον χολῆς ὅτι Simpl. 186, 12 || 2. ἄμφω ἕν 
ὃν ἄμφω coni. Susemihl || 3. καὶ ἐὰν] διὸ καὶ ἐὰν E, καὶ ἐὰν omisso διὸ etiam Simpl. || 
4. πλείονας T'W Philop., πλείους Simpl. Soph. |] 5. μόνον SUX, μόνην etiam Simpl. |f 
ἧττον μὴ TVWXy, ἦ 5, ἧττον etiam Simpl. Soph. || 7. ἡ om. STUVWX }} 
μόνον L, om. pr. E || αὕτη coni. H. Jackson, αὐτὴ vulg., καὶ αὐτὴ Ἀευκοῦ unc. incl. 
Torst., leg. Philop. Simpl. et, ut videtur, Soph. 108, 25 || av] κἂν E, sed x in rasura 
(Trend.), ἂν etiam Simpl. Soph. || 8. κἂν] καὶ Ey Soph. Bek. Trend., κἂν reliqui 
et corr. Ey (Bhi.) || ταὐτὸν TX Simpl., ταὐτὸ Wy Bek. Trend. Torst., τοῦτο SU, 
ταὐτὰ E (Bhi) LV Soph. || πάντα] πάντως coni. Essen II, p- 82, probat Rodier ΤΊ, 
364 || 9. pro dua coni. det Torst., leg, ἅμα Simpl. Soph. || 12. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ δὲ Them., 
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ Philop. || 13. ἢ τῇ ὄψει] ἤτοι ὄψει Alex., ἀπ. καὶ λύσ. ΟἹ, 26 || ὅτι] εἴ τε 

CHS. I, 2 425 8 30—425b 23 113 

But the various senses incidentally perceive each other’s 
proper objects, not as so many separate senses, but as 


per acci- forming a single sense, when there is concurrent per- 
special ception relating to the same object; as, for instance, 
Unity op 4 When we perceive that gall is bitter and yellow. For 
sense. it is certainly not the part of any other sense to declare 

that both objects are one and the same. Hence you are sometimes 
deceived and, on observing something yellow, fancy it to be gall. 

But, it might be asked, why have we several senses, instead of 8 
Why have Only one? I answer, it is in order that we may not be so 
senses likely to overlook the common attributes, such as motion, 
than one? magnitude, number, which accompany the special sen- 
sibles. For, if sight had been our only sense and whiteness its 
object, we should have been more apt to overlook the common 
sensibles and to confuse all sensibles, because colour and magnitude, 
for instance, must always go together. As it is, the fact that the 
common attributes are found in the object of another sense also 
shows that they are severally distinct. 

Inasmuch as we perceive that we see and hear, it must either 2 
Perception be by sight or by some other sense that the percipient per- 
τας ἶνας is ceives that he sees. But, it may be urged, the same sense 
by sense. = which perceives sight will also perceive the colour which 
is the object of sight. So that either there will be two senses to 
perceive the same thing or the one sense, sight, will perceive itself. 
Further, if the sense perceiving sight were really a distinct sense, 
either the series would go on to infinity or some one of the series 
of senses would perceive itself. Therefore it will be better to 
admit this of the first in the series. Here, however, there is a2 
Diffi- difficulty. Assuming that to perceive by sight is to see 
culties. and that it is colour or that which possesses colour which 
is seen, it may be argued that, if you are to see that which sees, that 
which in the first instance sees, the primary visual organ, will 
actually have colour. Clearly, then, to perceive by sight does not 3 
always mean one and the same thing. For, even when we do not 
see, it is nevertheless by sight that we discern both darkness and 
light, though not in the same manner. Further, that which sees 
is in a manner coloured. For the sense-organ is in every case 

Alex. 1. 1. 1} 15. καὶ εἰ E, om. καὶ y || ἡ ante τῆς ex solo E recepit Torst. || τό. ἄνεισιν 
LUWX, πρόεισιν in interpret. Them. || 17. ποιητέον] coni. θετέον vel δοτέον Torst., 
ποιητέον etiam Philop. Soph., δοτέον in interpret. Simpl. 188, 23. 31, vulg. defendit 
Bon., Ind. Ar. 609 a, 23 || 20. καὶ τὸ δρᾶν post ro τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι addenda esse 
censet Christ. 

H. 8 

[14 DE ANIMA 17 CH. 2 

/ 3 ~ ¥ 
τῆς ὕλης ἕκαστον. διὸ καὶ ἀπελθόντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν eve- 
“ns 3 ἤ 
σιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ φαντασίαι ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις. 25 
~ “~ ‘ ~ / ε 9 ‘ ? 3 
4 ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἐστι 
> A 9 eo e / 4 3 
καὶ μία, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐταῖς λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ὁ ψόφος ὃ κατ 
¥ \ » 
ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ἡ Kar ἐνέργειαν" ἔστι yap ἀκοὴν ἔχοντα 
“~ 7 3 “A 
μὴ ἀκούειν, καὶ τὸ ἔχον ψόφον οὐκ ἀεὶ ψοφεῖ. ὅταν δ᾽ ἐνεργῇ 
τὸ δυνάμενον ἀκούειν καὶ ψοφῇ τὸ δυνάμενον ψοφεῖν, τότε 30 
\ e δ, 
ἡ Kat ἐνέργειαν ἀκοὴ ἅμα γίνεται καὶ ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ψό- 
Ὄ ¥ + Ν Ν > + Ν δὲ 4 
gos, ὧν εἴπειεν ἄν Tis TO μὲν εἶναι ἄκουσιν TO δὲ ψόφησιν. 4268 
5 εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ ποίησις καὶ τὸ πάθος ἐν τῷ ποιου- 
- > 7 Ἀ “ 4 ‘ ‘“ > \ ‘ > >: 
μένῳ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ψόφον Kal THY ἀκοὴν THY κατ᾽ ἐνέρ- 
a >} a Ν 
γειαν ἐν τῇ κατὰ δύναμιν εἶναι" ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ κινη- 
ra) ? f 
τικοῦ ἐνέργεια ἐν TH πάσχοντι ἐγγίνεται" διὸ οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ 5 
ἴω ~ >> wn o~ 4 
κινοῦν κινεῖσθαι. ἣἧ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ψοφητικοῦ ἐνέργειά ἐστι 
/ cal , ε Ν “a 3 ~ > on ¥ \ 
ψόφος ἢ ψόφησις, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀκουστικοῦ ἀκοὴ ἢ ἄκουσις" διττὸν 
\ ξ 9 4 Ἀ \ € ‘4 ξ " 3 UN ’ N > ἃ ΤᾺ 
6 γὰρ ἣ ἀκοή, καὶ διττὸν ὁ ψόφος. ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν 
¥ 3 ‘4 XN 9 nw ν “\ € , Ἀν ξ 
ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων καὶ αἰσθητῶν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ποίησις καὶ ἡ 
> ~ / 9 3 3 » ΝᾺ “~ Ψ A € 
πάθησις ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τὸ 
τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἣ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ. 
“aN > 2 5 5 7 \ > 9 @ € , \ ¢ » 2 oN 
GAN ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων μὲν ὠνόμασται, οἷον ἡ ψόφησις Kal ἡ ἀκουσις, ἐπὶ 
δ᾽ 3 » > 7 ’ Ψ Ν, ᾽’ ξ ω. ¥ 
ἐνίων ἀνώνυμον θάτερον' ὅρασις yap héyerau ἡ τῆς ὄψεως 
ἐνέργεια, ἡ δὲ τοῦ χρώματος ἀνώνυμος, καὶ γεῦσις ἡ τοῦ 
~ e δὲ ΜᾺ aA 9 7 3 Ν δὲ 4 Fa 3 
7 YEVOTLKOV, ἡ δὲ τοῦ χυμοῦ ἀνώνυμος. ἐπεὶ δὲ μία μέν ἐστιν 


ς € ma 3 a \ ¢ aA 3 A Nw 4 y 
ἢ ἐνέργεια ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ Kai ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι ἔτε- 
> » ν , ‘ , \ ν 
ρον, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φθείρεσθαι καὶ σώζεσθαι τὴν οὕτω λεγο- 

id > ‘\ N\ rd Ν ‘ Ἧ ‘ -~ s ‘ 
μένην ἀκοὴν καὶ ψόφον, καὶ χυμὸν δὴ Kal γεῦσιν καὶ τὰ 
¥ cf - Ν, N Ν ΄ ,ὔ 3 > # 
ἄλλα ὁμοίως: τὰ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν λεγόμενα οὐκ ἀνάγκη: 

25. αἱ om. SWX Them. Simpl. Soph. {[|56. ἡ δὲ...426 Ὁ, 7. φθείρει spuria esse 
suspicatur Susemihl, Oecon. p. 85 || 27. οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐταῖς E (Trend.) 1, Torst., οὐ 
ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς Bek. Trend., αὐταῖς οὐ ταύτόν STUV Wy Soph., αὐταῖς οὐ τὸ αὐτό Them. ἢ 
οἷον ὁ ψόφος 6 EL ΝΥ Soph. Torst., οἷον ψόφος ὁ reliqui ante Torst. omnes || 28. καὶ ἡ 
ἀκοὴ ἡ EL Soph. Torst., καὶ.. ἐνέργειαν om. T, καὶ ἀκοὴ ἡ reliqui ante Torst. omnes ἢ 
80. τότε καὶ ἡ TW || τότε.. “I. γίνεται om. E, sed. in marg. add. (Stapf.) || 426a,1. dv] 
ὥστ᾽ TW, ὥστε καὶ SUV, ὧν leg. etiam Soph. || εἴποιεν EL, εἴποι y Soph., φήσειεν 
SUVX || 2. ed...12. οἷον e duabus recensionibus contaminata iudicat Torst., prioris esse 
9. ὥσπερ...11. αἰσθητικῷ, posterioris 4. ἡ γὰρ...6. κινεῖσθαι || 2. δ' ἔστιν W Bek. Trend., 
δή ἐστιν E (Trend.) et reliqui codd. Soph. Torst. {[|ποιουμένῳ] κινουμένῳ Ald. Bywater, 
J. of Ph., p. 55 || 6. ἐστὶν ante ἐνέργεια EL, post 7. ψόφησις Ty, om. Soph. || 9. ὥσπερ... 
11. αἰσθητικῷ post 6. κινεῖσθαι transposuit Biehl, eodem quo vulg. ordine leg. etiam 
Philop. 474, 16 sqq. Soph. 111, 30 544. || 9. ὥσπερ γὰρ] καὶ ὥσπερ TWy, ὥσπερ 



425 Ὁ 24—426 a 10 II5 

receptive of the sensible object without its matter. And this is 
why the sensations and images remain in the sense-organs even 
when the sensible objects are withdrawn. 
Now the actuality of the sensible object is one and the same 4 
with that of the sense, though, taken in the abstract, 

Identity of - . 
sense and sensible object and sense are not the same. I mean, for 

τ he ace example, actual sound and actual hearing are the same: 
conten. for it is possible to have hearing and yet not hear; again, 
that which is resonant is not always sounding. But 
when that which is capable of hearing operantly hears and that 
which is capable of sounding sounds, the actual hearing and the 
actual sound occur simultaneously, and we might, if we pleased, call 
them audition and resonance respectively. If, then, motion, action 5 
and passivity reside in that which is acted upon, then of necessity it 
is in the potentiality of hearing that there is actual sound and there 
is actual hearing. For the activity of agent and movent comes 
into play in the patient; and this is why that which causes motion 
need not itself be moved. The actuality of the resonant, then, is 
sound or resonance, and the actuality of that which can hear is 
hearing or audition, hearing and sound both having two meanings. 
The same account may be given of the other senses and their objects. 6 
For, just as acting and being acted upon are in the subject acted 
upon and not in the agent, so also the actuality of the sensible 
object and that of the sensitive faculty will be in the percipient 
subject. But in some cases both activities have a name; for 
example, resonance and audition: in other cases one or the other 
has no name. Thus, while the actuality of sight is called seeing, 
that of colour has no name; and, while the actuality of the taste- 
faculty is called tasting, that of the flavour has no name. Now, 7 
as the actuality of the object and that of the faculty of sense are one 
and the same, although taken in the abstract they are different, 
hearing and sound thus understood as operant must simultaneously 
cease to be or simultaneously continue in being, and so also with 
flavour and taste, and similarly with the other senses and their 
objects: but when they are understood as potentialities, there is no 

γὰρ καὶ EL || το. ἀλλ καὶ LTU, ἀλλ᾽ etiam Soph. || οὐκ ἐν) οὐ κὰν E (Rr.) 1} 
1τ. ἐνέργεια. . αἰσθητικοῦ om. TU Wy, tuetur Philop. || 12. μὲν καὶ ὠνόμ. rec. E (Trend.) 
TUWXy Philop., καὶ om. Soph. || ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων δ᾽ L, ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ Them. Soph. | 
16. ἡ ἐνέργεια E Soph. ν. 1. (om. ἡ cum codd. Hayduck, 112, 14) Torst., om. ἡ 
reliqui ante Torst. omnes |} ἡ post évépy. om. TV Wy Soph. || ἡ post καὶ solus 
E, om. etiam Soph. {| 17. dpa $6. ST y, $0. dua L, ἅμα φθ. etiam Philop. Simpl. 

116 DE ANIMA ΜΠ CH. 2 

ὃ ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πρότερον φυσιολόγοι τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ἔλεγον, οὐθὲν 20 
οἰόμενοι οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν εἶναι ἄνεν ὄψεως, οὐδὲ χυ- 
μὸν ἄνευ γεύσεως. τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγον ὀρθῶς, τῇ δ᾽ οὐκ dp- 
Gs: διχῶς γὰρ λεγομένης τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, 
τῶν μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν τῶν δὲ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, ἐπὶ τούτων 
μὲν συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων οὐ συμβαΐνει. 25 
ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι ἁπλῶς ἔλεγον περὶ τῶν λεγομένων οὐχ ἁπλῶς. 

9 εἰ δὴ συμφωνία φωνή τίς ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ καὶ 
ἀκοὴ ἔστιν ὡς ἕν ἐστι, [καὶ ἔστιν ws οὐχ ἕν τὸ αὐτό], λό- 
γος δ᾽ ἡ συμφωνία, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν λόγον τινὰ εἶς 
ναι. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ φθείρει ἕκαστον ὑπερβάλλον, καὶ TO 30 
ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρύ, τὴν ἀκοήν: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν χυμοῖς τὴν 
γεῦσιν, καὶ ἐν χρώμασι τὴν ὄψιν τὸ σφόδρα λαμπρὸν ἢ ζο- 426b 
φερόν, καὶ ἐν ὀσφρήσει ἡ ἰσχυρὰ ὀσμὴ καὶ γλυκεῖα καὶ πικρά, 
ὡς λόγου τινὸς ὄντος τῆς αἰσθήσεως. διὸ καὶ ἡδέα μέν, ὅταν 

w) On wn 

εἰλικρινῆ καὶ ἀμυγῆ ὄντα ἄγηται eis τὸν λόγον, οἷον τὸ ὀξὺ ἢ 
γλυκὺ ἢ ἁλμυρόν" ἡδέα γὰρ τότε" ὅλως δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ peELK- 5 
τόν, συμφωνία ἢ τὸ ὀξὺ ἣ τὸ βαρύ, ἁφῇ δὲ τὸ θερμαντὸν ἢ ψυκ- 
τόν" ἡ δ᾽ αἴσθησις 6 λόγος: ὑπερβάλλοντα δὲ λνπεῖ ἢ φθείρει. 

Ὁ ἑκάστη μὲν οὖν αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ 
ἐστίν, ὑπάρχουσα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἢ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ 
κρίνει τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ διαφοράς, οἷον Nev- τὸ 
κὸν μὲν καὶ μέλαν ὄψις, γλυκὺ δὲ καὶ πικρὸν γεῦσις. 
ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ 

20. πρότεροι ὌΝ ΜΝ, πρότερον Them. Soph. |] 24. περὶ EST V, ἐπὶ etiam Simpl. 
Soph. || 27. δὴ E (Trend.) SX y Simpl. Plutarch. ap. Simpl. Philop. Trend. Rodier, 
δὴ ἡ W, δ᾽ ἡ reliqui codd. et Bek. Torst. Biehl, εἰ δ᾽ ἡ φωνὴ συμφωνία rls ἐστιν 
mavult Trend., probat Bywater, p. 55, secutus Prisc., qui praebet p. 22, 24: 7 φωνὴ 
συμφωνία εἴρηται παρὰ τῷ ‘Aptor., ac sane in interpret. habet ἡ δὲ φωνὴ συμφωνία 
τις Soph. || ἡ post καὶ om. LSTUVXy Philop. 476, το, leg. Soph. 112, 30 sq. ἢ 
28. ἐστι post ἕν solus E, om. etiam Philop. Soph. || καὶ ἔστιν.. αὐτό unc. incl. Torst., 
quem secutus est Biehl in ed. alt., leg. etiam Soph., tuetur Rodier || τὸ αὐτὸ tantum 
in priore ed. unc. incl. Biehl, non legisse videtur Philop., ἢ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ST Xy, οὐδὲ 
τὸ αὐτὸ V, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ coni. Susemihl || 30. καὶ post τοῦτο om. LW, leg. Simpl. 
Soph. || 31. ὁμοίως d¢om. S$ TUV WXy, leg. Soph. || 426b, τ. 979¢.STUVWXy, 
τὸ om. etiam Soph. || 2. πικρά] λιπαρά EL et fortasse Philop. 476, 30, πικρά etiam 
Soph. || 3. διὸ om. SX et pr. Ὁ, διὸ καὶ om. V || 4. ἀμυγῇ ὄντα] ἀμιγῆ E Bek. Trend., 
ἀμιγῇ ἢ ὄντα L, ἄμικτα ὄντα STV WXy et in paraphr. Simpl., ἀμυγῇ ὄντα U Soph. 
Torst. || ἄγεται EL, ἄγηται post 3. ὅταν STU VWXy || 6. ante συμφωνία addendum 
esse el censet Essen, <el év> συμῴφωνίᾳ coni. Susemihl, <derep> συμφωνία vel <a > 
συμφωνίᾳ <dy> Shorey, A. J. Ph. XXII, p. 162, fort. ἀκοῇ μὲν ante συμφωνία intelligas 

CH. 2 426 a 20—426b 12 117 

such necessity. On this point the earlier natural philosophers were 
Mistake in error, when they supposed that without seeing there was 
of earlier neither white nor black, and without tasting no flavour. 

Their statement is in one sense true, in another false. 
For the terms sensation and sensible thing are ambiguous. When 
they mean the actual sensation and the actual sensible thing, the 
statement holds good: when they mean potential sensation and 
potential sensible, this is not the case. But our predecessors 
used terms without distinguishing their various meanings. 

If, then, concord consists in a species of vocal sound, and if vocal 
sound and hearing are in one aspect one and the same, [though in 
another aspect not the same|, and if concord is a proportion, it 
follows that hearing must also be a species of proportion. And 

this is the reason why hearing is destroyed by either 
As in . . .- ὃ. 
hearing,so excess, whether of high pitch or of low. And similarly, 
generay in the case of flavours, excess destroys the taste, and in 
ΤΟΤΕ ΤΟ colours excessive brightness or darkness destroys the 
sight, and so with smell, whether the excessive odour be 
agreeable or pungent. ΑἹ] this implies that the sense is a proportion. 
Hence sensibles are, it is true, pleasurable when they are brought 
into the range of this proportion pure and unmixed; for example, 
the shrill, the sweet, the salt: in that case, I say, they are pleasur- 
able. But, speaking generally, that in which ingredients are blended 
is pleasurable in a higher degree, accord more pleasurable to the 
ear than high pitch or low pitch alone, and to touch that which 
admits of being still further heated or cooled. The due proportion 
constitutes the sense, while objects in excess give pain or cause 

Now each sense is concerned with its own sensible object, being 
resident in the organ, gué sense-organ, and judges the specific 
differences of its own sensible object. Thus sight pronounces upon 
white and black, taste upon sweet and bitter, and so with the rest. 

licet {{συμφωνία..-«ψυκτόν unc. incl. Torst., qui colon post μεικτόν posuit, ἀφῇ... ψυκτόν 
eici, sed συμφωνία... βαρύ retineri et post μεικτόν virgulam poni vult Dittenberger, p. 1614, 
totum locum interpretantur Simpl. Philop. || a¢7...yuardy post 5. ἁλμυρόν transposuit 
Biehl, quod iam Dittenberger 1.1. voluerat || ἢ τὸ βαρύ E (Trend.), καὶ τὸ βαρύ L, καὶ 
βαρύ U VW, reliqui ante Biehlium omnes ἢ βαρύ || post βαρύ virg. Trend., vulg. 
punctum |} ἀφῇ y Philop. Trend., ἁφὴ ἘΣ (Bhl.) reliqui codd. et Bek., Soph. 113, 15 
interpretatur τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἷον τῶν τῆς ἁφῆς, unde ἁφῆς eum legisse 
suspicatur Biehl, ἁφῆς probat etiam Steinhart, ἐν τῇ ἁφῇ in interpr. Simpl., ἀλέα δ᾽ ἢ pro 
ἁφῇ δὲ coni. Madvig, p. 473 || θερμαντικὸν et ψυκτικόν WX, vulgatam tuentur etiam 
Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 7. 60m. SU Vy [λυπεῖ] λύει Soph. Bywater, p. 55. € Prisc. 22, 
27 Ἵ 12. καὶ post δὲ om. TU V Wy. 







= \ Ν ὃ , , δὲ S27 a 5 ΄ a 
14 εἰναι μὲν γὰρ ἰαϊρέετον, TOTM OE Και ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον. ω) 

118 DE ANIMA 17 CH. 2 

A y 
λευκὸν καὶ TO γλυκὺ Kal ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς ἐκαστον 
4 / ‘ > / θ Ψ ὃ [ή . 3 “ or 3 
κρίνομεν, τίνι καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι διαφέρει; ἀνάγκη δὴ at- 
’, 3 Ν , 3 «@ ‘\ Onn oY ε Ν 3 ¥ 
σθήσει: αἰσθητὰ γάρ ἐστιν. F καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σὰρξ οὐκ ἔστι 15 
aN Fd “~ 
τὸ ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον: ἀνάγκη yap ἣν ἁπτόμενον αὐτοῦ 
“A ’ Ψ 
κρίνειν τὸ κρῖνον. οὔτε δὴ κεχωρισμένοις ἐνδέχεται κρίνειν ὅτι 
ἕτερον τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ Evi τινι ἄμφω δῆλα 
εἶναι. οὕτω μὲν γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ μὲν ἐγὼ τοῦ δὲ σὺ aicbor%, 
δῆλον ἂν εἴη ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων. δεῖ δὲ τὸ Ev λέγεινᾳ ὅτι 20 
Ψ ν Ν ‘N λ Ν mn λ a λέ ¥ Ν > » 
ἕτερον: ἕτερον yap τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ. λέγει ἄρα τὸ «αὐτό. 
date as λέγει, οὕτω καὶ νοεῖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται. ὅτι μὲν οὖϊτῥ οὐχ 
οἷόν τε κεχωρισμένοις κρίνειν τὰ κεχωρισμένα, δῆλον" ὅτι 
δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐν κεχωρισμένῳ χρόνῳ, ἐντεῦθεν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ 
λέγει ὅτι ἕτερον τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν, οὕτω καὶ OTE Od. 25 
τερον λέγει ὅτι ἕτερον καὶ θάτερον (οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὼς τὸ 
ὅτε' λέγω 8, οἷον νῦν λέγω ὅτι ἕτερον, οὐ μέντοι ὅτι νῦν ἔγχε. 
INN Ψ λέ ‘ A \ ¢& A ᾽ν ” ey 
pov: ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω λέγει, Kal νῦν, καὶ OTL νῦν)" ἅμα ἄρα. Wore 
> “ No 9 / / > \ \ "δύ δ ρ 
ἀχώριστον καὶ ἐν ἀχωρίστῳ χρόνῳ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀδύνατον; dua 
τὰς ἐναντίας κινήσεις κινεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡ ἀδιαίρετον Kat ἐν 30 
9 / 4 3 Ν 4 ¢ Ν o~ ‘ ¥ 
ἀδιαιρέτῳ χρόνῳ. εἰ yap γλυκύ, wdt κινεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν 
ἢ τὴν νόησιν, τὸ δὲ πικρὸν ἐναντίως, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἑχέρως. 4278 
dp οὖν ἅμα μὲν καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀχώρρδτον τὸ 
κρῖνον, τῷ εἶναι δὲ κεχωρισμένον; ἔστι δή πως,“ὧς τὸ διαι- 
ρετὸν τῶν διῃρημένων αἰσθάνεται, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς “ἢ ἀδιαίρετον" τῷ 


14. τινὰ L, τινὶ Soph. Bek., Τίνι sine dubio Them., correxit Trend., qui post 
διαφέρει interrogationis signum posuit, secutus est Torst. |} rive καὶ] τινὶ κοινῷ coni. 
Essen || 16. yap ἂν ἦν W Torst., ἂν om. reliqui, etiam Philop. Soph. || αὐτοῦ] αὐτὸ 
coni. Essen, cui assentitur Susemihl || 19. yap] ἔχει LV, γὰρ ἔχει EE (Trend.), legit 
οὕτω μὲν yap κἂν ef etiam Them. 85, 15 || 20. verba δεῖ,..21. λευκοῦ post., 21. λέγει... 
22. αἰσθάνεται pr., recensionis esse indicat Torst. || 21. λέγει dpa τὸ αὐτό ut inertem 
repetitionem ejecta vult Trend., legit etiam Philop. in interpr. 483, 14 || 22. καὶ om. 
STV || νοεϊ] φρονεῖ UX, cui lectioni favet Rodier II, 386, καὶ νοεῖ etiam Philop. || 
24. ἐν] eve E, οὐδ᾽ évt ἐν in textum recepit Torst., reliqui οὐδ᾽ ἐν xey,, etiam Soph. || 
25. τὸ ante κακόν om. ELy || 26. καὶ ante οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς et Them. 85, 25 εἰ 
Philop. 483, 22 legisse suspicatur Rodier || οὐ xa7d...28. ὅτι νῦν in parenth. poni voluit 
Bywater, p. 55. || 30. διαίρετον pr. E (Trend. Bus.), ἁ addidit antiqua manus (Trend.) ἢ 
31. τὸ γλυκύ TW et rec. E Bek. Trend., defendit etiam Barco, Pp: 94, τὸ om. pr. E 
et reliqui || 4278, t. ἢ] καὶ rec. E in rasura (Rr.) ST W || 4. dp’ οὖν...3. κεχωρισμένον 
post., 3. ἔστι δή...5. ἀδιαίρετον pr., editionis esse iudicat Torst., quod refellit Neuhacuser, 
Pp. 40 || 2. καὶ post μὲν om. W, leg. καὶ etiam Alex., ἀπ. καὶ Ado. O4, 12 || ἀριθμῷ ἐν 
ἀδιαίρετον pr. E (Trend. Bus.), ἐν ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον rec. E (Trend. Bus.), ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαί- 

CH. 2 426 Ὁ 13—427a 5 [10 

But, since we compare white and sweet and each of the sensibles 
Compari- With each, what in fact is it by means of which we 
seo rewue perceive the difference between them? It must be by 
sensibles. sense, for they are sensibles. And thus it is clear that 11 
the flesh is not the ultimate organ of sense; for, if it were, it would 
be necessary that that which judges should judge by contact with 
the sensible object. Nor indeed can we with separate organs judge 
that sweet is different from white, but both objects must be clearly 
presented to some single faculty. For, if we could, then the mere 
fact of my perceiving one thing and your perceiving another would 
make it clear that the two things were different. But the single 
faculty is required to pronounce them different, for sweet and white 
are pronounced to be different. It is one and the same faculty, then, 
which so pronounces. Hence, as it pronounces, so it also thinks 12 
and perceives. Clearly, then, it is not possible with separate organs 
to pronounce judgment upon things which are separate: nor yet 
at separate times, as the following considerations show. For, 
as it is one single faculty which pronounces that good and bad 
are different, so when it judges “A is different from &” it also 
judges “SB is different from A” (and in this case the “when” is 
not accidental; J mean, accidental in the sense in which I may 
now say “Such and such things are different” without saying that 
they are different now. On the contrary, it pronounces now and 
pronounces that 4 and & are different now). That which judges 
judges, then, instantaneously and hence as an inseparable unit in an 
inseparable time. But, again, it is impossible for the same thing, in 13 
so far as indivisible and affected in indivisible time, to be moved at 
the same instant with contrary motions. For, if the object be sweet, 
it moves sense or thought in such and such a way, but what is bitter 
moves it in a contrary way, and what is white in a different way. 

A pro- Is, then, that which judges instantaneous in its judgment 
Maneiaes and numerically undivided and inseparable, although 
thesis. separated logically? Then it is in a certain sense that 

which is divided which perceives divided objects; in another sense it 
is gud indivisible that the divided perceives them: that is to say, logi- 
cally it is divisible, locally and numerically it is indivisible. Or is 14 

perov etiam Alex. 1. 1. || Καὶ χρόνω ἀχώριστον U y et το. E in litura (Trend. Bus.) Philop. 
484, 10, καὶ τόπῳ ἀχώριστον coni. Susemihl, textum receptum tuetur Alex. L 1. et vet. 
transl. || τὸ κρῖνον om. corr. E (Trend. Bus.) || 3. δή] δέ 5 U Alex. || pro τὸ διαειρ. coni. 
ὃν διαιρ. Steinhart ||°4. ὡς om. T W, leg. Alex. || ἢ] τὸ X, om. Alex. || διαιρετόν pr. E, 
adialperoy etiam Alex. |] 5. τόπῳ δὲ καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ΤΊ, καὶ χρόνῳ non habent Alex. 
Them. Simpl. Philop. || οὐ διαιρετόν T, ἀδιαίρετον etiam Alex. Simpl. Philop. 

120 DE ANIMA Ill CHS. 2, 3 

3 as , ‘ Ν Ν >A ‘ 10 7 3 
οὐχ οἷόν τε; δυνάμει μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὖτο καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τά- 
“ ~ , ‘ 
ναντία, τῷ δ᾽ εἶναι ov, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνεργεῖσθαι διαιρετόν, Kat 
> Ὁ» Φ \ N 4 > 4 3 δὲ Ν to 
οὐχ οἷόν τε ἅμα λευκὸν Kal μέλαν εἶναι, WOT OVOE TA εἰδὴ 
A nw ¥ \ oe , 3 3 
15 πάσχειν αὐτῶν, εἰ τοιοῦτον ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ νόησις. ἀλλ 
ω ? © ’ἤ «“λ ΄ , 
ὥσπερ ἣν καλοῦσί τινες στιγμήν, ἢ μία ἢ δύο, ταύτῃ 
"5. \ “ , & 
καὶ διαιρετή. ἣ μὲν οὖν ἀδιαίρετον, EV τὸ κρῖνόν ἐστι καὶ apa, 
“4 Ν ‘ -~ > a -~ la 
ἡ δὲ διαιρετόν, οὐχ ἕν ὑπάρχει: Sis γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ χρῆται σημείῳ 
κυ 3 ων ~ 2 / ‘“ 
ἅμα' ἢ μὲν οὖν δυσὶ χρῆται τῷ πέρατι, δύο κρίνει καὶ κεχωρι- 
aa ΄ ἃ "ὦ \ 
σμένα ἔστιν ὡς κεχωρισμένῳ" ἢ δ᾽ ἑνί, «ἕν; Kat ἅμα. περὶ 
Ν ἣν A 3 A @ \ \ a 3 θ δ > ὃ 
μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἢ φαμὲν τὸ ζῷον αἰσθητικὸν εἰναι, διω- 
ρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. 
“~ ᾽ν ,᾿ 
Ἐπεὶ δὲ δύο διαφοραῖς δρίζονται μάλιστα τὴν ψυχήν, 
nm wn Ὰ ‘4 A 
κινήσει TE TH κατὰ τόπον καὶ τῷ νοεῖν καὶ τῷ κρίνειν Kat 
3 ἰσιὺ A ‘\ ‘ a) ‘\ \ ~“ "4 
αἰσθάνεσθαι, δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ 
3 4 / εν 3 > (4 Ν, 4 [4 ς 
αἰσθάνεσθαί τι εἶναι (ἐν ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ τούτοις κρίνει τι ἡ 
ων gy ΤᾺ Ν 
ψυχὴ καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων), καὶ οἵ γε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρο- 
~ Ν ‘ 9 , > Ν > / Y \ 3 
νεῖν Kat τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτὸν εἶναί φασιν, ὥσπερ Kal ᾽Ἐμ- 
~ y CC 4 4 \ “~ 3 7 2 7 
πεδοκλῆς εἴρηκε “πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώ- 
” 2 » ες Ψ / 208 Ν \ A 
Tow καὶ ev ἄλλοις “ὅθεν σφίσιν αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν 
3  Ἂ id 33 Ν 3 > ‘ / 4 ‘ Ν 6 ld 
ἀλλοῖα παρίσταται," τὸ δ᾽ αὐτὸ τούτοις βούλεται Kat τὸ Ὁμής- 
a A ~ 
2 pov “τοῖος yap νόος éoTiv,” πάντες yap οὗτοι TO νοεῖν σωμα- 
‘ Ψ ‘XN 3 4 € A Ν 3 ? 
τικὸν ὥσπερ TO αἰσθάνεσθαι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, Kai aio Odve- 

6. καὶ ἀδιαίρετον] διαιρετὸν καὶ ἀδιαίρετον U Wy Torst., καὶ διαιρετὸν καὶ ἀδιαέρετον 
Them., οὐ διαιρετὸν καὶ διηρημένον T, ἀδιαίρετον καὶ διηρημένον rec. Τὸ in marg. (Rr-) X, 
textum receptum tuetur Alex. 94, 16 et vet. transl., defendit Neuhaeuser, p. 42 ἢ τἀναντία] 
kal τἀναντία EU, om. y et, ut videtur, Them. 86, 12 Torst., leg. τἀναντία (omisso καὶ) 
etiam Alex. Philop. et vet. transl., καὶ τοὐναντίον coni. Susemihl || 7. διαιρετόν] διαιρεῖται 
coni. Torst. (quod quidem habet Philop. in interpr. 484, 21), ἀδιαίρετον Susemihl || 
lo. ὥσπερ ἣν] ὥσπερ ὃν coni. Trend. || ἢ μία ἢ δύο E, ἢ μία καὶ δύο L, ἢ μία καὶ ἢ δύο Bek. 
Trend. Torst., ‘aut unum aut duo” vet. transl., ἢ μέαν ἢ δύο Alex. 94, 20, ἡ μία al δύο 
in codd. Alex. 96, το, ἡ μία, ἦ δύο coni. Rodier |} rz. καὶ om. L, καὶ ἀδιαίρετος καὶ 
διαερετή, quod in interpret. habent Them. et Simpl., in textum recepit Torst., vulgatam 
tuetur Alex. 1. 1. et vet. transl. || 9 μὲν...14. ἅμα e duab, rec. contam., post. rr. ἢ 
μὲν...18. dua, pr. 13. ἢ μὲν...τ4. dua iudicat Torst., cui adversatur Neuhaeuser, p- 40 | 
Ir. ἀδιαίρετος E, sed s in litura (Trend.), STU Alex. || cat ἅμα om. y || 12. διαιρετὸν 
ὑπάρχει οὐχ ἕν Ald. Sylb. Basil. Torst., διαιρετὸν οὐχ ὃν ὑπάρχει Ep (Β81.) Ty 
Soph., “non unum ” vet. transl., ox ἕν om. reliqui codd. et Alex. 94, 21 Bek. Trend., 
quibus assentitur Neuhaeuser, p. 45 || dis γὰρ τῷ Ey T W vet. transl. Ald. Sylb. Basil. Torst., 
διὸ γὰρ τῷ y et, omisso γὰρ, Soph., γὰρ om. reliqui codd. et Alex. Bek. Trend. ἢ 13. 
ἅμα] μα pr. E, add. ἅ rec. E (Rr.) || ὡς δυσὶ coni. Trend. et Torst. | virgulam a Bek. post 
χρῆται positam sustulerunt Trend. Torst. || ante κεχωρισμένα add. τὰ rec. E (Rr.) || 
Iq. κεχωρισμένῳ] ita EL T Torst. Belger, reliqui codd. aut κεχωρισμένων aut καχωρισμένα, 
τῷ κεχωρισμένῳ Alex., κεχωρισμένον Soph. 114, 38 || 7 δὲ ἕν, ἑνὶ T Wy Alex. Simpl. vet. 


CHS. 2, 3 427 a 06—427a 27 121 

this impossible? For the same indivisible unity, though in poten- 
tiality each of two opposites, in the order of thought and 
being is not so, but in actual operation is divided: it is 
impossible that it should be at the same time both white and black, 
and hence impossible that it should receive at the same time the 
forms of white and black, if reception of the forms constitutes 
sensation and thought. Rather is the case parallel to that of 15 
Analogy the point, as some describe it, which is divisible in so 
of the far as it is regarded as one or two. Well then, in so far 
ἌΝ as the faculty which judges is indivisible, it is one and 
judges instantaneously; but, in so far as it is divisible, it is not 
one, for it uses the same point at the same time twice. So far as 
it treats the boundary-point as two, it passes judgment on two 
separate things with a faculty which in a manner is separated into 
two; so far as it treats the point as one, it passes judgment on 
one thing, and that instantaneously. So much, then, for the principle 
in virtue of which we call the animal capable of sensation. 

There are two different characteristics by which the soul is princi- 3 
pally defined ; firstly, motion from place to place and, secondly, 
thinking and judging and perceiving. Both thought and intelli- 
gence are commonly regarded as a kind of perception, since the 
soul in both of these judges and recognises something existent. 
Sensa- The ancients, at any rate, identify intelligence and per- 
tion and ception: thus, in the words of Empedocles: “Wisdom 
thought . . . . . . 
of old for mankind is increased according to that which is 
identihed. present to them”: and again “Whence they have 
also continually a shifting succession of thoughts.” Homer's 
meaning, too, is the same when he says: “Such is the mind of 
men.” In fact, all of them conceive thought to be corporeal 2 


transl. Bek. Trend. Torst., évt om. pr. Ὁ, ἢ δὲ ἑνὶ ἅμα, omisso καὶ, etiam Soph., fort. ἡ δὲ 
ἑνί, ὃν Christ || 15. αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι rd Sov ST U || δρίσθω E (Bek., etiam Bhi.) ὡρίσθω E 
(Rr.), διωρίσθω E, Soph. || 18. καὶ τὸ κρίνειν καὶ νοεῖν W, καὶ τῶ νοεῖν καὶ τῷ ppovetvS UV; 
τῷ κρίνειν καὶ νοεῖν Torst., vulgatam tuentur etiam in interpr. Simpl. 202, 8 sq. Philop. 
489, 13 Soph. 115, 18 [| 19. annotat in margine Bas.: post αἰσθάνεσθαι deesse videntur, 
quae Argyropylus reddidit his verbis: considerandum est, si quid intersit inter intelligere 
ac sentire. cui opinioni assentitur Torst., negat excidisse quicquam Bon., stud. Arist. 
II, III, r3x, qui cum Plutarcho, Philopono, Simplicio apodosin, quam iam Alex. apud 
Philop. 489, 9 desideraverat, ab 427 Ὁ, 6. ὅτι μὲν οὖν incipit ; in interpungendis singulis 
membris, praeeunte Biehlio, secutus sum Bon. || 19. δὲ] yap coni. Susemihl || καὶ post δὲ 
om. LT || 20. γὰρ] τε yap ES Ὁ, τε om. etiam Soph. |! κρίνει re ἡ ψυχὴ T, ἡ ψυχὴ 
κρίνει τι SUV Wy, ἡ ψυχὴ κρίνει τε X, vulgatam tuetur etiam Soph. |] 21. ye corr. E, 
re SUV || 23. ἐναέξεται E,, nunc αὔξεται (Bhil.), déferac etiam Them. Philop. 485, 24 
Soph. || 25. τὸ δ᾽ adrd...b, 6. ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι in parenth. ponenda putat Susemihl, Oecon., 
p. 85 | 25. βούλεται τούτοις STUV Wy, τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο sed post o rasura Ἐφ (Bhl.) | 
27. ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ SUV. 


? ΑἉ “ “A ε , Ν a ? Ν 3 ~ 

σθαΐί τε Kai φρονεῖν τῷ ὁμοίῳ TO ὅμοιον, WOTEP καὶ ἐν τοῖς 

, » Y δ \ 

κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς λόγοις διωρίσαμεν: καίτοι ἔδει ἅμα Kal περὶ 

a / Ν , 

τοῦ ἠπατῆσθαι αὐτοὺς λέγειν, οἰκειότερον γὰρ τοῖς ζῴοις, 427b 
Ν 4 / 3 / ὃ λ ~ ε / ὃ Ἀ > », 

καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἐν τούτῳ διατελεῖ ἡ ψυχή" O10 ἀνάγκη 

» Ψ » ? la Ν / > aN Qn 

ἤτοι, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι λέγουσι, πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα εἶναι ἀληθῆη, 

nw 5 “~ ‘ ’ “ 

ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀνομοίου θίξιν ἀπάτην εἶναι, τοῦτο yap ἐναντίον τῷ 

\ Ψ ~ εξ [4 iC - ὃ a) δὲ Ν ε 3 4 ‘ 

TO ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ γνωρίζειν: δοκεῖ OE Kal ἢ ἀπάτη καὶ 


ΡᾺ 5 4 Ν δὰ 
3) ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταὐτόν 
3 \ 3 ’ὔ ‘ ‘ ~ / ~ \ 
ἐστι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν, φανερόν. Tov μὲν 
Ν A / a δὲ 2\ 2 ~ ’ a ὑδὲ Ν 
γὰρ πᾶσι μέτεστι, τοῦ δὲ ὀλίγοις τῶν ζῴων. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸ 
“ 3 ἘΞ 3 Ν ‘93 ΜᾺ Ν Ν Ν 2 aA \ \ > a 
νοεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς, TO μὲν ὀρθῶς 
φρόνησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα ἀληθής, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς 

A 3 Ν ‘ “~ 9 4 ε 
τἀναντία τούτων, οὐδὲ τοῦτο [δ᾽] ἐστὶ ταὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι" ἡ 



\ δ ¥ A 207 2\ 9 , Ν κ᾿ e+ 

μὲν yap αἴσθησις τῶν ἰδίων ἀεὶ ἀληθής, καὶ πᾶσιν ὑπάρ- 

ΜᾺ ἴω ~~ 3 3 id N ame) ‘ 

χει τοῖς ζῴοις, διανοεῖσθαι δ᾽ ἐνδέχεται Kal ψευδῶς, Kal 

9 Ἁ ε ’ ® ‘\ N / , “ Y “ 

4 οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει @ μὴ Kal λόγος. φαντασία yap ἕτερον καὶ 
αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας: αὐτή τε ov γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθής- 15 

ν » , > ¥ e+ 4 » 5 ¥ 

σεως, καὶ ἄνεν ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις. ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν 

ἡ αὐτὴ νόησις καὶ ὑπόληψις, φανερόν. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ 

᾿ » [3 € ων > 4 Ψ 4 ‘ 9 ,ὔ ‘ 
πάθος ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστίν, ὅταν βουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων yap 
ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι, ὥσπερ οἷ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ 
εἰδωλοποιοῦντες), δοξάζειν δ᾽ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ 20 

4 Ὁ 3 / ¥ ‘ 4 μ᾿ [4 ’ 
ψεύδεσθαι ἢ ἀληθεύειν. ἔτι δὲ ὅταν μὲν δοξάσωμεν δεινόν 

A 4 3 ‘ ‘4 e / N "ἃ 
τι ἢ φοβερόν, εὐθὺς συμπάσχομεν, ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν θαρρα- 
λέον: κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ 
5 θεώμενοι ἐν γραφῇ τὰ δεινὰ ἢ θαρραλέα. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς 
" ε f a 3 ᾽ ‘\ é N / ‘ 
τῆς ὑπολήψεως διαφοραί, ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ φρόνησις Kai 25 
τἀναντία τούτων, περὶ ὧν τῆς διαφορᾶς ἔτερος ἔστω λόγος. 

29. καίτοι...Ὁ, 2. ἡ ψυχή unc. incl. Essen III, p. 7 || 427 Ὁ, 2. τούτοις ST Vy, τούτῳ 
etiam Simpl. Soph. || 4. τῷ] τὸ 5, @ L, om. TU |] 5. τὸ ὅμοιον τῶ ὁμοίω STUVXy 
et E (Trend. Bhl.), τῶ ὁμ. τὸ ὅμ. TW Bek. Trend. Torst. || δοκεῖ δὲ οὕτω coni. Susemihl 
B.J. XXX, 47 || 6. ὅτι...τ6. ὑπόληψις. Hunc locum restituere tentat Essen III, 17 sqq. || 
6. ταὐτόν] τὸ αὐτό pr. E (Trend.) y || 9. μὲν γὰρ ὀρθῶς TU Wy et rec. E, om. γὰρ etiam 
Soph. || 11. δ᾽ om. y Philop., δ᾽ delendum esse censet etiam Vahlen, Oest. Gymn. 
Ztschr. 1868, p. 256 || ταὐτὸν L Philop., τὸ αὐτὸ STU VWX || 14. post λόγος punctum 
posui, vulg. colon || φαντασία yap...24. θαρραλέα ab hoc loco aliena esse iudicat Freudenthal, 
p. 11, cui assentitur Susemihl, Phil. Woch. 1882, p. 1283 || @ μὴ καὶ φαντασία" ἕτερον 
γὰρ (sc. ἡ pay.) καὶ κτλ. coni. Steinhart || 15. δὲ pro re coni. Susemih] || 16. ὅτι 3’...25. 
διαφοραί unc. incl. Essen III, p. rg || 17. ἡ ante αὐτὴ delendum esse censet Schneider, 

Rhein. Mus. 1866, p. 448, unc. incl. Rodier || véyors] om. y, quod probat Madvig, p. 473, 
φαντασία margo U, quod probant Susemihl Chaignet, Ess. sur la Psych. d’Ar. p. 445, in 

CH. 3 427 a 28—427 Ὁ 26 123 

like sensation and hold that we understand, as well as perceive, 
like by like: as we explained at the outset of the discussion. 
This view [πᾶν ought, however, at the same time to have dis- 
refuted. cussed error, a state which is peculiarly characteristic 
of animal life and in which the soul continues the greater part 
of its time. It follows from their premisses that either all pre- 
sentations of the senses must be true, as some affirm, or contact 
with what is unlike must constitute error; this being the converse 
of the position that like is known by like. But, as the knowledge 
of contraries is one and the same, so, too, it would seem, is error 
with respect to contraries one and the same. 

Now it is clear that perception and intelligence are not the 3 
same thing. For all animals share in the one, but only a few 
in the other. And when we come to thinking, which includes right 
thinking and wrong thinking, right thinking being intelligence, 
knowledge and true opinion, and wrong thinking the opposites of 
these, neither is this identical with perception. For perception 
of the objects of the special senses is always true and is found 
in all animals, while thinking may be false as well as true 
and is found in none which have not reason also. Imagination, in 4 
fact, is something different both from perception and from thought, 
and is never found by itself apart from perception, any more than 
is belief apart from imagination. Clearly thinking is not the same 
thing as believing. For the former is in our own power, whenever 
we please: for we can represent an object before our eyes, as do 
those who range things under mnemonic headings and picture them 
to themselves. But opining is not in our power, for the opinion that 
we hold must be either false or true. Moreover, when we are of 
opinion that something is terrible or alarming, we at once feel the 
corresponding emotion, and so, too, with what is reassuring. But 
when we are under the influence of imagination we are no more 
affected than if we saw in a picture the objects which inspire terror 
or confidence. There are also different forms even of belief; know- 5 
ledge, opinion, intelligence and their opposites. But the difference 
between these species must be reserved for another discussion. 
textum recepit Biehl in ed. alt., reliqui codd. νόησις, etiam Simpl. Philop. || 19. ἔστι τι 
E, receperunt Biehl Rodier, om. Ὁ, ἔστι τι etiam Soph., τὶ om. reliqui omnes || 20. 2 om. 
STUWXy, leg. Soph. |] 21. δοξάζωμεν LSU W, δοξάσωμεν etiam Philop. Soph. | 
22. κἂν] καὶ ἐὰν Ty, κἂν ἢ L, καὶ ἐὰν 7 SU VW X Soph., κἂν etiam Them. |} 23. ef] οἱ 
TW Bek. Trend. Torst., ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ etiam Simpl. 221, 3 Soph. 118, 32, ὥσπερ θεώμενοι 
πάσχομεν in paraphr. Them., ‘‘sicut si essemus considerantes” vet. transl., ef recepit 
Biehl {| 24. ἢ E Simpl. 221, 4 et Soph., reliqui codd. καὶ || εἰσὶ dé...26. Adyos ab hoc 

loco aliena et fort. spuria esse putat, Susemihl || καὶ αὐτῆς] αὐτῆς καὶ Essen |] 25. xat 
τἀναντία τούτων unc. incl. Essen || 26. τὰ ἐναντία SUV WX || ἔσται X. 


περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἕτερον τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι, 
ἴω > Ν \ ε , 
τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν φαντασία δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψις, 
\ 4 7 
περὶ φαντασίας διορίσαντας οὕτω περὶ θατέρου λεκτέον. 
4 ΄ 
6e δή ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία καθ᾽ ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμα τι 4288 
a Ν ? 
ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ εἴ τι κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν, 
a , 9 [4 δύ ‘A vy θ᾽ Δ / Ν 
μία τίς ἐστι τούτων δύναμις ἢ ἕξις, καθ᾽ ἣν κρίνομεν καὶ 
¥ , 
ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα. τοιαῦται δ᾽ εἰσὶν αἴσθησις, δόξα, 
a “5. » ἰοὺ 
7 ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις, δῆλον ἐκ 5 
ἴω ¥ Ν Ν, ¥ , A 3 © ¥ 
τῶνδε. αἴσθησις μὲν yap ἦτοι δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ὄψις 
, 4 
καὶ ὅρασις, φαίνεται δέ τι καὶ μηδετέρου ὑπάρχοντος Tov- 
~ a ΕΣ A ’ A - 
των, οἷον τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις. εἶτα αἴσθησις μὲν ἀεὶ πάρεστι, 
vd > ¥ 3 \ ~ > ? Ν 5 f “~ x 9 
φαντασία δ᾽ οὔ. εἶ δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ αὐτό, πᾶσιν ἂν ἐν- 
A re a ¥ @ 
δέχοιτο τοῖς θηρίοις φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν: δοκεῖ δ᾽ ov, οἷον τὸ 
᾽ὔ aA 4 a vd > ¢€ Ν aN θ a“ > 74 
μύρμηκι ἢ μελίττῃ ἢ σκώληκι. εἶτα αἱ μὲν ἀληθεις aici, 
» 3 > Ν 
ai δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται at πλείους ψευδεῖς. ἔπειτ᾽ οὐδὲ λέ- 
7 3 a 3 A Ν Ν 3 θ / Ψ vd 
γομεν, ὅταν ἐνεργῶμεν ἀκριβῶς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, ὅτι φαΐί- 
~ en ¥ > Ν a Ψ ἈΝ 3 
νεται τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος: ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὁταν μὴ ἐναρ- 
‘A ‘ a , ¢ Ν 
yas αἰσθανώμεθα [τότε ἢ ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής). καὶ ὅπερ δὲ 
8 ἐλέγομεν πρότερον, φαίνεται Kat μύουσιν ὁράματα. ἀλλὰ 



μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν ἀεὶ ἀληθευόντων οὐδεμία ἔσται, οἷον ἐπιστήμη ἢ 
νοῦς" ἔστι γὰρ φαντασία καὶ ψευδής. λείπεται ἄρα ἰδεῖν εἰ 
δόξα' γίνεται γὰρ δόξα καὶ ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδής. ἀλλὰ 
δόξῃ μὲν ἔπεται πίστις (οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δοξάζοντα οἷς 20 
δοκεῖ μὴ πιστεύειν), τῶν δὲ θηρίων οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει πίστις, 

27. τοῦ αἶσθ. E, sed nunc v eras. (Stapf.), τοῦ etiam Simpl. 221, 6 || 4284, 1. ἡ om. 
W et pr. E, leg. Soph, || 2. γενέσθαι ST VX, ἐγγίνεσθαι Wy Them. 89, 30 || 3. '‘negatio 
aut certe dubitatio in hac apodosi desideratur’’ Trend., ante ula addendum esse fyraper 
εἰ coni. Bywater, p. 56 || καθ᾽ as coni. Torst., καθ᾽ ἣν etiam Philop. Soph. || καὶ] 9 
ESU WX, καὶ etiam Soph. | 4. ἢ] καὶ ESTUW, ἢ etiam Soph. {τοιαῦτα SV y, 
ταῦτα LWX, τοιαῦται etiam Them. Philop. || 5. νοῦς ἐπιστήμη STUWX Philop., 
ἐπιστήμη νοῦς etiam Them. Simpl. Soph., ἐπιστήμην pr. E sed nunc v eras. (Rr.) || οὖν 
om. SU X, leg. Them. Soph. || 6. αἴσθησις μὲν...15. καὶ ὅπερ. Hune locum restituere 
tentat Essen JII, 21 || 6. μὲν om. y, leg. Soph. || 7. ante φαίνεται aliquid excidisse 
censet Freudenthal, p. 55 || τούτων ὑπάρχοντος STU VWX Soph. || 8 legendum 
proponit Torst., Jahrb. f. Phil. 1867, p. 246: αἴσθησις μὲν ἀεὶ «τοῦ »- παρόντος ἐστί, 
φαντασία δ᾽ οὔ, quod improbat Freudenthal, qui pro ἀεὶ legi vult πᾶσι (quod probat 
Susemihl) et ὑπάρχει pro πάρεστι, p. 12 et Rhein. Mus. 1869, p. 400, utrique adver- 
satur Schieboldt, De imag. disquis., p. 12, αἴσθησις μὲν ἡ δυνάμει ἀεὶ πάρεστι coni. 
Christ || 11. σκόληκι pr. E (Rr.) || Torst., Them. et Soph. secutus, scripsit: οἷον μύρμηκι 
μὲν ἢ μελίττῃ, σκώληκι δ᾽ of, quod etiam Belger in alt. ed. Trend. recepit et, omisso 
μὲν, Rodier, quibus assentitur Schieboldt, p. 9, ac profecto Them. ita legisse videtur, 

CH. 3 427 Ὁ 27----428 a 21 125 

To turn to thought: since it is different from sense-perception 
Imagi- and seems to include imagination on the one hand and 
nation. conception on the other, we must determine the nature of 
imagination before we proceed to discuss conception. If, then, 6 
imagination is the faculty in virtue of which we say that an image 
presents itself to us, and if we exclude the metaphorical use of the 
term, it is some one of the faculties or habits in virtue of which we 
judge, and judge truly or falsely. Such faculties or habits are sensa- 
Not tion, opinion, knowledge, intellect. It is clearly not 7 
sensation = sensation, for the following reasons. Sensation is either 
a faculty like sight or an activity like seeing. But we may have an 
image even when neither the one nor the other is present: for 
example, the images indreams. Again, sensation is always present, 
but not so imagination. Besides, the identity of the two in actuality 
would involve the possibility that all the brutes have imagination. 
But this apparently is not the case ; for example, the ant, the bee and 
the grub do not possess it. Moreover, sensations are always true, 
but imaginings prove for the most part false. Further, it is not 
when we direct our energies closely to the sensible object, that we 
say that this object appears to us to be a man, but rather when 
we do not distinctly perceive it [then the term true or false is 
applied). And, as we said before, visions present themselves even 
if we have our eyes closed. ; 

Neither, again, can imagination be ranked with the faculties, 8 
nor like knowledge or intellect, which always judge truly : it 
opinion, may also be false. It remains, then, to consider whether 
it be opinion, as opinion may be true or false. But opinion is 
attended by conviction, for it is impossible to hold opinions 
without being convinced of them: but no brute is ever convinced, 

quamquam suspicionem movet vocabulum tows, quod addidit 90, 8, et fort. Alex., qui 
scribit De An. 647, 2: καὶ αἰσθήσεως μὲν πάντα μετέχει τὰ ζῷα, φαντασίας δὲ οὐ δοκεῖ, ws 
τά τε ὀστρεώδη τῶν θαλασσίων καὶ of σκώληκες, et Soph. alieno loco, p. 55, 27, haec 
verba habet: μύρμηξι καὶ μελέτταις καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις... ἀνἀγκη παρεῖναι φαντασίαν ..., σκώληκες: 
δὲ καὶ μυῖαι... ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὅλως ἔχειν ἢ ἄμυδράν τινα, similiter Philop. ad 413 b, 22. et 
ad 414 b, 33. (258, 32), hoc vero loco diserte vulgatam lectionem agnoscit et interpretatur, 
quare neque ex Philop. neque ex Soph. lectionem a Torst. receptam confirmari posse 
iudicat Biehl ; vulgatam tuentur praeter omnes codd, etiam Simpl. hoc loco et p. 308, 19: 
et vet. transl. et Barco, p. 62; cf. ad hunc locum 4348, 4 |} 12. ἔπειτ᾽] ἔτι T et corr. E, 
ἔπειτα leg. etiam Soph. || 14. ἐνεργῶς E, ἐναργῶς etiam Them. Soph. || 15. 7] om. pr. Ἐς, 
καὶ Ὁ, καὶ ἢ Ty, καὶ ἡ SV |] ἢ] καὶ ἡ SV || τότε ἢ ad. ἢ ψ. unc. inclusit Torst., quod 
probat etiam Madvig, leg. Soph. et vet. transl. |} 67 5Τ ΟΝ Xy Soph. Bywater, p. 56 || 
19. ἀλλὰ...24. δ᾽ οὔ ε duab. ed. contam. indicat Torst., cui assentitur Freudenthal, 
Rhein. Mus. 1869, p. 405, pr. 22. ἔτι mdoy...24. δ᾽ οὔ, post. 19. ἀλλὰ...22. πολλοῖς | 
21. δοκεῖ] δοξάζει 1, Ὁ W Philop. s00, 20, δοκεῖ etiam Them. Soph. 


A ἌᾺ ’ 
φαντασία δ᾽ ἐν πολλοῖς. ἔτι πάσῃ μὲν δόξῃ ἀκολουθεῖ πίστις, 
A a \ 
πίστει δὲ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι, πειθοῖ δὲ λόγος: τῶν δὲ θηρίων 
3. ἢ [4 Ἀ εξ / , 3 ¥ XN ’ 
9 ἐνίοις φαντασία μὲν ὑπάρχει, λόγος δ᾽ ov. φανερὸν τοίνυν 
ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ δι’ αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ συμ- 25 
πλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως φαντασία ἂν εἴη, διά τε 
ταῦτα καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλον τινός ἐστιν ἡ δόξα, ἀλλ᾽ 
3 7 3 A ὌΝ Λε ἊΨ ᾽ δ᾽ 9 ἊΜ ΜᾺ .Ὰ , 
ἐκείνου ἐστὶν οὗ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις λέγω δ᾽, ἐκ τῆς τοῦ λευκοῦ δό- 
Ν 3 4 ὲ ᾿ / 3 4 9 Ν ‘\ 
Ens καὶ αἰσθήσεως ἡ συμπλοκὴ φαντασία ἐστίν: ov yap δὴ 
3 A , ‘ an ~ > θ la > A Ζ΄ δὲ fan Pa) 
ἐκ τῆς δόξης μὲν τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, αἰσθήσεως OE τῆς τοῦ 30 
λευκοῦ" τὸ οὖν φαίνεσθαί ἐστι τὸ δοξάζειν ὅπερ αἰσθάνεται 428b 
\ ιν , ’ \ ‘\ ΝᾺ ᾿ Ν 
τομὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ψευδῆ, περὶ ὧν 
Kd ε / 3 a Ψ ε' , \ c ¥ 
ἅμα ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῆ ἔχει, οἷον φαίνεται μὲν ὃ HALOS πο- 
διαῖος, πεπίστευται δ᾽ εἶναι μείζων τῆς οἰκουμένης: συμβαΐί.- 
>} » > , Ν ε ~ 3 A ? ἃ > 
νει οὖν ἤτοι ἀποβεβληκέναι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀληθῆ δόξαν, ἣν εἶχε, 
σωζομένου τοῦ πράγματος, μὴ ἐπιλαθόμενον μηδὲ μεταπει- 
? a) > -»¥ » > + ‘ > Ν > a > 4 
σθέντα, ἢ εἰ ἔτι ἔχει, ἀνάγκη THY αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ 
ψευδῆ. ἀλλὰ ψευδὴς ἐγίνετο, ὅτε λάθοι μεταπεσὸν τὸ 
πρᾶγμα. OUT ἄρα ἕν τι τούτων ἐστὶν οὔτ᾽ ἐκ τούτων ἡ φαντασία. 
Ir ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἔστι κινηθέντος τουδὶ κινεῖσθαι ἕτερον ὑπὸ το 
τούτον, ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ 
αἰσθήσεως γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ᾽ αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὧν αἴσθησίς 
3 » δὲ ᾽ θ 7 ε \ ἌΝ > Ζ “~ 9 , 
ἐστιν, ἔστι δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθή- 
} > 
σεως, Kal ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴη ἂν 
, ¥ 
αὕτη ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ al- 15 
σθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ Kar αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν 
‘ 4 ἈΝ ¥ ‘ > ‘ ΕῚ “~ \ A 
καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ. 


22. δ᾽ ἐν EL, δὲ ἐν Soph., ἐν om. reliqui ante Biehlium omnes || verba ἔτι... 24. δ᾽ οὐ unc. 
inclusit Biehl || πάσῃ] εἰ πάσῃ S ΧΎ, εἰ insert. Ey (Bhl.) || 26. ἡ φαντ. coni. Torst. || virgulam 
post εἴη delevit, post 27. ταῦτα posuit Rodier, Simpl. 212, 12. 28 Philop. 504, 31 et Them. 
90, 32 secutus. Idem Rodier dubitanter διά γε ταῦτα coni. || διά τε ταῦτα...28. αἴσθησις 
ante 24. φανερὸν poni vult G. Schneider, Rhein. Mus. 1866, p. 449 ll 27. καὶ ὅτι 
{omisso δῆλον») vel καὶ ὅτι δῆλον ὅτι et ἔσται pro ἐστιν coni. Shorey, p. 180 {{ ἄλλη τις 
ΘΎΝ, ἄλλης y, ἄλλου etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. || # om. SVX {|{| 28. ἐκείνη ST, 
ἐκείνης y, ἢ ἐκείνη Philop. || ἐστὶν} ἥπερ ἐστὶν S, ἧσπερ ἐστιν y, εἴπερ ἐστὶν TW Torst., 
vulgatam tuetur vet. transl. || οὗ καὶ ἡ] οὗ καὶ EL Bek. Trend., καὶ ἡ y, οὗπερ ἐστι καὶ ἡ 
UV, οὗ καὶ ἡ 5ΤΎ Χ, scripsit Torst., οὗπερ ἐστίν, ὁμοῦ καὶ ἡ Simpl. || ἐκ] ef V Trend. 
Ὁ. Schneider, ὅτε ἐκ y, vulgatam tuetur vet. transl. || 29. ἦ συμπλοκὴ une. incl. Torst. {} 
428 Ὁ, 1. ἔσται coni. Trend., scripsit Torst., cui assentitur G. Schneider, ἐστι etiam 
Philop. et vet. transl. || 2. δὲ] dé ye STU VW Χ νυ, fort. recte, iudice Biehlio { 3. ἔχειν 
ES |} wodcos pr. E || 4. πέπεισται ST UX Torst., πιστεύεται L || μείζων LU WX. Bek. 
Trend., μείζω EST Vy Torst. Biehl Rodier || 5. αὐτοῦ EL || ἀληθῆ post εἶχε SU WX { 

CH. 3 428 a 22—428 Ὁ 17 127 

though many have imagination. Further, every opinion implies 
conviction, conviction implies that we have been persuaded, and 
persuasion implies reason. Among brutes, however, though some 
have imagination, none have reason. It is evident, then, that 9 
imagination is neither opinion joined with sensation nor opinion 

nor through sensation, nor yet a complex of opinion and sen- 

opinion sation, both on these grounds and because nothing else 
with is the object of opinion but that which is the object of 

sensation. . ~, s oe 
sensation: I mean, it is the complex of the opinion of 

white and the sensation of white, not surely of the opinion of good 
with the sensation of white, which alone could constitute imagina- 
tion. To imagine, then, will be on this supposition to opine directly, 
not indirectly, that which we perceive. But there are false imagin- Io 
ings concerning things of which we hold at the same time a true 
conception. For example, the sun appears only a foot in diameter, 
but we are convinced that it is larger than the inhabited world: 
in this case, therefore, either, without any alteration in the thing and 
without any lapse of memory on our part or conversion by argument, 
we have abandoned the true opinion which we had about it; 
or else, if we still retain it, the same opinion must be both true and 
false. It could have proved false only in the event of the object 
having changed without our observing it. It is not, then, either 
one of the two, opinion and sensation, singly, or a combination 
of the two, which constitutes imagination. 

Now when one thing is moved, something else can be moved II 
by it. And imagination is thought to be a species of motion and 
not to arise apart from sensation, but only in sentient beings 
and with the objects of sense for its objects. Motion, again, may 
It is a be produced by actual sensation, and such motion must 
movement resemble the sensation which caused it. From all this 
tosensa- it follows that this particular motion cannot arise apart 
mon. from sensation nor be found anywhere except in sentient 
beings: and in virtue of this motion it is possible for its possessor to do 
and experience many things: imagination, too, may be both true and 

6. ἐπιλανθανόμενον LT UV WX || 7. τὴν αὐτὴν om. pr. Ἐς ante ἀνάγκη ponunt LW y | 
post εἶναι addendum πιστεύειν censet Essen III, p. 23 || 8. ἐγίνετο E, sed in litura 
(Trend.), LSUVXy Torst., ἐγένετο reliqui ante Torst. omnes, etiam Susemihl, B. J. 
XXX, 47 |] ἀλλὰ...9. πρᾶγμα Torst. suspecta sunt, non legisse videntur Them. Simpl. 
Soph., leg. etiam Philop. || 9. οὐκ ἄρα ELT Wy || το. τοῦδε SU Vy || 11. ad verba ἡ δὲ... 
12. αἴσθησίς ἐστιν annotat Torst.: vereor ne, etsi sunt Aristotelis, in posteriore edit. non 
fuerint scripta, leg. etiam Simpl. Philop. || 12. αἰσθήσεις εἰσίν Τ U V W et, omisso verbo, S, 
numerum singularem αἴσθησίς leg. etiam Philop. 512, 24 Simpl. 218» 3 Soph. rro, 34 ll 
15. αὐτῆς E || 16. ὑπάρχει E || κατὰ ταύτην EL, κατ᾽ αὐτὴν etiam Them. Simpl. Philop. 
Soph. || cat om. TVX y, tuentur etiam Them. Soph. 


Ψ “a ‘ 2Q 7 9 ,’ 
12 τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τάδε. ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν μὲν ἰδίων ἀληθής 
a / (a) 
ἐστιν ἢ ὅτι ὀλίγιστον ἔχουσα Td ψεῦδος. δεύτερον δὲ τοῦ 
2 a Ν 3 00 "ὃ 3 δέ ὃ 2 
συμβεβηκέναι ταῦτα' καὶ ἐνταῦθα yon ἐνδέχεται ὀὁιαψεύ- 20 
> Ν ἴω 
δεσθαι: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκόν, οὐ ψεύδεται, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ λευ- 
n A Ν 9 
κὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι, ψεύδεται. τρίτον δὲ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ἑπομένων 
wn ΄ @ ε ΄ bs ἴὸ . λέ δ᾽ ® , 
τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν, οἷς ὑπάρχει τὰ ἰδια" λέγω οἷον κί- 
ἃ / a ’’ ΝᾺ > θ “ ‘\ A 
vnoi Kal μέγεθος, ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, περὶ ἃ 
, » y 9 θῇ \ ‘ ¥ 6 ε δὲ , 
13 μάλιστα ἤδη ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν. ἡ δὲ κί- 25 
van) 4 “~ > / 
νῆσις ἡ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας γινομένη διοίσει [τῆς αἰσθήσεως] 
ΜᾺ ων \ εΕ Ν 7 
ἡ ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν τριῶν αἰσθήσεων. Kal ἡ μὲν πρώτη πα- 
4 ΜᾺ > ’ 3 θ la ς δ᾽ J ‘\ vA \ 
povons τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀληθής, αἱ δ᾽ ἕτεραι καὶ παρούσης Kal 
> 2 > K ὃ a Ν aN Ψ 2 μ 3 θ 
ἀπούσης εἶεν ἂν ψευδεῖς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν πόρρω τὸ αἰσθη- 
> ma ¥ ἣ, ν᾿ A ε 
τὸν ἢ. εἰ οὖν μηθὲν μὲν ἄλλο ἔχοι ἢ τὰ εἰρημένα ἡ φαν- 30 
, aA > 9 \ \ , ¢ ΄ 4 ¥ ΄ 
τασία, τοῦτο ὃ ἐστὶ τὸ λεχθέν, ἡ φαντασία ἂν Ein κίνησις 4298 
τ4 ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ 
κά ὔ » ’ 3 Ν \ » 3 \ nn ? ¥ 
ὄψις μάλιστα αἴσθησίς ἐστι, Kal TO ὄνομα ἀπὸ TOU φάους εἴ. 
“A Ἁ 
15 Ander, ὅτι ἄνευ φωτὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν. καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν 
Ν ς ’ > “~ > ’ Ν > > N , 
καὶ ὁμοίας εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ αὐτὰς πράτ- 5 
‘\ a“ Ν ‘ ὃ Ν ‘“ Ν ¥ ω ec ‘\ A ‘id 
Tee τὰ Coa, τὰ μὲν διὰ TO μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία, 
Ν δ ‘ A 3 4 ‘ a > ἢ 10 A ΄ 
τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίοτε πάθει ἢ νόσοις 
A Y Q © δ Ν > , ,o9 
ἢ ὕπνῳ, οἷον ot ἄνθρωποι. περὶ μὲν οὖν φαντασίας, τί ἐστι 
A [ων 
καὶ διὰ τί ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον. 

19. τῶ συμβεβηκέναι ταῦτα E (recte Bus., sed τῶ sine ἐ adscript.), τοῦ συμβεβηκότος Χ, 
τοῦ ᾧ συμβέβηκε καὶ ταῦτα Ald. Sylb. Basil. et vet. transl., Them. interpretatur: δεύτερον δὲ 
τῶν ὑποκειμένων τοῖς ἰδίοις καὶ ols ἐκεῖνα συμβέβηκε, ex Simpl. et Philop. interpr. colligit 
Biehl, eos legisse aut τοῦ συμβεβηκότος aut τοῦ ὃ συμβέβηκε τούτοις, quod scriptum esse ab 
Arist. coni. Torst., pro ταῦτα coni. τούτῳ Steinhart, fort. legendum ταῦτα τούτῳ censet 
Rodier || 20. v. ad b, 24 || διαψεύσασθαι E, διαψεύδεσθαι etiam Them. || 21. room. ES VX, 
leg. Philop. || 22. τι et 24. ἃ ante συμβ. om. STU V WX || 23. τοῖς... ἴδια unc. incl. Essen 
III, p. 25, οἷς.. ἔδια delenda censet Maier, Syllogistik des Arist., p. 9 in adn., Simpl. et 
Philop. videntur legisse καὶ τὰ ἴδια, fort. οἷς.. «τὰ ἴδια non leg. Them. [ 24. ἃ,. αἰσθητοῖς 
unc. inclusit Torst., post 20. ταῦτα transponenda censet Bywater, p. 58, cui assentitur 
Susemihl, B. J. LXVIT, τος, in parenth. posuit Rodier || 25. δὲ] δὴ TU Rodier, δ᾽ ἡ W || 
26. τῶν αἰσθήσεων T, τῆς αἰσθήσεως unc. inclusit Torst., fort. transponendum esse post 
ἐνεργείας putat Biehl, et iam idem G. Schneider suaserat; etiam facilius post γινομένῃ 
traici posse censet Susemihl, Oecon. p. 86 || 27. ἧἡ...αἰσθήσεων om. SU VW, leg. etiam 
Philop., pro ἡ sine ullo cod. scripserunt τῆς Bek. et Trend., ἢ coni. Christ, ἡ delendum 
censet G. Schneider, Zeitschr. f. Gym. 1867, p. 631 || 29. αἰσθητήριον TUVWX ἢ 
30. μὲν om. ST UV WX Philop. || ἔχοι ἢ E, recepit Biehl, ἔχοι Ly et Philop. cod. D, 
ἔχει, Omisso ἢ, reliqui omnes, etiam Torst. Zeller Rodier || Nescio an ἢ τὰ εἰρημένα unc. 
includenda sint, nisi forte, deserto cod. E, totus locus ita est purgandus: εἰ οὖν μηθὲν 
ἄλλο ἔχει τὰ εἰρημένα [ἢ φαντασία, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ λεχθέν], ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη Kré. || 

CH. 3 428 Ὁ 18—-429 a 0 129 

false. The reasons for the last conclusion are as follows. Perception 12 
of the objects of the special senses is true, or subject to the minimum 
of error. Next comes the perception that they are attributes: and 
at this point error may come in. As to the whiteness of an object 
sense is never mistaken, but it may be mistaken as to whether 
the white object is this thing or something else. Thirdly, there 
is perception of the common attributes, that is, the concomitants 
of the things to which the special attributes belong: I- mean, 
for example, motion and magnitude, which are attributes of 
sensibles. And it is concerning them that sense is most apt 
to be deceived. But the motion which is the result of actual 13 
sensation will be different according as it arises from one or other 
of these three kinds of perception. The first kind, so long as the 
sensation is present, is true: the other kinds may be false, whether 
the sensation is present or absent, and especially when the object 
perceived is a long way off. If then, imagination possesses no 
tmagi- other characteristics than the aforesaid, and if it is what 
nation | it has been described to be, imagination will be a motion 
generated by actual perception. And, since sight is the 14 
principal sense, imagination has derived even its name (φαντασία) 
from light (φάος), because without light one cannot see. Again, 15 
because imaginations remain in us and resemble the corresponding 
sensations, animals perform many actions under their influence ; 
some, that is, the brutes, through not having intellect, and others, 
that is, men, because intellect is sometimes obscured by passion 
or disease or sleep. Let this account of the nature and cause of 
imagination suffice. 

ὁ] solus E, 7 LSTUVXy, ἢ ἡ ἊΝ Rodier, ‘‘si igitur nihil aliud habet ea quae dicta 
sunt quam phantasia” vet. transl., ἢ μὴ Bek. Trend., secuti edit. Sylburgianam, vel 
potius eiusdem typothetarum errorem, ἢ ἡ φαντασία une. incl. Torst., non legisse Philop. 
514, 32 idem Torst. censet || φαντασίαν S Bek. Trend.; scriptum fuisse ab Arist.: εἰ οὖν 
μηθὲν μὲν ἄλλο ἔχει τὰ εἰρημένα, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔχει, ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις coni. Torst. || 
4298, τ. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔστι Biehl, etiam Them. 93, 22 || ταὐτὸ δ᾽ ἐστὲ sive ταὐτὸ δ᾽ ἔχει coni. Christ || 
2. γιγνομένη pr. E (Trend.) Ly Them. Philop. Simpl. vet. transl. Trend. Torst., quod etiam 
probat Zeller, p. 545, γιγνομένης reliqui codd., etiam Bek. || 3. ἐστι om. STUV WX | 
5. ὁμοίας E, sed as in rasura (Bhl.), TUX Them. Simpl. vet. transl. Torst., ὁμοίως 
reliqui ante Torst. omnes || κατὰ ταύτας ELy, κατ᾽ αὐτὰς etiam Them. Simpl. ἢ 
πράττειν E || 7. νόσω TUV, νόσοις etiam Them. Simpl. 221, 12 || 9. διότε E Soph. 
121, 20. 

H. . 9 


~~ A nl ~ ea 4 e 
4 Περὶ δὲ rod popiov τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ γινώσκει TE Ἢ τὸ 
ἮΝ τ » ‘ ‘ ΜᾺ 
ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ, εἴτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος ELTE καὶ μὴ χωριστοῦ 
7 3 » 
κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον, σκεπτέον τὶν ἔχει δια- 
“ 3 Ν ΝᾺ 
2 φοράν, καὶ πῶς ποτὲ γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν. εἰ δή ἐστι τὸ νοεῖν 
x + ε ‘\ rN ~ 
ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἢ πάσχειν TL ἂν εἴη ὕπο TOU νοητοῦ 7 
~ ον Ν Ν A ¥ 
4τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. ἀπαθὲς dpa δεῖ εἶναι, δεκτικὸν δὲ τοῦ εἴ- 15 
a N “Ἂ Ne , ¥ 
Sous καὶ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁμοίως ἔχειν, 
N rd Ψ \ ΝΆ \ 
ὦσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς 
~ OR y 
τὰ νοητά. ἀνάγκη apa, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, wo- 
\ 3 / “4 ἰοὺ “Ἂ δ᾽ 3 Ν Ψ 
περ φησὶν ᾿Αναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἵνα γνω- 
7 , Ν 4 Ἁ 3 , Ἁ > 
ρίζῃ" παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει TO ἀλλότριον καὶ ἀντι- 20 
Ψ 9 > φὶ 5 ’ ’, 9 2 J 
φράττει' wore μηδ᾽ αὐτοῦ εἶναι φύσιν μηδεμίαν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ 
¥ ta A ~ 
ταύτην, ὅτι δυνατόν. 6 apa καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς 
(λέγω δὲ νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἧ ψυχή) 

4 ΜᾺ 

3 ls 3 3 ¥ Ν “ ὃ \ ὑδὲ " A 
4 οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν. διὸ οὐδὲ μεμεῖχθαι 
4 Ν “Δ é “Ἃ 
εὔλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι' ποιός τις γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτο, ἢ ψυ- 25 
¥ ¥ a σι 
xpos ἢ θερμός, ἢ κἂν ὄργανόν τι εἴη, ὥσπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ: 

A > 22 » νι 5 ON εὰ 2 Ν \ > , 
νῦν δ᾽ οὐθέν ἐστιν. καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τό- 
Tov εἰδῶν, πλὴν ὅτι οὔτε ὅλη ἀλλ᾽ ἡ νοητική, οὔτε ἐντελε- 

΄ 3 Ν 7 Ν Ld 4 δ᾽ 3 ε - € 3 (θ 

5 χείᾳ ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἴδη. ὅτι δ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοία ἡ ἀπάθεια 

τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νοητικοῦ, φανερὸν ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων 30 

\ ἴω 3 ΄ ε \ ‘ ¥ 3 4 2 ΄ 
καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως. ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις οὐ δύναται αἰσθάνε- 

“Aw “~ ry ~ 

σθαι ἐκ Tov σφόδρα αἰσθητοῦ, οἷον ψόφου ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων 429b 
ψόφων, οὐδ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν χρωμάτων καὶ ὀσμῶν οὔτε 

e ΤᾺ y > wn 3 > € A Y 4 / 
ὁρᾶν ovre ὀσμᾶσθαι" add’ ὁ νοῦς ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα von- 

4 3 κ᾿ a ‘ ε a > ‘\ ‘ a \ 
TOV, οὐχ ἧττον νοεῖ TA ὑποδεέστερα, ἀλλὰ Kal μᾶλλον" τὸ 
6 μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὃ δὲ χωριστός. ὅταν ς 
δ᾽ οὕτως ἕκαστα γένηται ὡς ὃ ἐπιστήμων λέγεται ὃ κατ᾽ ἐνέρ. 

“ δὲ id ν , 3 ~ > € “" 
γειαν (τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει, ὅταν δύνηται ἐνεργεῖν δι’ αὑτοῦ), 

Io. τοῦ ante τῆς om. 5 TU WX Philop., τοῦ τῆς ψνχ. μορίον y, leg. τοῦ Them. { 
11. καὶ post εἴτε om. E (Bus.) et Simpl. || 14. τι ὅτε EL, τι leg. Philop. Soph. Simpl., hoe 
loco et p. 264, 17 || 15. dpa tuentur omnes codd. et Them. Simpl. Philop. || 18. ἀνάγκη... 
27. οὐθέν ἐστιν e duab. rec. contam. iudicat Torst., pr. a2. ὁ dpa...27. ἐστιν, post. 
18. dvdryin.,.22. δυνατόν, quod negant Noetel, Ztschr. f. Gymn. 1864, p. 140 et 
Dittenberger, Gotting. gelehrte Anzeigen 1863, p. 1610 || x8. ἐπειδὴ SUVWKXy 
Them. || 20. κωλύσει coni. Essen, Beitr. z. Lés., P- 44, Scripsit II. Jackson, Texts to 
illustrate, p. 93 || ἀντιφράζει SVX, ἀντιφράξει UWy Essen 11. Jackson, ἀντιφράττει 
leg. etiam Soph. || 25. γὰρ ἄν rs LSTU V WX, ποιός τις ἂν γίγνοιτο Soph. || ἡ ψ. ἢ 9. 
E, any. STUVWX Philop., ἢ θ. ἢ ψ. y, ψυχρὸς ἢ θερμός Soph. Bek. Trend. Torst. { 

CH. 4 420 εἰ το---420 Ὁ 7 131 

As to the part of the soul with which it knows and under- 4 
Intellect stands, whether such-part-be separable spatially, or not 
‘or Mind. —_ separable spatially, but only in thought, we have to con- 
sider what is its distinctive character and how thinking comes about. 
Now, if thinking is analogous to perceiving, it will consist in a2 
being acted upon by the object of thought or in something else of 
this kind. This part of the soul, then, must be impassive, but recep- 3 
tive of the form and potentially like this form, though not identical 
with it: and, as the faculty of sense is to sensible objects, so must 
intelfect be related to intelligible objects. The mind, then, since 
it thinks all things, must needs, in the words of Anaxagoras, be 
unmixed with any, if it is to rule, that is, to know. For by 
‘intruding its own form it hinders and obstructs that which is 
alien to it; hence it has no other nature than this, that it is a 
A poten- capacity. Thus, then, the part of the soul which we call 
Tithe clace intellect (and by intellect I mean that whereby the soul 
of forms.’” thinks and conceives) is nothing at all actually before 
it thinks. Hence, too, we cannot reasonably conceive it to be4 
mixed with the body: for in that case it would acquire some par- 
ticular quality, cold or heat, or would even have some organ, as the 
perceptive faculty has. But as a matter of fact it has none. There- 
fore it has been well said that the soul is a place of forms or ideas: 
except that this is not true of the whole soul, but only of the soul 
which can think, and again that the forms are there not in actuality, 
but potentially. But that the impassivity of sense is different from 5 
that of intellect is clear if we look at the sense-organs and at 
sense. The sense loses its power to perceive, if the sensible object 
has been too intense: thus it cannot hear sound after very loud 
noises, and after too powerful colours and odours it can neither 
see nor smell. But the intellect, when it has been thinking on 
an object of intense thought, is not less, but even more, able to 
think of inferior objects. For the perceptive faculty is not in- 
dependent of body, whereas intellect is separable. But when the 6 
intellect has thus become everything in the sense in 
which one who actually is a scholar is said to be so (which 
happens so soon as he can exercise his power of himself), even 

In habitu 

26. ἢ κἂν] καὶ κἂν S, κἂν TW Soph. Susemihl, Occon. p. 86, cai U VX || 29. ὅτι ὃ ...30. 
ψοητικοῦ unc. incl. Essen III, Ὁ. 38 || 429 b, x. οἷον τοῦ YW. ST VX y, οἷον ἐκ τοῦ y. EH, ἐκ 
τοῦ ψόφου τοῦ μεγάλου [ἢ] τῶν μικρῶν ψόφων Them. 104, 34 || ἐκ om. E, οἷον ψόφου ἐκ τῶν 
μεγ. Ψ. etiam Soph. || 4. verba ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον interpolata esse censet Torst., Jahrb. f. Phil. 
1867, p. 246, leg. etiam Them. || 5. ὁ δὲ νοῦς xwp. y et in interpr. Soph., om. voids etiam 
Them. 105, 4 || 6. ὁ post ὡς om. 5 W Theoph. ap. Prisc. 31, 8 Bek. Trend. || ὁ ante 
κατ᾽ om. SU V WX Theoph. ap. Prisc. 31, 9- 


32 DE ANIMA 11 CH. 4 


» ‘ Ν ld ad 3 Ν ε ’ Ν Ἁ 
ἔστι μὲν καὶ τότε δυνάμει πως, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν 
~ A ε a“ \ 9 \ δὲ ΕΝ / δύ ΜᾺ 

μαθεῖν ἢ εὑρεῖν: καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ αὕτον τότε δύναται νοεῖν. 
Ν > 
7 ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ μέγεθος Kai τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι καὶ το 
ὕδωρ καὶ ὕδατι εἶναι (οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἑτέρων πολλών, ἀλλ᾽ 
Ν 3. 
οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων" ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι), τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι 
καὶ σάρκα [καὶ] ἢ ἢ ἄλλῳ ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοντι κρίνει: ᾿ γὰρ σὰρξ 
οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ τὸ σιμόν, τόδε ἐν τῷδε. τῷ 
μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικῷ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν κρίνει, καὶ ὧν τς 
¥ Ν ¥ ~ Ἄ ε ε 
λόγος τις ἡ σάρξ' ἄλλῳ δὲ ἤτοι χωριστῷ ἢ ws ἡ κεκλα- 
κι Ν > 
σμένη ἔχει πρὸς αὑτὴν ὅταν ἐκταθῇ, τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι κρί. 
’ > 5 N an 3 3 ᾽ ¥ \ 34 ξ A 
Sve. πάλιν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν ἀφαιρέσει ὄντων τὸ εὐθὺ ὡς τὸ 
n > 4 ὃ" 
σιμόν μετὰ συνεχοῦς γάρ' τὸ δὲ τί ἣν εἶναι, εἰ ἔστιν ἕτερον 
% 3 ἴω <>) Ν \ 200 Ἷὰλλ . ¥ Ν ὃ , ¢. 4 
τὸ εὐθεῖ εἶναι Kat τὸ εὐθύ, ἄλλο: ἔστω yap duds. ἑτέρῳ 20 
dpa ἢ ἑτέρως ἔχοντι κρίνει. καὶ ὅλως ἄρα ὡς χωριστὰ τὰ 
κι \ “A 
ο πράγματα τῆς ὕλης, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν νοῦν. ἀπορήσειε 
> »* > ε a e a > A ν 2 \ ‘ Ν 
δ᾽ ἂν τις, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἁπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ μηθενὶ 
\ ¥ / ν Ν 3 / ω », 3 \ 
μηθὲν ἔχει κοινόν, ὥσπερ φησὶν ᾿Αναξαγόρας, πῶς νοήσει, εἰ τὸ 
® 3 ω 
νοεῖν πάσχειν τί ἐστιν. ἢ γάρ τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει, τὸ 25. 
τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ νοητὸς καὶ αὐτός. 
«Ὁ ᾿ ~ »» a € / > \ 5 ¥ 3 4 
ἢ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις νοῦς ὑπάρξει, εἰ μὴ Kar ἄλλο αὐτὸς 
’ a δέ Ν Ν lo a rd 4 
νοητός, ἕν δέ τι TO νοητὸν εἴδει, ἢ μεμειγμένον TL ἕξει, 
> Ἂ \ 
τι ποιεῖ νοητὸν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τἄλλα. ἢ τὸ μὲν πάσχειν κατὰ 

8. μὲν] μὲν οὖν LW Theoph. 1. 1, 31, 10 Them. || καὶ τότε E m. pr. y Them. 
Philop. Torst., καὶ τότε ὁμοίως insert. E, (Rr.), ὁμοίως καὶ τότε reliqui ante Torst. 
omnes || ὁμοίως om. SUX, leg. Them. Simpl. Theoph. 1. 1. 31, rr || 9. ἢ] καὶ 
Theoph. 1. 1, || 6¢ αὑτὸν] δι’ αὑτοῦ coni. Bywater, J. of Philol. XIV, p. 40, cui 
assentitur Susemih], Oecon., Ὁ. 86 || 11. καὶ rd ὕδατι E, sed τὸ expunct. (Stapf), τὸ 
om. reliqui omnes || οὕτω 6¢...12. ταὐτόν ἐστι in parenth. Bon., Stud. Arist. LV, 376 | 
rr. οὕτω δὲ om. LT, leg. Them. || 12. ταὐτό E (Trend.) || colon post ἔστι omissum 
post 13. σάρκα ponit Bek., corr. Trend., iam Them. hunc locum recte interpretatus 
est 96, 6 sqq. || 13. καὶ ἢ ἄλλῳ solus E, receperunt Biehl Rodier, καὶ ἄλλῳ y, 
ἢ ἄλλῳ, omisso καὶ, reliqui || ἔχοντι om. LS UV, leg. Them. Simpl. Philop. Soph. et 
insert. Ey || κρίνει ὁ νοῦς L et E, sed ὁ νοῦς exp. (Bhl.) || 14. virgulam post σιμόν a Bek. 
Trend. omissam ponunt Torst. Bon. |} 15. αἰσθητῷ pro αἰσθητικῷ legi vult Brentano, 
p. 134 || τὸ ante ψυχρ. om. EL || 16. ὁ λόγος E, ὁ om. etiam Simpl. Philop. || 17. αὐτὴν 
y et E (Trend.) || εἶναι καὶ κρίνει LS, καὶ om. etiam Simpl. || rg. e/...20. εὐθύ une. incl. 
Essen III, 40 || 20. virgulam post εὐθύ om. Bek., corr. Trend. || ἄλλο TVX et Bon. 
1.1., ἄλλῳ reliqui ante Bon. omnes, quod defendere studet Torst., Jahrb. f. Phil. 1867, 
p- 245 || 21. καὶ οἵα. LSTUVX et, ut videtur, Philop. 532, 12 || dpa om. pr. E, leg. 
etiam Philop. || 23. ἀπαθὴς pr. E (Bus.), verba καὶ ἀπαθὲς in interpr. ignorare videtur 
Them. 97, 8 sq., delenda esse censet Hayduck, progr. Gryphisv. 1873, p. 4, cui assentitur 
Susemihl, Phil. Anzeig. 1873, p. 683, pro ἀπαθὲς coni. ἀμιγὲς Zeller, p. 568 || 24. ἔχων 

CH. 4 420 Ὁ 8—429 Ὁ 29 133 

then it is still in one sense but a capacity: not, however, a capacity 
in the same sense as before it learned or discovered. And, more- 
over, at this stage intellect is capable of thinking itself. 

Now, since magnitude is not the same as the quiddity of 7 
magnitude, nor water the same as the quiddity of water 

How the 

Oty (and so also of many other things, though not of all, the 

is appre- thing and its quiddity being in some cases the same), 

we judge the quiddity of flesh and flesh itself either with 
different instruments or with the same instrument in different 
relations. For flesh is never found apart from matter, but, like 
“snub-nosed,” it is a particular form in a particular matter. It is, 
then, with the faculty of sense that we discriminate heat and cold 
and all those qualities of which flesh is a certain proportion. But it 
is with another faculty, either separate from sense, or related to it as 
the bent line when it is straightened out is related to its former self, 
that we discriminate the quiddity of flesh, Again, when we come 8 
to the abstractions of mathematics, the straight answers to the 
quality “snub-nosed,” being never found apart from extension. But 
the straightness of that which is-straight, always supposing that the 
straight is not the same as straightness, is something distinct: we 
may, for instance, assume the definition of straightness to be 
duality. It is, then, with another instrument or with the same 
instrument in another relation that we judge it. In general, there- 
fore, to the separation of the things from their matter corresponds 
a difference in the operations of the intellect. 

The question might arise: assuming that the mind is something 9 

Some simple and impassive and, in the words of Anaxagoras, 
ee has nothing in common with anything else, how will it 
sidered. think, if to think is to be acted upon? For it is in 

so far as two things have something in common that the one of 
them is supposed to act and the other to be acted upon. Again, ro 
can mind itself be its own object? For then either its other objects 
will have mind in them, if it is not through something else, but in 
itself, that mind is capable of being thought, and if to be so capable 
is everywhere specifically one and the same; or else the mind will 
have. some ingredient in its composition which makes it, like the rest, 
an object of thought. Or shall we recall our old distinction between 11 
two meanings of the phrase “to be acted upon in virtue of a 

SUV || νοήσειεν TV X || 26. δ᾽ om. pr. E |] 27. 6 νοῦς ST U WX Philop. Bek. Trend. 
Torst. {| 29. de verbis 4...31. νοῇ vide Torst., cui mutila et corrupta videntur; tuetur 
etiam Simpl., defendit Brentano, p. 137. 

134 DE ANIMA Ill CHS. 4, 5 

κοινόν τι διήρηται πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πώς ἐστι TA νοητὰ 30 
ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέν, πρὶν ἂν νοῇ" δευνάμ;ει δ᾽ οὕτως 
ὦσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ ᾧ μηθὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμ- 4308 

12 μένον: ὅπερ συμβαΐίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ. καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ νοητός ἐστιν 
ὥσπερ τὰ νοητά. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι 
τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον" ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ 
τὸ οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν. τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀεὶ νοεῖν τὸ 
αἴτιον ἐπισκεπτέον. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὕλην δυνάμει ἕκαστόν 
ἐστι τῶν νοητῶν. ὥστ᾽ ἐκείνοις μὲν οὐχ ὑπάρξει νοῦς (ἄνευ 
γὰρ ὕλης δύναμις ὁ νοῦς τῶν τοιούτων), ἐκείνῳ δὲ τὸ νοη- 
τὸν ὑπάρξει. 

5 Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐν ἁπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστί τι τὸ μὲν ὕλη το 
ἑκάστῳ γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὃ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκεῖνα), ἕτερον δὲ 
τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἢ τέχνη 
πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν 
ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς. καὶ ἔστιν ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα 


ω A Ν 
γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἕξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς" 15 
/ / ‘ \ A a ‘ / ¥ , 
τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώ- 
ματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα. καὶ οὗτος ὃ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ 
2 ἀπαθὴς καὶ duuyys, TH οὐσίᾳ ὧν ἐνέργεια. ἀεὶ yap τιμιώτε- 
ων > 
pov τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ H ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης. τὸ ὃ 
αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι: ἡ δὲ 20 
Ν ὃ , ., 7 ᾽ 3 ὌἊ ςςεφ . δὲ 3 / 
κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως δὲ OV χρόνφῳ' 
3 3 3 e Av ‘ me Ν > 9 ΜᾺ Ἁ > 3 ‘ 7 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ ὁτὲ δ᾽ οὐ νοεῖ. χωρισθεὶς δ᾽ ἐστὶ μόνον 
A ν 3 ’ Ν a , 52 ἢ ν 53. 3 
τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον. οὐ 

30. puncto post κοιρόν re posito, pro διήρηται leg. διὸ εἴρηται Ald., quam secutus 
est Wallace || 31. av] ἂν μὴ LVW et inter versus UX, ἂν insert. Ἐπ, πρὶν νοεῖν 
Simpl. Prisc. 35, 33, πρὶν ἂν voy etiam Them. || post voy vulg. punctum || δυνάμει 
coni. Cornford, δεῖ reliqui et scripti et impressi omnes || post οὕτως excidisse ὑπο- 
λαβεῖν coni. Torst. || 4308, 1 ¢om. ESUVXy et vet. transl. || ὑπάρχειν SU VX | 
καταγεγραμμένον L et E, sed xara expunct. (Bhl.), γεγραμ. etiam Them. || 2. post yeypap- 
μένον punctum Bek. Trend., colon posuit Torst., sustulit Rodier || 4. ἡ ante de. om. E, leg. 
Them. Simpl. || 6. μόνον ἕκαστον y Ald. Sylb. || 8. δύναμίς ἐστιν ὁ LS UV WX |] το. ἐπει- 
δὴ coni. Essen ITT, p. 43, cui assentitur Susemihl, Phil. Woch. 1893, p. 1321 πάσῃ ΤΥ 
Theoph. ap. Them. 108, 20 Simpl. 240, 1 in lemmate, ef. tamen 241, 27, ἁπάσῃ etiam 
Philop. §39, 13 Them. 103, 1 Soph. 125, 15 || 11. ὃ] ὅτι UV X, om, y, ὃ etiam Soph. | 
ἐκεῖνο Ἐν, o in a mutat. E, (Bhl.), ἐκεῖνα etiam Philop. Soph. || 12. καὶ τὸ π. 10 ἊΝ || τῷ] ὃ τῶ 
LTX |] 17. οὗτος] οὐχ ὡς S || 18. ἀμιγὴς καὶ ἁπαθὴς STU VW Χ γ Philop., ἀπαθ. καὶ 
ἀμιγὴς E Them, Simpl. || ἐνέργεια ex Simpl. restituit Torst., idem habent etiam Simpl.cod. 
Marcianus A in Phys. 1162, 3 Theoph. ap. Prisc. 28, 12. 29, 28 Bon., Ind. Ar. 491 Ὁ 4, 
ἐνεργείᾳ omnes codd., etiam Them. 106, § Philop. Soph. || 19. τὸ δ᾽ αὐτό...21. δὲ οὗ χρόνῳ 

CHS. 4; 5 429 Ὁ 30—430a 23 135 

common element,” and say that the mind is in a manner 
potentially all objects of thought, but is actually none of them 
until it thinks: potentially in the same sense as in a tablet which 
has nothing actually written upon it the writing exists potentially ἢ 
This is exactly the case with the mind. Moreover, the mind itself 12 
is included among the objects which can be thought. For where 
the objects are immaterial that which thinks and that which is 
thought are identical. Speculative knowledge and its object are 
identical. (We must, however, enquire why we do not think always.) 
On the other hand, in things containing matter each of the objects 
of thought is present potentially. Consequently material objects 
will not have mind in them, for the mind is the power of becoming 
such objects without their matter; whereas the mind will have the 
attribute of being its own object. 
But since, as in the whole of nature, to something which serves 5 

Intellect as matter for each kind (and this is potentially all the 
passive members of the kind) there corresponds something else 
and active. . - . 

which is the cause or agent because it makes them all, 
the two being related to one another as art to its material, of 
necessity these differences must be found also in the soul. And 
to the one intellect, which answers to this description because it 
becomes all things, corresponds the other because it makes all 
things, like a sort of definite quality such as light. For in 
a manner light, too, converts colours which are potential into 
actual colours. And it is this intellect which is separable and 
impassive and unmixed, being in its essential nature an activity. 
For that which acts is always superior to that which is acted upon, 2 
the cause or principle to the matter. Now actual knowledge is 
identical with the thing known, but potential knowledge is prior 
in time in the individual; and yet not universally prior in time. 
But this intellect has no intermittence in its thought. It is, how- 
ever, only when separated that it is its true self, and this, its 
essential nature, alone is immortal and eternal. But we do not 
alieno loco posita esse iudicant Kampe, p. 282 Bruno Keil, Analect. Isocrat. spec., p. 52 
Susemihl, Phil. Woch. 1884, p. 784: cf. Alex. ap. Philop. 558, 5 544. |} 19. τὸ δ᾽ αὐτό 
EL, etiam Soph., αὐτὸ δ᾽ reliqui codd. {| 21. οὐ E Philop. Bek. Trend., οὐδὲ insert. E, 
(Rr.) et reliqui codd. Soph. Torst. (cui assentitur etiam Zeller, p. 571) Rodier, οὐδὲ ἐν 
Them. ror, 23. 28 || post χρόνῳ virgulam poni vult Zeller, p. 572 in adn., posuit Rodier || 
22. οὖχ om. Wy Plut. ap. Philop. 535, 13 Simpl. 245, 34 et 263, 8 Soph. Torst. Kampe, 
p. 282 Susemibl], Phil. Anz. 1873, p. 690, Oecon., p. 86 Siebeck, Gesch. ἃ. Psych. I, 2, 
p. 64, οὐχ leg. Them. 101, 24 et 99, 35 Philop. et ap. Philop. Alex. Plotinus Marinus 
vet. transl., retineri malunt etiam Zeller, p. 571 Brentano, p. 182 Schlottmann, das 

Vergingliche und Unverg. in der Seele nach Arist., p. 43 || 23. ἀΐδιον καὶ ἀθάνατον ΝΥ, 
ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον etiam Them. Simpl. Philop. Soph. 


136 DE ANIMA III CFS, 5, 6 

‘\ > 4 € Ν Ν 
μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς 
3 Δ λ a 
νοῦς φθαρτός, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὖθὲν νοεῖ. 25 
r~ ro 4 “ A 3 
6 Ἢ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις ἐν τούτοις, περι ἃ οὐκ 
σι a ων Ν ‘\ 3 4 , 
ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος. ἐν οἷς δὲ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος Kal τὸ ἀληθές, σύν- 
¥ , 3 
θεσίς τις ἤδη νοημάτων ὥσπερ ἕν ὄντων, καθάπερ ᾿Εμπεδο- 
ἌᾺ e ἴω 3 ,ὕ 3) 
κλῆς ἔφη “ἢ πολλῶν μὲν κόρσαι ἀναύχενες ἐβλάστησαν, 
ἴω 7 \ “~ ᾿ 
ἔπειτα συντίθεσθαι τῇ φιλίῳ, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα κεχωρισμένα 30 
a ΝΕ , . 2 Ν 
2 συντίθεται, οἷον τὸ ἀσύμμετρον καὶ ἡ διάμετρος' ἂν δὲ γενο- 
A ? Ν, 
μένων ἣ ἐσομένων, τὸν χρόνον προσεννοῶν καὶ συντιθείς. τὸ 4300 
ον “A > θέ 3 / “ Ν KR Ν λ μ \ 
yap ψεῦδος ἐν συνθέσει ἀεί: Kal yap ἂν τὸ λευκὸν μὴ 
‘ 4 
λευκόν, τὸ μὴ λευκὸν συνέθηκεν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ Kai διαίρεσιν 
ΜᾺ “ἡ > 
φάναι πάντα. ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ἔστι ye ov μόνον τὸ ψεῦδος ἢ ἀλη- 
θές, ὅτι λευκὸς Κλέων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ἣν H ἔσται. τὸ δὲ ἐν ς 
A A A ’ Ν a Ἃ 
3 ποιοῦν, τοῦτο ὃ νοῦς ἕκαστον. τὸ δ᾽ ἀδιαίρετον ἐπεὶ διχῶς, ἢ 
“a + 
δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐθὲν κωλύει νοεῖν τὸ ἀδιαΐρετον, ὅταν 
an ΝᾺ / ἃ / 3 
von τὸ μῆκος (ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ), καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ἄδιαι- 
ρέτῳ: ὁμοίως γὰρ ὃ χρόνος διαιρετὸς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος τῷ 
μήκει. οὔκουν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ ἡμίσει τί ἐννοεῖ ἑκατέρῳ" τὸ 
a 3 A 7 N 3 
οὐ γάρ ἐστιν, ἂν μὴ διαιρεθῇ, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ δυνάμει. χωρὶς ὃ 
e Ὰ ω Ψ 
ἑκάτερον νοῶν τῶν ἡμίσεων διαιρεῖ καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἅμα." τότε 
3 ε δ 4 3 3 ε 3 3 “~ δ 3 ~ / δ 
δ᾽ οἱονεὶ μήκη. εἶ δ᾽ ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τῷ 
3 95 3 -~ Ν A Ν Ν Ν > ᾽ὔ bd Ν ΜᾺ ¥ 
4 ἐπ᾿ ἀμφοῖν. τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ ποσὸν ἀδιαίρετον ἀλλὰ τῷ εἴ- 
24. μνημονεύομεν...431 Ὁ, 16. ἐκεῖνα desunt E, folio exciso inter folia 200 et 2οι || 
a7. καὶ om. L || ψεῦδος ἤδη καὶ STU VW X yet, ut videtur, Them. 109, 9 |] 27. ἐν 
ols δὲ,..Ὁ, 5. ἔσται 6 duabus ed. contam., pr. Ὁ, τ. 70...5. ἔσται, post. a, 27. ἐν οἷς... 
b, 1. προσεννοῶν, indicat Torst., quod refellit Vahlen, Aristotel. Aufsdtze I, p. 4 sqq. 
et Noetel, Zeitschr. f. Gym. 1864, p. 140 || 30. φιλίᾳ, οὕτω Vahlen, p. 6, φιλίᾳ. οὕτω 
Bek. Trend. Torst. || 31. συντίθεσθαι STV Wey || post διάμετρος addunt ἢ τὸ σύμ- 
perpoy καὶ ἡ διάμετρος W Simpl. Torst., quod additamentum reicit Vahlen, p. 7 sq., 
om. etiam vet. transl. || γινομένων VWX Bek. Trend., γενομένων etiam ‘hem. 
Simpl. Torst. Vahlen Steinhart || 430 Ὁ, 1. πρὸς ὃν νοῶν LX, προσεννοῶν etiam 
Simpl. et sine dubio Them. 109, 18 || καὶ συντιθείς unc. incl. Torst., leg. Simpl. 
Philop. Soph. et defendit Vahlen, p. 9 sqq. || 3. τὸ (kal τὸ solus T) μὴ λευκὸν 
συνέθηκεν omnes codd., rd μὴ λευκὸν unc. incl. Trend. in prima edit., cui assentitur 
Dittenberger, Gott. gel. Anz., p. 1613, in alt. ed. scripsit Belger de coniectura Roeperi, 
Philologus VII, p. 324: τὸ μὴ λευκὸν λευκὸν cuv., quod iam Torst. coniecerat, « καὶ 
AevKoy> τὸ μὴ λευκόν, συνέθηκεν coni, Vahlen, p. 12, <kal> τὸ μὴ λευκὸν <deuKdy>, 
συνέθηκεν Biehl, quod legisse videtur Philop. 548, 10 sq., “si album non albo aut si non 
album albo componit” vet. transl. || évdéyerac...4. πάντα fort. post 5, ἔσται transponenda 
censet Maier I, p. 30, in adn. || 3. καὶ διαίρεσιν] καὶ κατὰ (vel κατὰ) διαίρεσιν coni, 
Chandler, p. 8 || 4. pro πάντα coni. ταῦτα vel τοιαῦτα Torst., leg. πάντα etiam 

Them., ἄμφω in interpr. Philop., πάντα defendit Vahlen, p. 14 sq. || ye eici vult Torst., 
def. Vahlen, p. 17 || verba od μόνον post ἀληθές transponi vult Torst., cui adversatur 

CHS. 5, 6 430 a 24—430b 14 137 

remember because this is impassive, while the intellect which can be 
affected is perishable and without this does not think at all. 

The process of thinking indivisible wholes belongs to a sphere 6 
Judgment from which falsehood is excluded. But where both 
comes truth and falsehood are possible there is already some 
rates. combining of notions into one. As, in the words of 
Empedocles, “where sprang into being the neckless heads of 
many creatures,” then afterwards Love put them together, so these 
notions, first separate, are combined ; as, for instance, the notions 
incommensurable and diagonal. And, if the thinking refers to the 2 
past or to the future, the notion of time is included in the com- 
bination. Falsehood, in fact, never arises except when notions 
are combined. For, even if white be asserted to be not-white, not- 
white is brought into a combination. We may equally well call every 
statement a disjunction. But at any rate under truth and false- 
hood we include not only the assertion that Cleon is white, but 
also the assertion that he was or will be. And the unifying prin- 
ciple is in every case the mind. | 

Since, however, the term indivisible has two meanings, accord- 3 
Single ing as a whole is not potentially divisible or is actually 
howappre. Undivided, there is nothing to hinder us from thinking 
hended. an indivisible whole, when we think of a length (that 
being actually undivided), or from thinking it in an indivisible time. 
For the time is a divisible or indivisible unit in the same way as 
the length thought of. We cannot therefore state what the mind 
thinks in each half of the time. For, if the whole be undivided, 
the half has only potential existence. But, if the mind thinks 
each half separately, it simultaneously divides the time also. And 
in that case it is as if the parts were separate lengths. If, how- 
ever, the mind conceives the length as made up of the two halves, 
then the time may be regarded as made up of corresponding 

Again, that which is not quantitatively but specifically an 4 

Vahlen || 5. δὴ UX || 6. ἑκάστοτε coni. H. Jackson || 7. τὸ ἀδ.] τὸ διαιρετὸν 7 ἀδιαίρετον 
coni. Torst., potest tale quid legisse Philop. 540, 18, τι ἀδιαίρετον coni H. Jackson || ὅταν» 
οἷον ὅταν coni. Torst., ὡς ὅταν Steinhart || 8. dd...dvepyelg in parenth. Torst. || post γὰρ 
addendum rt δυνάμει ἔσται censet Essen ITI, p. 49 |l 9. ὁμοίως...2ο. μήκει e duab. rec. 
contam. iudicat Torst., pr. 17. @vegrt...20. μήκει, post. 0. duolws...10o. μήκει, quod negant 
Noetel et Dittenberger |] 9. καὶ 46.) καὶ od διαρρετὸς T, om. X et pr. ὟΝ, καὶ ἀδιαίρετος 
etiam Them. Simpl. Philop. || ro. ἐνόει L Torst., ἐνόεις y, ἐννοεῖν T U W, tempus praesens 
etiam Them. Simpl. || 12. τῶν ἡμίσεων ante νοῶν SU, om. TX || 14. τὸ δὲ μὴ...15. ψυχῆς 
post 20. καὶ μήκει transponenda censet Bywater, p. 58 || 14. κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν TX || διαιρε- 
τὸν pro ἀδιαίρετον coni. Wallace, cui adversatur Susemihl, Oecon., Ὁ. 86. 

138 DE ANIMA Ill CHS. 6, 7 

/ \ 3 7 “A a. 
Ses νοεῖ ἐν ἀδιαιρέτῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς 
a ἴω LA ® o 
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δέ, Kal οὐχ ἣ ἐκεῖνα διαιρετά, ᾧ νοεῖ 
ὶ ἐν ᾧ χρό IN ἡ ἀδιαίρετα: ἔνεστι γὰρ Kav τούτοις 
καὶ ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ, GAN ἢ ἀδιαίρ γὰρ 
9 ’ 39 > ¥ > f ἃ a ¢ Ν ra 
τι ἀδιαίρετον, GAN ἴσως οὐ χωριστόν, ὃ ποιεῖ Eva TOY χρό- 
ἴω 4 “w iad 
νον Kat TO μῆκος. καὶ τοῦθ᾽ ὁμοίως ἐν diravTi ἐστι τῷ TUVEXEL 
Α Ν ΝᾺ a ἃ 
5 καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ μήκει. ἡ δὲ στιγμὴ καὶ πᾶσα διαίρεσις, καὶ 
ιν \ & 
τὸ οὕτως ἀδιαίρετον, δηλοῦται ὥσπερ ἢ στέρησις. καὶ OMOLOS 
ε / 5. Ν ca + “ μ᾿ Ν , Ἃ 
ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἷον πῶς τὸ κακὸν γνωρίζει ἢ 
“ ΄ ~ 9 ’, 4 ’ ῪᾺ Ν , 
67d μέλαν: τῷ ἐναντίῳ γάρ πως γνωρίζει. Set δὲ δυνάμει 
> \ / \ 32 A 3 5. A 3 δέ ς᾽. 3 
εἶναι τὸ γνωρίζον καὶ ἐνεῖναι ἐν αὐτῷ. εἰ δέ τινι μή ἐστιν 
\ ‘N a b ‘ 
ἐναντίον [τῶν αἰτίων), αὐτὸ ἕαυτο γινώσκει Kal ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστι 
Ψ ς 
7 καὶ χωριστόν. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν φάσις τι κατά τινος, ὥσπερ ἢ 
κατάφασις, καὶ ἀληθὴς ἣ ψευδὴς πᾶσα ὃ δὲ νοῦς οὐ πᾶς, 
ἀλλ᾽ 6 τοῦ τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἣν εἶναι ἀληθής, καὶ οὐ τὶ 
Ζ 3 3 ν \ ε Ἂ a ἰδί aN θέ > > ¥ 
κατά τινος" GAN woTEp TO ὁρᾶν τοῦ ἰδίου ἀληθές, εἰ ὃ αἂν- 
δ N A ΄ 9 3 \ > “ ν ¥ Y 
θρωπος τὸ λευκὸν ἢ μή, οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀεί, οὕτως ἔχει ὅσα 
ἄνευ ὕλης. 
‘\ 3 Ὁ, 3 ε > 5» 2 3 v4 “A , 
7 Τὸ δ᾽ αὐτό ἔστιν ἡ Kat ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πραγ- 
a , ¢ 
part. ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως 
δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ: ἔστι γὰρ ἐξ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος πάντα τὰ γι- 
χρονῷ γὰρ ἐχειᾳ οντος Y 
/ / de \ Ά >. \ > ὃ / ¥ nw 
γνόμενα. φαΐνεται δὲ τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος τοῦ 
αἰσθητικοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ ποιοῦν" οὐ γὰρ πάσχει οὐδ᾽ ἀλλοιοῦται. 

15. ψυχῆς νοήσει κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς sine interpunctione TV, νοήσει etiam legisse 
videtur Them. 110, 19, γοεῖ leg. Simpl. || 16. mallem hoc loco οὐχ 7 [ἐκεῖνα] et 
17. ἀλλ᾽ ἡ <éxeiva> || virgulam post διαιρετὰ Bek. Trend. Bywater, Ὁ. 58, post ἐκεῖνα 
Torst. Biehl Rodier || ἀδιαιρέτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἐκεῖνα ἀδιαίρετα, 
ᾧ νοεῖ καὶ coni. Christ || ᾧ] ᾧ τε coni. Torst., re om. Simpl., ὃ cum Vicomercato Bywater, 
Ῥ. 59 || @ voet...17. χρόνῳ interpolata esse censet Wilson, Trans. of Ox. Phil. Soc. 
1882/3, p. £0, cui adversatur Susemihl, B. J. XXXIV, 29 || 17. ἀλλ᾽ ἡ 46. unc. incl. 
Torst. Biehl, totam hance enunciationem a Torst. sanatam esse agnoscit etiam Hayduck, 
progr. Gryph. 1873, Ὁ. 5, contra Bywater haec verba, ut necessaria, retinere vult, p. 59, 
etiam Maier I, p. 32 in adn., leg. Simpl., sine uncis etiam Rodier, qui tamen ἄλλῃ pro 
ἀλλ᾽ ἢ scripsit || 19. καὶ τὸ μῆκος interpolata esse censet Wilson, 1. 1., probat Susemihl || 
καὶ Tovd’...20. μήκει post το. μήκει transponenda esse censet Susemihl, B.J. XXXIV, 29 | 
21. καὶ Swotos...23. μέλαν delenda esse censet Hayduck, p. 6 || 24. γνωρίζειν V || ἐνεῖναι 
SU y Simpl. Philop. Bek. Trend. Brentano, p. 115, ὃν εἶναι L. TV W X vet. transl. Biehl, 
καὶ ph ἕν εἶναι αὐτῶν coni. Torst., ἐναντίον εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ coni. Bywater, p. ὅο || ἐν ante 
αὐτῷ om. solus W Biehl, leg. etiam Simpl. || 25. αἰτίων] ἐναντίων S, αἰτίων etiam Them. 
Philop. Simpl. Brentano, p. 183 Bullinger, Arist. Nus-Lehre, p. rr, vel ἐναντίων vel 
ὄντων coni. Torst., cui assentitur etiam Kampe, p. 275, adn. 1, ἀδιαιρέτων coni. Essen, 
νοητῶν dubitanter coni. Rodier II, 487, τῶν αἰτίων delenda esse censet Zeller, p. 578, cui 
assentiuntur Susemihl et Bywater, p. 60, unc. inclusi || ἐνέργεια fort. Them. 112, 3 Simpl. 
258, 27. 31 || 26. τι] τις L, unde ris φάσις κατά τινος coni. Rodier II, 489, ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν 



CHS. 6, 7 430 Ὁ 15—431 a 5 139 

indivisible whole the mind thinks in an indivisible unit of time and 
by an indivisible mental act. Per accidens, however, such specific 
unity is divisible, though not in the same way as they, the act of 
-thought and the time required for the act, are divisible, but in the 
same way as they are whole and indivisible. For in these specific 
unities also there is present a something indivisible, though certainly 
not separately existent, the same as that which constitutes the 
unity of both the time and the length. And, as with time and 
length, so in like manner with whatever is continuous. But the 5 
point and every division and whatever is an undivided whole in 
the same sense as the point is clearly explained by the analogy 
of privation. And the same explanation holds in all other cases. 
How, for instance, is evil apprehended, or black? In some 
fashion by its contrary. But that which apprehends must poten- 
tially be, and must contain within itself, the contrary which it 
Hypothe- apprehends. If, however, there be something which has 
thinuing no contrary [some one of the causes|, then it is itself the 
thought. content of its own knowledge, is in actuality and is 
separately existent. 

Now every proposition, like an affirmative proposition, predi- 
cating something of something, is true or false. But with thought 
Intellect this is not always so, When its object is the What in 
sometimes the sense of the quiddity and there is no predication, 

thought is in every case true. But, as the perception by 
sight of the proper object of sight is infallibly true, whereas in the 
question whether the white object is a man or not, perception by 
sight is not always true, so is it with immaterial objects. 

Now actual knowledge is identical with the thing known. But 7 
potential knowledge is prior in time in the individual, and yet 
not universally prior even in time. For it is from something 
actually existent that all which comes into being is derived. And 
manifestly the sensible object simply brings the faculty of sense 
which was potential into active exercise: in this transition, in 
fact, the sense is not acted upon or qualitatively changed. Conse- 

κατάφασίς τι κατά τινος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις coni. Torst., vulgatam tuentur etiam Simpl. 
Philop. 556, 8 || ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ W Torst., καὶ non leg. Simpl. {| ὥσπερ ἡ κατάφασις, καὶ 
unc. incl. Essen || 27. ἢ] καὶ L |} 28. καὶ unc. incl. Essen |} 29. ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ...3ο. ἀληθὲς 
def unc. incl. Essen ITI, Ὁ. 51 || 29. ὁρᾶν -« ἐπὶ: coni. Beare, p. go, adn. 2 || 30. post 
οὕτως in lemmate add. δὲ Simpl. cod. A || 431 a, 1. τὸ δ᾽ αὐτὸ...7. τετελεσμένον alieno 
loco posita esse iudicat Torst., cui assentitur Zeller, p. 571, leg. veteres interpretes, 
nisi quod τὸ δ᾽ avrd,..3. γιγνόμενα praeterit Them., in quibus etiam Alex. ap. Philop. 
offendit || 1. τὸ αὐτὸ δ᾽ TUVXy || 2. τινὰ τῶν βιβλίων ἔχουσιν ὅλως, τινὰ δὲ ἁπλῶς 
annotat Philop. 

140 DE ANIMA 11] CH. 7 

ao € ‘ a “~ 9 ΜᾺ 

διὸ ἄλλο εἶδος τοῦτο κινήσεως" ἡ γὰρ κίνησις τοῦ ἀτελοῦς 
ἊΝ fan) “~ 4 

ἐνέργεια ἣν, ἡ δ᾽ ἁπλῶς ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα ἢ Tov τετελεσμένον. 

a ΝᾺ , td ‘ ~ . 

τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅμοιον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν 

a “ “ 5 ἴω , 

ὅταν δὲ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, οἷον καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα, διώ- 
~ \ 3 

κει ἢ φεύγει: καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι Kai λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνερ- 
A A ‘ \ > \ ry 2 πε 

γεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἢ τοι- 

ΜᾺ ε 3 3. », 
αῦτα. καὶ ἣ φυγὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις τοῦτο ἢ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, 
\ 9 Ψ :Ν 9 Ν Ν 4 » > UA. aN » 

καὶ οὐχ ἕτερον τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ φευκτικόν, οὐτ ἀλλήλων οὔτε 

“~ Ky + a“ A o ἴω 

τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ: ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο. τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ 

a , 4 ‘A 3 Ν 

τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει. ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν 
᾿ ΠῚ Ν > / 

ἢ κακὸν φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ, φεύγει ἢ διώκει (διὸ οὐδέποτε 

A ¥ / ε ‘4 φ δὲ ε ἮΝ Ν ᾽ 

νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἣ ψυχή), ὥσπερ ὃὲε ὃ αὴρ τὴν κό- 

3 y “ € 3 Ν ε , 

pyv τοιανδὶ ἐποίησεν, αὕτη δ᾽ ἕτερον, καὶ ἣ ἀκοὴ woav- 

Ν 9 <> > ~ 

τως, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον ἕν, καὶ pia μεσότης, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι αὐτῇ 

, Ν \ ; ¥ 

4 πλείω. τίνι δ᾽ ἐπικρίνει τί διαφέρει γλυκὺ Kat θερμόν, εἰ- 

\ \ , , Se δ eS ¥ Ἢ Ψ 

ρηται μὲν καὶ πρότερον, λεκτέον OE καὶ WOE. ἔστι yap ἐν 

Coed Ἁ Ν ε φ N ~ a ἰὴ 3 aN A 

τι, οὕτω δὲ Kal ws ὄρος. καὶ ταῦτα, ἕν τῷ ἀνάλογον ἢ 

a 5 “ὦ ¥ Ἁ ε 4 ε > ὦ Ν 3 . 

τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὄν, ἔχει πρὸς ἑκάτερον, as ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἄλληλα 

δὰ ΜᾺ Ν, \ € A ? Ἂ 

τί γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ ἀπορεῖν πῶς τὰ μὴ ὁμογενῆ κρίνει ἡ 

6. εἶδος om. SX, post τοῦτο TUVy Them. 28, 36, post κινήσεως W, vulgatam 
tuetur Simpl. || 7. ἦν om. LS UVX Them. 28, 37 et Simpl. || 4 post ἑτέρα om. L, 
leg. Them. 29, 1 || post τετελεσμένου lacunam esse iudicat Susemihl, Burs. Jahresb. 
IX, 351 || 9. ὅταν] ὅτι coni. Essen III, p. 58 || 10. ἢ Aur. ΤΌΝ Simpl. || 
11. πρὸς τὸ ante τῇ transponendum putat Essen, 1.1. || 7 τοιοῦτο L, om. X, ἢ τοιαῦτα 
etiam Philop., ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα Simpl. || 12. δὴ SU WX, om. TV || ravrav T, τὸ αὐτὸ 
LV Rodier, ταὐτὸ scripsit Biehl, τοῦτο reliqui et Bek. Trend. Torst., qui conicit τὸ 
αὐτὸ τοῦτο, velteres interp. quomodo legerint, incertum est || 7 om. V, aut delendum 
aut 7 scribendum censet Trend., unc. incl. Rodier |} 13. καὶ τὸ ¢. L et interpret. Them. 
Simpl. || 14. τῇ δὲ diav....17. ἡ ψυχή in parenth. ponencla et fort. ante 431 b, 2. τὰ μὲν 
οὖν εἴδη transponenda censet Cornford |} 15. αἰσθήματα) αἰσθητὰ coni. Schell, Einh. ἃ, 
Seelenleb. p. 19 || 15. Srav...16. διώκει post 17. ψυχή ponenda esse iudicat Susemihl ἢ 
16. φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ solus L, uncis incl. Torst., καταφήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ y, φησὶν ἢ ἀπόφησι 
TX, κατάφησιν ἢ ἀπόφησι U, ἐστι κατάφησιν ἢ ἀπόφησιν V, ἐστι καταφήσειν ἢ ἀποφήσειν 
corr. 5, κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις W, Philop. 559, 31 interpretatur τὰ ὑποκείμενα οἱονεὶ 
καταφάσεις εἰσὶ καὶ ἀποφάσεις || καὶ φεύγει STU VWX, ἢ φεύγει γ || 16. διὸ...17. ψυχή 
secludenda esse coni. Torst., in parenth. posui || 17. totum hune locum ab Gorwep...b, 1. 
λευκόν are proposita alienum esse iudicat Torst., non interpretatur Them., recte explicat 
Neuhaeuser, p. 51 sqq. || post ἡ ψυχή virgulam Bek. Trend., punctum Torst. Biehl Rodier ἢ 
δὲ] yap coni. Essen || 18. αὐτὴ UV Wy Bek. Trend., αὕτη etiam Simpl. Soph. Torst. || 
δ᾽ unc. incl. Essen || 19. post ὡσαύτως colon Bek. Trend. Rodier || airg om. SUV X | 
20. post πλείω signum enunciati non absoluti cum Torst. posuit Biehl, adversatur Rodier 
II, 499, etiam Simpl. et Philop. hoc loco desiderant apodosin, putant autem eam ex 
praecedentibus supplendam esse; νεῦρα 17. womep...20. πλείω post 21. et 22. ἕν re trans- 
ponenda et apodosin sic conformandam esse: οὕτω δὴ καὶ ταῦτα (omissis verbis καὶ ὡς 8pos) 




CH. 7 4318. 6—431a 24 141 

quently this must be a different species of motion. For motion is, 
as we Saw, an activity of that which is imperfect; but activity in 
the absolute sense, that is, activity of that which has reached 
perfection, is quite distinct. 

Sensation, then, is analogous to simple assertion or simple 2 
Sense apprehension by thought and, when the sensible thing 
affirming is pleasant or painful, the pursuit or avoidance of it by 
or denying, . . 
pursues the soul is a sort of affirmation or negation. In fact, 
or avoids: to feel pleasure or pain is precisely to function with 
the sensitive mean, acting upon good or evil as such. It is 
in this that actual avoidance and actual appetition consist: nor 
is the appetitive faculty distinct from the faculty of avoidance, nor 
either from the sensitive faculty ; though logically they are different. 
So, too, But to the thinking soul images serve as present sen- 3 
the mind. sations: and when it affirms or denies good or evil, it 
avoids or pursues (this is why the soul never thinks without an 
image). To give an illustration: the air impresses a certain quality 
on the pupil of the eye, and this in turn upon something else, and 
so also with the organ of hearing, while the last thing to be impressed 
is one and is a single mean, though with a plurality of distinct 

What that is by which the soul judges that sweet is different 4 
from warm has been explained above, but must be restated here. 
The unity It is a unity, but one in the same sense as a boundary 
of sense point, and its object, the unity by analogy of these two 
restated. . : ἢ . : 

sensibles or their numerical unity, is related to each of the 
two in turn as they, taken separately, are to each other. For what 
difference does it make whether we ask how we judge the sensibles 
that do not fall under the same genus, or the contraries which do, 

censet Freudenthal, Rhein. Mus. 1869, p. 398, cul assentitur Susemihl, Burs. Jahresb. XVIT, 
p. 264 et Phil. Wochenschr. 1882, p. 1283 || 21. ὧδε] νῦν T Wy et in interpret. Simpl. 
Philop. || ἔστι yap...23. ἄλληλα ante 20. tive transponenda censet Essen IT, Ὁ. 88 || 22. καὶ 
ws] καὶ ὁ Xy, ἡ στιγμὴ καὶ ὁ T, om. cum ipso ὅρος LV, in interpret. ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ὅρος 
Simpl., ὥσπερ ὅρος Philop., qui ἡ στιγμὴ non legerunt; οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ στιγμὴ καὶ ὅλως 
ὁ ὅρος de coniectura scripsit Torst. || post ταῦτα virgulam posuit Rodier || ἐν ΤΟΥ Χ 
Trend., ὃν etiam Simpl. Philop. Soph. in marg. Bek. Torst. || 22. et 23. ἢ τῷ] 
ἢ τῷ Ly, ἢ UVWX Simpl., om. S, καὶ τῷ T Philop. Bek. Trend. Torst. Biehl 
Rodier || 23. ὄν] ὅν omnes libri scripti et ante Biehlium impressi, ὃν restituerunt 
Freudenthal, 1. 1. et Neuhaeuser, confirmant Simpl. et vet. transl., quae vertit es || 
kat ταῦτα ἕν τᾷ ἀνάλογον. καὶ τὸ ἀριθμῷ ἕν ἔχει πρὸς ἑκάτερον ws in scholis coni. 
H. Jackson || ἑκάτερα Simpl., post ἑκάτ. excidisse ἐναντίον coni. Torst., cui assentitur 
Frendenthal |} ὡς.. «ἄλληλα unc. incl. Torst., legit etiam Simpl. et fort. Philop., defendit 
Neuhaeuser, p. 57 || ὡς] ἡ Simpl. || 24. μὴ om. TV Wy Simpl. Bek. Trend., leg. etiam 
Philop. Soph. vet. transl. 


142 DE ANIMA 11] CH. 7 

© δὴ by lA ¥ ᾽ν ε μ᾿ Ν 
τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν; ἔστω δὴ ὡς τὸ Α τὸ 
\ N ‘ e 9 ~ 
λευκὸν πρὸς τὸ Β τὸ μέλαν, τὸ Τ' πρὸς τὸ A [ὡς ἐκεῖνα 
4 3 Ν ‘\ e oN ¥ 
πρὸς ἄλληλα]: wore καὶ ἐναλλάξ, εἰ δὴ τὰ TA evi εἴη 
ν N Ν \ > AN ‘ 
ὑπάρχοντα, οὕτως ἔξει ὦσπερ Kal τὰ AB, τὸ avTo μέν 
N Ψ \ δ᾽ ὧν 3 Ν 3 έ 9 ~~ e , ε δ᾽ 3 Ν 
καὶ ἕν, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, κἀκεῖνο ὁμοίως. ὃ O αὖτος 
» Ν \ \ / 
λόγος καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν A τὸ γλυκὺ εἴη, TO δὲ B τὸ λευκόν. 
4 a , ~ 
τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη TO νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ, 
‘ e 3 9 4 4 9 ~ A ὃ “ ἃ / 
Kai ws ἐν ἐκείνοις ὥρισται αὐτῷ τὸ διωκτὸν καὶ φευκτόν, 
~ 7d \ ΜᾺ , > 
Kat ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὅταν ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων ἢ, 
wn a μὰ ἰφὺ “ 
κινεῖται" οἷον αἰσθανόμενος τὸν φρυκτὸν ὅτι πῦρ, [τῇ κοινῇ] 

6 γνωρίζει, ὁρῶν κινούμενον, ὅτι πολέμιος. ὁτὲ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ 

ΓᾺ 2 A 4 ? ε ΝᾺ ¢ N 
ψυχῇ φαντάσμασιν ἣ νοήμασιν ὥσπερ ὁρῶν λογίζεται καὶ 
ς » 
βουλεύεται τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα: καὶ ὅταν εἴπῃ 
~ “ K 

ὡς ἐκεῖ TO ἡδὺ ἢ λνπηρόν, ἐνταῦθα φεύγει ἢ διώκει, 
καὶ ὅλως ἐν πράξει. καὶ τὸ ἄνευ δὲ πράξεως, τὸ ἀληθὲς 
Ἁ ‘ a) 3 ΤᾺ > “A ‘4 9 Ἂ ἊΝ 3 ~ Ν ΝᾺ 
καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ: 

ἀλλὰ τῷ γε ἁπλῶς διαφέρει καὶ Twi. τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀφαι- 

/ / A“ 9 KA 3 Ν / ® ‘ / 
ρέσει λεγόμενα νοεῖ ὠσπερ ἂν εἰ TO σιμὸν, ἢ μεν σιμόν, 
@ A ¥ , 3 
οὐ κεχωρισμένως, ἢ δὲ κοῖλον, εἴ τις ἐνόει ἐνεργείᾳ, ἄνευ 
τῆς σαρκὸς ἂν ἐνόει ἐν ἢ τὸ κοῖλον: οὕτω τὰ μαθηματικὰ 

a YY aA a Ψ 
8 ov κεχωρισμένα ὡς κεχωρισμένα νοεῖ, ὁταν νοῇ ἐκεῖνα. ὅλως 

δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν τὰ πράγματα [νοῶν]. dpa 
δ᾽ ἐνδέχεται τῶν κεχωρισμένων τι νοεῖν ὄντα αὐτὸν μὴ κε- 
χωρισμένον μεγέθους, ἢ οὔ, σκεπτέον ὕστερον. 

25. τἀναντία S WX y Bek. Trend., τὰ ἐναντία etiam Soph. Torst. || 26. ὡς...27. ἄλληλα 
interpolata esse iudicant Christ, Stud. in Ar. libb. met. coll. (in thes.) Freudenthal et 
Baeumker, Ὁ. 74, unc. incl. Biehl Rodier, leg. Philop. 561, ro || 27. ὃν Ty || 28. καὶ τὰ] 
καὶ τὸ STV, κἂν ef τὰ coni. Torst. || 29. pro κἀκεῖνο, quod etiam leg. Vhilop., coni. 
κἀκεῖνα Jul. Pacius Torst. Brentano || 431 b, 1. καὶ] κἂν SO VX Simpl. || μὲν τὸ 
SUVWX || 3. ὥριστο Ὁ X et corr. S, etiam Simpl. || 4. αἰσθ. ὃν ὅταν 8 TU VX, αἰσθ. ὧν 
ὅταν Wy || 5. φευκτὸν TUVWX, φρυκτὸν etiam Simpl. Philop., de Them. codd. v. 
Hayducki ap. crit. ad rr4, 1 || ὅτε πῦρ unc. incl. Torst., leg. Philop. Simpl. {| τῇ κινήσει 
Basil. in marg., scripsit Torst., τῇ κοινῇ reliqui, etiam Simpl. Philop., delendum censet 
Bywater, p. 61, cui assentitur Susemihl, cf. Praechter, Berl. Phil. Woch., p. 196 sqq., unc. 
inclusi || 9. post ἐνταῦθα excidisse τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν coni. Torst. || 10. ὅλως] οὕτως coni. 
Trend. || καὶ ante τὸ ἀληθὲς leg. Simpl. in lemmate || rx. τὸ om. L et fort. Philop. in 
interpr. 562, τὸ || cal τῷ κακῷ LUX, ἢ τῷ W, τῷ om. etiam Simpl. || 12. -yeom. S Wy || 
rz. τὰ 6€...19. ὕστερον a re proposita aliena et 12. τὰ S¢...16. ἐκεῖνα corrupta esse iudicat 
Torst., locum ita restituit Bywater, p. 62: τὰ δ᾽ ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα νοεῖ, ὥσπερ dy, 
εἴ <rus> τὸ σιμὸν 7 μὲν σιμὸν οὔ [Kexwpicuévws], 7 δὲ κοῖλον [εἴ ris] ἐνόει, ἐνεργείᾳ 
-«-νοῶν» ἄνευ τῆς σαρκὸς ἂν ἐνόει ἐν ἢ τὸ κοῖλον, οὕτω τὰ μαθηματικὰ κτέ. || 12. ἐν om. 
STU Χ Them., leg. Simpl. Philop. || 13. ἂν om. SVX, leg. etiam Philop. || 14. 9 δὲ 
κοῖλον] ef δὲ καμπύλον X, καμπύλον in interpret. etiam Simpl. Philop., κοῖλον Them. || ef 




CH. 7 431 a 25—431 Ὁ 10 143 

like white and black? Suppose, then, that as A, the white, is to 5, 
the black, so Cis to D [that ts, as those sensibles ave to one another). It 
follows, coxvertendo, that “4 isto Casto D. If, then, C and D are 
attributes of a single subject, the relation between them, like that be- 
tween A and B, will be that they are one and the same, though the 
aspects they present are distinct: and so, too, of their single subject. 
The same would hold, supposing A were the sweet and & the white. 
Thus it is the forms which the faculty of thought thinks in 
Images mental images. And, as in the region of sense the objects 
move to of pursuit and avoidance have been defined for it, so also 
outside sensation, when engaged with images, it is moved 
to action: as, for instance, you perceive a beacon and say “ That is 
fire’; and then [dy the central sense], seeing it in motion, vou 
recognise that it signals the approach of an enemy. But at other 
times under the influence of the images or thoughts in the soul 
you calculate as though you had the objects before your eyes and 
deliberate about the future in the light of the present. And when 
you pronounce, just as there in sensation you affirm the pleasant or 
the painful, here in thought you pursue or avoid: and so in action 
generally. And, further, what is unrelated to action, as truth and 
falsehood, is in the same class with the good and the evil. Yet in 
this, at any rate, they differ, that the former are absolute, the latter 
relative to some one concerned. 


But the abstractions of mathematics, as they are called, the 7 

Mathe- mind thinks as it might conceive the snub-nosed ; 
matical gué snub-nosed, it would not be conceived apart from 

how con- flesh, whereas gué hollow, if anyone ever had actually so 

conceived it, he would have conceived it without the flesh 
in which the hollowness resides. So, too, when we think of mathe- 
matical objects, we conceive them, though not in fact separate 

from matter, as though they were separate. And, speaking 8 

generally, mind in active operation is its objects [when ἐξ thinks 
them). The question, whether it is possible for the mind to think 
anything which is unextended without being itself unextended, 
must for the present be postponed. 

ris] ef τε Ly Simpl., om. X, εἴπερ coni. Trend. || ἐννοεῖ S, ἐννόει V || ὥσπερ ἄνευ coni. 
Torst., quod refellit Vahlen, Oest. Gymn. Ztschr. 1867, p. 722 [| 15. ἂν secludendum esse 
coni. Susemihl, Oecon., p. 86 || é 7 om. SUV, leg. Simpl. || 16. ὡς κεχ.] ὡσεὶ xex. T, 
τῇ ὑποστάσει L, τῇ ὑποστάσει ws κεχ. W, alteram quoque lectionem ferri: οὗ κεχωρισμένως 
ὡς κεχωρισμένως commemorat Simpl., ὡς κεχωρισμένα etiam Philop. Simpl. et, ut videtur, 
Them. 114, 22 || voy <g> ἐκεῖνα legendum proponit Bon., cf. Oest. Gymn. Ztschr. 
1867, p. 722 || 17. νοῶν om. Τί Ὁ pr. E et Torst., uncis incl. Bon., Ind. Ar. 4918, 61 
Susemihl, B. J. XLII, 240 Busse, Hermes XXVIII, 271, legit Simpl. et vet. transl., 
non leg. 566, 22—24 neque ad 402 Ὁ, 7 (37, 26sq.) Philop. || 18. αὐτὸν ὄντα SV W Xy. 

144. DE ANIMA Ill CH. 8 

8 Νῦν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς τὰ λεχθέντα συγκεφαλαιώσαν- 20 
3, ’ἤ 9 , 
τες, εἴπωμεν πάλιν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστιν' πᾶντα 
\ “Ἁ 3 Ν Ν » Ὁ A ¥ δ᾽ ε 9 ΄ ‘ 
yap ἢ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά, ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν 
Ἁ 3 4 € δ᾽ » θ ‘ 9 θ 4, ΜᾺ δὲ a 
τὰ ἐπιστητά πως, ἡ δ᾽ αἴσθησις τὰ aloOyTa: πῶς O€ τοῦτο, 
A 5 e ¥ 3 Ν᾿ 
2 δεῖ ζητεῖν. τέμνεται οὖν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἰς τὰ 
4 ξ Ν ὃ ? 3 ἈΝ ὃ / εξ δ᾽ 3 λ 
πράγματα, ἡ μὲν δυνάμει Els τὰ δυνάμει, ἢ ἐντελε- 25 
, 3 Ν 3 / ~ δὲ a“ Ν 3 θ Ν Ν 
χείᾳ εἰς τὰ ἐντελεχείφ. τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ 
τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν δυνάμει ταῦτά ἐστι, τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν τὸ 
‘ 3 4 > ᾿ δ᾽ A 3 Ν a Ν to iy 3 Ν 
δὲ αἰσθητόν. ἀνάγκη δ᾽ ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ τὰ εἰδὴ εἶναι. αὐτὰ 
va “A \ \ Ξ- 
μὲν δὴ οὗ: οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. ἀλλα TO εἰἶ- 
Ν Ν ε Ν 
δος' ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χείρ ἐστιν: καὶ yap ἡ χεὶρ 4328 
ΝᾺ 5 wn y¥ 
ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὃ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ αἵ. 
5 3 A 9 ON \ IQ A 524 2 3 
ϑ83σθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα οὐθέν ἐστι 
΄΄ ‘ 
παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, Ta αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισμένον, ἐν 
τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι, τά τε ἐν ἀφαι- 5 
4 f \ 4 “A 9 θ “Ἂ ῳ \ LO) 
ρέσει λεγόμενα, καὶ doa τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕξεις καὶ πάθη. 
‘ ὃ \ ἴω ¥ ‘ > θ 7 θὲ ὑθὲ “Ἄν, (0 
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι 
ἡ δὲ ἕξ / . 7 θ a 3 / ψ φ » 
οὐδὲ ξυνίοι: ὅταν τε θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φαντάσματι 
» Ἁ ν 
θεωρεῖν: τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ὥσπερ αἰσθήματά ἐστι, 
XN ¥ 4 ¥ 3 ξ ΄ Ψ ᾽ Ν 
πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ φαντασία ἕτερον φάσεως καὶ 
> ’ ‘ 4 4 3 Ν \ > ‘\ aA 
ἀποφάσεως: συμπλοκὴ yap νοημάτων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ 
ψεῦδος. τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοήματα τίνι διοίσει τοῦ μὴ φαν- 
, εν x ὑδὲ 3 3 3 > ¥ 
τάσματα εἶναι; ἢ οὐδὲ τἄλλα φαντάσματα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἄνευ 




21. εἴ 22. ex solo E ἐστιν" πάντα γὰρ ἢ scripsit Biehl, leg. etiam Soph. 138, 33 (ἢ in 
uno Soph. cod. A), ἐστι (τὰ X) πάντα. ἣ “γὰρ (om. γὰρ 1.) αἰσθ. reliqui codd., etiam Them. 
Philop. 567, 17 vet. transl. Bek. Trend. Torst. Rodier, qui tamen pro puncto post πάντα 
colon posuit, ἐστι πάντα. πάντα yap ἢ coni. Torst. || 22. δ᾽ δὴ EL, δὲ ἡ Them. Soph. || 
24. «- τρόπον τινὰ τῷ ἀνάγεσθαι. els coni., vel potius interpr., Essen, Beitr. z. Lis. ἃ. ar. 
Frage, p. 34, els om. L Soph., insert. Ἐν (Stapf.), ὡς coni. Susemihl, B. J. IX, 352, qui 
etiam ὡς pro 25. et 26. eds scribi vult, B. J. XXXIV, 30; cf. tamen Susem. ibid. XLII, 
238, LXVII, 104, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ πράγ. coni. Torst. || 25. ἡ prius re. E in ras. || duvduecs 
et 26. évrehexelas Let pr. E Torst. Biehl, τὰς δυνάμεις et τὰς ἐνεργείας Soph., τὰ δυνάμει 
et τὰ ἐντελεχείᾳ reliqui codd. omnes (praeterquam quod etiam SX ras évredexelas 
praebent), etiam Them, Simpl. Philop., qui τὰ ἐνεργείᾳ interpretantur, et vet. transl. 
Bullinger, Metakr. Gange, p. 6, Nus-Lehre, p. ry Susemihl, B. J. XXXIV, 30 
Marchi, p. 18, els δυνάμεις et εἰς ἐντελεχείας scribarum errore ex els δυνάμει et els 
ἐντελεχείᾳ (Sc. πράγματα) orta esse suspicatur Christ || 27. τὸ om. ELSUVX, leg. 
Soph. || ταὐτόν EL Bek., ταὐτά corr. Ἐς, (Bhl.), scripsit Biehl in ed. alt., ταῦτα corr. Ey 
(Rr.), ταῦτα etiam Soph. et vet. transl. || ἐπιστητὸν] ἐπιστημονικὸν S U V et 28. αἰσθητικόν 
5. unde ταῦτά ἐστι, τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ ἐπιστητόν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθητικὸν τὸ αἰσθητόν 
scripsit Torst., τὸ μὲν «τὸ: ἐπιστητὸν τὸ δὲ «-τὸ:» αἰσθητόν coni. Hayduck, ἐπιστητῷ et 

CH. 8 431 Ὁ 20—432a 14 145 

And now let us sum up what has been said concerning the soul 8 
Summary by repeating that in a manner the soul is all existent 
ofresults. things. For they are all either objects of sensation or 
objects of thought; and knowledge and sensation are in a manner 
identical with their respective objects. How this is so requires to be 
explained. Knowledge and sensation, then, are subdivided to 2 
correspond to the things. Potential knowledge and sensation 
answer to things which are potential, actual knowledge and sensa- 
tion to things which are actual, while the sensitive and the cognitive 
faculties in the soul are potentially these objects; I mean, object of 
sensation and object of cognition respectively. It follows that the 
faculties must be identical, if not with the things themselves, then 
with their forms. The things themselves they are not, for it is not 
the stone which is in the soul, but the form of the stone. So that 
there is an analogy between the soul and the hand; for, as the 
hand is the instrument of instruments, so the intellect is the form 
Nihilestin of forms and sensation the form of sensibles. But, since, 3 
inteliectu apart from sensible magnitudes there is nothing, as it 
prius in would seem, independently existent, it is in the sensible 
senses forms that the intelligible forms exist, both the abstrac- 
tions of mathematics, as they are called, and all the qualities and 
attributes of sensible things. And for this reason, as without 
sensation a man would not learn or understand anything, so at the 
very time when he is actually thinking he must have an image 
before him. For mental images are like present sensations, except 
that they are immaterial. Imagination, however, is distinct from 
affirmation and negation, for it needs a combination of notions 
to constitute truth or falsehood. But, it may be asked, how will 
the simplest notions differ in character from mental images? I 
reply that neither these nor the rest of our notions are images, 
but that they cannot dispense with images. 

αἰσθητῷ Chandler, τὸ μὲν τὸ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν εἶδος Essen, Ὁ. 72, vulgatam 
tuetur etiam vet. transl. || 29. γὰρ ante δὴ STUX Soph. Bek. Trend. Torst., om. 
etiam Philop. et vet. transl. || ὁ om. EL Them. Philop., leg. Soph. || 432 a, 2. νοῦς 
ἐστὶν SV y, νοῦς δὲ TW |] εἶδος om. E, ἐστὶν εἶδος marg. ἘΣ || 5. ἐν om. ELSUV 
Them. Philop., leg. Simpl. || 7. αἰσθανόμενον L et E (Trend.) || 8. ξυνίη LS Xy Philop., 
ξυνίοι reliqui codd. Trend., ξυνείη Bek. Torst. || δὲ TUV || φαντάσματα SV WX, 
φαντάσματι E, « in rasura, etiam Them. Philop., scripsit Biehl, reliqui ante Biehlium 
omnes φάντασμά τι, etiam Simpl. vet. transl Bek. Trend. Torst. || 9. αἰσθήματα) 
αἰσθητά coni. Kampe, p. ror || ro. et τι. καὶ ἀποφάσεως om. 5 ὌΝ, leg. etiam Soph. |] 
ΣΙ. ἐστι νοημάτων SUV || 12. τίνι EL, reliqui τί, etiam Them. Philop. 569, 21 et ad 
403 8, 8 (45, 22) || φάντασμα E, φαντάσματα etiam Them. Philop. || 13. τἄλλα] ταῦτα 
Them. 116, 18 (sed τἄλλα ex Arist. scripsit Hayduck) Ald. Torst. Freudenthal, p. 13, 
τἄλλα vel τὰ ἄλλα etiam Simpl. et Philop. 569, 28 et ad 403 a, 8 (45, 23). 

H. To 





146 DE ANIMA Ill CH. 9 

4 , 
Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ δύο ὥρισται δυνάμεις ἡ τῶν 
~ Ἁ Ν 3 / 
ζῴων, τῷ τε κριτικῷ, ὃ διανοίας ἔργον ἐστὶ Kal αἰσθήσεως, 
\ » A A \ ‘\ ; , ‘ \ 3 4 
καὶ ἔτι τῷ κινεῖν THY κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν, περὶ μὲν αἰσθή- 
“ \ A ΜᾺ a) 
σεως Kat νοῦ διωρίσθω τοσαῦτα, περὶ δὲ τοῦ κινοῦντος, 
ἴω ~ 4 
τί ποτέ ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς, σκεπτέον, πότερον EV TL μόριον 
3. ΜᾺ Ν a aA / “Ὁ / “Ὁ ~ ς ΄ 
αὐτῆς χωριστὸν ὃν ἢ μεγέθει ἢ λόγῳ, ἢ πᾶσα ἡ ψυχῆ, 
“ 5» / 4 id ¥ ‘4 ‘ \ 3 / , 
κἂν εἰ μόριόν τι, πότερον ἴδιόν τι παρὰ τὰ εἰωθότα λέγε- 
Ν ‘ > Ld A ᾽ A ¥ δὲ 3 ? 
σθαι καὶ τὰ εἰρημένα, ἢ τούτων ἕν τι. ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν 
> \ *~ A ᾽ 2 ΝᾺ “ A ᾽ 
εὐθὺς πῶς τε δεῖ μόρια λέγειν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πόσα. 
τρόπον γάρ τινα ἄπειρα φαίνεται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἃ τινες 
λέγουσι διορίζοντες, λογιστικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητι- 
’ἤ ε A Ν᾿ ’ ¥ \ \ xd ‘ ‘ \ 
κόν, οἱ δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ TO aroyov' κατὰ yap τὰς 
‘ > ἃ A , Ν ¥ A 
διαφορὰς δὲ ds ταῦτα χωρίζουσι, καὶ ἄλλα ὠφανεῖῦται 
μόρια μείζω διάστασιν ἔχοντα τούτων, περὶ ὧν καὶ νῦν εἴ. 
pyta, τό τε θρεπτικόν, ὃ καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ 
ΝᾺ “ , Ἁ Ν 3 ’ aA 3 [ ¥ δ 
πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ὃ οὔτε ὡς ἄλογον οὔτε 
ἕ a μι [4 μή c / ¥ \ \ / 
ws λόγον ἔχον Dein av ris ῥᾳδίως. ἔτι δὲ τὸ φανταστικόν, 
ὃ τῷ μὲν εἶναι πάντων ἕτερον, τίνι δὲ τούτων ταὐτὸν ἢ ἔτε- 
ρον, ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, εἴ τις θήσει κεχωρισμένα μό- 
a las) N \ 4 Ν 3 4 a ‘\ ? 
pla τῆς ψυχῆς. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ὃ Kal λόγῳ 
“N 5 4 Ψ Ἃ δό 5 4 N ¥ on 
καὶ δυνάμει ἕτερον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι πάντων. καὶ ἄτοπον δὴ 
Ἁ an ¥ ~ ΝᾺ 
τὸ τοῦτο διασπᾶν" ἐν τε τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις γίνεται, 
κ ὶ 3 "Ὰ λό ε 3 θυ ία \ oe θ ΕΝ 2 δὲ / ¢ 
ai ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἡ ἐπιθυμία Kat ὁ θυμός: et δὲ τρία ἡ 
, 59 © + ¥ ¥ \ δ ‘ \ a on ¢ 
ψυχή, ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔσται ὄρεξις. καὶ δὴ Kal περὶ οὗ νῦν ὃ 
λόγος ἐνέστηκε, τί τὸ κινοῦν κατὰ τόπον τὸ ζῴόν ἐστιν; τὴν 
\ ‘ > ¥ “ - ’ Ψ ξ / 
μὲν γὰρ Kar αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν κίνησιν, ἅπασιν ὑπάρχου- 
\ “" 
σαν, τὸ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον δόξειεν ἂν κινεῖν τὸ γεννητικὸν καὶ 
θρεπτικόν: περὶ δὲ ἀναπνοῆς καὶ ἐκπνοῆς καὶ ὕπνου καὶ 
ἐγρηγόρσεως ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον" ἔχει γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα πολ- 

\ 3 ? 9 \ Ν ~ \ ? ra ΄ ‘ 
5 Anv ἀπορίαν. ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως, Ti TO 

15. ἡ ante τῶν om. L et pr. E (Bus.) Soph. || 20. ἢ post ὃν om. SU W Soph., leg. 
Simpl. || 23. re] wore W, om. L, re leg. Soph. || de7] δὴ E (Trend.), δεῖ corr. E | 
λέγειν ψυχῆς X, ψυχῆς λέγεν STUVWy Soph. || 27. ταύτας EL, ταῦτα etiam 
Soph. || galveraa TUWXy, φαίνονται LSV, φανεῖται etiam Soph. || 29. τε om. 
STUVWX, δὲ y, τε etiam Soph. || 8 om. SUV, leg. Them. || 30. ὃ om. UV | 
432 b, 1. ὃ om. E Them. 117, 15 Philop. 574, 22 in lemmate, leg. etiam Soph. || 
τὸ EL, τῷ leg. Them. Soph. || τινὶ Bek., τίνε etiam Philop. Soph. || 4. πάντων om. W y, 
leg. etiam Them, Soph. || xat ante ἄτοπον om. TUVWy || δὴ τὸ τοῦτο] δὲ τοῦτο T Vy, 
δὲ τὸ τοῦτο W, δὴ τὸ τοῦτο ἘΞ Soph., artic. τὸ etiam Them. Simpl., reliqui ante Torst. 
omnes δὴ τοῦτο, etiam Bek. Trend., δὴ τὸ, uncis includens τοῦτο, Torst. |] 9. αὔξην E 






CH.Q ᾿ 4328 15--432 Ὁ 13 147 

The soul in animals has been defined in virtue of two faculties, 9 
Animal lo. not only by its capacity to judge, which is the function 
comotion. of thought and perception, but also by the local move- 
ment which it imparts to the animal. Assuming the nature 
of sensation and intellect to have been so far determined, we 
have now to consider what it is in the soul which initiates 
motion: whether it is some one part of the soul, which is either 
locally separable or logically distinct, or whether it is the whole 
soul: and again, if a separate part, whether it is a special part 
distinct from those usually recognised and from those enumerated 
above, or whether it coincides with some one of these. A question 2 
at once arises in what sense it is proper to speak of parts 

oorts of of the soul and how many there are. For in one sense 
the soul. there appear to be an infinite number of parts and not 

merely those which some distinguish, the reasoning, passionate and 
concupiscent parts, for which others substitute the rational and the 
irrational. For, if we examine the differences on which they base 
their divisions, we shall find that there are other parts separated 
by a greater distance than these; namely, the parts which we 
have just discussed, the nutritive, which belongs to plants as 
well as to all animals, and the sensitive, which cannot easily be 
classed either as rational or irrational. Imagination, again, is 3 
logically distinct from them all, while it is very difficult to say 
with which of the parts it is in fact identical or not identical, if we 
are to assume separate parts in the soul. Then besides these there 
is appetency, which would seem to be distinct both in concept and 
in capacity from all the foregoing. And surely it is absurd to split 
this up. For wish in the rational part corresponds to concupiscence 
and passion in the irrational. And, if we make a triple division of 
soul, there will be appetency in all three parts, 

To come now to the question at present before us, what is it 4 
that imparts to the animal local movement? For as for the 
motion of growth and decay, which is found in all animals, it 
would seem that this must be originated by that part of soul 
which is found in all of them, the generative and nutritive 
part. Inspiration and expiration of breath, sleep and waking, 
subjects full of difficulty, call for subsequent enquiry. But to5 
return to locomotion, we must enquire what it is that imparts 

(Trend.), αὔξησιν etiam in interpret. Them. Philop. Soph. || ἅπασιν ὑπάρχουσαν E et 
Soph., 4 πᾶσιν ὑπάρχουσα W, at πᾶσιν ὑπάρχουσι reliqui codd. |] 10. καὶ θρεπτικόν om. 
EL, leg. etiam Them. Soph., καὶ τὸ Op. S |] rx. καὶ ante tervov'om. E || 13. τί om. E, 
leg. etiam Them. Soph. 



A \ / 4 Ψ ΝΑ > 
κινοῦν τὸ ζῴον THY πορευτικὴν κίνησιν, σκεπτέον. OTL μὲν οὖν 
> ε \ ’ ΜᾺ > » Ά Ψ ‘4 € 4 
οὐχ ἡ θρεπτικὴ δύναμις, δῆλον" ἀεί τε yap ἕνεκά TOV ἡ κίνησις 15 
Ψ ‘ A ‘ ? A 3 7 , > θὲ Ν 
αὕτη, καὶ ἢ μετὰ φαντασίας ἢ ὀρέξεώς ἐστιν: οὐθὲν γὰρ 
‘ 3 , “Ὁ, “A om INA, a / ¥ A \ 
μὴ ὀρεγόμενον ἢ φεῦγον κινεῖται ἀλλ ἢ βίᾳ. ἔτι κἂν τὰ 
δ᾿ a Ν ᾿ 
φυτὰ κινητικὰ ἣν, κἂν εἶχέ τι μόριον ὀργανικὸν πρὸς τὴν 
/ f εξ / δὲ ὑδὲ Ν 3 θ la λ Ν » 
6 κίνησιν ταύτην. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν: πολλὰ γάρ 
9 [οὶ 7 A ¥ θ Ν ¥ / δ᾽ > Ν Ν 5. 2 
ἐστι τῶν ζῴων ἃ αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχει, μόνιμα δ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκί- 20 
\ 3 On ε 7 “ ~ / \ 
νητα διὰ τέλους. εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις μήτε ποιεῖ μάτην μηθὲν 
μήτε ἀπολείπει τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, πλὴν ἐν τοῖς πηρώμασι 
Ν 3 a) 3 7 δ Ἁ ΄ὰ a 4 2 AY 
Kat ἐν τοῖς ἀτελέσιν: τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ζῴων τέλεια Kat 
οὐ πηρώματά ἐστιν: σημεῖον δ᾽ ὅτι ἔστι γεννητικὰ καὶ ἀκμὴν 
ν ον aN nw 
ἔχει καὶ φθίσιν: wor εἶχεν ἂν καὶ τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη τῆς 25 
, 3 Ν Ν 9 ‘ Ν Ν Ν ε 2 “~ 
πορείας. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ TO λογιστικὸν καὶ 6 καλούμενος νοῦς 
5 \ e ἴω . ξ ‘ Ν θ SN ἡ θὲ ἴω , Oe 
ἐστὶν ὁ κινῶν: ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸς οὐθὲν νοεῖ πρακτόν, οὐδὲ 
λέγει περὶ φευκτοῦ καὶ διωκτοῦ οὐθέν, ἀεὶ δὲ ἡ κίνησις ἢ φεύγον- 
“Ὁ, », 7 ,»» » 3 9Q> ἢ “ A 
τος ἢ διώκοντός Ti ἐστιν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὅταν θεωρῇ τι τοιοῦτον, 
+ a @ a“ 
non κελεύει διώκειν ἢ φεύγειν, οἷον πολλάκις διανοεῖται 30 
φοβερόν τι ἣ ἡδύ, οὐ κελεύει δὲ φοβεῖσθαι, ἡ δὲ καρδία 
~ jf ν , 
8 κινεῖται, ἂν δ᾽ ἡδύ, ἕτερόν τι μόριον. ἔτι καὶ ἐπιτάττοντος 4338 
A A Ν [4 ~ - / aA - 9 
τοῦ νοῦ καὶ λεγούσης τῆς διανοίας φεύγειν τι ἢ διώκειν οὐ κι. 
~ 3 Ν Ν Ν 3 , , ® ¢€ 3 / 
νεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττει, οἷον ὁ ἀκρατής. 
N “ON δὲ ε ΝᾺ Ψ ε ¥ \ > ‘ > 3. ΜΔ ς 
καὶ ὁλως O€ ὁρῶμεν OTL ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἰατρικὴν οὐκ ἰᾶται, ὡς 
΄ ¥ ΜᾺ 
ἑτέρου τινὸς κυρίου ὄντος τοῦ ποιεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλ᾽ 5 
3 ~ 3 , Ἰλλὰ ‘\ 0 e -» , 2 ΡῈ 
οὐ τῆς ἐπιστήμης. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἡ ὄρεξις ταύτης κυρία τῆς 
, € ‘ 3 vad 
κινήσεως" οἱ γὰρ ἐγκρατεῖς ὀρεγόμενοι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες οὐ 
a %® ¥ Ν » 9 9. 9 ω “ ad 
πράττουσιν wy ἔχουσι THY ὄρεξιν, GAN ἀκολουθοῦσι τῷ νῷ. 

15. re ET, om. reliqui codd., leg. etiam Philop. 581, 39 Soph. || ἡ ante κίνησις 
om. pr. E (Trend.) || 16. ἢ post καὶ om. SW Soph., leg. Philop. Simpl. || 21. διὰ 
τέλους] διατελεῖ Wy || εἰ ofv...unGev] hic variant SVWX, vulgatam tuentur etiam 
Simpl. Soph. || 22. τὸ EV, om. reliqui codd. et Simpl., leg. etiam Them. Philop. 
Soph. || 23. ἐν om. LTV Them. Simpl., leg. etiam Soph. || 24. ἔστι solus E, om. 
reliqui codd., etiam Them. Soph. || 27. κινῶν] ἐκείνων pr. E | θεωρεῖ EL et, αἱ 
videtur, Them. 118, 9, voe? legisse videtur etiam Soph. 41, 4 || 28 ἡ δὲ W 
Bek. Trend. Torst., ἀεὶ δὲ ἡ STUVXy et vet. transl., ἡ insert. E, (Bhl.) | 
φεύγοντός τι ἢ διώκ, τί omnes libri et scripti et ante Biehlium impressi exceptis E 
et Soph., τί prius om. Biehl || 30. φεύγειν ἢ διώκειν, exceptis EL et vet. transl., omnes 
scripti et ante Biehlium impressi || 31. re φοβερὸν TU V | φοβεῖσθαι" ἡ δέ ye καρδία 
coni. Torst. || 433a, 3. πράττειν E (Trend.) et y || ὁ om. STUXy, leg. Them. || 
4- 60m. L, leg. Them. Soph. || riv om. TW, leg. Them. Soph. || οὐκ expellendum 
esse censet Christ. 

CH. 9 432 Ὁ 14—433 a 8 140 

to the animal progressive motion. That it is not the nutritive 

The cause ἰδοῦν is clear. For this motion is always directed to 

f 1 - νι bed - a Φ 

οὗ ottan an end and is attended either by imagination or by 
τ th * . Φ . - 

ΤΟ ΗΝ appetency. No animal, which is not either seeking or 


avoiding something, moves except under compulsion. 
Moreover, if it were the nutritive faculty, plants also would be 
capable of locomotion and thus would have some part instrumental 
nor in producing this form of motion. Similarly it is not 6 
Senses the sensitive faculty, since there are many animals which 
have sensation and yet are throughout their lives stationary and 
motionless. If, then, nature does nothing in vain and, except in 
mutilated and imperfect specimens, omits nothing that is indis- 
pensable, while the animals we are considering are fully developed 
and not mutilated—as is shown by the fact that they pro- 
pagate their kind and have a period of maturity and a period of 
decline,—it follows that, if locomotion was implied in sensation, 
they would have had the parts instrumental to progression. Nor, 7 

nor again, is it the reasoning faculty or what is called 

intellect, = intellect that is the cause of motion. For the specula- 

tive intellect thinks nothing that is practical and makes no assertion 
about what is to be avoided or pursued, whereas motion always 
implies that we are avoiding or pursuing something. But, even if 
the mind has something of the kind before it, it does not forthwith 
prompt avoidance or pursuit. For example, it often thinks of some- 
thing alarming or pleasant without prompting to fear ; the only effect 
is a beating of the heart or, when the thought is pleasant, some other 
bodily movement. Besides, even if the intellect issues the order and 8 
the understanding bids us avoid or pursue something, still we are 
not thereby moved to act: on the contrary, action is determined 
by desire; in the case, for instance, of the incontinent man. And 
generally we see that, although a man possesses a knowledge of 
medicine, it does not follow that he practises; and this implies 
that there is something else apart from the knowledge which deter- 
mines action in accordance with the knowledge. Nor, 
nor ap- . . . . . ° 
petency again, is it solely appetency on which this motion de- 
pends. The continent, though they feel desire, that is 
appetite, do not act as their desires prompt, but on the contrary 
obey reason. 

150 DE ANIMA III CH. τὸ 

a Y AOA ν 
10 Φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα «τὰ» κινοῦντα, ἢ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς, εἴ 
\ Ν \ 
τις THY φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νόησίν τινα" πολλὰ yap Tapa Io 
‘ 3 ’ 9 “Ἂ ΜᾺ , \ 9 a ἫΝ 
τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῖς φαντασίαις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς αλ- 
ν᾿ / 
λοις ζῴοις οὐ νόησις οὐδὲ λογισμός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ φαντασία. 
+ ¥ ΜᾺ Ν Ν / a) ‘ » 
ἄμφω ἄρα ταῦτα κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, 
A \ ε Ψ , / x ¢€ ’ . ὃ ? 
νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός: διαφέρει 
δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει. καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ἕνεκά του πᾶσα" οὗ τ5 
γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ" τὸ δ᾽ ἔσχατον 
3 Ν οι / ν 3 , [φὶ δύ ? Ν 
ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως. ὥστε εὐλόγως ταῦτα δύο φαίνεται τὰ 
Ἂ Ἁ 
κινοῦντα, ὄρεξις καὶ διάνοια πρακτική; τὸ ὀρεκτὸν γὰρ κι- 
a) \ \ ~ ¢ f Ἂ Ψ 3 Ν 393 OA 3 ‘ Ν 
νεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ, ὅτι ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς ἐστι τὸ 
> ‘4 ‘ ε , ἂν “ 3 ~ ¥ 5 , 
3 ὀρεκτόν. Kal ἡ φαντασία δὲ ὅταν κινῇ, οὐ κινεῖ ἄνευ ὀρέ- 20 
A pay \ 
ἕεως. ἕν δή τι τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. εἶ yap δύο, νοῦς Kal 
» > » \ Ν ¥ » 9 Τὸ “ δὲ ε Ν 
ὄρεξις, ἐκίνουν, κατὰ κοινὸν ἄν τι ἐκίνουν εἶδος. νῦν O€ ὁ μὲν 
”~ 3 id ΜᾺ ¥ 9 ? c ‘ 4 ¥ 
νοῦς ov φαΐνεται κινῶν ἄνευ ὀρέξεως: ἡ yap βούλησις ὄρεξις" 
Ψ Ν ‘ > Ἅ ΜᾺ ‘ ‘ , 
ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κινῆται, καὶ κατὰ βούλησιν κι- 
A ε 3. Ὁ a) Ά XN / é \ 3 
νεῖται. ἡ δ᾽ ὄρεξις κινεῖ παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν" ἡ yap ἐπιθυ- 25 
/ » , ’ 3 ἰῳ \ > A 3 / 3 ¥ 
4 μία dpekis τίς ἐστιν. νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὀρθός ἐστιν' ὄρεξις 
\ Ν ’ \ 3 ‘\ \ > > / δὴ > ' “Ἂ Ν 
δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή. διὸ ἀεὶ κινεῖ μὲν 
A > ‘4 > \ ~ 3 3 Ἁ “Ὁ. ἃ > Ἁ A ‘ f 
TO ὀρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ TOUT ἐστὶν ἢ TO ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον 
> ? > a δὴ 3 ‘ ‘ \ 9 ᾿ Ν 3 
ἀγαθόν! οὐ πᾶν δέ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. πρακτὸν ὃ 
3 “ \ 3 a N cll ¥ 
ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν. 30 
ν A εν e - , “~ ~ A“ ε ψ, 
5. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις κινεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ καλουμέ- 
, A 
vn ὄρεξις, φανερόν. τοῖς δὲ διαιροῦσι τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, 433b 
\ \ 
ἐὰν KaTaras δυνάμεις διαιρῶσι καὶ χωρίζωσι, πάμπολλα γίνεται, 

9. ταῦτα δύο E L, δύο ταῦτα etiam Them. Soph. et vet. transl., post ταῦτα addendum τὰ 
coni. Bywater, p. 64, -- τὰ» recepi || 10. θείη W Philop. || πολλὰ] πολλοὶ coni. Bywater, 
cui assentitur Susemihl, Β, J. LXVII, 110 || 12. οὐ νόησις] βούλησις videtur habuisse 
pr. E(?) (Rr.) || οὐ] οὐχ ἡ L, ἡ ST VX Essen ΠῚ, p. 56 || οὐδὲ] οὐ TV X et pr. HE Essen, 
vulgatam utrobique tuentur Simpl. Philop. || 14. colon post πρακτικός sustulit et 15. δὲ 
unc, incl. Essen III, p. 56 || 15. οὗ yap...16. νοῦ post., 18. τὸ dpexrdv...20. dpexréy pr. 
edit. esse iudicat Torst., quod negat Noetel, p. 540, et refellit Pansch, Philologus XXI, 
Pp. 543, qui, ut Torstrikii contaminationem evitet, legendum proponit: οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις 
αὐτὴ || τό. αὐτὴ X || 17. δύο ταῦτα STUVXy Them. || τὰ om. E, insert. Ie, {} 
18. διάν, ἡ mp. TX || ὀρεκτὸν E Them. vet. transl., ceteri codd. ὀρεκτικὸν || 20. ὀρεκτόν 
EL Them. vet. transl., reliqui codd. ὀρεκτικόν || κινεῖ om. pr. E (Trend.) || 21. τὸ ante 
κινοῦν unc. incl. Essen III, p. 57 || ὀρεκτόν EL W Them. et fort. Philop. 585, 17 
(cf. Hayducki ap. crit. ad loc.), et dpexréy et ὀρεκτικόν legi commemorat Simpl. 207, 
31 56.» ὀρεκτικόν corr. E, et Torst., ὀρεκτόν defendere studet Pansch, 1. 1., cui assentitur 
Belger in alt. ed. Trend. || 22. εἶδος ἐκίνουν SUV W Xy et Simpl., εἶδος secludendum 
esse coni. Torst. || post νῦν δὲ addendum ἐπεὶ censet Essen, l. 1. || 2 5. Κινεῖ καὶ Philop. et 

CH. 10 4338. 9—433b 2 I51 

The motive causes are apparently, at any rate, these two, either 10 
Appe- appetency or intelligence, if we regard imagination as 
tency, how one species of thinking. For men often act contrary to 
practical knowledge in obedience to their imaginings, while in the 

other animals there is no process of thinking or reason- 
ing, but solely imagination. Both these, then, are causes of loco- 
motion, intelligence and appetency. By intelligence we mean that 2 
which calculates the means to an end, that is, the practical intellect, 
which differs from the speculative intellect by the end at which 
it aims. Appetency, too, is directed to some end in every case: for 
that which is the end of desire is the starting point of the practical 
intellect, and the last stage in this process of thought is the start- 
ing point of action. Hence there is good reason for the view that 
these two are the causes of motion, appetency and practical thought. 
For it is the object of appetency which causes motion; and the 
reason why thought causes motion is that the object of appetency is 
the starting point of thought. Again, when imagination moves to 3 
action, it does not move to action apart from appetency. Thus there 
is one single moving cause, the appetitive faculty. For, had there 
been two, intelligence and appetency, which moved to action, still 
they would have done so in virtue of some character common to both. 
But, as a matter of fact, intellect is not found to cause motion 
apart from appetency. For rational wish is appetency ; and, when 
anyone is moved in accordance with reason, he is also moved 
according to rational wish. But appetency may move a man in 
Opposition to reason, for concupiscence is a species of appetency. 
While, however, intellect is always right, appetency and imagina- 4 
tion may be right or wrong. Hence it is invariably the object of 
appetency which causes motion, but this object may be either the 
good or the apparent good. Not all good, however, but practical 
good: where by practical good we mean something which may 
not be good under all circumstances. 

It is evident, then, that motion is due to the faculty of the 5 
soul corresponding to this object—I mean what is known as ap- 
petency. But those who divide the soul into parts, if they divide 
it according to its powers and separate these from one another, 
will find that such parts tend to become very numerous: nutritive, 
fort. Them. 119, 13 sq., scripsit Torst. || 26. νοῦς μὲν... ἐστιν unc. incl Essen III, p. §7 Il 
26. ὀρθός ἐστιν" dp. et 27. μὲν κινεῖ STUVWXy, ὀρθός ἐστιν etiam E, (Bhl.), cued μὲν 
etiam Them., om. éorw Bek. Trend. Torst. || 27. καὶ φαντασία] κατὰ φαντασίαν coni. Essen, 
1.1. || 31. κινεῖ] κοινὴ W Essen, 1. 1. || 433 Ὁ, 1- τοῖς δὲ διαιροῦσι...4. θυμικόν alieno loco 

inserta iudicat Torst., p. 216 || τὰ μέρη τῆς ψνχῆς sive post κατὰ transponenda sive delenda 
censet Essen ITI, p. 58. 

152 DE ANIMA Ill CH. 10 

, 3 - 4 λ ld » Ὁ 4 . 
θρεπτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, νοητικόν, βουλευτικόν, €TL ὀρεκτικὸν 
a \ ἃ 
ταῦτα γὰρ πλέον διαφέρει ἀλλήλων ἢ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμι- 
6 κόν. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὀρέξεις γίνονται ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις, τοῦτο δὲ 
συμβαίνει ὅταν ὁ λόγος καὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι ἐναντίαι ὦσι, γίνεται 
“Ἂ “ \ \ 
δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς χρόνου αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν (ὃ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς dia τὸ 
μέλλον ἀνθέλκειν κελεύει, ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἤδη" φαί.- 
A \ ¥ OU Ν e οὶ OU ‘ 3 Ac ε λῷ 
νεται γὰρ τὸ ἤδη ἡδὺ καὶ ἁπλῶς YOU καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς, 
᾽ν δ εκ \ , [ὃ Ν ἃ a + ‘\ ἰφὶ \ 
διὰ TO μὴ ὁρᾶν τὸ μέλλον), εἴδει μὲν Ev ἂν εἴη TO κινοῦν TO 
ὀρεκτικόν, ἢ ὀρεκτικόν, πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ ὀρεκτόν (τοῦτο 
γὰρ κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι), ἀριθμῷ 
XN / ‘ “A 3 Ν > 5 \ a a \ Ν mn 
7 δὲ πλείω τὰ κινοῦντα. ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τρία, ἐν μὲν TO κινοῦν, 
δεύτερον δ᾽ ᾧ κινεῖ, ἔτι τρίτον τὸ κινούμενον" τὸ δὲ κινοῦν διττόν, 
τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν 
ἀκίνητον τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον τὸ 
ὀρεκτικόν (κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον ἣ ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἡ 
» a / / 3 A "» 92 \ A 4 ‘ “~ 
ὄρεξις κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν ἢ ἐνέργεια), TO δὲ κινούμενον τὸ ζῷον" 
ᾧ δὲ κινεῖ ὀργά ἡ ὄρεξις, HO υ ἦν ἐ . διὸ 
ἡ vel ὀργάνῳ ἢ ὄρεξις, NON τοῦτο σωματικὸν ἐστιν" OLO 
ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργοις θεωρητέον περὶ 
8 αὐτοῦ. νῦν δὲ ws ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, τὸ κινοῦν ὀργανικῶς 
μ᾿ 3 Ἁ \ Ἅ \ 9 / “« ε “ > 
ὅπον ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ TO αὐτὸ, οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός' ἐν- 
ΜᾺ \ Ν Ν ἃ ‘\ ~ Ν N Ν νι 3 
ταῦθα γὰρ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον τὸ μὲν τελευτὴ τὸ ὃ 
9 va ‘ ἃ \ > “A Ἁ Ἀ -~ ‘a ‘ ¥ 
ἀρχή! διὸ TO μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τὸ δὲ κινεῖται, λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερα 
μά ΄ 3 > , 7 Ν, ¥ ‘ Y 
ὄντα, μεγέθει δ᾽ ἀχώριστα' πάντα yap woe. καὶ ἔλξει κι- 
ad ὃ Ἁ ὃ “~ ν 3 id 4 Ν Ψ ~ ¥ 
νεῖται. διὸ δεῖ ὥσπερ ἐν κύκλῳ μένειν τι, Kal ἐντεῦθεν ap- 
3. vonrixdv unc. incl. Essen, 1.1. || BouAeurexdy τι coni. Essen, 1.1. {{ἀἔτε δὲ 5 ΟΝ ΣΧ, 
dé insert. Ey, δὲ om. Simpl. || 4. πλεῖον LSU, πλείω TVWXy Them. || ἀλλήλων ἢ] 
ἢ ἀλλήλων in interpr. Simpl. 299, 16 || τὸ om. L et E (Trend.) || §. γίν. καὶ ἐν, SUV 
Them., καὶ om. etiam Soph. et, ut videtur, Philop. 586, 18. 21. 23 || 6. ὅταν ὅ τε 
λόγος καὶ al ἐπιθυμίαι E (Bhl.) || 8. ἀνθέλκει, κελεύει δ᾽ ἡ coni. Essen IIL, p. 6o | 9. ἤδη 
insert. E,, leg. sine dubio Them. || το. μὲν] μὲν οὖν insert. E,(Rr.), μὲν οὖν TV Xy Them., 
μὲν ὃ W, οὖν om. etiam Simpl. || ἂν εἴη ὃν SU W, ἂν ὃν εἴη Simpl. || 11. parenthesin a 
πρῶτον ordiendam putat Bywater, p. 64, cui assentitur Susemih], B. J. LXVII, rio || 
13. ἐπεὶ Ey Simpl., ἐπειδὴ etiam Philop. et ap. Philop. Alex. et Plut. Athen. {| 14. ἔτι 
τρίτον E (Trend.) LS Torst., καὶ ἔτι τρίτον TX y Philop., ἔτι om. UV W Bek. Trend. ἢ 
15. κινοῦν καὶ om. E, leg. etiam Them. Simpl. Philop. |{ δὲ] δὴ coni. Susemihl, 
Oecon. p. 86 || 16. τὸ post κιν. om. ELSUV || 17. ὀρεκτόν corr. E (Trend.) ἢ} 
ὀρεγόμενον T Xy vet. transl. Torst. Belger in alt. ed. Trend. Biehl, κινοῦν sine dubio 
Philop. s91, 12 (v. quae ad loc. adnotavit Hayduck), reliqui κινούμενον, etiam Simpl. 
Bek. Trend., quibus assentitur Pansch, p. 545 || 18. κίνησις ὄρεξις EL et, ut videtur, 
Them. 120, 31 sq. Bek., ὄρεξις κίνησις etiam Simpl. vet. transl. Trend. Torst., ὄρεξις ἢ 

κίνησις Philop. || τίς om. TW Xy, leg. Simpl. || ἡ ἐνέργεια E (Bek. Stapf.), 7 ἐνέργεια 
E (Β81.), ἢ ἐνέργεια U Philop. Rodier, καὶ ἐνέργεια Them., ἢ ἐνέργεια Bek. Trend., etiam 


CH. τὸ 433 Ὁ 3—433 Ὁ 26 153 

sensitive, intelligent, deliberative, with the further addition of an 
appetent part: for these differ more widely from one another than 
the concupiscent does from the passionate. Now desires arise 6 
Conflict of Which are contrary to one another, and this occurs when- 
desires. ever reason and the appetites are opposed, that is, in 
those animals which have a perception of time. For intelligence 
bids us resist because of the future, while appetite has regard 
only to the immediate present; for the pleasure of the moment 
appears absolutely pleasurable and absolutely good because we do 
not see the future. Therefore, while generically the moving cause 
will be one, namely, the faculty of appetency, as such, and ultimately 
the object of appetency (which, without being in motion itself, causes 
motion by the mere fact of being thought of or imagined), numeri- 
cally there is a plurality of moving causes. 

Now motion implies three things, first, that which causes motion, 7 
How the Secondly, that whereby it. causes motion, and again, 
animal thirdly, that which is moved; and of these that which 
mess causes motion is twofold, firstly, that which is itself 
unmoved and, secondly, that which both causes motion and is 
itself moved. The unmoved movent is the practical good, that 
which is moved and causes motion is the appetitive faculty (for 
the animal which is moved is moved in so far as it desires, and 
desire is a species of motion or activity) and, finally, the thing 
moved is the animal. But the instrument with which desire moves 
it, once reached, is a part of the body: hence it must be dealt with 
under the functions common to body and soul. For the present, 
it may be enough to say summarily that we find that which 
causes motion by means of organs at the point where beginning 
and end coincide; as, for instance, they do in the hinge-joint, for 
there the convex and the concave are respectively the end and the 
beginning, with the result that the latter is at rest, while the former 
moves, convex and concave being logically distinct, but locally in- 
separable. For all animals move by pushing and pulling, and 
accordingly there must be in them a fixed point, like the centre in 


Simpl., qui tamen et ἢ évepy. scribi (immo, id quod H scribebatur legi) posse dicit, ἡ ἐν- 
€pyela scripsit Torst., els ἐνέργειαν coni. Chaignet, p. 433 || 21. αὐτῶν ἘΞ (Trend.) y, 
€tiam, nisi fallor, LU VW, quorum scripturam errore, ut videtur, typographico, Bek. 
αὑτῶν esse rettulit, αὐτοῦ etiam Them. Soph. et, ut videtur, Simpl. 303, 15 sq. || 22. ὅπου 
ay ἀρχὴ EW Soph. || γινγλυμός E et Trend., γιγλυμός X, γιγλυσμός STV, γιγγλισμός 
UW X, γιγγλυσμός Soph., γίγγλυμος Simpl. Philop. et ap. Simpl. Alex. et Plut. Athen., 
γεγγλυμός Them. (v. 1. γειγγλυσμός) Bek. Torst. || 23. καὶ rd κοῖλον X et rc. E (Bus.) 
Soph., recepit Biehl, reliqui ante Biehlium omnes om, τὸ, etiam Bek. Trend. Torst. | 
γὰρ ante τελευτὴ insert. E, (Rr.) || 24. διεὸ., κινεῖται in parenth. et post 25. ἀχώριστα 
punctum posuit Bywater, p. 64, cui assentitur Susemihl, B. J. LXVIT, rio. 

154 DE ANIMA Ill CHS. 10, II 

“\ Pd + “ > ν » Ἔ 5 Ν 
9 χεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν. ὅλως μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἢ ὀρεκτικὸν 
ω a Ν Ν 9 ¥ 
τὸ ζῷον, ταύτῃ ἑαυτοῦ κινητικόν: ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ dav- 
4 , 4 ΝᾺ “ἡ Ν A 3 θ ’ 4 
τασίας" φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική. ταύ- 

5 \ Ὁ ἰφὶ ΄ 
της μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα μετέχει. 30 
“~ , ~ 3 [4 
11 Σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτελῶν, τί τὸ κινοῦν ἐστίν, 

¥ , 9 , 
ols ἀφὴ μόνον ὑπάρχει αἴσθησις, πότερον ἐνδέχεται φαν- 4348 
aA ¥ Ν ‘4 4 Ἃ 
τασίαν ὑπάρχειν τούτοις, ἣ οὔ, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. φαίνεται γὰρ 
~ »Ὁ»Ἄ Ν [4 3 / 
λύπη Kai ἡδονὴ ἐνοῦσα. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνάγκη. 
ow οἱ 9 - 
φαντασία δὲ πῶς ἂν ἐνείη; ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ κινεῦται ἀορίστως, 
Ν a> ἣ ? > / δ᾽ » ς \ > 3 θ \ 
2 καὶ TAUT EvEoTL μέν, ἀορίστως δ᾽ ἔνεστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ ς 
~ ¥ , ε 
φαντασία, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὑπαρ- 
A a) la Ν 4 
χει, ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς (πότερον yap πρά- 
/ “Ὁ / a »¥ 5 \ ¥ \ 3. 9 e N 
fe. τόδε ἣ τόδε, λογισμοῦ ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔργον: καὶ ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ 
A Ν "Ἢ Ν ὃ , 4 δύ A > λ , 
μετρεῖν: τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ διώκει. ὥστε δύναται ἕν ἐκ πλειό.- 

/ ~ Ν » ΜᾺ “Ἂ δά A ὃ 
VOV φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν). Και QLUTLOY TOVUTO TOV όξαν μη O- IO 


ΝᾺ » 4 ἈΝ 3 “~ 9 ¥ 4 \ 9 4 
κειν ἔχειν, OTL τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ οὐκ ἔχει, αὐτη δὲ ἐκεί- 
μ ‘ N 3 ¥ ξ κά ίφ 3  », 

ϑνην. διὸ τὸ βουλευτικὸν οὐκ ἔχει ἡ ὄρεξις: νικᾷ δ᾽ ἐνίοτε 
Ν ΝᾺ ᾿ 4 € A 3 3 μά 4 ν ΝᾺ 6 
καὶ κινεῖ; τὴν βούλησιν, ore δ᾽ ἐκείνη ταύτην, ὥσπερ σφαῖρα, ἡ 
¥y Ν » 4 3 ’ / ’ \ 3 αὶ € 
ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρεξιν, ὅταν ἀκρασία γένηται' φύσει δὲ ἀεὶ ἡ 
ἄνω ἀρχικωτέρα καὶ κινεῖ: wore τρεῖς φορὰς ἤδη κινεῖσθαι. 



28. ἑαυτοῦ V Them., δ᾽ αὐτοῦ EL Soph., reliqui ante Biehlium omnes αὑτοῦ || 
81. καὶ om. E, leg. Soph. || ἀτελῶν etiam Them. Simpl. Soph., ἄλλων L, ἁπλῶν y | 
4344,1. αἴσθ. ἡ αἴσθησις E, ἢ αἴσθησις L, ἁφὴ μόνη αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει Simpl. |i 
2. καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν unc. incl. Essen || 3. ἔχουσα E, ἐνοῦσα etiam Them. || 4. εἴη 
LSUVW || ἢ om. ES | ἀόριστος exceptis ES reliqui codd. omnes, ἀορέστως etiam 
Them. {| 5. τούτοις LX et, ut videtur, Philop. 592, 26 Soph. 144, 37, ταῦτ᾽ xeliqui et corr. 
E || ἀόριστος y et fort. Simpl. in interpr. 307, 24. 308, 3 Soph. 144, 38, ἀορίστως etiam 
Them. 122, 11 Philop. || 6. φαντασία] ὄρεξις coni. Essen III, Ρ. 62 || ddéyos T Wy 
Them. 121, 21, ἄλλοις etiam Simpl. in lemmate 308, 2 et, ut videtur, Philop. 592, 22: 
cf. tamen τὰ ἄλογα 593, 5 || 7. ἡ δὲ BovAeuTiKh...10. ποιεῖν in parenth. posuit Rodier || 
7. πότερον...το. ποιεῖν in parenth. posui || 7. λογικοῖς Wy || 8 ἐστιν ἤδη L 1} ἔργον 
ἐστίν y || ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ μετρεῖν ἑνί W, vulgatam tuentur etiam Them. 121, 24 Philop. in interp. 
592, 30 || 8. καὶ ἀνάγκη... τι. ἐκείνην unc. incl. Essen || 9. πλεόνων E, πλειόνων Them, 
Simpl. Philop. || το. καὶ atriov...12. ὄρεξις mutila vel corrupta esse censet Torst., leg. 
Simpl. Philop. et, ut videtur, Them. 121, 29 5644. || 10. τοῦτο τοῦ] τούτον τὸ corr. E, (Rr.), 
quod legisse videtur Philop. in interpr. 593, 4 || 11. post οὐκ ἔχει add. «τἄλλα fGa> et αὕτη 
δὲ ἐκείνην hoc loco delevit Bywater, αὕτη δὲ κιν εἶ, coll. a, 19, coni. Cornford || 12. διὸ -«- ἢ 
τὸ βουλευτικὸν.. «νικᾷ [δ᾽] ἐνίοτε... βούλησιν, [ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐκείνη ταύτην] ὥσπερ σφαῖρα -- σφαῖραν > 
coni. Essen IIT, p. 62 || 13. τὴν βούλησιν om. SV W | post βούλησιν colon vulg. || ὁτὲ δὲ 
κινεῖ Ὑ αὑτήν pro ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐκείνη ταύτην coni. Cornford ll σφαῖραν y || 13 et 14. ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρ. 
coni. Trend., ἢ υἡ ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρ. coni. Chandler, totum Jocum sic restituendum esse: νικᾷ δ᾽ 
ἐνίοτε καὶ x. τ. βούλησιν, ὅταν ἀκρασία γένηται" ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐκείνη ταύτην" ὁτὲ δ᾽, ὥσπερ σφαῖραν 
σφαῖρα, ἡ bp. τὴν ὄρ. coni. Torst., νικᾷ δ' ἐν. καὶ x. τ. B., ὅταν ἀκρ. y-, ὁτὲ ἐκείνη ταύτην, ἢ 

CHS. I0, II 433 Ὁ 27—434 a 15 155 

a circle, and from this the motion must begin. Thus, then, in 9 
general terms, as already stated, the animal is capable of moving 
itself just in so far as it is appetitive: and it cannot be appetitive 
without imagination. Now imagination may be rational or it may 
be imagination of sense. Of the latter the other animals also have 
a share. 

We must also consider what is the moving cause in those im- 11 
The low. perfect animals which have only the sense of touch. Is 
crite how it possible that they should have imagination and desire, 
moved. or is it not? It is evident that they feel pleasure and 
pain: and, if they have these, then of necessity they must also 
feel desire. But how can they have imagination? Shall we say 
that, as their movements are vague and indeterminate, so, though 
they have these faculties, they have them in a vague and indeter- 
Delibera- minate form? The imagination of sense, then, as we 2 
tive imagi- have said, is found in the other animals also, but delibe- 

rative imagination in those alone which have reason.— 
For the task of deciding whether to do this or that already implies 
reasoning. And the pursuit of the greater good necessarily implies 
some single standard of measurement. Hence we have the power 
of constructing a single image out of a number of images.—And 
the reason why the lower animals are thought not to have opinion 
is that they do not possess that form of imagination which comes 
from inference, while the latter implies the former. And so ap- 3 
petency does not imply the deliberative faculty. But sometimes it 
overpowers rational wish and moves to action; at other times the 
latter, rational wish, overpowers the former, appetency. Thus one 
appetency prevails over another appetency, like one sphere over 
another sphere, in the case where incontinence has supervened. 
But by nature the upper sphere always has the predominance and 
is a moving cause, so that the motion is actually the resultant of 
three orbits. 
ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρ. coni. Steinhart, βούλησιν ὥσπερ σφαῖρα <éré μὲν αὕτη ἐκείνην Ξ- ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐκείνη 
ταύτην ἡ ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρ. coni. Bywater, p. 67: cf. ad a, 11, ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐκείνη ταύτην, ὥσπερ 
«πἿ dvw> σφαῖρα «-τὴν κάτω, ὁτὲ δ᾽: ἢ ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρ. ὅταν axp. y. (φύσει δὲ ἀεὶ 
ἢ ἄνω ἀρχικ. καὶ xw.), ὥστε coni. Zeller, p. 587, adn. 4, φύσει δὲ ἀεὶ ἡ ἄνω ἀρχικ." 
καὶ κινεῖ ἡ ὄρ. τὴν 8p. ὅταν ἀκρασία yév., wore coni. Busse, Hermes XXIII, 460 sq., 
νικᾷ δ᾽ ἐνίοτε καὶ κινεῖ τὴν βούλησιν, ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐκείνη ταύτην, ὥσπερ ἣ ἄνω σφαῖρα 
(φύσει δὲ ἀεὶ ἡ ἄνω ἀρχ. καὶ κιν.) ὁτὲ δ᾽ 4% ὄρ. τὴν ὄρ., ὅταν ἀκολασία γένηται" ὥστε 
coni. Susemihl, Β. J. LXVII, 11, vulgatam Rodier et certe Simpl. et vet. transl., 
vulgatam legisse videntur etiam Them. 121, 33 sqq- Soph. 145, 11 sqq., «ὁτὲ D> 
ante ὥσπερ de coniect. inseruit Biehl || 14. ἐνῇ EL, etiam Philop. 593, 12, v. 

Hayducki ap. crit. ad loc., γένηται corr. Ey || 15. wore κατὰ τρεῖς διαφορὰς coni. 
Essen III, p. 63. 

156 DE ANIMA III CHS. 11, 12 

A \ > ε \ 
4 τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιστημονικὸν ov κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ μένει. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ μὲν 
io > ¢ ε \ 
καθόλου ὑπόληψις Kal λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα (ἡ μὲν 
6 rn ΝΥ ε ¢ 
γὰρ λέγει ὅτι δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ τοιόνδε πράττειν, ἡ δὲ ὅτι 
¥ Ψ ~ e 
τόδε τοίνυν τοιόνδε, κἀγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε), NON αὕτη κινεῖ ἡ 
δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου: ἢ ἄμφω, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἠρεμοῦσα μᾶλ- 20 
λον, ἡ δ᾽ οὔ. 
Ν Ἁ 3 N A 9 / A ¥ rd 
12 Τὴν μὲν οὖν θρεπτικὴν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πᾶν ἔχειν ὅτι 
Ὁ ~ \ ‘\ ¥ > N , Ὰ 2 θ a 
περ ἂν ζῇ, καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχει ἀπὸ γενέσεως καὶ μέχρι φθορᾶς 
‘ Ν ‘ 
ἀνάγκη yap τὸ γενόμενον αὔξησιν ἔχειν καὶ ἀκμὴν Kat 
/ a > >» a 9Q 7 > 7 » 2 Ἂ 
φθίσιν, ταῦτα δ᾽ ἄνευ τροφῆς advvaTov' ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐνεῖναι 25 
A “Ὰ ἃ 
τὴν θρεπτικὴν δύναμιν ἐν πᾶσι Tots φυομένοις καὶ φθίνουσιν. 
“αἴσθησιν δ᾽ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ζῶσιν" οὔτε γὰρ 
we Ν a ε ῳ 2 , ε Ἀ Ν ¥ vd 
ὅσων τὸ σῶμα ἁπλοῦν, ἐνδέχεται ἁφὴν ἔχειν, [οὗτε ἄνευ 
@ o“ Ν ΜΆ 
ταύτης οἷόν τε οὐθὲν εἶναι ζῷον] οὔτε ὅσα μὴ δεκτικὰ τῶν 
9 αὶ ¥ Ἂ Ψ Ν , a 3 “Ὰ » ¥ 
5 εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης. τὸ δὲ ζῷον ἀναγκαῖον αἴσθησιν ἔχειν, 30 
εἰ μηθὲν μάτην ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις. ἕνεκά τον γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρ- 
χει τὰ φύσει, ἢ συμπτώματα ἔσται τῶν ἕνεκά TOV. εἰ οὖν 
πᾶν σῶμα πορευτικόν, μὴ ἔχον αἴσθησιν, φθείροιτο ἂν καὶ 
els τέλος οὐκ ἂν ἔλθοι, ὅ ἐστι φύσεως ἔργον' πῶς γὰρ θρέ- 434b 
ψεται; τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μονίμοις ὑπάρχει τὸ ὅθεν πεφύκασιν. 
ᾳοὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ σῶμα ἔχειν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν κριτικόν, αἵ- 
Ν \ » Ν / μέ Ν »;, 3 Ν ‘ 
σθησιν δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, μὴ μόνιμον ὄν, γενητὸν δέ, [ἀλλὰ μὴν 
3. 9 2 Ν , Ν Y a Ν - αὶ / 
οὐδὲ adyévyrov:| διὰ τί γὰρ ἕξει; ἢ yap τῇ ψυχῇ βέλτιον ς 
ἢ τῷ σώματι. νῦν δ᾽ οὐδέτερον: 7 μὲν γὰρ οὐ μᾶλλον νοήσει, 
μ 3 afr ¥ ων 9. 5 ἴω 5 \ ὃ » 4 
τὸ δ᾽ οὐθὲν ἔσται μᾶλλον δι ἐκεῖνο. οὐθὲν dpa ἔχει ψυχὴν 
σῶμα μὴ μόνιμον ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως. 
16. κινεῖ TWX, vel κινεῖ vel κινεῖταε hic legi commemorat Simpl. 311, g sq. || 
17. ἕκαστον Ey Them. || 19. τοίνυν] τὸ νῦν E, sed ita ut lacuna sit minuta inter 
τὸ et vw (Trend. Bus.) Bek. Trend., νῦν Xy, om. LSTUVW, τοίνυν Simpl. 
Torst. || 19. ἢ δὴ atry...20. καθόλου, ἢ ἄμφω coni. Spengel in com. ad Ar. rhet. 
IT, 300 || 20. καθόλου; ἢ scripsit Torst. {| 23. καὶ ἔχειν coni. Christ, ἔχῃ Xy Bek. Trend., 
ἔχει etiam Philop. Torst., ἔχειν videtur legisse Them. 122, 22 || catom. TUVXy 
Bek. Trend. || 27. alios ζῶσιν, alios ζῴοις legere tradit Philop. 598, 17 sq. || 28. ὅσων] ὧν 
EL Philop., ὅσων etiam Simpl. 320, 38 et, ut videtur, Them. 122, 29 sq. || odre...29. ζῷον 
suspecta erant Trend., unc. incl. Torst., leg. Simpl., non videtur legisse Them. Philop. 
Soph. || 29. οὐθὲν οἷόν re LT W, οἷόν re οὐθὲν etiam Simpl. || 30. τὸ δὲ ξῷο»] τὶ δὲ ζῶν 
coni. Essen ΠῚ, p. 64 || 31. μη-} exit E || ἅπαντα LT VX |] 33. pro πᾶν coni. Torst. 
εἴη vel γένοιτο, cui assentitur Dittenberger, p. 1615, pro ἔχον coni. Trend. ἔχοι, quod 
probant Steinhart et Susemihl, Oecon. p. 86, post πορευτικόν virgulam posuit Biehl ἢ 

434}, 2. τὸ] ταῦτα W, τοῦτο ST UV X y Trend. || ὅθι Ὁ, ὅτι SV X, ὅθεν etiam Philop. 
Simpl. || 4. γενητὸν et 5. ἀγένητον Simp]. Them. Philop. ex cod. Ὁ Hayduck Torst., reliqui 

CHS. 11,12 434 a 1τ6----434 Ὁ 8 157 

The cognitive faculty, however, is not subject to motion, but is 4 
rhe at rest. The major premiss is universal, whether judg- 
practical ment or proposition, while the minor has to do with a 
syllogism. particular fact: for, while the former asserts that such and 
such a person ought to do such and such an act, the latter asserts 
that a particular act is one of the sort and that I am such a person. 
Now it is the latter judgment which at once moves to action, not the 
universal, Or shall we say that it is both together, but the one is 
akin to the unmoved movent, the other is not? 

Every living thing, then, must have the nutritive soul and in fact 12 
Teleology; has a soul from its birth till its death. For what has 
nutritive been born must necessarily grow, reach maturity and 
cessary. decline, and for these processes nutriment is indispens- 
able. It follows, then, of necessity that the nutritive faculty is 
present in all things that grow and decay. But sensation is not 2 
necessarily present in all living things. For wherever the body is 
uncompounded there can be no sense of touch [ yet without this sense 
animal existence 1s impossible|: nor, again, in those living things 
which are incapable of receiving forms apart from matter. But 3 
sensation the animal must of necessity possess sensation, if nature 
necessary makes nothing in vain: for everything in nature sub- 
to animals. - . 

serves an end or else will be an accessory of things 
which subserve an end. Now every living body having the power 
of progression and yet lacking sensation would be destroyed and 
never reach full development, which is its natural function. For 
how in such a case is it to obtain nutriment? Motionless animals, 
it is true, have for nutriment that from which they have been 
developed. But a body, not stationary, but produced by genera- 4 
tion, cannot possibly have a soul and an intelligence capable of 
judging without also having sensation. [lVetzher can tt, tf τῇ be not 
genevated.| For why should it have the one without the other? 
Presumably for the advantage either of the soul or of the body. 
But neither of these alternatives is, in fact, admissible. For the 
soul will be no better able to think, and the body will be no 
better off, for the absence of sensation. We conclude, then, that no 
body that is not stationary has soul without having sensation. 
ante Torst. omnes γεννητὸν εἰ ἀγέννητον, etiam Them. v.l. Philop. ed. Trincavelli || ἀλλὰ .. 
5. ἀγένητον unc. inclusit Torst., leg. quidem omnes libri scripti et impressi, etiam Them. 
Philop. 599, 32 Soph. et apud Simpl. et Philop. Alex. et Plut. et vet. transl., omisit Simpl., 
qui annotat 320, 28: ἔν τισι δὲ ἀντυγράφοις πρόσκειται τὸ ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγένητον || 4. οὐ μὴν 
ἀλλὰ dry. coni. Essen III, p. 65 || 5. γὰρ οὐχ ἕξει TUV Wy Plut. apud Simpl. εἰ apud 
Philop. et vet. transl., om. οὐχ reliqui, etiam Them. Philop. Alex. || verbis διὰ ri γὰρ ἔξει (sc. 

τὸ μόνιμον); ἢ yap...7. 5: ἐκεῖνο parenthesi inclusis apodosin sententiae conditionalis εἰ οὖν 
πᾶν ab οὐθὲν ἄρα ἔχει incipere statuit Christ || 7. τῷ LW, τὸ etiam Them. 





158 DE ANIMA “27 CH. 12 

3 > A ε ἰῳ 
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴγε αἴσθησιν ἔχει, ἀνάγκη τὸ σῶμα εἶναι ἢ ἁπλοῦν 
@ δ δ ψ ¥ \ 
ἢ μεικτόν. οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ ἁπλοῦν: ἁφὴν γὰρ οὐχ ἔξει, ἔστι δὲ τὸ 
A a“ oN ‘\ 
ἀνάγκη ταύτην ἔχειν. τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ἐπεὶ yap τὸ 
D DLA € ἦν ἐ Hua δὲ ἅπαν ἁπτόν, ἁπτὸν δὲ τὸ 
ζῷον σῶμα ἔμψυχόν ἐστι, σῶμα ὃὲ ἀπαν a ὸ 
ἊᾺ 3 Ν Ν ΡΜᾺ , ~ € Ν, 
αἰσθητὸν ady, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ τοῦ ζῴου σῶμα ἀἁπτικὸν 
> in nd 
εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει σώζεσθαι τὸ ζῷον. αἱ yap ἄλλαι aio ly- 
> ¢ 2 9 θά τ » » 3. ᾿ς 
σεις δι ἑτέρων αἰσθάνονται, οἷον ὄσφρησις ὄψις ἀκοή" 15 
ε - ? 9 ‘ Ψ » > ὃ ¢ Ν ‘\ 
ἁπτόμενον δέ, εἰ μὴ ἔξει αἴσθησιν, ov δυνήσεται τὰ μὲν 
φεύγειν τὰ δὲ λαβεῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀδύνατον ἔσται σώζε- 
θ ὃ lw διὸ καὶ ἡ γεῦσίς ἐστιν ὥσπερ ἁφή TIS’ τρο- 
σθαι τὸ ζῷον. διὸ καὶ ἡ γεῦσίς ἐστιν ὥσπερ ἀφὴ τις" TPO 
~ 7 , € δὲ \ ‘ “~ XN € ? ? δὲ 
φῆς γάρ ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ τροφὴ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἁπτόν. ψόφος dé 
νΝ ων \ 93 ‘ 3 / Oe wn » 3 ¥ » 
Kal χρῶμα καὶ ὀσμὴ οὐ τρέφει, οὐδὲ ποιεῖ οὔτ᾽ αὔξησιν οὔτε 20 
φθίσιν. ὥστε καὶ τὴν γεῦσιν ἀνάγκη ἀφὴν εἶναί τινα, διὰ 
τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ θρεπτικοῦ αἴσθησιν εἶναι" αὗται μὲν οὖν 
ἀναγκαῖαι τῷ ζῴῳ, καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ 
ς ΓΟ 3. ae ξ δὲ tN ΜᾺ 5 Ψ \ , 
ἁφῆς εἶναι ζῷον. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι τοῦ τε εὖ ἕνεκα καὶ γένει 
¥ > ~ / 9 Ν [4 Os ἊΝ ~ 
ζῴων ἤδη ov τῷ τυχόντι, ἀλλὰ τισίν, οἷον τῷ πορευτικῷ 25 
5» 9 ε 7 . 3 ‘\ f / > 4 ὃ μᾺ 
ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν εἰ γὰρ μέλλει σώζεσθαι, οὐ μόνον δεῖ 
ε , 9 θά θ aN Ν ΟΝ» θ “ δ᾽ a ¥ 
ἁπτόμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄποθεν. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἂν etn, 
3 ὃ ‘ ~ ξὺ 3 θ ὸ » ~ 5» ἊΝ ‘ € Ἅ “ 
εἰ διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ αἰσθητικὸν εἴη τῷ ἐκεῖνο μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ 
~ ~ > 3 
αἰσθητοῦ πάσχειν καὶ κινεῖσθαι, αὐτὸ δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ exeivov. ὥσπερ 
γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν κατὰ τόπον μέχρι του μεταβάλλειν ποιεῖ, 30 
S na FY [οὶ 
καὶ τὸ ὦσαν ἕτερον ποιεῖ ὥστε ὠθεῖν, καὶ ἔστι διὰ μέσου ἡ 
κίνησις, καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κινεῖ καὶ ὠθεῖ οὐκ ὠθούμενον, 
\ δ᾽ Ψ id oO Ὁ 9 > ‘ δὲ , » 
τὸ ὃ ἐσχατον μόνον ὠθεῖται οὐκ ὥὦσαν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἄμφω, 
πολλὰ δὲ μέσα, οὕτω «καὶ; ἐπ᾽ ἀλλοιώσεως, πλὴν ὅτι μένοντος 4354 
3 A 3 a ? aN “A e 3 > δὴ / ed 
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ ἀλλοιοῖ, οἷον εἰ eis κηρὸν βάψειέ τις, 
μέχρι τούτου ἐκινήθη, ἔως ἔβαψεν' λίθος δὲ οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾽ 

9. ἔχοι L, om. SUV |] 9. ἀνάγκη...13. ἁφῇ unc. incl. Essen || 17. ἐστι Τ' Χ, ἔσται etiam 
Philop. |} 18. διὸ xal...19. ἁπτόν post., 21. ὥστε...22. εἶναι pr., edit. esse iudicat Torst. |{ 
19. post ἁπτόν addendum καὶ θρεπτικόν censet Bywater, p. 67 || 24. τὸ ζῷον L, τὸ om. 
Them. |} 27. σώζεσθαι TWX, αἰσθάνεσθαι etiam Soph. || 30. τον Torst. et, ut videtur, 
Them. 124, 30, Soph. interpretatur μέχρι τινός, τούτου S, reliqui ante Torst. omnes τοῦ || 
31. ὦσαν} ὠσθὲν coni. Torst., doay etiam Simpl. Soph. et, ut videtur, Philop. 605, 1 ἢ 
καὶ ἔστι...32, κίνησις] καὶ ἔστι ταῦτα διὰ μέσου coni. Torst., vulg. tuetur Soph. || 32. καὶ rd 
μὲν rp. W Torst., τὸ δὲ wp. L, καὶ τὸ mp. μὲν TX, καὶ μὲν δὴ τὸ wp. SU, καὶ δὴ τὸ μὲν πρ. 
Vy Bek. Trend. || κινεῖ καὶ ὠθεῖ Ly Soph., reliqui ante Biehlium omnes κινοῦν ὠθεῖ, 
κιψοῦν unc. incl. Torst. || 33. ὥσαν] ὠθοῦν X || 435 a, 1. οὕτω δὴ ἐπ᾽ vel οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπ᾽ 
coni. Torst., οὕτω vel οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ Them. Simpl. Philop. Soph. vet. transl., om. καὶ 
omnes codd., «καὶ; in textum recepit Biehl || μένοντα VWX Trend., μένοντος etiam 

CH. 12 434 Ὁ 9—435 a 3 159 

But, further, the body, assuming that it has sensation, must 5 
Touch be either simple or composite. But it cannot be simple, 
necessary for then it would not have touch, and this sense is indis- 
for self- . . . . . 
preserva- pensable. ‘This is clear from the following considerations. 6 
son The animal is an animate body. Now body is always 
tangible and it is that which is perceptible by touch which is tan- 
gible: from which it follows that the body of the animal must have 
tactile sensation, if the animal is to survive. For the other senses, 
that is to say, smell, sight, hearing, have media of sensation, but 
a being which has no sensation will be unable when it comes into 
contact with things to avoid some and seize others. And if 
this is so, it will be impossible for the animal to survive. This 7 
is why taste is a kind of touch, for taste is of nutriment and 
nutriment is body which is tangible; whereas sound, colour and 
smell afford no nourishment and promote neither growth nor 
decay. So that taste also must be a kind of touch, because it is 
a sensation of that which is tangible and nutritive. These two 
senses, then, are necessary to the animal, and it is plain that 
without touch no animal can exist. 

But the other senses are means to well-being, and are necessary, 8 
The higher not to any and every species of animal, but only to cer- 
necessary tain species, as, for example, those capable of locomotion. 
pressive For, if the animal capable of locomotion is to survive, it 
animals. must have sensation, not only when in contact with any- 
thing, but also at a distance from it. And this will be secured if it 
Amedium can perceive through a medium, the medium being capable 
for sense. Of being acted upon and set in motion by the sensible 
tion. object, and the animal itself by the medium. Now that 9 
which causes motion from place to place produces a change oper- 
ating within certain limits, and that which propels causes the thing 
propelled to propel in turn, the movement being transmitted 
through something intermediate. The first in the series initiates 
motion and propels without being itself propelled, while the last 
is simply propelled without propelling; the numerous middle 
terms of the series both propel and are propelled. So it is also 
with qualitative change, except that what is subject to this 
change remains in the same place. Suppose we were to dip 
something into wax, the movement in the wax would extend just 

so far down as we had dipped the object, whereas in the like case 

Philop. et, ut videtur, Them. 124, 28 || 2. ἀλλοιοῖ, οἷον] ἀλλ᾽ οἷον 5 Poppelreuter, zur 
Psych. d. Ar., p. 17 || 3. τοῦ UX. 

160 DE ANIMA III CHS. 12, 13 

ὕδωρ μέχρι πόρρω; ὁ δ᾽ ἀὴρ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον κινεῖται καὶ 
“ ‘ ® 3 \ ‘ Ν 3 
ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχει, ἐὰν μένῃ καὶ εἷς ἧ. διὸ καὶ περὶ ἀνα- 5 
, “~ 3 Ἁ 9 
κλάσεως βέλτιον ἢ τὴν ὄψιν ἐξιοῦσαν ἀνακλᾶσθαι, τὸν ἀέρα 
A Ν vd / @ 
πάσχειν ὑπὸ TOV σχήματος Kal χρώματος, μέχρι περ οὗ 
“Ὁ ~ “ἃ > ON δὲ “ λ 7, 3 Ν @,. 8 Ν aN e Ν ¥ 
ἂν ἢ els. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ λείου ἐστὶν εἷς" διὸ πάλιν οὗτος THY ὄψιν 
A ~ ae “ / 
κινεῖ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸ ἐν τῷ κηρῷ σημεῖον διεδίδοτο μέχρι 
τοῦ πέρατος. 
1. Ὅτι δ᾽ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἁπλοῦν εἶναι τὸ τοῦ ζῴου σῶμα, 
/ / 5 @ / aK 3 ¥ A Ν 
φανερόν, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον πύρινον ἢ ἀέρινον. ἄνευ μὲν yap 
ε ran 3 , 3 4 + Ψ ¥ Ἁ ‘ 
ἁφῆς οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἔχειν: τὸ γὰρ 
σῶμα ἁἅπτικὸν τὸ ἔμψυχον πᾶν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. τὰ δὲ 
¥ ¥ ΜᾺ 3 θ 7 Ν “Ὁ, / 4 δὲ ΝᾺ 
ἄλλα ἔξω γῆς αἰσθητήρια μὲν ἂν γένοιτο, πάντα δὲ τῷ τς 
> ε», > θά θ “ Ν ¥ θ ἃ ὃ Ν on 
dv ἑτέρου αἰσθάνεσθαι ποιεῖ THY αἴσθησιν καὶ διὰ τῶν με- 
7 ε > ε Ν a > A ᾽ , 53 Ἁ Ν ¥ 
ταξύ. ἡ δ᾽ ἁφὴ τῷ αὐτῶν ἅπτεσθαί ἐστιν, διὸ καὶ τοὔνομα 
“A ¥ ’ὔ \ Ν AON > A , ι Lon 3 θ , 
τοῦτο ἔχει. καίτοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητήρια ἀφῇ αἰσθάνε- 
3 Ν > € Ff Ψ Ἃ “ 7 > ec A Ψ ΜᾺ 
ται, ἀλλὰ δι ἑτέρου: αὕτη δὲ δοκεῖ μόνη du αὑτῆς. ὥστε τῶν 
A - [4 9 Ν A » “A ῪᾺ / > Ν ‘ 
μὲν τοιούτων στοιχείων οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη σῶμα τοῦ ζῴον. οὐδὲ δὴ 
γήϊνον. πάντων γὰρ ἡ ἁφὴ τῶν ἁπτῶν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ μεσότης, 
καὶ δεκτικὸν τὸ αἰσθητήριον οὐ μόνον ὅσαι διαφοραὶ γῆς 
5 ’, 3 Ν, Ν A A ΝᾺ \ Ἂ 4 ε ΝᾺ ε ᾽ὔ 
εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπτῶν ἀπάν- 
των. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ὀστοῖς καὶ ταῖς θριξὶ καὶ τοῖς τοι- 
4 , 9 3 2 ῳ ΝΜ 3 , Ν Ν Ν 
οὕτοις μορίοις οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅτι γῆς ἐστίν. καὶ τὰ φυτὰ 25 
ὃ Ν a“ 3 / ¥ ¥ Ψ ἰοὺ 3 / ¥ \ ς 
lad τοῦτο οὐδεμίαν ἔχει αἴσθησιν, ὅτι γῆς ἐστίν: ἄνευ δὲ a- 4350 
“ 0 / as Υλλ ε , “ δὲ ‘ > θ / 
φῆς οὐδεμίαν οἷόν τε ἄλλην ὑπάρχειν, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αἰσθητήρι- 
ον οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε γῆς οὔτε ἄλλον τῶν στουχείων οὐδενός. 
λ φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μόνης ταύτης στερισκόμενα 
τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὰ ζῷα ἀποθνήσκειν: οὔτε γὰρ ταύτην 5 
é ει as ‘ ζῷ ¥ ζῷ ‘A *r ¥ 
xew οἷόν te μὴ ζῷον, οὔτε ζῷον ὃν ἄλλην ἔχειν 
3 Ν A Ν Ν, “~ ‘\ ἢ ¥ > “‘ 
ἀνάγκη πλὴν ταύτης. Kal διὰ τοῦτο Ta μὲν ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ 
A ε λ aA > ὃ θ ΄ Ν a ΤᾺ διὰ 
ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς οὐ διαφθείρει τὸ ζῷον, οἷον χρῶμα 
Ἀ ‘4 Α > 4 3 Ν᾿ ld Ν 3 ᾽ ra ») 
καὶ ψόφος καὶ ὀσμή, ἀλλὰ μόνον τὰ αἰσθητήρια, av μὴ 

4. post πόρρω punctum Bek. Trend. Torst., colon Biehl, virgulam Susemihl B. J. 
IX, 352 || 5. μείνη SUXy Them. Philop., μένῃ etiam Soph. || mept ἀνακλάσεως unc. 
incl. Torst. Essen III, p. 66, leg. Them. Philop. Soph. || 6. ἀνακλᾶσθαι LW Them. 
Soph. Trend. Torst., reliqui ante Trend. omnes κλᾶσθαι || 7. ἂν ot ἢ εἷς L, οὗ ἂν ἢ els 
T WX Soph. Biehl, reliqui ante Biehlium omnes οὗ ἂν εἷς 7 || 8. τοῦ λείου] τελείου Xy || 
πάλιν om. L, leg. Them. Philop., πάλιν καὶ W || 9. ἐκίνει X || 13. ἄλλην ἐνδέχεται SU V | 
17. ἁπτῶν W, τῶν ἁπτῶν y, αὐτῶν etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. 148, 21 || 18. καίτοι... 
1g. αὑτῆς unc. incl. Essen ITI, Ὁ. 67 || 19. ἑτέρων LV || 438b, 1. αἴσθησιν ἔχει LW | 
εἰσίν TVX || 2. ἄλλην οἷόν re V Wy, οἷόν τε ἄλλην etiam Soph. || 6. οἷόν re μὴ ζῶον ὃν 




CHS. 12, 13 435 a8 4—435b 9 161 

a stone is not moved at all, while water is disturbed to a great 
distance and air is disturbed to the farthest extent possible and acts 
and is acted upon as long as it remains unbroken. And, to revert 
to the reflection of light, that is why, instead of holding that the 
visual ray leaving the eye is reflected, it would be better to say that 
the air is acted upon by the shape and colour, so long as it is one 
and unbroken. This is the case over any smooth surface: and ac- 
cordingly the air acts on the organ of sight in turn, just as if the 
impress on the wax had penetrated right through to the other side. 

It is evident that the body of an animal cannot be uncom- 
A mixture pounded; I mean, it cannot consist entirely of fire, for 
of Several instance, or of air. An animal, unless it has touch, can 
pee ae, have no other sense, the animate body being always, as 
mal body. we have remarked, capable of tactile sensation. Now the 
other elements, with the exception of earth, would make sense- 
organs: but it is always indirectly and through media that such 
organs effect sensation. “Touch, however, acts by direct contact 
with objects: hence its name. The other sense-organs, it is true, 
also perceive by contact, but it is by indirect contact: touch alone, 
it would seem, perceives directly in and through itself. Thus, then, 
no one of the three elements referred to can constitute the body of 
the animal. Nor indeed can it be of earth. For touch is a sort 
of mean between all tangible qualities, and its organ is receptive 
not only of all the distinctive qualities of earth, but also of heat 
and cold and all other tangible qualities. And this is why we 
do not perceive anything with our bones and our hair and such 
parts of us, namely, because they are of earth. And for the same 
reason plants, too, have no sensation, because they are composed 
of earth. Without touch, however, there can be no other sense; 
and the organ of this sense does not consist of earth nor of any 
other single element. 


Thus it is evident that this is the only sense the loss of which 2 

necessarily involves the death of the animal. For it is not possible 
for anything that is not an animal to have this sense, nor is it 
necessary for anything that is an animal to have any other sense 
Why besides this, And this explains another fact. The other 
tangibles sensibles—I mean, colour, sound, odour—do not by their 
in excess . . 

destroy excess destroy the animal, but only the corresponding 
_ sense-organs: except incidentally, as when concurrently 

ἔχειν ὟΝ, οἷόν τε ἔχειν μὴ ζῴον ὅν y, οἷόν τε μὴ ζῷον ἔχειν αὐτὴν Soph., μὴ ἔχον οἷόν re εἶναι 
ζῷον coni. Steinhart, οἷόν re μὴ ἔχειν ζῷον coni. Hayduck, progr. Gryph. 7 || ὃν ante 
ἄλλην om. SU Vy Soph., igor ὃν delendum esse censet Hayduck 1.1. || 7. ταύτην UXy 
et T (supra posito s). 

H. II 

162 DE ANIMA Ill CH. 13 

ΕΥ gy ww é > Ea 
κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷν ἂν ἅμα τῷ ψόφῳ ὦσις γένηται 
Ν Ψ a) 
καὶ πληγή, καὶ ὑπὸ ὁραμάτων Kal ὀσμῆς έτερα κινεῖται, 
~ \ € ‘\ ‘ © Y , 
ἃ τῇ ἀφῇ φθείρει. καὶ ὃ χυμὸς δὲ ἢ apa συμβαίνει 
ε \ yy ? θ ? [2 δὲ ~ ε lan e λ , 
ὠὡπτικὸν εἶναι, ταύτῃ φθείρει. ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀπτῶν ὑπερβολή, 
“~ o~ on 9 ~ \ ἴω 
οἷον θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ σκληρῶν, avaiper τὸ ζῷον' 
μ᾿ \ Α e ‘ > θ ΤᾺ 3 ~ “ > θ a 
παντὸς μὲν yap ὑπερβολὴ αἰσθητοῦ ἀναιρεῖ TO αἰσθητήριον, 
4 Ν Ν, ε δ ‘ ε ΄ ’, δὲ 7 Ν ΝᾺ 
ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἁπτὸν τὴν ἀφήν, ταύτῃ OE ὡρισται τὸ ζῆν' 
» ‘ ea 2 id 2Q 7 > οὶ ὃ ‘\ ε 
ἄνευ γὰρ ἀφῆς δέδεικται ὅτι ἀδύνατον εἶναι ζῷον. διὸ ἡ 
ἴω ε “~ € ‘ > 7 ‘ > fa 4 5 νῚ 
τῶν ἁπτῶν ὑπερβολὴ οὐ μόνον τὸ αἰσθητήριον φθείρει, ἀλλὰ 

ἉἍ μὴ ~ μά 3 4 4 ¥ ? ‘ 5 Ψ 
καὶ τὸ ζῷον, ὅτι ἀνάγκη μόνην ἔχειν ταύτην. τὰς δ᾽ ἄλ.- 

ν » 9 Ξ 
λας αἰσθήσεις ἔχει τὸ ζῷον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, οὐ τοῦ εἶναι 
Ψ 9 ‘ A > e ¥ > ON 3 we \ 5 
ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ εὖ, οἷον ὄψιν, ἐπεὶ ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι, 
κά ε ΜᾺ cd 3 3 Ἁ 3 ~ -~ Ν Ν ‘ 
ὅπως ὁρᾷ, ὅλως δ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἐν διαφανεῖ, γεῦσιν δὲ διὰ τὸ 
εῶν ‘ Ld Ψ 3 9 \ 3 \ 3 ~ 
ἡδὺ Kat λυπηρόν, ἵνα αἰσθάνηται τὸ ἐν τροφῇ καὶ ἐπιθυμῇ 

A a) 9 Ἁ \ Vd / - 9 ΨᾺ “ 
καὶ κινῆται, ἀκοὴν δὲ ὅπως σημαίνηταΐί τι αὐτᾷ, γλῶτταν 

\. & , 
δὲ ὅπως σημαίνῃ τι ἑτέρῳ. 

158. ὑπερβολὴ αἰσθητοῦ L.W Them. Soph., recepit Biehl, αἰσθητικοῦ ὑπερβολὴ ΤΌΝ, 
reliqui ante Biehlium omnes αἰσθητοῦ ὑπερβολὴ || 16. διώρισται STU X, ὦρισται etiam 
Soph. || ζῶον TX, quam lectionem probat H. Jackson, ζῆν etiam Soph. || 22. ὅπως ὁρᾷ 
post διαφανεῖ transponendum esse dubitanter coni. Susemihl, Oecon. Ὁ. 86 || δὲ διὰ] τε 
διὰ T Vy Bek. Trend., δὲ etiam Soph. Torst. || 24. σημανῇ TUX, σημαίνη SVWy 
Soph. Bek. Trend., σημαίνηται (om. tt) 1, Torst., σημαίνηταί re etiam sine dubio Them. 

et vet. transl. || αὐτῷ restituit Torst., vulgo αὑτῷ || 24. yAOrrav...28. ἑτέρῳ unc. incl. 
Torst. Essen ITI, p. 68, leg. Them. Philop. Soph. et vet. transl. 






CH. 13 435 Ὁ 10—435 Ὁ 25 163 

with the sound some thrust or blow is given, or when objects of 
sight or smell move something else which destroys by contact. 
Flavour, again, destroys only in so far as it is at the same time 
tactile. Tangible qualities, on the other hand, as heat, cold and 3 
hardness, if in excess, are fatal to the living animal. For excess 
of any sensible object is fatal to the organ, and so consequently 
excess of the tangible object is fatal to touch. And it is by this 
sense that the life of the animal is defined, touch having been 
proved to be indispensable to the existence of an animal. Hence 
excess in tangible qualities destroys not only the sense-organ, but 
also the animal itself. For touch is the one sense that the animal 

The cannot do without. The other senses which it possesses 
higher . . . 
senses are, as we have said, the means, not to its being, but to 

to well, its well-being. Thus the animal has sight to see with, 
being. because it lives in air or water or, speaking generally, 
in a transparent medium. It has taste on account of what is 
pleasant and painful, to the end that it may perceive what is 
pleasant in food and feel desire and be impelled to movement. It 
has hearing in order that information may be conveyed to it, and 

a tongue, that in its turn it may convey information to its fellow. 



lib. II, 4128, 3—12. E. fol. 186 v9. 
‘ o~ “‘ ra) » 
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ παραδεδομένα περὶ ψυχῆς παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, 
ῪᾺ ¥ Fal 
ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἕκαστος ἀπεφήνατο τῶν πρότερον, εἴρηται σχεδόν, 
κ᾿ , 
νῦν ὥσπερ ἐξ apyns πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν πειρώμενοι διορίσαι 
4 3 ¢ A \ 4 Ἃ » λό 3 gn ‘4 . 
τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τίς ἂν Ely λόγος αὐτῆς κοινότατος 
~ ~ ¥ 
χωρίζομεν δὴ τὰς μὲν οὐσίας ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων τῶν ἄλλων" 5. 
- 5 e 
τῆς δὲ οὐσίας TS μὲν ws ὕλην λέγεσθαι τίθεμεν, ὃ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ 
X 3 Ὁ ὃ Ν δὲ ε 9 ᾿ς ὃ᾽ 5 ΄ 
«μὲν οὐκ ἔστι τόδε τι, τὸ» δὲ ἡ μορφὴ, τὸ ἐκ τούτων. 
cy >» 
ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ὕλη δυνάμει, TO δ᾽ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια, αὕτη ὃ 
ΜᾺ aA ε \ ἴα 
ὑπάρχει διχῶς, ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἢ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν, 
A Ν 
οὐσίαι δὲ μάλιστα δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τὰ σώματα καὶ τούτων τὰ το' 

φυσικά: ἀρχαὶ yap.... 


lib, II, 414b, 139--ατὖό 8, 9. E. fol. I, r°. 
ε Ν Ἃ A + 7 ΕῚ ’ / Ψ 
Ο δὲ χυμὸς ὥσπερ ἤδυσμα τούτοις ἐστίν: διόπερ ὅσα 
¥ ΜᾺ ΄ ε rd ΜᾺ ε \ » Ἃ δὲ 
ἔχει τῶν ζῴων ἁφήν, πᾶσιν ὕπάρχει καὶ ὄρεξις. περὶ δὲ 
+ ΓᾺ 
φαντασίας ἄδηλον καὶ ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. ἐνίοις δὲ ταῦτά 
τε ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, τοῖς δ᾽ ἔτι πρὸς 
τούτοις διάνοια καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ς 
A ¢ rat rat 
ζῷον erepov ἐστι τοιοῦτον ἢ Kal τιμιώτερον. δῆλον οὖν 
ε ε a 4 Ἧ ~ 4 x » / ¥ 
ὡς ὁμοίως σχήματος Kal ψυχῆς Ets ἂν εἴη λόγος. οὔτε 
Ν 9 ΝᾺ ΜᾺ \ , / > Ν Ν 3 a ἊΨ > 
yap ἐκεῖ σχῆμα Tapa τρίγωνόν ἐστι καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς, οὔτ 
9 ΄Ν Ν Ἀ Ν 3 - ’ 3 ‘ aN 
ἐνταῦθα ψυχὴ παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας. γένοιτο δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ 
᾽ A 
TOV σχημάτων λόγος, ὃς ἐφαρμόσει «μὲν; πᾶσιν, οὐκ ἔσται το. 

I, 7. μὲν οὐκ ἔστι τόδε τι, τὸ supplevit Torst. || II. 5. τούτοις καὶ E (Bus.) || 8. παρὰ 
τὸ Tp. coni. Torst. || ro. μὲν om. E. 


, io 9 \ ? ε ‘4 μ᾿ 9" ΝᾺ 9 
μέντοι ἴδιος οὐθενὸς σχήματος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς εἰρη- 

- a ὃ Ν “ Ὁ. ἈΝ μ 4 Ἁ 9. 9 
μέναις ψυχαῖς. ὁιὸ γελοῖον ζητεῖν τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ ἐπ 
DON νι 3A 4 a 9 ¥ "0 Ν ΜΆ ¥ to 
ἄλλων Kal ἐπὶ τούτων, ὃς οὐκ ἔσται οὐθενὸς τῶν ὄντων ἴδιος, 
οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ ἄτομον εἶδος, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀφέντας. 
παραπλησίως δὲ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων, ἔχει καὶ τὰ τ5 
πε t ny us - . > ON Ν 3 a 3 En € # ὃ 7 \ ’ 

ρὲ τὴν ψυχήν ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχει δυνάμει τὸ πρότε- 
ρον ἐπί τε τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, λέγω δ᾽ ὥσπερ 
ἐν τετραγώνῳ μὲν τρίγωνον, ἐν αἰσθητικῷ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικόν. ὥστε 

Ν > ὦ “~ ~ a ¢ ε a ? es ’ ~ 
καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον δεῖ ζητεῖν ris ἣ ἑκάστου ψυχή, οἷον Tis φυτοῦ 

N [4 3 θ , Ἀ ’ὔ θ ld ὃ Ἀ ‘4 δ᾽ 5.» 2 δὴ 
καὶ τίς ἀνθρώπου καὶ τίς θηρίου. διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν τῷ 20 
ἐφεξῆς οὕτως ἔχουσι, σκεπτέον. ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ οὐ- 

θ »» 3 3 θ 7 “~ 3 3 o~ , Ἂς 

έν ἐστιν αἰσθητικόν" τοῦ δ᾽ αἰσθητικοῦ χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτι- 

᾽ eS 3 -~ a f > » “ns ε ΝᾺ 9 ‘4 
KOV, οἷον ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. πάλιν δ᾽ ἄνευ TOD ἁπτικοῦ οὐδεμία 

΄--ς » a 
τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, ἁφὴ δ᾽ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχει" 

“ A 
πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι τῶν ζῴων, ἃ ovr ὄψιν ἔχει οὔτ᾽ ἀκοήν. καὶ 25 
τῶν αἰσθητικῶν δὲ κίνησις τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχει τοῖς δ᾽ οὐχ 
ἤ ΤᾺ e 
ὑπάρχει" τελευταῖον δὲ διάνοια καὶ λογισμός" οἷς μὲν yap 
ὑπάρχει λογισμός, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων, 
Ὁ δ᾽ 3 , ῳ 3 ΄“ ε , ᾿ 3 \ ‘ 
ois ὁ ἐκείνων EKaOTOY, OV πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει λογισμός. ἀλλὰ τὰ 

‘ δὲ [4 ¥ / Ψ A “3. ε ‘ , 
μὲν ovde φαντασίαν ἔχει μόνον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὁ περὶ τούτων 30 
ε ’ 4 3 7 Ν ἊΝ > 4 ~ 
ἑκάστου λόγος οἰκειότατος περὶ ψυχῆς ἐστί, δῆλον. 

2 4 Xv ‘ Ν [4 , " rd 
IV. ᾿Ανάγκη δὲ τὸν περὶ τούτων μέλλοντα πραγματεύεσθαι 
λαβεῖν τί ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστίν, εἶθ᾽ οὕτω περὶ τῶν ἐχο- 

’, Ν A ¥ aa) G ‘ >? > δὲ ὃ ~ 
μένων Kat τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖσθαι THY ἐπίσκεψιν. εἰ OE ὃὲεὶ 
λέγειν τί ἕκαστον, οἷον τί τὸ νοητικὸν ἢ τί τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ 35 
θρεπτικόν, πρότερον λεκτέον τί τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τί τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι: 
αἱ γὰρ πράξεις καὶ at ἐνέργειαι πρότεραι κατὰ τὸν λόγον 
> N ~ 4 3 \ Ἁ ¥ ~ / » 
εἰσὶ τῶν δυνάμεων. ἄλλα μὴν εἴ γε ταῦτα πρότερον ἔτι 
τούτων διοριστέον τὰ ἀντικείμενα, οἷον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ αἰ- 
σθητοῦ καὶ νοητοῦ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. ὥστε πρῶτον 40 

Ἁ ΤᾺ Ν 4 , Ψ ‘ € “ ‘ 
περὶ τροφῆς καὶ γεννήσεως λεκτέον: αὕτη yap ἡ ψνχὴ καὶ 

~ 4 ε ? A μ᾿ μ - ἔφυ 3 Ἀ [4 
τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, πρώτη δὲ καὶ κοινοτάτη ψυχῆς ἐστὶ δύ- 

a ΝᾺ Ὄ >’ 
vapis, καθ᾽ ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν πᾶσιν. ἧς ἔργον ἐστὶ γέννη- 
σις καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι τροφῇ τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον μάλιστα φυσικὸν 
πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσιν, ὅσα μὴ ἀτελῇ ἢ πηρώματά ἐστιν, ἢ avTO- 45 
ματον ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν, τὸ ποιῆσαι οἷον αὐτὸ ἕτερον, ζᾷον 

20. 21. τὸ ég. E || 42. πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη ψυχῆς δ᾽ ἐστὶ E. 


μὲν ζῷα, φυτὸν δὲ φυτά, ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ Kal τοῦ θείου μετέχῃ ἕκα- 
στον ὃν δύναται τρόπον: πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου ὀρέγεται, κἀκείνου 
6 Ν 
ἕνεκα πράττει ὅσα πράττει κατὰ φύσιν. τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα διττόν, 
τὸ μὲν οὗ, τὸ δὲ @* ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ τῇ συνεχείᾳ τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ 50 
? 2 ΜᾺ 3 Ν 3 δέ A 2 oN o> N 35 θ en 
θείου δύναται κοινωνεῖν: ov γὰρ ἐνδέχεται TO αὐτὸ ἄει ἀριθμῷ 
> 3 \ ω ΜᾺ ἃ , 3 , A Ψ 
εἶναι οὐθὲν τῶν φθαρτῶν: ὃν τρόπον ἐπιβάλλει, τοῦτον ἕκαστον 
, \ \ πὰ Ν δὲ e . Ν ὃ / 3 > “2 
θιγγάνει, TO μὲν μᾶλλον, TO OE ἥττον" καὶ ὀιαμένει οὐκ αὑτό, 
3 > - > 72 9 θ ΜᾺ Ν 3 ν to δ᾽ Ψ ¥ δ᾽ ε 
ἀλλ᾽ οἷον αὑτό, ἀριθμῳ μὲν οὐχ ἐν, εἰὃῪι ἕν. ἐστι ὃ ἢ 
Ἅ 9 ‘\ ~ “ 4 9 3 e > ‘ Ν ‘ » 
ψυχὴ ἀρχὴ τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἀρχὴ καὶ TO αἰτιον 55 
ial ἴων € + - ὁ 4 ‘ o~ 4 > »ἢ 
λέγεται πολλαχῶς. ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἡ ψυχὴ τοὺς τρεῖς τρόπους αἰτία 
τοὺς διωρισμένους: καὶ yap ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις καὶ οὗ ἔνεκα 
A ε 3 ΄ a 3 4 a 3 ‘ € 7 Ψ XN 
Kal ὡς οὐσία τῶν ἐμψύχων σωμάτων ἐστὶν ἢ ψυχή. OTL μὲν 
οὖν ws οὐσία δῆλον: τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αἴτιον πᾶσι, 
Ν \ ΜᾺ αἱ ΜᾺ Ἁ > f 3 ¥ Ν Ἁ 3 \ ε 
τὸ δὲ ζῆν τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ εἶναί ἐστιν, αἴτιον δὲ καὶ ἀρχὴ ἡ 60 
Ἁ 4 3 , 4 ‘\ A ξ ‘ ὃ ξ - 
ψυχὴ τούτου ἐστίν. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὡς TO οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ ψνχή: 
gy a) ν 
καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἕνεκά του ποιεῖ ὠσπερ G νοῦς, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ 
¥ } Δ Ν ’ Ν ε Ν ἰφ > Os \ 
ἔστιν αὐτῆς τὸ Téhos. καὶ ἢ Ψψυχὴ τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς κατὰ 
φύσιν, καὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον τῇ ψυχῇ" ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ 
ΜᾺ ᾿ Ν A 4. ay > ‘ X Ἀ ¢ ε a 
τῶν ζῴων, Kat TO τῶν φυτῶν. adda μὴν καὶ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις 65 
πρῶτον ἡ κατὰ τόπον, τοῦτό ἐστι ψυχή: ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πᾶσι τοῖς 
td ε ,’ 4 a a ¥ 3 > 7 Ἀ ¥ 
ζῴοις ἡ τοιαύτη ὑπάρχει δύναμις. ἔτι δ᾽ ἀλλοίωσις καὶ av&y- 
‘ ‘4 € A ‘ ¥ ΝᾺ 3 - 
σις κατὰ ψυχήν: ἡ μὲν yap αἴσθησις δοκεῖ τις ἀλλοίωσις 
εἶναι, μὴ ἔχον δὲ ψυχὴν οὐθὲν ἂν αἴσθοιτο. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 
περὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ φθίσεως ἔχει: οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐξάνεται οὐδὲ 70 
4 ΝᾺ ‘ , +O\ a \ ~ 
φθίνει φυσικῶς μὴ τρεφόμενον, οὐδὲ τρέφεται μὴ ζωῆς pe- 
2 3 ‘ ~ 3 ἴω 9 » 8 A \ 
τέχον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ᾽᾿Ἐμπεδοκλῆς οὐκ εἴρηκεν ὀρθῶς, προστιθεὶς 
‘ ¥» , a A , 4 \ . 4 
τὴν αὔξησιν συμβαίνειν τοῖς φυτοῖς κάτω μὲν διὰ τὸ τὴν 
A A Ψ / 6 ¥ δὲ ὃ Ν Ν A y A 
γὴν φύσει οὕτω φέρεσθαι, ἄνω δὲ διὰ τὸ πῦρ. οὔτε yap 
΄ ¢ ‘ ¥ id 3 ΝᾺ > Ν > 3 \ «ε 4 
τὸ κάτω καὶ ἄνω λαμβάνει ὀρθῶς: οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάστου 75 
Ν y Ἀ Ν ’ “ ΝᾺ la 9 > .ε ε Ν “ 
TO ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω καὶ τοῦ παντός" ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἡ κεφαλὴ τῶν 
ζῴ ν e er “~ ~ 9 ’ . A δὲ > 4 ὃ ~ λέ 
ῴων, οὕτως ἡ ῥίζα τῶν φυτῶν ἐστίν' τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ δεῖ λέγειν 
¥ © A > \ > \ ¥»¥ ¥ ἃ 4 Ν 5 
ὄργανον, ὧν ἂν ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔργον. ἔτι δὲ τί τὸ συνέχον εἰς 
τἀναντία φερομένων; τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον τὸ τῆς αὐξήσεως καὶ 
ΝᾺ 3 δὲ 4 Oe , ὃ 
τροφῆς" εἰ ὃὲ μή, οὖὗθεν κωλύσει OL — —. 80 

50. οὖν et ovry incerta Torst., γοῦν οὐκέτι (?semideletum) Bus. || 56. ὅμως E |] 
61. (ἢ, δᾶ g15b, 14 || 65. ἡ ante κίνησις om. E. 



lib. II, 4218, 5—422a, 23. E. fol. IT, το, 
ῳ 9 4 δ 5.4. 9903 3 4 3 ἃ > 
ὅτι ov δέχονται τὸν ἀέρα οὐδ᾽ ἀναπνέουσιν: δι ἣν ὃ 
2. » 9 » Ν 3 “~ , ἈΝ, , 323 eed \ 
αἰτίαν ἕτερος ἔσται περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος. Περὶ δὲ ὀσμῆς Kat 
τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ οὐκ ἔστι ῥᾷδιον διορίσαι ὁμοίως τοῖς εἰρημέ- 
3 » »ἤἢ 3 ξ 3 Ν Ψ ε ε ? “ A “~ 
vous αἰσθητοῖς, τί ἔστιν ἢ ὀσμὴ οὕτως ὡς ὁ ψόφος καὶ TO φώς, 
¥ > + > ¥ 3 ~ , \ ¥ 3 \ 
αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχομεν ἀκριβῆ ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλὰ 5 
χείριστα ὀσμᾶται ἄνθρωπος τῶν ζῴων, καὶ οὐδεμίαν ἄνευ 
ΜᾺ ΜᾺ ‘\ εξ a f > lA 39 4 € ΡᾺ 3 
τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος δύναται αἰσθέσθαι ὀσμήν, ὡς τοῦ αἰ- 
’ "4 9 2 nl y » ~ Ud 
σθητηρίου ὄντος οὐκ ἀκριβοῦς. ὥσπερ οὖν τοῖς σκληροφθάλ- 
μοις ἀδήλους εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν χρωμάτων καὶ 
‘a 3 X ~ o~ Ν ~ 3 7 7 » 
συγκεχυμένας, ἀλλὰ τῷ φοβερῷ καὶ τῷ ἀφόβῳ διορίζειν μόνον, τὸ 
οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ Tas dopas τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐπεὶ ἔοικέ 
τε ἀνάλογον ἔχειν πρὸς γεῦσιν καὶ ὅμοια τὰ εἴδη τῶν 
χυμῶν τοῖς τῆς ὀσμῆς, ἀλλὰ τὴν γεῦσιν ἔχομεν ἀκριβεστέραν 
Ν ‘ » € 4 > - 4 5 ¥ ‘\ ¥ 
διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἁφήν twa αὐτήν: ταύτην δ᾽ ἔχει τὴν αἴ. 
3 4 ¥ 9 ‘ ‘ ~ ἐμ 
σθησιν ἀκριβεστάτην ἄνθρωπος" ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις 15 
λείπεται πολλῶν ζῴων, τῶν δ᾽ ἁπτῶν αἰσθάνεται μάλιστα 
ἀκριβῶς. διὸ καὶ φρονιμώτατον τῶν ζῴων ἐστίν. σημεῖον 
΄ Ἁ ‘ 9 ~ ~ 43 F 3 ~ ε > 9 ~ 
δέ: Kal yap αὐτῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων evdveis, ot δ᾽ adverts 
3 Ν 3 Qn > ‘4 y 9 Ν ‘ ~ = 
εἰσὶ παρ᾽ οὐδὲν αἰσθητήριον ἕτερον ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῦτο. ὦν 
Ἁ Ἁ ε Ἁ ’ 3 ~ ε Ν / 3 ΝᾺ 
μὲν γὰρ ἡ σὰρξ μαλακή, εὐφυεῖς, οἱ δὲ σκληρόσαρκοι ἀφυεῖς 20 
\ ed ¥ > F A ε Ἁ Ἅ ε ‘ rd 
τὴν διάνοιαν. ἔστι δ᾽ ὥσπερ χυμὸς ὁ μὲν γλυκὺς ὁ δὲ πικρός, 
\ 3 ἈΝ Ν, > Ns »ἭἍ. f > Ν ‘ ‘ ¥ “ 
καὶ ὀσμαὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχουσαι τρόπον. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἔχει τὴν 
> 2 3 ᾿ Ν / ‘ δὲ 3 ΄ ε rd δὲ ν 
ἀνάλογον ὀσμὴν καὶ χυμόν, τὰ ὃὲ τοὐναντίον. οΟμοίως OE καὶ 
δριμεῖα καὶ αὐστηρὰ καὶ ὀξεῖα καὶ λιπαρά ἐστιν ὀσμή. 
ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ εἴρηται διὰ τὸ μὴ σφόδρα διαδήλους εἶναι 25 
Ν 3 ‘\ ? “ A ? ᾿ς - » ‘\ > 4 
Tas ὀσμὰς ὥσπερ τοὺς χυμούς, ἀπὸ τούτων εἴληφε TA ὀνό- 
ματα καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τῶν πραγμάτων: ἡ μὲν γλυκεῖα κρό- 
κου καὶ μέλιτος, ἡ δὲ δριμεῖα θύμου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων" 
[οὶ Ψ 
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἔστι δ᾽ ὥσπερ 
καὶ ἢ ἀκοὴ καὶ ἑκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων τοῦ τε ἀκουστοῦ 30 
κι " 
καὶ ἀνηκούστου καὶ ὁρατοῦ καὶ ἀοράτου, καὶ. ἢ ὄσφρη- 
m~ 59 ~ \ 9 , 3 ‘4 δὲ x ‘ 
σις TOU ὀσφραντοῦ καὶ ἀνοσφράντον. ἀνόσφραντον δὲ TO μὲν 

ILI. 14. ταύτην om. E. |} 19. τοῦτο] ταύτην E || 20. ἡ σὰρξ E (Bus.), ἡ om. E 
(Torst.) || 26. ἀπό re E || 27. καὶ ὁμοιότητα E. 


“A Ν a 3 4 ¥ 9 ΄ Ν δὲ ‘A » 
παρὰ τὸ ὅλως ἀδύνατον ἔχειν ὀσμήν, τὸ δὲ μικρὰν ἔχον 
ΝΌΟΝ ΄ ν . » ε , λέ ¥ Se 
καὶ τὸ φαύλην, ὥσπερ τὸ ἄγευστον ὡσαύτως λέγεται. ἔστι δὲ 
\ Ν»Ἡ ὃ ‘ A , Ὁ “ὃ 39 . Ἁ 
καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις διὰ τοῦ μεταξύ, οἷον ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος: καὶ 35 
γὰρ τὰ ἔνυδρα φαίνεται αἰσθανόμενα ὀσμῆς, καὶ τὰ ἐναιμα 
καὶ ἄναιμα ὁμοίως, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι' καὶ γὰρ 
τούτων ἔνια πόρρωθεν ἀπαντᾷ πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν αἰσθανό.- 
μενα τὴν ὀσμήν" διὸ καὶ ἔχει ἀπορίαν εἴ πάντα μὲν ὡσαύτως 
ΕἼ ἴω e 3 ¥ 3 la id “ > ? + 
ὀσμᾶται, 6 δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος ἀναπνέων μέν, μὴ ἀναπνέων δὲ 40 
> 9 aA - ‘ “~ KA > 3 3 9 “ » 
ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατέχων τὸ πνεῦμα ἢ ἐκπνέων οὐκ ὀὄσμαται, οὔτε 
᾽ὔ » > 3 4 5 5 A ϑ ΜᾺ 3 Ν ΡᾺ 3 4 
πόρρω ovr ἐγγύς, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐπιθῇ τις εἰς τὸν μυκτῆρα ἐντός. 
καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ τιθέμενον ἀναίσθητον 
5. Ν , > δ ν ΓΚ a 3 κι \ 5 , 
εἶναι κοινὸν πάντων: ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν μὴ αἰσθά- 
¥ 2 oN ~ 3 , 3 ΄ ΜᾺ δὲ 4 
νεσθαι ἴδιον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν: τοῦτο δὲ πειρωμένῳ 45 
δῆλον. εἶ οὖν τὰ ἄναιμα μὴ ἀναπνεῖ, ἑτέραν ἄν τινα ἔχοι 
» ‘ ‘ od > 3 ¥ -~ 3 ~ 3 - 
αἴσθησιν παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας. ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ τῆς ὀσμῆς αἰσθά. 
2907 . ε \ A 3 a \ 9 7 \ , 
νεται ἀδύνατον᾽ ἡ yap TOU ὀσφραντοῦ καὶ εὐώδους καὶ δυσώ- 
ὃ » θ κά rd > » δὲ ‘ θ / 
ovs αἰσθησις ὀσφρησίς ἐστιν. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ φθειρόμενα 
e \ ~ > A 4 ~ e > Ὁ . ¥ “ν 5 # 
ὑπὸ TOV ἰσχυρῶν ὀσμῶν ὑφ᾽ ὦνπερ καὶ ἄνθρωπος, οἷον ἀσφάλ- 50 
του καὶ θείου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ὀσφραίνεσθαι μέντοι νῦν ἀναγ- 
“~ 9 > > Ψ A“ > 3 ¥ - Ν, 3 A 
καῖον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀναπνεῖν. ἀλλ᾽ ἔοικε διαφέρειν τὸ αἰσθητή- 
a [αι] > vd Ν ‘ ΡᾺ » - Ψ 
ριον τοῦτο τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ὥσπερ 
‘ ν κ᾿ δ ‘ A , ‘ ‘ ‘ 
καὶ τὰ ὄμματα πρὸς Ta TOV σκληροφθάλμων' τὰ μὲν yap 
¥ A \ 9 ¥ ‘ , A ah Ν 
ἔχει πῶμα καὶ ὥσπερ ἔλυτρον τὰς βλεφαρίδας, ἃς ἂν μὴ 55 
a a i ; ὑχ Opa: Ta δὲ σκληρόφθαλ ; 
νασπάσῃ καὶ κινήσῃ, οὐχ Opa: Ta ὃδὲ σκληρόφθαλμα οὐκ 
» 3 3 3 \ e A Ὁ aA ~ 3 wn ~~ ῳ 
ἔχει, ἀλλ᾽ εὐθὺς ὁρᾷ, ὅτι ἂν τεθῇ ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ! οὕτω 
Ν XN > \ 3 ΄΄ A ‘\ > », > 
καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον Tots μὲν ἀκάλνφον εἶναι, 
9 κι ca 
ὥσπερ τὸ ὄμμα, τοῖς δὲ δεχομένοις τὸν ἀέρα ἔχειν ἐπικάλυμμα, 
a 3 ’ 9 , Νὴ ων ~ 
6 ἀναπνεόντων ἀποκαλύπτεσθαι, διευρυνομένων τῶν φλεβῶν 60 
Ν Ἁ 
καὶ τῶν πόρων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ ἀναπνέοντα ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ 
3 3 ca ig > 74 > , > ~ 3 ‘ 
οὐκ ὀσμᾶται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη ἀναπνεύσαντα ὀσφρανθῆναι, ἐν δὲ 
τῷ ὑγρῷ ἀδύνατον τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ ὀσμὴ τοῦ ξηροῦ 
bd e “A “ ε a ‘ 3 3 ἈΝ 3 7 
ὥσπερ ὁ χυμὸς TOV ὑγροῦ: τὸ δ᾽ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον 
δυνάμει τοιοῦτον. 65 
\ δ 
To δὲ γευστόν ἐστιν ἅπτόν τι καὶ τοῦτο αἴτιον τοῦ 
᾿ > Ν 3 
μὴ εἶναι αἰσθητὸν διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀλλοτρίον ὄντος σώμα- 
. ὑδὲ \ e ε , \ \ A 3 ® ε , \ 
TOS' οὐδὲ yap ἡ ady. Kal TO σῶμα, ἐν ᾧ ὁ χυμός, TO γευ- 

40. μέν om. E || 62. ἀναπγεύσαντος E || 63. τοῦτο om. E || 64. τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὸ Suv. E. 


3 ε ~ ε ῳ “w 
στόν, ἐν ὑγρῷ ws ὕλῃ' τοῦτο δ᾽ ἁπτόν τι. διὸ κἂν εἰ ἐν 
» 3 
ὕδατι εἴημεν, αἰσθανόμεθα ἐμβληθέντος γλυκέος, οὐ διὰ 
τοῦ μεταξὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἡ αἴσθησις, ἀλλὰ τῷ An D ὑγρῷ 
μ ἡμῖν ἢ nous, ἀλλὰ τῷ μειχθῆναι τῷ ὑγρῷ, 
Ld ΡῪΜΆ ‘ ‘A ΝᾺ ἴω - 
ὥσπερ ποτῷ' τὸ δὲ χρῶμα οὐχ οὕτως δρᾶται τῷ μείγνυσθαι 
δὲ ἰοὺ 3 ΄, ε Ἀ x \ Ν 5202 3 ε 
οὐδὲ ταῖς ἀπορροίαις. as μὲν οὖν τὸ μεταξὺ οὐθέν ἐστιν" ὡς 
Se A Noe , Ψ ‘ , “5 Δλὰ 4 nN ψΨ 
ἐ χρῶμα TO ὁρατόν, οὕτω γευστὸν χυμός. οὐθὲν δὲ ποιεῖ aio On- 
AN + ε 7 3 
σιν χυμοῦ avev ὑγρότητος, GAN ἔχει ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ δυνάμει ὑγρό- 
eS A ε la 
THTA, οἷον TO ἀλμυρόν' τηκτόν TE yap αὐτὸ Kal συντηκτικὸν 
“ XO 9 δὲ ν ἐ» 3 \ ῳ ε ἰω A 
τῆς γλώττης. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄψις ἐστὶ τοῦ τε ὁρατοῦ Kal 
a , € ον »Ὁἅ 
τοῦ ἀοράτου (ὁ γὰρ σκότος ἀόρατος, κρίνει δὲ καὶ τοῦτον ἡ 
5» ¥ ~ - “A Ν \ a + > 7 
ὄψις), ἔτι τοῦ λίαν λαμπροῦ (Kat yap τοῦτό πως ἀόρατον, 
‘4 Ἀ 
ἄλλον τρόπον καὶ 6 σκότος), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ψόφου 
τε καὶ σιγῆς, ὧν τὸ 

lib. II, 423b, 8—424b, 18. E. fol. 196 r° 
¥ , id N 5» e ? a , 9 4 
εἴρηται πρότερον ὅτι Kat du ὑμένος ἂν πάντων αἰσθανοί- 
θ ΜᾺ € a“ aA 5 X θ 4 ὃ 7 ε ’ A » 
μεθα τῶν ἁπτῶν, κἂν εἰ λανθάνοι διείργων, ὁμοίως ἂν ἔχοι- 
9 ΝᾺ ΤᾺ ~ A 
μεν ὥσπερ νῦν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι" δοκοῦμεν yap 
> ~ 7 ‘ > A 4) ‘\ rd > ‘ 4 [4 
αὐτῶν θιγγάνειν καὶ οὐθὲν εἶναι διὰ μέσου. ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τούτῳ 
XN ε ‘ a) € [ω ‘ a“ φ 3 - 3 » 
τὰ ἁπτὰ τῶν ὁρατῶν καὶ ψοφητικῶν, ὅτι ἐκείνων αἰσθανόμεθα 
ΜᾺ \ ξὺ ~ ec 7m a δ᾽ ε as > ¢ Ἁ ~ 
τῷ τὸ μεταξὺ ποιεῖν TL ἡμᾶς, τῶν δ᾽ ἅπτῶν οὐχ ὑπὸ TOU με- 
ταξὺ ἀλλ᾽ ἅμα τῷ μεταξύ, ὥσπερ οἱ διὰ τῆς ἀσπίδος πλη- 
Ζ . 59. \ e 9 ‘ a > “ 53. λ3 Ὁ > 
γέντες" οὐδὲ yap ἡ ἀσπὶς πληγεῖσα ἐπάταξεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἅμα ap- 
~ ld oN "4 > ¥ \ ςε ‘\ x 6 ΝᾺ 
φοῖν συνέβη πληγῆναι. ὅλως δ᾽ ἔοικε καὶ ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἡ γλῶττα, 
ε ξ aN Ἃ Ἃ ῳ ‘ ‘“ »¥ Ἁ ‘ > Ἁ . 
ὡς 6 ἀὴρ καὶ TO ὕδωρ πρὸς THY ὄψιν καὶ THY ἀκοὴν Kat 
ὄσφρησιν ἔχουσιν, οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητήριον ὧσ- 
Ψ ~ ἴω 
περ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον. αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἁπτομένου 
ys SOA ¥ 3 5 ΄ὰὦ 4 > ἃ » Ὄ » δ 
ovr ἐκεῖ out ἐνταῦθα γένοιτ᾽ ἂν αἴσθησις. οἷον et τις τὸ 
~ Ν Ν 9. Ν a ΚΞ» ἤ \ Y» Ζ' Ν on 
σῶμα τὸ λευκὸν ἐπὶ TOV ὄμματος Dein TO ἔσχατον. ἢ καὶ δῆλον 
Ψ 9 \ δ ~ ε wn 3 id Ψ Ν ΓΝ , 
ὅτι ἐντὸς TO TOV ἁπτοῦ αἰσθητικόν. οὔτω yap ἂν συμβαΐί.- 
Ψ ».ν δ 5 . 3 , \ 2 NN 9 , 
vou ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν addov’ ἐπιτιθεμένου yap ἐπὶ τὸ αἰσθητή- 
> 5 - > A ὃ A Ἁ ’ 3 θ 4 > θ ? 
ριον οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν σάρκα ἐπιτιθεμένον αἴσθα- 
» ν \ » δ ε m €¢ f ε ‘ .} = 
νεται" ὥστε μεταξὺ Apa TOD ἁπτικοῦ ἡ σάρξ. ἁπταὶ μὲν οὖν 
> ἃ ε ὃ ‘ ἊΜ , © “A m λέ δὲ ὃ ΄ 
εἰσὶν at διαφοραὶ τοῦ σώματος ἢ σῶμα λέγω ὃὲ διαφοράς, 

70. αἰσθανοίμεθ᾽ ἂν coni. Torst. || 74. τὸ γευστὸν coni. Torst. || IV. 8. οὐδὲ] οὔτε E. 




“ Ν μ Ν 
at τὰ στοιχεῖα διορίζουσι, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ 
ὔὕ Fan’ Μὰ »ἤ Ν 
ὑγρόν, περὶ ὧν εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν στοιχείων. τὸ δὲ 


2 4 > a ΛΝ ἃ , Ν 9 € λ , ε \ ε ΄ 
αἰσθητήριον αὐτῶν τὸ ἁπτικόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡ καλουμένη ἀφὴ ὑπάρ- 
“ »͵Φᾳῃ Ἁ ‘ 
χει πρώτῳ, TO δυνάμει τοιοῦτόν ἐστι μόριον: TO yap αἰσθά- 
a \ 
νεσθαι πάσχειν Ti ἐστιν᾽ ὦστε TO ποιοῦν οἷον αὗτο ἐνεργείᾳ, 
τοιοῦτον ποιεῖ ἐκεῖνο τὸ δυνάμει ὄν. διὸ τοῦ ὁμοίως θερμοῦ 
ἢ ψυχροῦ ἢ σκληροῦ ἢ μαλακοῦ οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἀλλὰ 
ων A A Ων 4 / 
τῶν ὑπερβολῶν, ws ἂν τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον μεσότητός τινος 
“~ ~ “~~ Ἀ ~ 
οὔσης THs ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Kpi- 
4 Ν 
νει τὰ αἰσθητά. τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν" γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς 
ΜᾺ o~ a“ Ψ 
ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων: καὶ δεῖ ὥσπερ τὸ 
᾽ A 5 , a 2 δέ > 3 
μέλλον λευκοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἣ μέλανος μηδέτερον εἶναι ἐνερ- 
- 3 ΄ς ὃ rd y on; ‘ > oN o LAX s > A“ A 
yeia, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς 
ε a rd Ν 4 7 ¥ δ᾽ Ψ ΎἌᾺ ε “ Ν 
ἁφῆς μήτε θερμὸν μήτε ψυχρόν. ἔτι δ᾽ ὥσπερ τοῦ τε ὁρατοῦ καὶ 
~ 93 , > e » ε / δὲ Ν e » A 5 
τοῦ ἀοράτου ἣν πως ἢ OWLS, ὁμοίως OE καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τῶν aVTL- 
κειμένων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἀφὴ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ ἀνάπτου' ἄναπτον 
»» Ν ae ἊΜ “" 
δὲ τό τε μικρὰν πάμπαν ἔχον διαφορὰν τῶν ἅπτῶν, οἷον 
᾿ θ ς 3. Ff Ἁ ε ε λ Ν ων ε ~ Ψ Ν 
πέπονθεν 6 ἀήρ, καὶ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ 
φθαρτικά. καθ᾽ ἑκάστην μὲν οὖν αἴσθησιν εἴρηται ὡς ἐν 
τύπῳ εἰπεῖν. 
Καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ 
‘ + θ ΄ 3 Ἂς ὃ Ἅ oO > ~ “ἢ a 
μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι TO δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἄνευ τῆς 
nN es e ‘\ ἴω ὃ λί ¥ ΡᾺ ὃ 7 ‘ aa 
ὕλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου Kal TOD 
A δέ \ a) r 4 δὲ ‘\ λ “~ « 
χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χαλκοῦν ἢ χρυ- 
~ a TAA 3 δ λ ‘ A , € ra δὲ 
σοῦν σημεῖον, ἃ οὐχ ἢ χαλκὸς ἢ χρυσός. ὁμοίως δὲ 
ων ε ¥ ε 7 εξ A ~ » ΝᾺ ms 4 
καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἑκάστη ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα ἢ ψόφον 
a δὶ 7 3 3 > e °F 3 ’ ’, 3 3 
ἢ χυμὸν πάσχει, ἀλλ οὐχ ἢ ἐκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλ 
' i ὃ Ν ‘\ Ν λό 3 θ / δὲ a“ > 
ἢ τοιόνδε καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. αἰσθητήριον δὲ πρῶτον, ἐν 
® ε - δύ ¥ 4 > Ν ΕῚ ’ Α δ᾽ > Ψ 
ᾧ ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις. ἔστι μὲν οὖν TO AUTO, τὸ O εἶναι ἔτε- 
¥ ¥ 
pov: μέγεθος μὲν γὰρ av τι εἴη τὸ αἰσθανόμενον: οὐ μέντοι 
τό γε αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι ἢ αἰσθήσει μεγέθει ἐστὶν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ λό- 
Ν δύ 3 / \ δ᾽ 3 od % ὃ Ν 
γος τις καὶ δύναμις ἐκείνου. φανερὸν δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων καὶ διὰ 
’ ~ 3 “~ e € ‘ 4 A 3 ’ 
τί ποτε τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ φθείρουσι τὰς αἰσθή- 
᾿ λ \. ,5 na 
σεις" ἂν yap ἢ ἡ κίνησις ἰσχυροτέρα τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου, λύε- 
ε ra ”~ 3 > » ε ‘ € 
ται ὁ λόγος, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἣν αἴσθησις, woTEpavet ἣ συμφω- 
20. αἷς E || 24. οἷον om. E. || 27. ὡς ἂν τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου τῆς αἰσθήσεως E || 29. κριτικόν " 
γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς om. E || 32. δὴ] δὲ E || 37. ἁπτῶν ἄναπτοι ὥσπτερ E || 54. ἦν ἢ coni. Torst- 





, N  ¢€ ; ὃ / ‘ad δῶ Ν τ 
via καὶ 6 τόνος σφόδρα κρουομένων τῶν χορδῶν. καὶ διὰ 55 
\ Ἁ 
τί ποτε τὰ φυτὰ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἔχοντά τι μόριον ψυχι- 
κὸν καὶ πάσχοντα ὕπο τῶν ἁπτῶν. καὶ γὰρ ψύχεται καὶ 
θερμαίνεται" αἴτιον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν μεσότητα, μηδὲ τοιαύ- 
> la Ψ δ LO ΝᾺ > θ a δέ > ‘ 
THY ἀρχήν, olay Ta εἰδὴ τῶν αἰσθητῶν δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ 
Ἂ »“ > 
μετὰ τῆς ὕλης πάσχειν. ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἂν τις, ἄρα πάθοι ἂν 60 
aa Ν ΜᾺ 
tr ὀσμῆς τὸ μὴ δυνάμενον ὀσφρανθῆναι, ἢ ὑπὸ χρώματος τὸ 
Ν ὃ ’ iO a, ΚΕ ΄ δὲ Ν 39. δ “~ ¥ 3 > ¢ 
μὴ δυνάμενον ἰδεῖν᾽ ὁμοίως δὲ Kai ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δ᾽ ἡ 
ὀσμὴ τὸ ὀσφραντόν, εἴ τι ποιεῖ, τὴν ὄσφρησιν ποιεῖ ὀσμή. 
gy 3 Ἅ a ~ 2 4 Pd [δι] ε 2 3 
ὥστε οὐθὲν πάσχειν τῶν ἀδυνάτων ὀσφρανθῆναι. ὃ δ᾽ αὐὖ- 
τὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲ τῶν δυνατῶν, ἀλλ᾽ 7-65 
2 Ν Ld Ψ “ “~ ‘ Y ¥ ‘ 
αἰσθητικὸν ἕκαστον. apa δὲ δῆλον Kat οὕτως. οὔτε γὰρ 
’ ¥ \ “A \ 4 ¥ ¢ 3 bs 29% ey 4 
ψόφος οὔτε TO φῶς Kal σκότος οὔτε ἡ ὀσμὴ οὐθὲν ποιεῖ τὰ 
΄ > > 3 ae 3 - a aN ε A o~ ΜᾺ 
σώματα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν οἷς ἐστίν, οἷον ἀὴρ ὃ μετὰ τῆς βροντῆς 
, ν δ) N\A QL _V_E Ν Ye . κι . 9 
διέστησε τὸ ξύλον. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὰ ATTA καὶ οἱ χυμοὶ ποιοῦσιν᾽ εἶ 
Ν ’ ε s id 4 ‘\ ¥ a) > on Φ > 
yap μή, ὑπὸ τίνος ἂν πάσχοι τὰ ἄψυχα ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο; ap 70 
> fan) “ oa ΡᾺ ν᾿ 3 
οὖν κἀκεῖνα ποιεῖ; ἢ οὐ πᾶν σῶμα παθητικὸν ὑπ᾽ ὀσμῆς 
\ ἤ Ν Ν # > / Ἁ Φ ? 4. 
καὶ ψόφου: καὶ τὰ πάσχοντα ἀόριστα, καὶ οὐ μένει, οἷον 
3 / + ‘ & 4 ’ > 2 Ν ἈΝ > ~ “ 
ἀήρ: ὄζει γὰρ ὧς παθών τι. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι παρὰ 
Ν »,; A “‘ ‘ 2 “a θ 4“ 3 θ ? Q e€ δ᾽ 
τὸ πάσχειν τι; ἢ τὸ μὲν ὀσμᾶσθαι καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὃ 
ἀὴρ παθὼν τοῦτο ταχὺ αἰσθητὸς γίγνεται. 75 

59. οἷον E || 61. 7 om. E || 63. ἡ ὀσμή coni. Torst. || 71. ἢ om, E |] 74. καὶ] ac E. 



402 a 1—22. In this introductory chapter A. first touches upon the 
importance and utility, especially for physics, of an enquiry into the soul, and 
next enlarges upon the difficulties besetting such an enquiry. Its object is to 
determine the nature of the soul and its essential attributes [§ 1]. There is the 
general logical difficulty, viz., the absence of any uniform recognised method of 
obtaining definitions and the uncertainty as to the premisses from which the 
investigation should start [§ 2]. 

402a I τῶν...4 τιθείημεν. Universam hanc periodum sic recte inter- 
preteris: Quarum rerum cognitio pulchra et honore digna est, earum etiam 
investigatio est pulchra et honore digna: quarum igitur illa magis est honore 
digna, earum et haec. At pulcherrima facile est animae cognitio: pulcherrima 
igitur etiam investigatio e1us quid sit (Torstrik, p. 112). According to Philop. 
(24, 3 sqq., 17 sqq.) these apparently harmless propositions caused Alex. Aphr. 
so much perplexity that he condemned as spurious the whole passage a I μᾶλλον 

..3 εἶναι and explained δὲ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα as διὰ τὸ καλὴν καὶ τιμίαν εἶναι. If the 
report is correct, Alexander’s suspicions must have been aroused because he 
supposed the supremacy of metaphysics to be challenged and even the place 
claimed for psychology among the natural sciences to be inconsistent with 
such passages as, eg., #f#. Mic. 1141 a 33—b 2. See note on 402 a 4 ἐν 

al. τῶν καλῶν καὶ τιμίων τὴν εἴδησιν. The partitive genitive becomes a 
predicate here after ὑπολαμβάνοντες. This is fairly common with εἶναι, e.g. 
infra 402 a τὸ ἐστὶ τῶν χαλεπωτάτων, 417 a 24, 4228. 6. Soalso with γίγνεσθαι, 
Pod. 1304 a τό γενόμενος τῶν ἀρχόντων, as in other writers ; with ποιεῖν, Rez, 11. 
23 ὃ ΤΊ, 1398 Ὁ 13 Λακεδαιμόνιοι Χίλωνα τῶν γερόντων ἐποίησαν ; with τιθέναι, 
τίθεσθαι, γράφειν [Kiihner-Gerth, Gr. Gr. ὃ 418, p. 375]. After ὑπολαμβάνειν 
A. omits upon occasion the infinitive [here εἶναι), thus converting the verb into 
one of incomplete predication, and assimilating its construction to that of τιθέναι 
(405 Ὁ 18, 26), τίθεσθαι (405 a 15), ποιεῖν (404 Ὁ 10, 31, 405 Ὁ 13 Sq., 19), καλεῖν 
(405 b 28 sq.) when similarly used. Thus, to confine ourselves to I., c. 2, the 
infinitive εἶναι after ὑπολαμβάνειν is found 403 Ὁ 31, 404 a 8, 22 sq. and omitted 
404 Ὁ 8, 405 a5, 20, 7. The same freedom of construction is permitted with 
λέγειν, See 404 a 5, 21 compared with 26. For τιμίων cf. 430 a 18 sq., De Part. 
Av. 1. 5, 644 Ὁ 22-645 al, Metaph. 1074 Ὁ 21 (where it is an attribute of vows), 
26, 30 (where it is applied to the object of thought). 

The rare word εἴδησις 15 apparently used by A. here only. It may be his 
own coinage, for, though occurring in Theophrastus (e.g. /rag. LXXXIX. § 4), in 
scholiasts on Homer and Sophocles, and, as might be expected, in commentators 
like Philop., it seems to have found little favour. Later it was affected by 
Clement of Alexandria and Sextus Empiricus. Hesychius explains it by γνῶσις, 
and like γνῶσις, 402 a 5, it is a comprehensive, general term for knowledge of 

174 NOTES I. I 

any and every kind. Cf. Jud. dr. 158 Ὁ 42 pro synonymis vel in eodem 
sententiae contextu vel in iisdem formulis γνωρίζειν, γιγνώσκειν, γνῶσιν hapBa- 
νειν, μανθάνειν, εἰδέναι, ἐπτίστασθαι leguntur. In 402 Ὁ 16 sqq. γνῶναι, θεωρῆσαι, 
κατιδεῖν, εἰδέναι, γνωρίζειν are used in succession. Like other verbal nouns in -ἰς 
εἴδησις is strictly the act or process of knowing, as νόησις is thinking, ποίησις 
producing, ἄκουσις hearing, ὄρεξις longing, αὔξησις growing, σύνθεσις combining, 
though sometimes the strict sense is not maintained, ὄψις and αἴσθησις being 
notoriously ambiguous. 

84 1, 2. μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἑτέραν ἑτέρας. Supply τῶν καλῶν καὶ τιμίων. Cf. Mefaph. 
996 b 16 αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον [int. εἰδέναι φαμέν]. A. is fond of 
arranging kinds of knowledge in a scale of increasing dignity or intrinsic worth. 
Thus in Metaph. 980a 27—981a12 and dxal. Post. Il. 19, 99b 34—100a 9 
we have such a scale of knowledge rising from sense-perception through 
memory and experience to art, and finally to science (ἐπιστήμη). The sciences 
themselves are variously classified. See Axal. Post. 1. 13, 78 Ὁ 34—~79 a 6. 
In Metaph. 1026 a 18—23 a scheme of three theoretical sciences is projected in 
outline,—First Philosophy (called θεολογική) 15 the highest, next comes Mathe- 
matics, next Physics, 1064 Ὁ 1—6. Cf. Zog. VIII. 1, 157 a ὃ τὸ δὲ διαιρεῖσθαι 
τοιοῦτον οἷον ὅτι ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης βελτίων ἢ τῷ ἀκριβεστέρα εἶναι ἢ τῷ 

a2 κατ᾽ ἀκρίβειαν. The meaning of the term varies according as it is 
applied to ἀπόδειξις or ἐπιστήμη. (1) Therigorous accuracy of a demonstration 
depends upon the correctness of the reasoning and the truth of the premisses, 
In sciences which deal with the contingent it often happens that premisses and 
therefore conclusions are only general, not universal, truths. The rigorous 
accuracy of mathematical proof is not to be looked for in ethics (27%. NVZc. 
1094 Ὁ 11—27) because the premisses are contingent, Cf. 1104 a 1—6. In this 
sense all scientific reasoning and all theoretical science is exact, and to ἀκρι- 
βέστερον δεικνύναι, Metaph. 1064 a 6 54., is opposed μαλακώτερον δεικνύναι, to 
reason loosely or inconclusively. But (2) in another sense ἀκριβῆς is applied 
to a science or knowledge in respect not of the proof but of the method 
of treatment employed. It then means “abstract,” like ἁπλοῦς, and it is 
implied that the objects with which such a science deals are themselves 
by comparison more abstract, more simple and logically prior; for ἀκρίβεια 
is a relative term. Thus of First Philosophy, the highest of the sciences, 
and also the most abstract, A. says (Wefaph. 982 a 25): ‘Those amongst 
the sciences are most exact which have especially to do with the first 
causes, for the sciences which start from fewer premisses are more exact 
than those which are complicated with additional determinations: Arith- 
metic, for example, is more exact than Geometry.” On this Bonitz ad loc., 
“ἀκρίβειαν sive exactam et omnibus numeris perfectam cognitionem tum maxime 
possumus Consequi, cum in simplicissimis versamur notionibus. Simplicissimae 
autem notiones eaedem maxime sunt universales et summae et sua natura 
primae...Itaque ἀκρίβειαν praecipuam qui tribuunt sapientiae [i.e. First Philo- 
sophy], eam referre debent ad prima et simplicissima rerum genera.” Jb. 1078a9 
καὶ ὅσῳ δὴ ἂν περὶ προτέρων τῷ λόγῳ καὶ drAoverépar [Sc. ἐπιστήμη ἐστί], τοσούτῳ 
μᾶλλον ἔχει τἀκριβές" τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἐστίν. ὥστε ἄνευ τε μεγέθους μᾶλλον ἢ 
μετὰ μεγέθους, καὶ μάλιστα ἄνευ κινήσεως. ἐὰν δὲ κίνησιν, μάλιστα τὴν πρώτην" 
ἁπλουστάτη γάρ, καὶ ταύτης ἡ ὁμαλή. ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ ἁρμονικῆς καὶ 
ὀπτικῆς- οὐδετέρα yap 7 ὄψις ἢ Govt θεωρεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἣ γραμμαὶ καὶ ἀριθμοί: οἱκεῖα 
μέντοι ταῦτα πάθη ἐκείνων. καὶ ἡ μηχανικὴ δὲ ὡσαύτως. First Philosophy con- 
siders its objects, gvé existent, as possessing but one attribute, that which is 

1.01 402 a 1---402 8 4 175 

postulated in all the rest; Arithmetic regards its objects as numerable, but 
takes no account of extension; Geometry complicates its investigations by 
regarding its objects, ἐκ προσθέσεως, not only as numerable, but also as ex- 
tended. All mathematical sciences are more abstract than the physical sciences, 
for the former treat their objects as unmoved, while physics takes account 
of motion. Optics does not deal with the physiological properties of vision, 
nor harmonics with those of voice: the former treats the ray of light as a line, 
the latter a chord as the ratio of two numbers: and so on. It often happens 
that the more abstract science discovers the cause which is necessary to explain 
the facts investigated by a more concrete science. Amal. Post. τ. 27, 87 a 31 
᾿Ακριβεστέρα δ᾽ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης καὶ mporépa (1) ἣ re τοῦ ὅτι καὶ διότι ἡ αὐτή, ἀλλὰ 
μὴ χωρὶς τοῦ ὅτι τῆς τοῦ διότι, καὶ (2) ἡ μὴ καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τῆς καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου, οἷον 
ἀριθμητικὴ ἁρμονικῆς, καὶ (3) ἡ ἐξ ἔλαττόνων τῆς ἐκ προσθέσεως, οἷον γεομετρίας 
ἀριθμητική. λέγω δ᾽ ἐκ προσθέσεως, οἷον μονὰς οὐσία ἄθετος, στιγμὴ δὲ οὐσία θετός" 
ταύτην ἐκ προσθέσεως. Of these three conditions it is easy to see that the 
last 1s the most fundamental and that the others rest upon it. Trendelenburg’s 
translation “quod vel acrius ingenii acumen requirit” has no sort of justifi- 
cation, and the discrepancy which he discovers between these words and 
aro is imaginary. First philosophy is at once the most abstract and the 
most difficult of the sciences (AWefapA. 982 a 24 Sq.), and psychology presents 
more difficulties than the other biological sciences precisely because it is 
more abstract than the rest. Its ἀκρίβεια is relative. In Anal. Post. τι. 19, 
99 Ὁ 33 A. speaks hypothetically of a (δύναμις) τούτων τιμιωτέρα κατ᾽ ἀκρίβειαν, 
and 7.99 Ὁ 27 of ἀκριβεστέρας γνώσεις ἀποδείξεως. Of course as a matter of 
fact (100 Ὁ 8) οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον. Plato, Pkzlebus 59D, uses of νοῦς 
and φρόνησις the words d γ᾽ ἄν τις τιμήσειε μάλιστ᾽ ὀνόματα and ἀπηκριβωμένα. 

δι. 2 ἢ τῷ...3 εἶναι. The subject-matter (τὸ ἐπιστητόν, the province or γένος 
with which the science deals) also helps to determine the place of a science in 
the scale, quite independently of the question whether the treatment is abstract 
or concrete. For this reason in the realm of Nature the sciences which deal 
with the πρῶτον στοιχεῖον, ἄφθαρτον, ἀγένητον, κύκλῳ φορητόν, rank higher than 
the rest: De Cael. 111. τ, 298 b6sqq. Cf. Mefaph. 1026 ἃ 21 καὶ τὴν τιμιωτάτην 
(sc. ἐπιστήμην) δεῖ περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον γένος εἶναι. Jb. 1064b5 βελτίων δὲ καὶ 
χείρω» ἑκάστη λέγεται κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐπιστητόν. The genitive of relation ex- 
pressing the object of a cognition, as of any other mental act, may be freely 
illustrated from the terminology of this treatise in reference to sensation and 
the sensible object. Cf, eg., 418 a 13, 26, 421 Ὁ 4—6, 422 a 20—29, 422 Ὁ 23— 
25, 424 a 1ὸ---12, 426 Ὁ 8, 434 Ὁ 18. 

8.3. 8 ἀμφότερα ταῦτα, “for both these reasons,” i.e. for its exactitude 
(ἀκρίβεια) and for the importance of its subject-matter. In this treatise our 
subject is τὸ ἔμψυχον ζῷον 7 ἔμψυχον, and we deal preeminently with the form 
(which is ἀκίνητον) not with the matter; and in proportion as we do this 
we regard the ἔμψυχον (Gov not concretely as made up of σάρξ, ὀστοῦν, νεῦρον, 
and the like, but abstractly as living, moving, perceiving, thinking, these 
attributes being due to soul as cause. Cf. motes zmf. on a 9. 

a4. ἱστορίαν loco nostro non esse eandem ac τὴν εἴδησιν, sed significare 
indagationem et investigationem, ex universi prologi ratione intelligitur : omnia 
enim spectant ad viam ac rationem qua ad animae cognitionem perveniatur 
(Torst.). A. modestly styles the science which he is inaugurating a study: an 
enquiry concerning soul. As applied to his Natural History, ἱστορίαι περὶ 
(dev, the term denotes researches undertaken and materials collected to serve 
as the basis of a future science. 


a4. ἐν πρώτοις, relatively to other natural sciences. Cf. De Cael. Ill. 7, 
306 a 27 sq., where mathematics are styled ai ἀκριβέσταται ἐπιστῆμαι. The only 
conceivable ground on which absolutely first rank can be claimed for psychology 
is the doctrine of νοῦς χωριστός 430a 17, but I cannot see that A. makes the 

a5. πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἅπασαν. How necessary it is for practical philosophy 
can be seen from £74. ic. 1.13. (Cf. Them. 1, 20—2, 6 H., 2, 18—28 Sp.) 

a 6. πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, to the study of nature, of which biology was and isa 
main department. The importance of soul as πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ πάσης κινήσεως, 
ἴσως μὲν καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς σώμασι, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν φυτῶν (Them. l.c.), 
will be greatest to the science, viz. φυσική, which treats its subject-matter so 
far as it is capable of motion [AZezap~h. 1026a 12]. ἔστι γὰρ, sc. ἡ ψυχή. οἷον 
ἀρχή. More explicitly 413b 11 ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων ἀρχὴ καὶ 
τούτοις ὥρισται, θρεπτικῷ, αἰσθητικῷ, διανοητικῷ, κινήσει. For the proof see 
415 Ὁ 8—416a 18, where the various senses in which soul is τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος 
αἰτία καὶ ἀρχή are discriminated and we are plainly told that the bodies of 
animals and plants are instruments of the soul (415 b 18 sq.). Why οἷον ἢ 
Confuse legentis (Zabarella): cf. 414a 9 οἷον ἐνέργεια. The mode of expression 
should mislead no one: A. firmly holds that soul is ἀρχή; as that health Lc. is 
ἐνέργεια. It remains to be seen in what precise sense soul is ἀρχή. If we 
compare the expression ras ἐν ὕλης εἴδει αἰτίας applied to the ἀρχαί of the Ionian 
philosophers (AZetph. 984 a 17), we may perhaps see a characteristic reserva- 
tion for which the vagueness of the prevailing views (cf. I., c. 2) 1s responsible. 

a 7 ér{yrotpev...10 ὑπάρχειν. In this section A. maps out his enquiry. 
If there is a science of soul it must conform to the conditions laid down in 
Anal. Post. for all sciences and particularly for all physical sciences, as it is 
plainly a branch of physics. On the formal side the main work of the enquirer 
will be to delimit his province, to define it and to deduce the essential properties: 
Anal. Post. 1. 7. 75 Ὁ 7sq., Metaph. 1004b 7 ἐκείνης τῆς ἐπιστήμης (ἐστὶ) καὶ ri 
ἐστι γνωρίσαι καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα αὐτοῖς. 

a7. θεωρῆσαι καὶ γνώναι. Καὶ explicative=“that is,” γνῶναι being the 
more general term. As to θεωρεῖν see Imad. Ar. 328a 40 apud animum con- 
templari. The precise and specialised meaning can be best gathered from 
De A. itself, esp. 417 a 21--- 26 and 432a 8sq.: in particular, to apply know- 
ledge already acquired, ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην 412 ἃ 9—II1, 25 sq., 417 a 
28 sq.,b5sq. Here, however, the verb is used more generally without any such 
implication, the two terms @. and y. being as nearly synonymous as in 402 Ὁ 17 
except that even in this unrestricted sense θεωρεῖν is always an active operation, 
not a latent capacity. It is the act of apprehending by mental vision (and so 
σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐπισκοπεῖν are synonyms): eg. PAys. 111. 5, 204 Ὁ 4, 10 λογικῶς 
μὲν oxomoupévos...puotkas δὲ Gewpoiow..., Melaph. 1003 a 21, 23, 1004 b 1 sq. 
Cf. Anal. Post. τ. 18, 81b 2 ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι μὴ δι᾽ ἐπαγωγῆς, ἐπεὶ 
καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόμενα ἔσται δι’ ἐπαγωγῆς γνώριμα ποιεῖν. 

a 8. καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, “that is to say, its essence”: καὶ again explicative. 
Ind. Ar. 545b 23 pariter atque εἶδος vel λόγος cum οὐσία syn conjungitur φύσις, 
Metaph. 1014b 36, 1070a 9, 12, Io31a 30, bi, De Part. An. il. 1, 6468 25 sq. 
De Cael. 11. 4, 286b τὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ τῇ φύσει, Phys. 11. τ, 1938. 9 ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ 
οὐσία, Metaph. 1053b 9 κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν, 26. l019a 2 κατὰ φύσιν 
καὶ οὐσίαν, 1064b 11. Our first task is to discover τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή. We 
must obtain a definition which will express its “essential nature.” This last 
expression, retained in modern writings, attests how completely φύσις and οὐσία 
in the sense here intended are synonymous. 

1.1 402 a 4—a 8 177 

a8. @0’=next in order. Z. contrasting 415 a 14—16 remarks: hic loquitur 
de ordine doctrinae, ibi de-via, non de ordine. Z. further maintains that this 
programme is so far carried out that the whole of De A. treats properly of the 
τί ἐστι, the nature of soul, its συμβεβηκότα or accidents being reserved for the 
Parva Naturalza, appealing to De Sensu 436a1—5. But Z. is obliged to admit 
that in 111. cc. 4—8 the treatment of intellect is exhaustive, including properties 
as well as essential nature. There is no need to lay such stress on this formal 
division of the task before us. Every science must delimit its yévos, and define 
its subject, before it can proceed to deduce the essential properties: Metaph. 
1003 a 2I—26, b 19-22, 1004 Ὁ 5-8, lo—17, 1025 Ὁ 3 sqq., esp. Ὁ 5—13 and 
1063 Ὁ 36—1064 a 7, which is a convenient summary of Mezaph/. E. τ. 

a8. ὅσα συμβέβηκε, 1.6. all essential attributes, often styled ra καθ᾽ αὑτὰ συμβε- 
βηκότα and (Anal. Post. and Metaph.) τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχοντα, also (402 a 15) τὰ 
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἴδια (=properties). The usual example is the property of a 
triangle that its angles are equal to two right angles (402 b 20). This forms no 
part of the definition, but can be deduced from it. Jud. Ar. 713 Ὁ 43 inde 
συμβαίνειν, συμβεβηκέναι, συμβεβηκός id dicitur, quod cum non insit 1051 alicuius 
rel notioni, tamen concludendo ex ea necessario colligitur. It is not enough 
that a science should delimit its province and obtain a definition. From this 
definition it must deduce all the essential properties of the subject under investi- 
gation. We shall presently see (402 b 16—403 a 2) that essence and properties 
are mutually implicated, and that in some cases the study of the property is the 
best road to the determination of the essence. In this treatise there are various 
designations and enumerations of the attributes of soul (or, more correctly, 
of the animate being which possesses the soul gzdé animate), e.g. ἔργα καὶ πάθη 
(409 Ὁ 15, cf. 407 b 18), ἐνέργειαι καὶ πράξεις (415 ἃ 19), παθήματα (403 a τ; cf. 
403 a5—7, 16—18, 4114 26--Ὁ 5. Cf. De Sensu 1, 436a1—18. They are 
seldom styled συμβεβηκότα. See, however, 409 b 14. In general terms, what- 
ever the possessor of soul does or suffers in virtue of such possession, 411 b 2 sq. 
ποιοῦμέν τε καὶ πάσχομεν (cf. 403 a 6 Sq. πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν), A. regards as a 
“function” or operation of soul. 

In this well-established sense συμβεβηκός Ξε συμβ. καθ᾽ αὗὑτός But the term is 
ambiguous, and is more commonly used by A. to denote something quite 
different, i.e. an accident, a purely fortuitous attribute, white and musical in 
man being the stock instances (Jmd. Ar. 714420). AS συμβεβηκότα in this 
latter sense are never necessary, are neither universal nor even general attri- 
butes, they do not fall under demonstrative science. Jfefaph, 1025 al4 συμβεβηκὸς 
λέγεται ὃ ὑπάρχει μέν τινι καὶ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, οὐ μέντοι οὔτ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ 
πολύ, οἷον εἴ τις ὀρύττων φντῷ βόθρον εὗρε θησαυρόν : 1026 Ὁ 27---37. Compare 
for the two meanings PAys. 1. 3, 186 Ὁ 17 εἰ γὰρ μὴ ὅπερ ὅν τι, συμβεβηκότα 
ἔσται. ἢ οὖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἣ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὑποκειμένῳ..-.συμβεβηκός Te γὰρ λέγεται 
τοῦτο, ἢ ὃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν [accident proper, non-essential 
attribute], ἢ οὗ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐνυπάρχει τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ 6 λόγος ὑπάρχει 
ᾧ συμβέβηκεν, οἷον τὸ μὲν καθῆσθαι ὡς χωριζόμενον, ἐν δὲ τῷ σιμῷ ὑπάρχει ὃ λόγος 
ὁ τῆς ῥινὸς 7 φαμὲν συμβεβηκέναι τὸ σιμόν. Anal. Post. 1. 22, 83 Ὁ 17—-24 
ὑπόκειται δὲ ἕν καθ᾽ ἑνὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι, αὐτὰ δὲ αὑτῶν, ὅσα μὴ τί ἐστι, μὴ κατη- 
γορεῖσθαι. συμβεβηκότα γάρ ἐστι πάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν καθ᾽ αὗτά, τὰ δὲ καθ᾽ ἕτερον 
τρόπον" ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς κατηγορεῖσθαί φαμεν, τὸ δὲ συμβε- 
βηκὸς οὖκ εἶναι ὑποκείμενόν rt. οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων τίθεμεν εἶναι, ὃ οὐχ ἕτερόν 
τε ὃν λέγεται ὃ λέγεται, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ ἄλλοις, καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα καθ᾽ ἑτέρου [1.6. ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ 
sc. τὸ συμβεβηκός, ἄλλοις SC. συμβεβηκέναι φαμὲν καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα καθ᾽ ἑτέρου 
sc. κατηγορεῖσθαι]. Cf Phys. VII. 5, 256 Ὁ 9 sq. οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ συμβεβηκός, 

Ἡ. 12 

178 NOTES I. I 

ἀλλ᾽ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι. ἐὰν οὖν θῶμεν τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον συμβήσε- 
ται, Ψεῦδος δ᾽ ἴσως. περὶ αὐτήν, ig. τὴν ψυχήν. The usual construction with 
συμβαίνειν as with ὑπάρχειν is the dative, 402 Ὁ 18 ταῖς οὐσίαις. Properties 
belong to or go with the things of which they are predicated. For the variant 
with περὶ c. acc. cf. Mefaph. 997 a 29 περὶ ἕκαστον γένος, 33 περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, 
De Part. An. 1. 5,645 Ὁ τ τὰ συμβεβηκότα περὶ ἕκαστον γένος, ὅσα καθ᾽ αὑτὰ... 
ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις. . ἝΝ 

ag. ὧν τὰ pev...d0xet. As ἃ logical term πάθος, like συμβεβηκὸς and ὑπάρχον, 
denotes an attribute: J/e¢afh. 1037 Ὁ 16 ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ [sc. θατέρῳ θάτερον] καὶ 
πάθῃ τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον : Cf. 403217, 25, 403 Ὁ 17 and notes. Regarded as 
attributes of a subject, ὑποκείμενον, the active operations, no less than the 
passive affections, of soul are ἴδια πάθη, as they are συμβεβηκότα καθ᾽ αὑτά : and 
this applies to all the acts or operations enumerated 411 a 26 56. See also 
417 4 14 544ᾳ. Ὁ 12 sqq., 431 a6sq. On the surface the words before us imply 
that there are thought (δοκεῖ to be properties of soul which are not properties 
of the animal to whom the soul belongs. Whatare they? ζῷον ΞΞἔμψυχον σῶμα; 
and when the question arises below (403 a 310) A. inclines to the view that 
there are none such. 

ag. τὰ δὲ δι᾽ ἐκείνην καὶ Tots ζῴοις ὑπάρχειν. This is the normal type of attri- 
butes of soul, whether active operations or passive states. As expressed below, 
403 a 3—10, the body as well as the soul shares in them, and therefore their 
definition ought to take account of the body (403a 16—27), and psychology 
becomes a branch of physics (403 a 27—b 7); in other words this second class 
of attributes or “states” of soul are ἀχώριστα τῆς φυσικῆς ὕλης τῶν ζῴων 
(403 b 17). If so, the subject, ὑποκείμενον, to which they belong is properly 
the animal (ζῷον ἔμψυχον), and we are often reminded that such is really the 
fact, e.g. 408 Ὁ 13—15, 411 b 2 ποιοῦμεν ἢ πάσχομεν, 415 Ὁ 8, 11, 416 b 22, 
434 Ὁ 12; cf. Metaph. 1038 Ὁ 5 διχῶς ὑπόκειται, ἢ τόδε τε ὃν ὥσπερ τὸ ζῷον τοῖς 
πάθεσιν, ἢ κτέ. 

alo. ἐστὶ τῶν χαλεπωτάτων, i.g. ἐστὶ χαλεπώτατον. This predicative use 
of the partitive gen. has become a mere trick of style, e.g. Pol. 1339 ἃ 17 ταῦτα 
γὰρ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ μὲν οὔτε τῶν σπουδαίων ἀλλ᾽ ἡδέα. Cf. τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν, Pol. 
1287 Ὁ 22, 1204 a I, 1329293 ἐστὶ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων, 20. 1273 ἃ 32. Occasion- 
ally the fuller form is retained as below, 406 ἃ 2 ἕν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων. Cf. Pol. 
1291 a 8, 1332 Ὁ 32, 1340 Ὁ 23 sq.; Jud. Ar. 149 Ὁ 2; Waitz ad Zop. Iv. 2, 
121 b 36. 

all. λαβεῖν τινὰ πίστιν. As generally, λαβεῖν means to “get,” “ascertain” or 
“find out,” just as ἔχειν ξεῖο have as a result of enquiry (cognovisse). πίστις, 
like Latin fides, is trustworthy information, or “ ground of belief.” 

all καὶ ydp...12 ἑτέροις. Why the enquiry is so difficult is now explained ; 
yap introduces the reason, which, stated in the briefest terms, is the absence of 
any uniform logical method of obtaining a real definition. The complaint is 
familiar to the readers of AmaZ. Post., much of Bk 11. of that work being devoted 
to pointing out the defect and proposing various ways of remedying it. πολλοῖς 
ἑτέροις, masculine, other enquirers, distinct from ὁ περὶ ψυχῆς ἐπισκοπῶν. 

8. 12. τοῦ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι, 55. ζητήματος, λέγω having no effect 
upon the construction. καὶ is again explicative, οὐσία is now glossed by τὸ τί 
ἐστι as just before (a 7) by φύσις. τί ἐστι has become a sort of indeclinable 
noun. Cf. ri ἦν εἶναι and various prepositional phrases, e.g. καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, 
καθόλου nd. Ar. 763 Ὁ 10 qui quaerit τί ἐστι is ipsam rei naturam quaerit, 
non quaerit eius accidentia. ad eam quaestionem, qua respondetur formula τὸ 
τί ἐστι nomMiInis vim induit, cuius usus eandem habet varietatem, ac verbi εἶναι et 

I. I 402 a 8—a 15 179 

nominis οὐσία. But the answer to the question ri ἐστι is wider than a true 
definition. It might be any rough description sufficient to identify the thing in 
question provided it excluded everything merely unessential or accidental, 
leaving only what is ἀναγκαῖον. Thus the genus will answer the question τί 
ἐστι, but without the differentia would not be a complete definition. See below 
a 23, where the summa genera are meant, and 7of. 1. 5, 102a 31—35. Compare 
Lup. Vi. 5, 142 Ὁ 27 τὸ δὲ γένος βούλεται τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνειν, καὶ πρῶτον ὑποτίθεται 
τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ λεγομένων. Or again, either ὕλη or τὸ σύνολον ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους 
would answer the question τί ἐστι, but would not furnish the definition we seek. 
We arrive at the true definition when we have collected all that can be thus 
predicated of the thing ἐν τῷ ri ἐστιν, and arranged these various parts in the 
proper order. 7222. Ar. 763 Ὁ 47 si quis τὰ ἐν τῷ Ti ἐστι κατηγορούμενα et omnia 
compleverit et suo ordine posuerit, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι vel τὸν δρισμόν constituit. 
Anal. Post. 1. 22, 82 Ὁ 37 sqq., Zop. VI. 3, 153 a 15—21, Anal. Post. 11. 6,92 a7 
τὸ Ti ἦν εἶναι τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ἴδιον (Wz., ἰδίων Bk.). Cf also De A. 430 Ὁ 28. 
In the foregoing the definition of a ΖζΖ7ι᾽ is made prominent. But science has to 
investigate and define attributes and properties as wellas things. Thus we may 
enquire ri ἐστι λεῦκον; τί ἐστε τρίπηχυ; τί ἐστε κίνησις; and so through all the 
categories. Hence τὸ τί ἐστι as a noun may denote any of the categories, 
Metaph. 1030 a 18—20. It belongs ἁπλῶς to οὐσία, and in a derivative sense to 
the rest, just as εἶναι itself does: zd. a 20 ὥσπερ yap καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοίως, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν πρώτως τοῖς δ᾽ ἑπομένως, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἁπλῶς 
μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ πῶς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις. And the same applies to τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι: 26. 
1030 Ὁ 4—-7. Lastly, there is a further case, of which λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος is ἃ 
type. This, too, has its τί ἐστι and can be defined, though again in a different 
sense from either ἄνθρωπος or λευκόν: 7, 1030 Ὁ 12 56. 

a 13. μία τις εἶναι μέθοδος κατὰ πάντων. A single method, it might be 
thought, applies to all the objects which we seek to define scientifically. The 
natural expectation that there is some such universal method of finding a defi- 
nition which all the sciences may adopt proves to be without foundation (see Azad, 
Post. τι. cc. 3—7. Cf. 2b. τι. ας. 13). The ordinary procedure of the sciences as 
they existed in A.’s time was to assume the definition or to collect it by induc- 
tion on the evidence of the senses, J/efaph. 1025 Ὁ ὃ πᾶσαι αὗται [sc. ai ἐπιστῆμαι] 
περὶ ὄν τι Kal γένος τι περιγραψάμεναι περὶ τούτου πραγματεύονται;.. οὐδὲ TOU τί 
ἐστιν οὐδένα λόγον ποιοῦνται, GAN ἐκ τούτου [sc. τοῦ γένους] αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσει 
ποιήσασαι αὐτὸ δῆλον, αἱ δ᾽ ὑπόθεσιν λαβοῦσαι τὸ τί ἐστιν, οὕτω τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ 
ὑπάρχοντα τῷ γένει περὶ ὅ εἶσιν ἀποδεικνύουσιν ἢ ἀναγκαιότερον ἢ μαλακώτερον. 
διόπερ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις οὐσίας οὐδὲ τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης 
ἐπαγωγῆς, ἀλλά τις ἄλλος τρόπος τῆς δηλώσεως" ὁμοίως δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ ἔστι τὸ 
γένος περὶ ὃ πραγματεύονται οὐδὲν λέγουσι, διὰ τὸ τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι διανοίας τό τε 
τί ἐστι δῆλον ποιεῖν καὶ ei ἔστιν. In mapping out a new province of knowledge, 
and in projecting the organisation of a new department of enquiry, the defect 
here mentioned, the want of a short and easy road to definitions, would naturally 
be felt. κατὰ c. gen. is used after εἶναι and ὑπάρχειν, and even after κοινόν, in 
much the same sense as after verbs of predication, λέγεσθαι, κατηγορεῖσθαι, the 
technical expressions καθόλου and κατὰ παντὸς (Anal. Post. 1. 4, 73 a 28 sqq-) 
being evidence how wide this usageis: Eucken, Uder die Praeposttzonen, p. 40, 
observes that éwic. gen. et dat., περί c. gen. et acc. are almost equivalent. 

a Is. ὥσπερ.. ἀπόδειξι. The nature and functions of demonstration or 
demonstrative proof are the subject of Avzaz. Post. 1., where they are fully 
treated. Very briefly, A.’s position is that, since all extension of knowledge 
depends upon previous knowledge, demonstration implies undemonstrated 


180 NOTES I. t 

premisses or principles, from which by syllogistic reasoning conclusions true 
and necessary are obtained in a particular province. Geometry is the typical 
demonstrative science, and Euclid’s elements illustrate its application to the 
extension of knowledge. Cf. Amal. Post. τ. 7, 75 a 39 τρία γάρ ἐστι τὰ ἐν ταῖς 
ἀποδείξεσιν, ἕν μὲν τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον τὸ συμπέρασμα: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον 
γένει τινὶ καθ᾽ αὑτό [the κατὰ συμβ. ἴδιον of our present lemma. Cf. Them. 
5, 14 sq. H., 3, 11 Sp., Philop. 31, 22 sq., Simpl. 9, 33 sq.], ἐν δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα" 
ἀξιώματα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν. τρίτον τὸ γένος τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὗ τὰ πάθη Kai τὰ καθ᾽ 
αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα δηλοῖ ἡ ἀπόδειξις. Occasionally A. twits those whom he is 
criticising with ἀπαιδευσία on the ground that they have not mastered the true 
nature of demonstration with its three indispensable elements, the yévos or 
περὶ 6, the premisses ἐξ ὧν and the conclusion, so that they irrationally demand 
a proof of everything, e.g. AZetaph. 1006 a 5—-11, 1005 Ὁ 2—4. As to the con- 
junction of ἴδια and κατὰ συμβεβηκός, the latter must be taken in the sense 
explained above (on a 8) ὅσα συμβέβηκε ; otherwise they could not be demon- 
strated: Azal. Post. τ. 6, 75a 18 τῶν συμβεβηκότων μὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ.. οὐκ ἔστιν 
ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική, 20. 1. 30, 87b19sqq. The passage in 702. V. 1, 128b 16 566. 
(cf. 2. 3, 131 a 27, Ὁ 1—6), where ἴδιον is divided into (1) καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ dei, and 
(2) πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ ποτέ, belongs to dialectic not science, and the examples given 
of (2) lie outside theoretical science in which all the attributes demonstrated 
must be ἀΐδια καὶ ἀναγκαῖα. Cf. Mefaph. 1025 a 30 λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλως συμβε- 
βηκός, οἷον ὅσα ὑπάρχει ἑκάστῳ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὴ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὄντα... καὶ ταῦτα μὲν 
ἐνδέχεται ἀίδια εἶναι, ἐκείνων δ᾽ [accidents proper, τῶν μὴ καθ᾽ αὑτά] οὐδέν. Asa 
technical term of logic ἴδιον is defined, Zo. I. 5. 102 ἃ 18 ὃ μὴ δηλοῖ μὲν τὸ τί 
fv εἶναι, μόνῳ δ᾽ ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος (1.6. eius notionis, 
cui tamquam ἴδεον tribuitur; /zd. Ar. 330 Ὁ 18). Contrast Zog. 1. 5, 102 Ὁ 4—26. 
Cf. Mfetaph. 1025b 7—13: each separate science having marked off its province, 
γένος, and somehow empirically obtained or provisionally assumed a definition 
of it, proceeds to deduce the essential attributes of that γένος, τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ 
ὑπάρχοντα τῷ γένει, here called ἴδια. 

a 18 δεήσει ydp...19 τίς ὁ τρόποςς If we assume that there are various 
methods of arriving at a definition, the difficulty is increased, because in investi- 
gating any single department (περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων) we must first ascertain 
which of these various methods is appropriate to that department (ris τρόπος 
οἰκεῖος: Them. 2, 18 H., 3, 16 Sp.): cf. Philop. 32, 2 ποίᾳ μεθόδῳ eri ποίων 
πραγμάτων χρηστέον. 

arg. ἐὰν δὲ φανερὸν ἢ. Philop. 32, 5 τοῦτο ὡς ἐν ὑποθέσει λέγει. This 
suggestion seems reasonable. A. himself would not seriously identify the 
method of obtaining definitions with ἀπόδειξίς τὶς or διαίρεσις. See next notes. 
What he now urges is that the application as well as the choice of the method 
is attended with difficulty. Simpl. 10, 4 sqq. thinks the whole sentence an expla- 
nation (ἐξήγησις) of the words (a 18 sq.) δεήσει yap λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τίς 6 τρόπος. 
The problem of determining which method is applicable to a special case is the 
problem of discovering from what principles we must start in framing the 
appropriate definition. Simpl. 10, 7 émerae yap καὶ τούτοις ζητεῖν, ἐκ τίνων 
ἀρχῶν ὁ ἴδιος ἑκάστου ἀποδοθήσεται ὁρισμός. 

8 19. πότερον ἀπόδειξίς τίς ἐστιν. Tis quod in quibusdam libris omittitur, id 
casu factum est. Nam quoniam (8 15) posuimus demonstrationem esse τῶν κατὰ 
cupBeBnxds ἰδίων, si demonstratio etiam est τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ τί ἐστιν, erit sane 
alia species demonstrationis, ἀπόδειξίς ris. Metaph. 1059 a 30 εἶ yap περί ye τὰ 
συμβεβηκότα ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν, περὶ τὰς οὐσίας οὐκ ἔστιν. 997 a2 Sqq. e quibus. 
haec opponimus, (a 25) ἔτι δὲ πότερον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία μόνον ἐστὶν ἢ καὶ 

1.1 402 a 15--τ- 21 ISI 

περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα ταύταις...εἰ μὲν yap τῆς αὐτῆς, ἀποδεικτική τις ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ τῆς 
οὐσίας- ov δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις εἶναι (Torst. p. 113. Cf. Wetaph. 
1025 Ὁ 14 διόπερ Φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις οὐσίας οὐδὲ τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἐκ τῆς 
τοιαύτης ἐπαγωγῆς, ἀλλά τις ἄλλος τρόπος τῆς δηλώσεως. Stapfer, Kyzt. Sind, 
Ῥ. 28, urges that the alternatives would be more sharply defined if, with E, we 
omit τις, contrasting the use of the pronoun, “richtig gesetzte tis,” 402 a 13, 20. 
But, in view of Torstrik’s citations, even the hypothetical mention of ἀπόδειξις 
in this connexion needs some qualification, and ris=“ of a sort” is half ironical, 
half apologetic. The relation of demonstration to definition is fully discussed 
in “μας. Post. 11. cc. I—11. The two processes are wholly dissimilar. It is 
impossible to demonstrate essence or to obtain a definition by demonstration 
alone. All such attempts involve a petitio principit. Ci. Anal. Post. τι. 3, 
especially 90 Ὁ 18—91 a 8, 2d. 11. 7, 92 Ὁ 35—39, ΖΦ. 11. 8, 93 bi5—20. But 
where to know what a thing really is is the same as to know why it is (Az. 
Post. 11. 2, 90 a 15, 31), and the question, “ What is the real nature of a thing?” 
can be interpreted to mean, “‘ What is the cause which makes the thing what it 
is?,” then the search for definitions becomes virtually a search for causes in 
which demonstration and the syllogism play an important part: Amal. Post. 
11. 8, 93 a I—15 (the passage ends with the words: otros μὲν οὖν ὁ τρόπος--- 
this method of defining—sr: οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀπόδειξις εἴρηται πρότερον. ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι 
λογικὸς συλλογισμὸς τοῦ τί ἐστιν), Ζ6. II. 10, 93 Ὁ 38—94 a 10. This subsidiary 
use of demonstration is illustrated 413 a 16—20. Similarly at the end of III. 3 
A. claims to have ascertained at once the essence and the cause of imagination; 
having explained the process from its causes, 428 Ὁ 10 sqq., he has been able to 
define it: 429 ἃ ὃ περὶ μὲν οὖν φαντασίας, τί ἐστι καὶ διὰ τί ἔστιν, εἰρήσθω ἐπὶ 
τοσοῦτον. No logical instrument demonstrates that a combination of certain 
elements makes up the essence to be defined, Azal. Post. 11. 5, ΟἹ Ὁ 24 sqq., 
iWetaph. 1037 Ὁ τὸ sqq.: all we show is that (ὅτι), or why (δεότι) an attribute can 
be predicated of a subject. In other words, given a knowledge of the facts 
(τὸ ὅτι) and the cause (τὸ διότι), the definition can be discovered and recognised 
as such, and the practical rules laid down employ demonstration, especially 
demonstration @ posteriore of the cause from the effect, and demonstration that 
the elements of the definition are essential attributes of the definiend. 

a 20. ἢ διαίρεσις. Analysis of a genus into its species, of these into their 
sub-species, and so on until we come to the lowest or ultimate species containing 
only individuals. This process of obtaining a definition is employed by Plato, 
e.g. in Sofhist and Poltticus. A. criticises the process (Amal. Prior. 1. 31, 
46 a 32 sq., Anal. Post. Il. 5, 91 Ὁ 14 Sqq.), pointing out that it always involves 
a petttio principiz. But in his own practical rules A. employs division as a 
subsidiary process, 2d. 11. 13, 96 b 25 566. ἢ καί τις ἄλλη μέθοδος. If these 
suppositions are not seriously meant, it is unimportant what the reference 
is. In Amal. Post. 11. 6 A. rejects the claims of hypothetical proof of definition 
and proof by definition of the opposite. When all false claims are disallowed 
we fall back presumably upon sense-perception and induction: see woze on 
a 13. A.’s own method as elaborated in Anal. Post. is designated by Them. 
(2, 20 H., 3, 19 Sp.) σύνθεσις μᾶλλον. Zabarella calls it via compositiva. 

4 2:1. πλάνας. Cf Zrth. Nic. 1094 Ὁ 15 τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην. 
A favourite Platonic term for mental perplexity and error, e.g. Rep. 444 8, 16. 
δος C, Phaedo 81 A, Parm. 135 Εὶ τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν. ἐκ τίνων Set ζητεῖν. 
The search for a definition may start from a higher genus: Philop. 32, 12 
τουτέστιν ὑπὸ ποῖον γένος ἀνάξομεν τὸ προκείμενον πρᾶγμα, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ἕν γένος 
τῶν ὄντων ἀλλὰ δέκα......22 ζητοῦμεν οὖν, φησίν, ὑπὸ ποῖον γένος ἀνάγεται τὸ 

182 NOTES 1.1 

προκείμενον (πολλῶν γὰρ τὸ γένος ἀμφισβητήσιμον), ἵνα εὑρόντες τοῦτο καὶ διε- 
λόντες εἰς τὰς οἰκείας διαφορὰς οὕτω τοὺς δρισμοὺς ἀποδῶμεν. Or, again, it may 
start from particulars and proceed by induction, though this procedure will 
require subsidiary processes ; see the rules laid down in dzal. Post. Il. 13 and 
Top. νι. 1. The procedure in De A. IL, c. 1 resembles in the main the former, 
though with peculiarities of its own. 

ἄλλαι γὰρ ἄλλων ἀρχαί. The definitions of the unit and of number as 
the sum of units (τὸ ἐκ μονάδων συγκείμενον πλῆθος) belong to discrete quantity 
(διωρισμένον ποσόν), whereas those of surface and of line belong to continuous 
quantity (τὸ συνεχές). Such definitions form the starting-points or principles 
of the respective sciences. To the conclusions of the science they are related 
as cause to effect (διὰ ri): PAys. 11. 7, τοῦ a 16—18 ἢ γὰρ eis τὸ τί ἐστιν ἀνάγεταε 
τὸ διὰ τί ἔσχατον ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις, οἷον ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν (εἰς ὁρισμὸν yap τοῦ 
εὐθέος ἢ συμμέτρου ἣ ἄλλου τινὸς ἀνάγεται ἔσχατον) ἢ εἰς τὸ κινῆσαν ττρῶτον, οἷον διὰ 
τί ἐπολέμησαν. See also 2026 on 402 b 18 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι. 

402 a 23—b 8. The problems which more particularly concern the 
definition of soul and the investigation of its essential properties are: (1) To what 
category does the soul belong? (2) Is it potentially or actually existent? [§ 3] 
(3) Is it divisible or indivisible? (4) Is it throughout homogeneous? If not, 
does the difference between soul and soul amount to a difference of genus or 
only of species? In contemporary discussion the soul of man stands for soul in 
general [§ 4]. (5) Does soul, like animal, admit of a single definition, or must 
we rest content with definitions of the several species of soul? [§ 5]. 

a23. πρῶτον δ᾽ ἴσως. If we mean to proceed with the task of defining the 
soul, there are certain problems to be solved which A. now states explicitly, 
though, contrary to his usual custom, he omits the arguments for and against, 
except in the case of the last, 403 a 3, and even then the discussion is of the 
briefest. Jud. Ar. 347 b 32 saepe ἴσως non dubitantis est, sed cum modestia 
quadam asseverantis. Cf., e.g., 405 Ὁ 31. διελεῖν, “distinguish” or rather 
“determine.” Jud. Ar. 180 a 22 ex distinguendi significatione [cf. 2. 179 Ὁ 54 
distinguere genus aliquod in species] διαιρεῖν abit in notionem disputandi, 
explorandi, explicandi. Cf. Pol. 1339 a 14 οὔτε yap τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν ῥάδιον περὶ 
αὐτῆς διελεῖν, 26. 1299 a 12, 1300 Ὁ 18, 1341 b 31. On Pol. 1321 b 4 Newman 
remarks, ‘‘ Acaipeiv seems here to be used in the sense of διορίζειν, as in 1289 Ὁ 12 
and elsewhere.” τῶν yevov=(a 25 and 410 a 15) τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν κατηγοριῶν, 
the table of the ten categories being at once a classification of predications or 
attributes predicated of a subject and the swzzu2a genera of all that exists (γένη 
τοῦ ὄντος). Ultimately these ten δε) genera may be reduced to two, viz. 
substance on the one hand, and its appendages quality, quantity, relation, etc. 
on the other. See A@efaph. 1028 a lo—b 7, 1045 b 27-—32, 1069 a 18—~24. 
καὶ τί ἐστι. καὶ explicative, as also in the following line τόδε re καὶ οὐσία : Simpl. 
10, 27 προστέθεικε Kal τί ἐστι σαφηνίζων τί δηλοῖ τὸ ἐν γένει εἶναι, ὅτι καθ᾽ 6 τί ἐστιν 
(i.e, in what respect it is something), ὥσπερ ἐν διαφοραῖς καθ᾽ ὃ τοιόνδε: Philop. 
33, 16 ἐκ διαιρέσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν αὐτῆς τὸ γένος, ὅπερ γένος ἐν τῷ ri ἐστι κατηγορεῖται. 
Philoponus, anticipating 11.) c. 1, means that soul will ultimately be found under 
the category of substance, τὸ ri ἐστιτετόδε τι καὶ οὐσία. 

8. 24 λέγω δὲ...25 κατηγοριῶν. Simpl. 10, 28 ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς, 
εἰ τὸ γένος αὐτῆς οὐσία ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν. Simplicius thinks that su